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Abstract

I construct Thomas Carlyle’s political philosophy in the contexts of twentieth-century and
contemporary political philosophy by dialoging and contrasting Carlyle with the work of John
Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, Jacques Ellul, and Sayyid Qutb, among others. I also focus my
attention on Carlyle as a philosopher who is an intermediary between ancient Platonism and
nineteenth-century American Transcendentalism. Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus is a Platonic text
that provided a foundational inspiration for Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and
American Transcendentalism writ-large. Despite Carlyle being a chief source of inspiration for
American Transcendentalism, his political theory did not inspire the development of a widely
adopted political ideology to compete alongside other prominent twentieth-century ideologies
such as liberalism, Marxism, fascism, and Islamism. It is in this context that Carlyle is also
relevant in the philosophical inquiry of the “end of history,” or the ascertaining of the last stage
of human political development. I argue that this is because Carlyle’s philosophical account of
transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus can be constructed as “post-liberalism,” an ideology that
reforms liberalism by seeking to stem its facilitation of increasing levels of economic inequality
and increasing levels of political conflict on the bases of race, class, religion, etc. I apply Carlyle’s
philosophy to build on literature that theorizes about post-liberalism by authors such as Patrick
Deneen, John Milbank, and Adrian Pabst, who argue that liberalism is on a hazardous trajectory
and there is a need to conceive of post-liberalism as an alternative to the trend of increasing
authoritarianism.
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Preface
Thomas Carlyle provided a revolutionary critique of liberal democracy and capitalism in
the context of their modern emergence and ascendancy in nineteenth-century Victorian
England. Rather than being rooted in materialism, as Karl Marx’s critique was, Carlyle’s critique
largely embodied Romanticism, a European tradition that refuted Enlightenment rationalism
and industrialization by elevating nature, spirituality, and aesthetics.1 Carlyle’s political
philosophy is cryptic and grounded in a philosophy of negation, so much so that his political
philosophy must be constructed and pieced together using analysis and synthesis. A critical
examination of Carlyle’s multiple books and articles yields the conclusion that his overarching
assessment of politics and political economy is that dogma and materialism eventually yield
diminishing returns.
Carlyle indicts dogma through the voice of the protagonist, Professor Diogenes
Teufelsdröckh, in Sartor Resartus:
Which of your Philosophical Systems is other than a dream-theorem; a net quotient,
confidently given out, where divisor and dividend are both unknown? What are all your
national Wars, with their Moscow Retreats, and sanguinary hate-filled Revolutions, but the
Somnambulism of uneasy Sleepers? This Dreaming, this Somnambulism is what we on Earth call
Life; wherein the most indeed undoubtingly wander, as if they knew right hand from left; yet
they only are wise who know that they know nothing.2
In short, dogma is a “dream-theorem” that precipitates perpetual conflict with other “dreamtheorems,” and it is only those who are wise who recognize this and eschew dogma. Carlyle
offers a pathway to end the vicious cycle of conflict, or “what we on Earth call Life.”

1

My definition of Romanticism has been informed by Lӧwy and Sayre’s treatment of Romanticism. See Michael
Lӧwy and Robert Sayre, Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).
2
Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, ed. Kerry McSweeney and Peter Sabor (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 43.
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Carlyle indicts materialism as a particular dogma that defines Enlightenment rationality
and engulfs humanity in a hegemony of anti-Platonism. Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus stands as a
counter to materialism, which can be defined as a wholly non-spiritual devotion to economic
and technological development and the pursuit of increasing levels of consumption by the
individual in the context of an economy.3 The insatiability of consumption, and by that token
also technological development, means that materialism is bound to eventually yield
diminishing returns due to the scarcity of resources. Through the voice of Teufelsdröckh, Carlyle
attempts to illustrate that every individual who subscribes entirely to materialism has no
chance of being satisfied until he or she has consumed personally the universe in its entirety.
Carlyle writes:
Will the whole Finance Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe
undertake, in joint-stock company, to make one Shoeblack HAPPY? They cannot accomplish it,
above an hour or two; for the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and
would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this
allotment, no more, and no less: God’s infinite Universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy
infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a Throat like that
Ophiuchus! Speak not of them; to the infinite Shoeblack they are as nothing. No sooner is your
ocean filled, than he grumbles that it might have been of better vintage. Try him with half of a
Universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and
declares himself the most maltreated of men. –Always there is a black spot in our sunshine: it is
even, as I said, the Shadow of Ourselves…So true is it, what I then said, that the Fraction of Life
can be increased in value not so much by increasing your Numerator, as by lessening your
Denominator. Nay, unless my Algebra deceive me, Unity itself divided by Zero will give Infinity.
Make thy claim of wages a zero, then; thou hast the world under thy feet. Well did the Wisest
of our time write: ‘It is only with Renunciation (Entsagen) that Life, properly speaking, can be
said to begin.’4

3

I construct this definition of materialism and it is inspired by Versluis’s treatment of materialism in Platonic
Mysticism. See Arthur Versluis, Platonic Mysticism: Contemplative Science, Philosophy, Literature, and Art (Albany,
NY: SUNY Press, 2017).
4
Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 144-145.
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It may be an ironic contradiction that such a call for economic renunciation, rather than
indefinite insatiable consumption, is likely to be most salient and credible in the context of a
developed economy rather than a developing economy. Nonetheless, Carlyle’s view can be
applied in the context of a developed economy to refine and moderate such an economy so
that it could be stable and sustainable rather than burnout quickly due to overconsumption,
resource depletion, and/or the onset of irregularities (such as climate change, cyberattacks,
pandemics, etc.) manifesting from technological and economic complexities that have
surpassed their optimal levels.
In the context of Carlyle’s critique of dogma and materialism, it is important to reflect
on the fact that the era Carlyle was composing his philosophy and social criticism was an era, at
a minimum more so than the early twenty-first century, defined by the hegemony of
Christianity and the advent and ascendancy of industrial capitalism in Western Europe and the
United States. In the twenty-first century, Carlyle’s philosophy can be re-assessed from a social
vantage point of a rapidly waning hegemony of Christianity, so much so that the twenty-first
century can be characterized as “post-Christian” and defined by its secularism, agnosticism, and
religious pluralism as much as it is defined by Christianity. The waning of Christianity’s
hegemony is particularly significant in the study of politics and society in that it provides a
stimulus for increasing contention on the bases of dogmatic ideology and religion. The Great
Recession and the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic have harmed the prospects
of legitimately being able to cast capitalism as perpetually ascendant and capable of yielding
increasing economic returns indefinitely. Such recessions may be indicative of the need to
sustain developed economies through the adoption of renunciation rather than a perpetual
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commitment to economic growth and consumption. It is in this unprecedented social,
economic, and political environment of the twenty-first century in which Carlyle’s political
philosophy can be re-constructed and applied as a normative tool for political inquiry.
Carlyle can also be cast as an intermediary between Platonism and American
Transcendentalism, a nineteenth-century intellectual and reform movement he inspired.
Platonism, though a very abstract term that encompasses a large tradition, can be defined as a
spiritual philosophy inaugurated by Plato that seeks to ascertain and realize archetypal
conceptions of truth, justice, and beauty by drawing on intuition derived from intellectual
discernment.5 Specifically, Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus embodies an intermediary between
Platonism and American Transcendentalism, so much so that American Transcendentalism can
be defined as a modern adaptation of Platonism partly and to a significant extent via Carlyle’s
philosophical construction of transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus.6 Although Sartor Resartus
takes the form of a satire, the format Carlyle chose to communicate about the limitations of
materialism and dogma in the context of the nineteenth century should not preclude further
construction and application of transcendentalism in the context of the twenty-first century.
Carlyle’s transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus can be defined, much as American
Transcendentalism in its totality can be, as a philosophy that espouses that the universe is
enchanted and that dogma and materialism, eventually, yield diminishing returns.7 It is in this
way that both Carlyle’s transcendentalism and American Transcendentalism are immaterialist

5

I have constructed this definition of Platonism drawing principally on Arthur Versluis’s construction of Platonism.
See Versluis, Platonic Mysticism.
6
American Transcendentalism is a highly abstract term in that it embodies an intellectual tradition influenced by
many antecedent traditions in addition to Platonism such as Hinduism and American indigenous culture, among
others.
7
I construct this definition based on my reading of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus and Versluis’s Platonic Mysticism.
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and anti-dogmatic. Additionally, each can be cast as a post-Christian final “reformation” of
Christianity and, as such, a type of dialectical synthesis of pre-Christian Platonism.8 This is why
Carlyle’s transcendentalism, and American Transcendentalism writ-large, can each be cast as a
“philosophico-religion” in that each borders between being a philosophy and a religion, thus
amounting to a type of hybrid of philosophy and religion.9 Of course, applying the term
“dialectical synthesis” is an appropriation of a Hegelian conception for the purpose of situating
both Carlyle’s transcendentalism and American Transcendentalism within the contexts of
Platonism and Christianity as philosophical and religious traditions, respectively.
Carlyle’s relevance to political science and political philosophy in the twenty-first
century is on the basis that his conception of transcendentalism has yet to be constructed and
applied in the context of politics as a type of political ideology. In Sartor Resartus, Teufelsdröckh
discovers transcendentalism as a philosophy that serves a personal and private purpose.
Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that Teufelsdröckh embraces renunciation of materialism
and embraces the pursuit of social solidarity as a consequence of first subscribing to the nondogmatic spiritual worldview that the universe is enchanted.10 In this way, I will argue that

8

Arthur Versluis defines American Transcendentalism as such by drawing on Orestes Brownson and Sydney
Ahlstrom as sources. Versluis writes: “In fact, the individualism that the Transcendentalists shared was a
development out of Protestantism—it was, as the prolix Orestes Brownson recognized, a kind of final logical result
of Protestantism. Separation from Catholicism, then dissent from the resulting organization, in a process of
sectarian division, would result, finally, in a church of one. And that, the criticism goes, is Transcendentalism.
Historian Sydney Ahlstrom describes the development of American Protestantism through Unitarianism into
Transcendentalism as An American Reformation. This American reformation, he argues, derives from two primary
sources: Hellenism (in particular, Platonism) and Scottish realism, derived from Aristotelianism. Ahlstrom locates
the tradition of Plato and Plotinus as vital for the later development not only of Unitarianism, but also of
Transcendentalism….” See Arthur Versluis, American Gurus: From American Transcendentalism to New Age
Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 18-19.
9
Versluis casts Platonism as a “philosophico-religion” and I apply this term to characterize American
Transcendentalism as a modern adaptation of Platonism. See Versluis, Platonic Mysticism, 5.
10
See chapter “The Everlasting Yea” in Carlyle, Sartor Resartus.
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transcendentalism can be cast as a non-dogmatic, non-sectarian, objective spirituality that is
instrumental in facilitating a social purpose, namely the facilitation of renunciation and social
solidarity. Since it is non-dogmatic and non-sectarian, transcendentalism can be classified as an
“objective spirituality” that is merely opposite to, but yet on the same plane as, atheism.
It is on this basis that Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism can be constructed in
the context of contemporary political philosophy and in the context of social, economic, and
political environments increasingly being defined by atomization, alienation, social
disintegration, and economic inequality. Moreover, Carlyle’s transcendentalism can be applied
to inform ideological and religious political contention. It is in this context that Carlyle can be
aptly applied to Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism, namely that liberalism manifests
interminable conflict among incommensurable political views, thus precipitating liberalism’s
vulnerability to dissolution in the long-term as a function of the disintegrating effect of conflict
on a liberal political system.11
It is in this light that it can be concluded that a liberal political system/culture defined by
the hegemony of Christianity and the ascendancy of capitalism is of a different nature entirely
from a liberal political system/culture defined by the non-existence of a spiritual hegemony and
a capitalism increasingly delivering diminishing returns rather than indefinite economic growth.
It is in this context that Carlyle’s transcendentalism can be applied to academic conceptions of
post-liberalism as a prospective model for post-liberalism. I define post-liberalism as a political
ideology that seeks to sustain liberalism’s commitments to democracy and a free-market

11

I summarize MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism that he develops in After Virtue. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
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economy by seeking to stem its facilitation of increasing levels of economic inequality and
increasing levels of political conflict on the bases of ideology, race, class, religion, etc. Postliberalism thus is an alternative to the trend of liberalism becoming increasingly eclipsed by
authoritarianism and the prospects of such an eclipse unfolding further.
In dialoging Carlyle with contemporary political philosophy, it is important to recognize
how Carlyle is intertwined with American Transcendentalism. Ralph Waldo Emerson was
integral to Carlyle in that he saw to it that Sartor Resartus was published in book form in
America, when Carlyle could not find a publisher for it in book form in England. The popular
reception of Sartor Resartus in the form of multiple reprintings within a short time of its initial
publication fueled American Transcendentalism as a movement and Sartor Resartus inspired
Henry David Thoreau personally in addition to Emerson.12 Without Emerson and Thoreau, it is
unlikely Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus would have been able to have
any place in the marketplace of ideas, much less have wide resonance in an American
intellectual and social movement. It is for these reasons that the political application of Carlyle’s
transcendentalism takes place in the context of this dissertation as a construction that
recognizes and builds on Emerson’s construction on and promotion of Carlyle during the, albeit
narrow and brief, era of American Transcendentalism. To the extent that Emerson was
influenced by Carlyle and Carlyle was promoted by Emerson, it can be said there is no Carlyle
without Emerson and no Emerson without Carlyle. At a minimum, in the absence of the other,

12

See Andrew Hook, “United States of America,” in The Carlyle Encyclopedia, ed. Mark Cumming (Cranbury, NJ:
Associated University Presses, 2004), 474; Sharon Gravett, “Ralph Waldo Emerson,” in The Carlyle Encyclopedia,
ed. Mark Cumming (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2004), 145.
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the legacies of both Carlyle and Emerson would be fundamentally different, and one could
easily say, in hindsight, much more limited.13
In Chapter 1, I situate Carlyle in the history of political thought and illustrate his unique
perspective that diverges from the political philosophies of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill,
and Karl Marx. I also contextualize Carlyle’s transcendentalism as being within the Platonic
tradition and provide an exposition of how transcendentalism can be applied within the context
of politics.
In Chapter 2, I discuss Carlyle’s reactionary turn with his publication of Latter-Day
Pamphlets, in which he criticizes democracy and the political culture of Victorian England.
Carlyle explicitly grounds his critique in Plato as an influence and his diatribes against aspects of
liberal political culture such as parliament and stump-oratory provide fodder for his
appropriation by the Nazis in the twentieth century. Carlyle is “reactionary” in the most literal
sense of the word in that he reacts to what he takes to be negative political developments
without articulating a coherent alternative platform for progress. It is crucial to acknowledge
this, since it is the determining factor that alters and ossifies Carlyle’s brand and legacy as
associated with authoritarian fascism. Carlyle’s transcendentalism is thus left in a blind spot, as
his reactionary streak essentially delegitimizes him in both the academic and popular spheres.
In Chapter 3, I discuss Carlyle in relation to Islam and Islamism. Carlyle’s deliberations
about Islam and his public lecture on Muhammad as “Hero as Prophet” is a foundation to
acknowledge the parallels between transcendentalism and Islam. It may be possible, though

13

I make these characterizations of the relationship of Carlyle and Emerson in the context of constructing Carlyle’s
transcendentalism and American Transcendentalism in the context of politics and contemporary political
philosophy.

9

not without debate and controversy, to be able to cast transcendentalism as a branch in the
Islamic tradition. Doing such allows for transcendentalism to be seen as a modern dialectical
synthesis of Platonism since transcendentalism is a post-Christian and post-Islamic philosophy
that borders on being a religion in its own right. I contrast the lack of political application of
transcendentalism with Sayyid Qutb’s political application of Islam in the twentieth century,
such that he became a preeminent Islamic political theorist. The relatively recent political
appropriation of Islam provides a basis to acknowledge that a political application of
transcendentalism is possible in the contemporary context. Although controversial, the
construction of transcendentalism in the contexts of Islam and Islamism is essential in order to
distinguish transcendentalism from Islam and Islamism so that the political application of
transcendentalism is not conflated with the political application of Islam in the form of
Islamism.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I contrast Carlyle with John Rawls, an influential liberal political
philosopher of the twentieth century. I acknowledge how the philosophical conclusions
espoused by each are incommensurable in that they arrive at different conclusions with respect
to justice by constructing different premises. In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle, as a Romantic, seeks to
discern social justice from the vantage point of alienation and non-ideal theory. In A Theory of
Justice, Rawls, as a rationalist, seeks to discern social justice from the vantage point of what he
calls a “veil of ignorance.” Moreover, I dialogue Carlyle with Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue,
which acknowledges Rawls’s limitations in that Rawls offers a philosophy that is
incommensurable with Robert Nozick’s rebuttal to Rawls. Carlyle informs such a theory of
incommensurability in pluralist political discourse and also informs MacIntyre’s view that

10

modern political philosophy comes down to a choice between Nietzsche’s nihilism and
Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Carlyle’s Platonic transcendentalism offers a third way to these polar
choices just as it offers a third way to the polar choices promoted by Rawls and Nozick.
In Chapters 6 and 7, I relate Carlyle’s sociological critiques of modernity with those
offered by Jacques Ellul in the twentieth century. Carlyle and Ellul are compatible in that they
seek to demonstrate that the expansion in size and scope of technological innovation and
industrial capitalism embodies an unsustainable pursuit in that the amassed technical
civilization becomes increasingly vulnerable to diminishing returns and eventual dissolution. In
short, the materialist and technological accumulation of an advanced technological society and
developed economy facilitates irregularities that can neither be foreseen nor prevented, due to
the inherent complexity and vastness of what Ellul terms “the technological society.” The
dissolution of such a society, which Carlyle refers to as a “phoenix,” provides a basis for the
emergence of transcendentalism as a successor to the hegemony of liberal democratic
capitalism. Carlyle and Ellul also expose what they take to be the illusory mirage that is politics,
given the momentum and weight behind such an autonomous trajectory that modernity is on. I
discuss Carlyle’s transcendentalism in light of recent literature that conceives of post-liberalism
as being a necessity to resolving the irregularities inherent within liberalism.
In Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, I grapple with the prospects of Carlyle’s
transcendentalism being applied in the context of politics as a post-liberal possibility and
alternative to not only liberalism but Islamism, fascism, and communism as well. It also has the
capacity to ameliorate the growth in ideological contention and mutually antagonistic identity
politics in the United States. In the midst of revising a final draft, the coronavirus pandemic

11

struck, a global catastrophe the likes of which has not been witnessed since World War II. I
acknowledge the pandemic’s relevance to this dissertation’s subject matter and its potential
impact and ramifications on what had been an increasingly globalized, technological, and
market-driven world order.
In summary, I seek to construct Carlyle’s cryptic political philosophy that spans multiple
books and articles into a coherent political philosophy. I also construct Carlyle’s political
philosophy by contrasting it with and integrating it with contemporary political philosophy,
principally the work of John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, Jacques Ellul, and Sayyid Qutb. By doing
such, I seek to offer Carlyle’s political philosophy as an analytical framework for the study of
politics, particularly for the study of the outsized roles played by dogma and materialism in
politics. Such a framework inherently offers a normative application of Carlyle, in which the
validity, utility, and sustainability of dogma and materialism are examined with a critical lens.

12

Introduction

When Thomas Carlyle died in 1881 he, as biographer David Alec Wilson put it,
“commanded the venerations of the civilized world [and] was esteemed and honoured
wherever the English language was spoken.”1 Wilson even went on to characterize Carlyle as
the Confucius of the English-speaking world: “I may or may not be mistaken in believing
Thomas Carlyle to be the Confucius of the English-speaking races; but it is beyond dispute that
he was one of the greatest and most interesting men in Europe in the nineteenth century.”2
Wilson continues his profile: “there are few things rarer than the apparition of a man of genius
of any kind, to say nothing of a great spirit like Carlyle. Centuries may pass before we see
another like him.”3 Carlyle was recognized as a moral force to be reckoned with in Europe and a
man of international importance in many respects:
He made it possible for Englishmen and Germans to understand each other. The Muslims
openly rejoice to this day at his vindication of Mohammed, and the Chinese and the Japanese
are loud in their appreciation. He is the greatest of our historians, and the greatest of our
peacemakers, as well as the greatest man of letters whom men now alive can boast that they
have seen.4
In 1898, Wilson wrote prophetically about the influence Carlyle’s ideas would wield in
later centuries:
Already [Carlyle’s] influence can be traced even in political history, both foreign and domestic;
and where the tendencies of the moment seem most hopelessly at variance with what he
advised, there are signs of change. For example, his contempt for parliaments as governing
bodies and for stump-orators as administrators are sentiments that do not appear so very

1

David Alec Wilson, The Truth About Carlyle: An Exposure of the Fundamental Fiction Still Current (London: Alston
Rivers, Ltd., 1913), 9.
2
Wilson, The Truth About Carlyle, 23.
3
Wilson, The Truth About Carlyle, 23.
4
Wilson, The Truth About Carlyle, 26.
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peculiar now as when first expressed. But centuries must pass before the full effects of his
teaching can be visible.5
In his biography of Carlyle, James Anthony Froude prophesied: “It may be, and I for one
think it will be, that when time has leveled accidental distinctions, when the perspective has
altered, and the foremost figures of this century are seen in their true proportions, Carlyle will
tower far above all his contemporaries, and will then be the one person of them about whom
the coming generations will care most to be informed.”6 Froude remarked further: “A hundred
years hence, the world will better appreciate Carlyle’s magnitude. The sense of his importance,
in my opinion, will increase with each generation.”7 On Carlyle’s popularity in his own time,
David Masson comments as to how Carlyle’s “name was running like wildfire through the
British Islands and through English-speaking America; there was the utmost avidity for his books
wherever they were accessible, especially among the young men; phrases from them were in
all young men’s mouths and were affecting the public speech…”.8
These biographical accounts of Thomas Carlyle demonstrate the weight of influence an
outsider, observer, and commentator can have on politics both in one’s domestic sphere and in
the international sphere. Carlyle wrote in his journal on his awkward position vis-à-vis the
political domain: “Politics confuse me—what my duties are therein? As yet I have stood apart,
and till quite new aspects of the matter turn up, shall continue to do so.”9 Carlyle
comprehended his limitations when it came to changing the minds of his readers. In a

5

David Alec Wilson, Mr. Froude and Carlyle (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1898), 347.
James Anthony Froude, Thomas Carlyle: A History of His Life in London, 1834-1881, vol. 1 (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1897), 4.
7
James Anthony Froude, My Relations with Carlyle (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 39.
8
David Masson, Carlyle Personally and in His Writings (London: Macmillan and Co, 1885), 67.
9
James Anthony Froude, Thomas Carlyle: A History of the First Forty Years of His Life, vol. 2 (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1882), 249.
6
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conversation with Froude a few days before Carlyle’s death, he remarked as to how “they call
me a great man now, but not one believes what I have told them.”10
Carlyle addressed what he takes to be the purpose of political philosophy in an August
5, 1829, journal entry:
Political philosophy? Political philosophy should be a scientific revelation of the whole secret
mechanism whereby men cohere together in society; should tell us what is meant by “country”
(patria), by what causes men are happy, moral, religious, or the contrary. Instead of all which it
tells us how “flannel jackets” are exchanged for “pork hams,” and speaks much about “the land
last taken into cultivation.” They are the hodmen of the intellectual edifice, who have got upon
the wall and will insist on building as if they were masons.11
Moreover, he remarked on political philosophy in 1837 in The French Revolution:
Theories of Government! Such have been, and will be; in ages of decadence. Acknowledge
them in their degree; as processes of Nature, who does nothing in vain; as steps in her great
process. Meanwhile, what theory is so certain as this, That all theories, were they never so
earnest, painfully elaborated, are, and, by the very conditions of them, must be incomplete,
questionable, and even false? Thou shalt know that this Universe is, what it professes to be, an
infinite one.12
Carlyle’s profile as a political philosopher is idiosyncratic in that he committed his
energies largely to the negation of the theories of other political philosophers, yet his own
constructivist political thought is cryptic and in many ways accessible only through inference.
Carlyle’s theory is in need of explication, refinement, and application, particularly in the context
of the twenty-first century, since his theory informs the critique of liberalism in political
philosophy writ large.
The contrast between Carlyle and Karl Marx and their political philosophical accounts
deserves special consideration. Carlyle and Marx can be contrasted such that, according to

10

Froude, Thomas Carlyle: A History of the First Forty Years of His Life vol. 2, 386.
Froude, Thomas Carlyle: A History of the First Forty Years of His Life vol. 2, 64.
12
Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution (Boston, MA: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1838), 52.
11
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Philip Rosenberg, Marx used the Hegelian dialectic to theorize as to how liberal political
economy would turn against itself and yield communism, while Carlyle levelled against liberal
political economy (as the status quo) only a flat repudiation.13 Carlyle offered a non-dialectical
account of how society would transition from a liberal political economy to a new and
indeterminable economic and political order. Such a non-dialectical repudiation of liberal
political economy, according to Rosenberg, left Carlyle “with no conception of how one would
get from the discredited system to a new social, economic, and moral order.”14 This dissertation
will seek to amend such an assessment by Rosenberg in part through a critical analysis of Sartor
Resartus, a text in which Carlyle embeds his own theory of communitarian living in the context
of his larger theory of transcendentalism. I will expound upon and define Carlyle’s conception
of transcendentalism after laying the foundation as to how Carlyle came to construct
transcendentalism.
In this way, Carlyle and Marx each had different “end of history” theses, a conclusion
that has gone heretofore largely unrecognized and unexplored. Carlyle’s account of the
dissolution of liberal democratic capitalism as the hegemonic political and economic order that
organically yields a new political economy (the attributes of which cannot be forecasted) stands
in contrast with Marx’s account of political revolution yielding communism once capitalism has
come to its full fruition and can no longer sustain itself.
Carlyle, though he never explicitly devoted an essay or any writing at length on Hegelian
philosophy, nonetheless made known in passing his dissatisfaction with Hegel. In Sartor
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Resartus, Carlyle writes of his fictional alter ego Professor Teufelsdrӧckh: “a man devoted to the
higher Philosophies, indeed; yet more likely, if he published at all, to publish a Refutation of
Hegel and Bardili, both of whom, strangely enough, he included under a common ban; than to
descend, as he has here done, into the angry noisy Forum, with an Argument that cannot but
exasperate and divide.”15 Carlyle further expressed his view with respect to the limitations of
Hegelian philosophy in Sartor Resartus when he quotes Teufelsdrӧckh as saying:
The man who cannot wonder, who does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he
President of innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole Mecanique Celeste and Hegel’s
Philosophy, and the epitome of all Laboratories and Observatories with their results, in his
single head,--is but a Pair of Spectacles behind which there is no Eye. Let those who have Eyes
look through him, then he may be useful.16
Emery Neff characterizes Carlyle’s political philosophy vis-à-vis Hegelian philosophy: “Carlyle’s
transcendentalism was not a Hegelian ‘bloodless ballet of categories.’ It ramified into no
elaborate system [but] was stripped for action.”17
If Carlyle had ever encountered Marx’s theory of economic determinism yielding a
proletarian revolution, he would have found it, as Lea forecasts it, to be “something devilish
beyond his worst forebodings [and] it is hard to imagine the terms he would have applied to
it.”18 Lea entertains how it is hard to imagine how Carlyle would have reacted to Marx on the
basis that Carlyle provided such a condemnation of Benthamism, which he had “considered to
have carried the spirit of materialism to its logical and ultimate end.”19 Essentially, Marxism
takes Bentham’s utilitarianism to a further end, an end that prizes materialism and therefore is
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inherently non-transcendentalist. Lea provides a pertinent comparison of Carlyle and Marx
from the vantage point of 1943, in the midst of the conflagration of World War II:
Marx and Carlyle are both, in the first place, men of religious genius. Marx may be called the
last great representative of the German Romantic revolt, which was predominantly
philosophical in expression; Carlyle of the English, which was predominantly literary….Native to
both men, furthermore, is the faith that justice will be triumphant on earth and that history is a
meaningful process: native, no doubt, but incalculably strengthened by the habit of mind
derived from the Old Testament. The same eighteenth century rationalism which leads them to
reject Christianity, however, prevents them from adopting the simple formulation of their faith
acceptable to the Hebrew prophet or the Cromwell-Puritan. They are driven to deify the
historical process itself, as they have deified nature: and the instrument by which this
deification is accomplished is in each case the Hegelian dialectic. Not that either Carlyle or Marx
simply took over the dialectic from Hegel. On the contrary, Carlyle probably never heard of it;
but the process of growth through the resolution of contradictions was, as we have seen, a fact
of experience to him, as to all the Romantics; and it had been applied to the growth of society
long before Hegel discovered it to be the universal law of becoming….That nothing which was
truly creative in the past will be lost; that the positive achievements of feudalism, therefore,
will be combined with those of capitalism in a new and higher synthesis: this is common ground
to Carlyle and Marx….20
Carlyle recognized the limitations of being able genuinely to reconstruct politics and, as
a function of that, recognized the limits of political philosophy. In The French Revolution, Carlyle
made known his view that “all things are in revolution; in change from moment to moment,
which becomes sensible from epoch to epoch: in this Time-World of ours there is properly
nothing else but revolution and mutation, and even nothing else conceivable!”21 Carlyle writes,
openly embracing the merits of change and evolution: “In Change, therefore, there is nothing
terrible, nothing supernatural: on the contrary, it lies in the very essence of our lot and life in
this world. Today is not yesterday: we ourselves change; how can our Works and Thoughts, if
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they are always to be the fittest, continue always the same?”22 Essentially, an inference can be
made that political philosophy cannot ossify an ideal political order because mutation and
evolution are higher laws that govern the world.
S. Law Wilson, writing in the late nineteenth century, characterized Carlyle this way:
Perhaps no writer was ever a cause of greater perplexity to that type of mind which will insist
on classifying than Carlyle. He does not lend himself easily to any such process. He has not
taken sides on any of the great theological issues or debates which have agitated and divided
the modern mind. He had not ranged himself under any particular flag, nor shouted any of the
usual religious shibboleths or war-cries. You can identify him with no ism or ology. He is too
universal for you to label or ticket him, or assign him a place in your cabinet of specimens. He
stubbornly refuses to fit into any of those little pigeonholes into which classifying minds find it
so exceedingly convenient to thrust all sorts of men and things. We defy you to distil his
essence and bottle it up, and put it on the shelf, duly catalogued, marked, and numbered. He is
too massive to be classed, too vast to be tabulated.23
The problem with Carlyle is his informal approach to philosophy and his devotion to
commentary rather than systematic philosophy. Like Emerson, Carlyle can be characterized as a
Platonic mystic (a term synonymous with transcendentalist), and this philosophical tradition has
gone out of vogue and largely has been displaced by analytical philosophy and materialist
dogmatism since the eighteenth century.24 Such a devotion to commentary and social criticism
cast him more as a social critic than a social theorist, and more a political commentator than a
political philosopher. Carlyle’s social theory and political philosophy have to be ascertained
through inference and application to other philosophical tracts in order to synthesize its explicit
contribution to political philosophy. Though Carlyle dealt with philosophical themes, he offered
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very little in the way of a systematic analysis of such concepts as rights or justice.25
Nevertheless, Carlyle’s political thought can be constructed in a systematic manner so that it
speaks to political and social theory, and this just has not been undertaken yet.
Carlyle was a philosopher who drew from both reactionary and progressive ideas, but
he was a loyal supporter of neither the reactionary side of the political spectrum nor the
progressive side. Carlyle has little in common with conservative ideology and extended the
meaning of his pejorative term “mechanism” to include established traditions whether they be
in the political or ecclesiastical realms.26 By doing this, Carlyle cut himself off from the
conservative fold in English politics, for such an ideology insisted on the value of
“establishments” as a resource for society to preserve and draw on.27 Reflecting on his unique
political profile and lamenting the alienation that it yielded him, Carlyle wrote to Ralph Waldo
Emerson: “I care not a doit for Radicalism, nay I feel it to be a wretched necessity, unfit for me;
Conservatism being not unfit only but false for me: yet these two are the grand Categories
under which all English spiritual activity that so much as thinks remuneration possible must
range itself.”28 Froude provides a valuable description of Carlyle’s profile: “He had offended
Tories by his Radicalism, and Radicals by his scorn of their formulas….Yet all had acknowledged
that here was a man of extraordinary intellectual gifts and of inflexible veracity.” 29 Carlyle
remarks in a letter to Emerson of his reservations about founding a new ideology as a means to
resolve the deficiencies of the conservative and progressive categories:
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Sect-founders withal are a class I do not like. No truly great man, from Jesus Christ downwards,
as I often say, ever founded a Sect,--I mean willfully intended founding one. What a view must a
man have of this Universe, who thinks “he can swallow it all,” who is not doubly and trebly
happy that he can keep it from swallowing him!30
Yet, in an 1848 journal entry Carlyle bemoans his struggle with being taken seriously:
I am wearied and near heartbroken. Nobody on the whole “believes my report.” The friendliest
reviewers, I can see, regard me as a wonderful athlete, ropedancer whose perilous somersets it
is worth sixpence (paid into the Circulating Library) to see; or at most I seem to them a
desperate half mad, if usefullish fireman, rushing along the ridge tiles in a frightful manner to
quench the burning chimney. Not one of them can or will do the least to help me.31
Carlyle was an Enlightenment thinker in his fierce criticism of past customs and what he
took to be flaws in theology, but in no way did he have faith in reason alone to liberate
humanity to a higher plane. Christopher Lasch captures Carlyle’s position that lies beyond the
scope of the conventional political spectrum, particularly that of the nineteenth century, by
recognizing that “Carlyle advocated neither a working-class revolution (though his criticism of
the ‘cash nexus’ appealed to Marx) nor a revival of custom, organic solidarity, and paternalism
(though his contrast between medieval unity and modern disorganization appealed to
paternalists like John Ruskin, George Fitzhugh, and Henry Adams).”32
Carlyle challenges us to see the multiplicity of ideologies and political parties in politics
as being individually and collectively deficient. John MacCunn suggests with respect to Carlyle’s
idiosyncrasy: “For at first sight his politics puzzle. He is not Tory, nor Whig, nor Radical (in the
ordinary sense of the word), except indeed in so far as he may be made to fill office admirably
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in all of these parties as ‘Devil’s advocate.’”33 In Carlyle’s words, “radicalism goes on as fast as
any sane man could wish it, without help of mine [and] conservatism I cannot attempt to
conserve, believing it to be a portentous embodied sham, accursed of God and doomed to
destruction, as all lies are.”34 In his dissatisfaction with the political left and right, Carlyle stood
and continues to stand as unique among political philosophers.
Another of Carlyle’s profound contributions has been the recognition of the difficulty
and near-impossibility of altering the historical trajectory that the development of modernity is
on. This is underscored when, through Teufelsdrӧckh’s voice, Carlyle asks, “‘who is there that
can clutch into the wheel-spokes of Destiny, and say to the Spirit of the Time: Turn back, I
command thee?—Wiser were it that we yielded to the Inevitable and Inexorable, and
accounted even this the best.’”35 Such a sentiment acknowledges the magnitude of history’s
destination, a destination so grand that it shows the smallness and automatized nature of
human action in the ephemeral present.
Carlyle emphasizes the importance yet near-impossibility of locating and empowering
the best political leadership possible. He emphasizes that political theory has been unsuccessful
in deriving a means of elevating those who are most capable to positions of authority. In
“Chartism,” Carlyle says: “for this now is our sad lot, that we must find a real Aristocracy, that
an apparent Aristocracy, how plausible soever, has become inadequate for us.”36 Neff
poignantly describes Carlyle’s search for the ideal political leaders in the context of Carlyle’s On
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Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History as a form of political theory: “Like a Messianic
prophet, Carlyle waited on the coming of one of these Heroes to restore an efficient
government.”37 But the natural and obvious question arose: how could he (or anybody else)
recognize the hero? In response to this question Carlyle could never provide an unambiguous
answer.38
Carlyle’s philosophy had shades of populism in that he recognized that unless there was
a change in the behavior of the wealthy classes they would be vulnerable to being the targets of
a revolutionary uprising on the part of the laboring classes.39 Froude synthesizes Carlyle’s
position with respect to the deficiencies inherent in both conservative and progressive
ideologies:
He was never a Conservative, for he recognised that, unless there was a change, impossible
except by miracle, in the habits and character of the wealthy classes, the gods themselves could
not save them. But the Radical creed of liberty, equality, and government by majority of votes,
he considered the most absurd superstition which had ever bewitched the human
imagination—at least, outside Africa.40
In an obituary, Leslie Stephen articulated a common perception and criticism of Carlyle:
Some writers complain that Carlyle did not advance a new doctrine, or succeed in persuading
the world of its truth. His life failed, it is suggested, in so far as he did not make any large body
of converts with an accepted code of belief. But here, as it seems to me, the criticism becomes
irrelevant. No one will dispute that Carlyle taught a strongly marked and highly characteristic
creed, though one not easily packed into a definite set of logical formulae.41
In writing a dissertation on Thomas Carlyle, I seek to perform a critical engagement of Carlyle’s
texts for the purpose of bringing them into conversation with and informing contemporary
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political philosophy through the vantage point of the early twenty-first century. In so doing, I
will seek to demonstrate how Carlyle also informs the zeitgeists, among them populism,
inequality, authoritarianism, and polarization, that grip politics on the global stage in the early
twenty-first century. I will explore Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus; Critical and Miscellaneous Essays;
Latter-Day Pamphlets; On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History; and Past and
Present through a contemporary lens to determine the extent to which Carlyle has been
vindicated or disproven. In particular, I will engage Sartor Resartus to unpack Carlyle’s theory of
transcendentalism and re-theorize it in the context of global politics in the early twenty-first
century. Sartor Resartus has been called the “highest achievement of the Romantic movement
in Europe” and I will seek to construct Romanticism as a political ideology (with Sartor Resartus
as a foundational text) by contextualizing it with liberalism, communism, and Islamism.42
“Romanticism” is a nebulous construct but it connotes the European reaction to Enlightenment
rationalism and science by seeking to prioritize what is beyond the scope of rigid scientific
positivism, such as intuition, nature, spirituality, and aesthetics.43
Carlyle’s approach to philosophy is in many ways a type of conformity to Plato’s
philosophy in that both cast the role of the philosopher to be that of ascertaining the true
nature of the world by seeking to perceive beyond the merely material appearances of the
physical and external world. Carlyle does not explicitly acknowledge the extent to which he is
indebted to Plato, but Plato’s influence is acknowledged by Carlyle cryptically and in passing.44
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Carlyle’s philosophy matches that of Plato in the sense that in both philosophies all actual and
perceptible phenomena imperfectly represent perfect, infinite ideas.45
Plato is deeply relevant to the construct of Carlyle’s philosophy of clothes. Carlyle
describes the “philosophy of clothes” and defines its scope as such: “in this one pregnant
subject of CLOTHES, rightly understood, is included all that men have thought, dreamed, done,
and been: the whole external Universe and what it holds is but Clothing; and the essence of all
Science lies in the PHILOSOPHY OF CLOTHES.”46 The material appearances, or phenomena that
are perceptible, thus are ephemeral and finite symbols—clothing--of what lies imperceptibly
and exists infinitely beyond the surface. From the “philosophy of clothes” Carlyle theorizes
transcendentalism. He describes the means by which Teufelsdrӧckh becomes a
transcendentalist: “In a word, he has looked fixedly on Existence, till one after the other, its
earthly hulls and garnitures, have all melted away; and now to his rapt vision the interior,
celestial Holy of Holies, lies disclosed.”47 At this point, according to Carlyle, the “Philosophy of
Clothes attains to Transcendentalism; this last leap, can we but clear it, takes us safe into the
promised land, where Palingenesia, in all senses, may be considered as beginning.”48
Palingenesia refers to a type of rebirth that takes place when transcendentalism is attained.
The implications of such a Palingenesia have gone unexplored in the context of the hypothetical
consideration of transcendentalism’s (universal) adoption as not only a philosophy but also as a
political, social, and religious creed that as such manifests as a comprehensive doctrine.49
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By making such an inference, a corollary inference is that Carlyle’s theory of
transcendentalism has the potential to embody an end-of-history narrative, one that has not
been entertained at all, much less to the extent other end-of-history narratives such as those
offered by Weber, Nietzsche, Fukuyama and the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic have been
entertained. The implication, with respect to political philosophy, is that transcendentalism, by
melting away all earthly hulls and garnitures, also melts away all philosophies, ideologies, and
theologies that are not themselves transcendentalism. Transcendentalism, by resolving and
consuming all previous, alternative, and incommensurable philosophies, ideologies, and
theologies, yields a social rebirth as a function of embodying a singular and universal creed. This
is how transcendentalism is itself an end-of-history narrative whereby, according to Carlyle, it
“takes us safe into the promised land, where Palingenesia, in all senses, may be considered as
beginning.”50
Carlyle himself prophesied that study of the philosophy of clothes will precipitate
applications of practical importance. In this way, Carlyle cast the philosophy of clothes as a
branch of political philosophy and even as a political science. Carlyle asks of his readers a
rhetorical question:
Must it not also be admitted that this Science of Clothes is a high one, and may with infinitely
deeper study on thy part yield richer fruit: that it takes scientific rank beside Codification, and
Political Economy, and the Theory of the British Constitution; nay, rather, from its prophetic
height looks down on all these, as on so many weaving-shops and spinning-mills, where the
Vestures which it has to fashion, and consecrate, and distribute, are…mechanically woven and
spun?51

50
51

Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 193.
Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 205.

26

The basis for this dissertation rests in large measure on this passage, and I seek to argue
that Carlyle’s statement in particular--that the “science of clothes” (as transcendentalism)
“may with infinitely deeper study on thy part yield richer fruit”--has gone unacknowledged and
forgotten, and as such has been underappreciated since the publication of Sartor Resartus.
Carlylean transcendentalism remains a heretofore untapped reservoir for political science and,
in particular, normative political philosophy. Moreover, Carlylean transcendentalism has yet to
be positioned among other political ideologies that have dominated political science. Why has
Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism gone undeveloped, unrefined, and unbranded in
mainstream political discourse, while liberalism, communism, fascism and Islamism have been
studied and articulated at such great lengths both in academic and non-academic discourses?
Carlylean transcendentalism has yet to be applied to become a practical political philosophy
and as such the “richer fruit” that may have been otherwise yielded has gone unyielded.
I will seek to engage, critically examine, and display Carlylean transcendentalism in the
context of contemporary political philosophy, specifically political philosophy that has
captivated widescale attention since Carlyle’s passing, or, more specifically, since the
publication of Sartor Resartus. Such an engagement of Carlylean transcendentalism vis-à-vis
developments in contemporary political philosophy will seek to illustrate the persistent
applicability of transcendentalism to political philosophy and global politics. By so doing,
transcendentalism may become illustrative of Carlyle’s sentiments “that no province of ClothesPhilosophy, even the lowest, is without its direct value, but that innumerable inferences of a
practical nature may be drawn therefrom.”52 Carlyle cryptically prophesies that the application
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of the philosophy of clothes offers “pregnant considerations” toward political and ethical
questions.53 Moreover, the philosophy of clothes as a science offers “‘architectural ideas’
which, as we have seen, lurk at the bottom of all Modes, and will one day, better unfolding
themselves, lead to important revolutions…”54 This is an extraordinarily cryptic statement in the
history of political thought and is a testament that is quite literally a rationale for the
composition of this dissertation. Carlyle, in the penultimate paragraph of Sartor Resartus, also
enigmatically insinuates that Teufelsdrӧckh’s influence as a philosopher is to be continued and
may only be just beginning: “So that Teufelsdrӧckh’s public History were not done, then, or
reduced to an even, unromantic tenor; nay, perhaps, the better part thereof were only
beginning?”55
On such bases, this dissertation seeks to derive inferences of a practical nature by
positioning Carlylean transcendentalism in political philosophy and global politics and using it to
inform philosophical questions deliberated on by Rawls, Ellul, MacIntyre, and Qutb, among
others. As such, I argue that Carlylean transcendentalism provides an alternative solution to the
conclusions derived by Rawls, Ellul, MacIntyre, and Qutb.
Carlyle’s “philosophy of clothes,” culminating in the “everlasting yea,” is the
philosophical conclusion that the entire universe, all living and non-living matter, all time,
space, human speech, etc., symbolizes or connotes a universal divinity and Carlyle cast the
“philosophy of clothes” as the divine idea of the world. I would suggest that this philosophical
conclusion can compete with the conclusions derived from “competitor” ideologies, doctrines,
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and theologies and, if accepted, would logically expose all other ideologies, doctrines,
theologies as subsumed within transcendentalism. This is because Carlylean transcendentalism
casts the other ideologies, doctrines, and theologies not itself as “clothing.” What is more,
Carlylean transcendentalism is the only ideology that embodies a consciousness that the other
ideologies, doctrines, and theologies are clothing. By not being Carlylean transcendentalism, all
other ideologies and theologies are unconscious of the “philosophy of clothes” that supersedes
them by casting all of them uniformly as clothing. Prior to consciousness of the “philosophy of
clothes,” all other ideologies and theologies are seen as unique, mutually exclusive, and
collectively “poly-chromatic.” The “philosophy of clothes” casts ideologies and theologies that
are not transcendentalism as uniform or collectively “mono-chromatic,” in that they are
collectively and universally not the “philosophy of clothes.” It is the philosophical conclusion
inherent in the “philosophy of clothes” that allows it to uniquely supersede other ideologies
and theologies on a different plane than the other ideologies and theologies. Another inference
is that ideologies and theologies previous to the consciousness of the “philosophy of clothes”
typify constructs that came into being randomly over the course of history in unconscious
pursuit of the ultimate discovery of the “philosophy of clothes.”
Carlylean transcendentalism thus can account for prominent ideologies espoused by
prominent thinkers within the purview of contemporary political philosophy. Carlylean
transcendentalism can be applied to inform Rawls’s theories of justice and political liberalism,
MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism and promotion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Qutb’s theory
of the political nature of Islam. It also informs Jacques Ellul’s theory of technology, namely that
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technology embodies the hegemonic and autonomous force that dominates and guides all
other sociopolitical attributes of globalized society.
I have specifically chosen these philosophers to dialogue with Carlyle because I cast
them as having the most influence on twentieth-century political and social theory. They have
each fostered either protracted debates in the academic literature or behavior in the political
sphere or have influenced both academia and the political sphere. Though it is deeply
unscientific, I cast each philosopher as being a principal/founder of the respective philosophies
they posit in the context of the twentieth century, meaning that they capture their respective
philosophical accounts in a “hegemonic” manner (that is more deeply influential) relative to the
influence of other philosophers in their respective schools of thought. In this way, Carlyle can
be contrasted most efficiently with these other philosophical traditions that have emerged
since his passing. I will posit that Carlyle is a principal philosopher of European Romanticism,
Rawls of liberalism, MacIntyre of the critique of liberalism, Qutb of Islamism, and Ellul of the
critique of technology. I fully acknowledge that such casting is obviously subjective and
qualitative in that it cannot be quantified in an objective sense.56 The idea for such a
comparison came from Hansen and Kainz’s comparison of Qutb, Marx, and Hitler, in which they
cast them as the “three major founders” of Islamism, Marxism, and National Socialism,
respectively.57 Qutb’s attachment to being the founder of Islamism is debatable more so than
Marx’s and Hitler’s association with their respective ideologies. Nonetheless, Hansen and Kainz
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offer a valuable template that is replicable to compare philosophers, and I replicate it in the
context of this dissertation. I also retain their casting of Qutb as the principal founder of
Islamism and will seek to demonstrate why he should be designated as such in the context of
the broad tradition of Islamism in the twentieth century.
Carlylean transcendentalism can be cast as an “end-of-history” ideology in that it can be
compared and contrasted with liberalism and communism, both of which have been cast as
“end-of-history” ideologies by Fukuyama and Marx, respectively. Carlyle’s theory of
transcendentalism also inherently embodies an implicit and cryptic contrast to Sayyid Qutb’s
conceptualization of Islamism as representing the final doctrine for humanity to live by as an
“end of history” ideology. Such a contrast can be made in the context of how Qutb claims that a
Muslim is “superior and eminent in the comprehension of the universe as compared to others,
for the belief in Allah and the theory of unity of God, as presented by Islam, is the master-key
for gaining acquaintance of the great reality of the universe.”58 Carlylean transcendentalism, I
will argue, can be seen as the master-key for acquainting with the great reality of the universe
in that it both accounts for Islam and builds on Islam as a post-Islamic ideology. In this way, the
claim can be made that Carlylean transcendentalism supersedes Islam in a way that in so doing
neutralizes all other -isms from being prospective “end of history” ideologies the way Islamism
was theorized as being capable of doing.
Qutb defines Islam’s unique value as a political religion in a manner that is not only
applicable to but also perfectly transferable to Carlylean transcendentalism:
The picture of the universe which the concept of unity of God presents is so shining, white,
beautiful and proportionate that when we compare it with those heaps of concepts and beliefs
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comprised of the impressive theories of the past and present about the universe, or those born
as a result of polytheistic religions and interpolated divine religions or which have been
engendered by repulsive materialistic movements, the grandeur and sublimity of the Islamic
faith comes before us in full blaze….When a believer takes stock of all the religions and system
of life fabricated by man right from old ages to the present day and compares them with his
own Shariah and system of life, he comes to the conclusion that these human efforts spanning
over thousands of years appear no more than a child’s play or a blind man’s staggering, before
the solid Shariah and comprehensive system of Islam. Hence when he looks with affectionate
and compassionate eyes at the helplessness and adversity of the misguided humanity from his
elevated stand point, he sees no other way but to come forward to do something to overcome
the misfortune and aberration of man.59
From this passage, the inference can be made that Carlylean transcendentalism is a
“religion” that is “fabricated by man” in a manner distinct from all other religions and systems
of life “fabricated by man.” Qutb’s passage could be applied to define Carlylean
transcendentalism and serve as a synopsis of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus because Carlylean
transcendentalism does not offer a theological narrative that is incommensurable with the
narratives of other theologies. Carlylean transcendentalism adds Islam to “those heaps of
concepts and beliefs comprised of the impressive theories of the past and present about the
universe,” unlike how Qutb excludes Islam from such heaps and casts it as exceptional. Qutb
does not acknowledge that Islam, as a dogmatic theology within the Abrahamic tradition,
shares much more in common with Judaism, Christianity, and all other dogmatic theologies
than transcendentalism does as a non-dogmatic philosophy of spirituality. The conclusion
follows that Carlylean transcendentalism is a philosophy that could itself not be characterized
as being a religion or system of life “fabricated by man” on the basis that it is a philosophy that
recognizes all philosophy as “fabricated.” It also follows that Carlylean transcendentalism is a
philosophy that could expose the futility of economic, religious, social, and political conflict if it
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is recognized as the “end-of-history” ideology. This illustrates how Carlylean transcendentalism
can be understood as post-Islam while being also post-Christianity. Similarly, it shows how
Carlylean transcendentalism can be cast as post-liberalism while also being post-communism,
post-fascism, and post-Islamism.
Carlylean transcendentalism is universally post-ideology and post-theology. On this
basis, an inference can be made that Carlylean transcendentalism can be conceived of as the
last stage of human political development. By synthesizing all other ideologies and theologies
that are not Carlylean transcendentalism, Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism embodies a
philosophy that subsumes all ideologies and theologies within it by “reweaving” each of their
distinct, mutually exclusive, and incommensurable fabrics into a new singular and universal
philosophy.
I will argue that Islam is integral to providing a constructivist account of Carlylean
transcendentalism because I will make the claim that Islam is closest to Carlylean
transcendentalism and is merely one step removed from itself being Carlylean
transcendentalism. By dialoging Qutb’s account of Islam with Carlyle’s account of
transcendentalism, transcendentalism can be positioned as an ideology that supersedes
Islamism while also embodying it.
Carlyle himself promised his readers a sequel to Sartor Resartus that would have the
purpose of applying the philosophy of clothes to practical political and social problems. Carlyle
called this potential sequel On the Palingenesia, or Newbirth of Society, “which volume, as
treating practically of the Wear, Destruction, and Re-texture of Spiritual Tissues, or Garments,
forms, properly speaking, the Transcendental or ultimate Portion of this my Work on Clothes,
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and is already in a state of forwardness.”60 Such reference to a sequel that Carlyle never wrote
serves a dual purpose of being 1) a fictional construct internal to the plot of Sartor Resartus and
2) a covert means of communicating to his readers that the philosophy of
clothes/transcendentalism will need to be revisited in the future to be further
refined/theorized/applied so that it can evolve from a theoretical philosophy to a practical
philosophy. The phrase “newbirth of society” could be interpreted in multiple ways, as it is a
highly cryptic phrase. Nonetheless, the most obvious inference would likely be that the
“newbirth of society” would take place when transcendentalism emerges as the sole
comprehensive doctrine such a society lives by following the wear, destruction, and re-texture
of all the ideologies and theologies that transcendentalism itself supersedes. The “Wear,
Destruction, and Re-texture of Spiritual Tissues, or Garments,” as Carlyle phrases it, can be
theorized to mean simply the appearance and destruction of all ideologies and theologies until
the appearance and adoption of transcendentalism as the final comprehensive doctrine
incapable of being superseded and as such incapable of being destroyed and re-textured like all
previous mutually incommensurable ideologies and theologies.
That Carlyle never released it in no way means that such a sequel is impossible but,
rather, indicates merely the limits of how far and to what extent Carlyle could apply
transcendentalism in the context of living in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century.
There is, hypothetically, an optimal point in the context of historical political development for
Carlylean transcendentalism to emerge, gain favorable reception, and establish a hegemony as
an ideology. Carlylean transcendentalism offers compelling prospects for the “newbirth of
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society” because it is inherently the recognition that society will eventually need to be reborn
as a result of the incapacity of all other ideologies and theologies to provide a comprehensive
doctrine capable of resolving incommensurable debates in the political, social, and religious
arenas. Teufelsdrӧckh explains how religion is constantly “‘weaving for herself new Vestures’”
and it is inquired by Teufelsdrӧckh’s editor as to whether Teufelsdrӧckh himself is “one of the
loom-treaddles?”61
Just as Marxists and Islamists viewed and view communism and Islam, respectively, to
be something wherein all contradiction is solved, Carlyle’s political philosophy provides the
basis for the conclusion that it is in, and only in, transcendentalism where all contradiction is
solved. The Carlylean “newbirth of society” would be one in which, by resolving all
contradiction, transcendentalism would emerge as the only comprehensive doctrine whereby
subscribers to other doctrines heretofore would be able to come to terms with the limitations
and contradictions of their doctrines by fully comprehending the philosophy of
transcendentalism.
I will argue that transcendentalism has yet to be applied because it has yet to be
popularized as a legitimate means of resolving the problems inherent in liberal democratic
capitalism and socialism/communism as political economies. Transcendentalism has yet to
mobilize itself in the manner of the twentieth century’s most profound and influential, albeit
materialist and compromised, illiberal ideologies—namely communism, fascism, and Islamism. I
will argue that Carlylean transcendentalism should be conceived of as being neither “liberal”
nor “illiberal,” as its viability as a political ideology must be determined by whether it is capable
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of mobilizing a coalition of support in the sociopolitical contexts of regimes that span the
spectrum of “liberal” and “illiberal” regimes. For example, a hypothetical emergence of political
support for Carlylean transcendentalism via institutional/electoral political channels or a social
movement need not mean that Carlylean transcendentalism has to be accepted through
coercion as a comprehensive doctrine to displace liberalism, an ideology that allows the liberty
for individuals to subscribe to his or her own ideology/theology of one’s choosing. Carlylean
transcendentalism is compatible with liberalism because it can be conceived as one more
ideology/theology to compete against others for support. This dissertation merely seeks to cast
Carlylean transcendentalism as an ideology/theology through a normative lens as being a
choice in the marketplace of ideologies and theologies.
It should be noted that, as the theorist of transcendentalism, Carlyle offered a
philosophy that drew on Islam as an influence while Carlyle was himself eventually
appropriated by both Marxism and National Socialism.62 Carlyle’s transcendentalism has been
obscured by Marxism and National Socialism as more dominant ideologies and, as such, has not
been developed or tried. Thus, Carlylean political philosophy offers a type of cryptic nexus
among Marxism, National Socialism, and Islamism as illiberal ideologies, yet Carlyle’s
transcendentalism has gone un-theorized and unnoticed in the context of political theory.
Carlyle’s writings can be placed in conversation with some of the most renowned and
influential political and social philosophers that span intellectual history, such as Plato, John
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Stuart Mill, Sayyid Qutb, Jacques Ellul, Alasdair MacIntyre, and John Rawls, among others.
Emerson commented, with respect to Carlyle, that “He is a man of the world. He does not
belong to this or that country only, but by his broad genius and talent of satire, which he throws
about him, he is cosmopolitan; but his aims are as good as can be.”63
Victor Basch provides a valuable basis and pretext for what my dissertation sets out to
do when he reflects on the enormity of Carlyle’s relevance more than a century after his
publications:
But what struck me, even more than his prodigious eloquence, fraught with a biblical sense of
the sublime, all grandiose ugliness and barbaric vehemence, was the extraordinary topicality of
so much of Carlyle’s writing. It is more than a century since Signs of the Times (1829) was
written. It could have been yesterday. The perils to culture that he identifies are the very ones
denounced today by many contemporary thinkers. Mechanization, the same mechanization
which the twentieth century has so diabolically perfected, triumphing over dynamism: that is
the disease of his times, which the Craigenputtock loner never tires of diagnosing. Isn’t it that of
ours?...Reading so much of Past and Present and of the Latter-Day Pamphlets on the distress of
unemployed miners and textile workers, and the unpitying egoism of the propertied classes,
one could almost believe oneself transported into the midst of the post-war economic crisis.64
Carlyle’s comments on the nineteenth century in his essay “Signs of the Times” in many ways
are more applicable to the twenty-first century since mechanization has grown in scale
exponentially during the period of time since the nineteenth century:
Were we required to characterise this age of ours by any single epithet, we should be tempted
to call it, not an Heroical, Devotional, Philosophical, or Moral Age, but, above all others, the
Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward sense of that word;
the age which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches and practises the great art of
adapting means to ends. Nothing is now done directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated
contrivance. For the simplest operation, some helps and accompaniments, some cunning
abbreviating process is in readiness. Our old modes of exertion are all discredited, and thrown
aside. On every hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a
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speedier, inanimate one. The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, and falls into iron
fingers that ply it faster….There is no end to machinery.65
Carlyle also acknowledged how “wealth has more and more increased, and at the same time
gathered itself more and more into masses, strangely altering the old relations, and increasing
the distance between the rich and the poor, [and it] will be a question for Political Economists,
and a much more complex and important one than any they have yet engaged with.”66
This dissertation argues that Carlyle has been largely overlooked as a theorist who
fertilized the social and political thought of pertinent philosophical traditions including Marxism
and American Transcendentalism. Moreover, it seeks to show that Carlyle’s conception of
transcendentalism, as a political philosophy of practical import, has yet to be fully formulated,
much less attempted and practiced. In this way, Carlylean transcendentalism is an elusive and
untapped alternative to liberalism, communitarianism, and the failed totalitarian Marxist and
fascist regimes of the twentieth century. Individualist political philosophy—the tradition of
Hobbes, Locke, Mill and Rawls—gained strength in the twentieth century because the only
alternative to individualism seemed to be totalitarianism in the form of Soviet communism.67
Carlylean transcendentalism, once adequately refined and articulated, could provide another
alternative to individualist political philosophy in the twenty-first century.
The basis for conceiving Carlylean transcendentalism as a prospective practical political
philosophy is that political societies both in domestic and global contexts have the capacity of
not only adopting Carlylean transcendentalism, but adopting Carlylean transcendentalism as an
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optimal and convenient solution to various and emergent political crises. Political societies have
the potential to adopt Carlylean transcendentalism as a function of and as a product of the
capacity of individual citizens to adopt Carlylean transcendentalism as a coherent political creed
to espouse ideologically. Essentially, Carlylean transcendentalism has the potential to be
adopted because individuals have the potential of adopting the conclusions Carlyle’s
transcendentalist character, Teufelsdrӧckh, reaches in the context of Sartor Resartus.
Individuals can uphold Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophical conclusions as their own not on the basis
of having lived his life but on the basis of reflection on his biography and the conclusions
constructed on the basis of his personal socialization into politics.
Aristotle theorized how “moral goodness will ensure that the property of each is made
to serve the use of all, in the spirit of the proverb which says ‘Friends’ goods are goods in
common.’”68 Aristotle makes known his view that “the better system is that under which
property is privately owned but is put to common use; and the function proper to the legislator
is to make men so disposed that they will treat property in this way.”69 Carlyle, through
Teufelsdrӧckh, exemplifies such a “legislator” who came up with a means to make humanity
disposed so as to treat property in such a manner. Teufelsdrӧckh illustrates how such “moral
goodness” can come to fruition, at least theoretically, on the basis of the construction of a
philosophy that facilitates such mutual solidarity coming to fruition on a collective scale.
Members of a political community can adopt Teufelsdrӧckh’s vantage point and philosophy,
both theoretically and realistically, both as individuals and as a collective political community.
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I will argue that Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophy, transcendentalism, and the concurrent
values and principles it espouses, has the capacity as well to assume the role of embodying the
Aristotelian conception of the good, or telos, more generally both for the individual and the
community. Communitarianism has been seen as attractive due to how it “offers a picture of
the citizen as a member of a community seeking the common good.”70 The notion of what
exactly the “common good” entails has remained nebulous and indefinable, whereas Carlyle’s
conception of transcendentalism puts forward a largely coherent conception of the common
good.71 What transcendentalism and communitarianism share is that each offers an alternative
to individualist values that are largely based on the maximization of consumption in the
economic sphere in the context of liberal democratic capitalism. In both transcendentalism and
communitarianism, competition as an economic value is modified considerably through the
import of mutual solidarity as a corollary, if not additive or alternative, principle.
R.F. Stalley presents a compelling critique of Aristotle that can also be entertained in the
context of Carlyle’s philosophy of transcendentalism when considering whether it is a viable
comprehensive doctrine to apply to politics: “we may also question whether a society based on
a common conception of what constitutes the good life for a human being can grant its
members the freedom, which most of us would cherish, to develop their own lifestyles and
personalities.”72 This poses as a critical test for Carlylean transcendentalism and I will seek to
demonstrate how Carlylean transcendentalism does indeed offer a conception of what
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constitutes the good life that simultaneously enhances individual liberty and enhances the
prospects for human flourishing. A common conception of the good need not be mutually
exclusive from freedom but, if constructed properly, they can be compatible.
Rawls inaugurated the term comprehensive doctrine in Political Liberalism and defined it
as a doctrine that “applies to a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects
universally,” and “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal
character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and
much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.” 73 Rawls’s
conception of the gradation of comprehensive doctrines with respect to their
“comprehensiveness” is particularly noteworthy in the context of delineating Carlylean
transcendentalism’s application to politics as a prospective political doctrine and ascertaining
the degree to which it fulfills the notion of a comprehensive doctrine:
A conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one
rather precisely articulated system; whereas a conception is only partially comprehensive when
it comprises a number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather
loosely articulated. Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and
comprehensive.74
As a loosely articulated doctrine due to the highly cryptic presentation of
transcendentalism in the context of Sartor Resartus, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact degree
to which transcendentalism can be characterized as a comprehensive doctrine. Rawls coined
and defined the term “political liberalism” such that it “assumes that, for political purposes, a
plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the
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exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional
democratic regime.”75 Moreover, Rawls articulates the “problem” of political liberalism: “How
is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?”76
Furthermore, Rawls conceives of and defines the term overlapping consensus as a
means to ensure the stability of political liberalism that allows for a multiplicity of contrasting
comprehensive doctrines.77 Such a consensus is what adherents of opposing religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines would agree upon as a shared political conception of
justice.78 Rawls proposes his theory of “justice as fairness” as a prospective conception of
justice to gain the support of an overlapping consensus, whereby “justice as fairness” would be
embodied in two principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all.79
I assert and will seek to demonstrate how Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism
embodies an alternative and is in many ways a “third way” to Rawls’s conceptions of, first, a
comprehensive doctrine and, second, an overlapping consensus in the context of political
liberalism. I will argue Carlyle’s transcendentalism does so by offering an idiosyncratic doctrine
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that inherently supersedes other comprehensive doctrines. I will also argue that Carlyle’s
transcendentalism shows us why an overlapping consensus within political liberalism is in some
ways both unsatisfying and naturally unstable.
This dissertation is motivated in part by Paul E. Kerry and Marylu Hill’s 2010 edited
volume, Thomas Carlyle Resartus: Reappraising Carlyle’s Contribution to the Philosophy of
History, Political Theory, and Cultural Criticism. Their edited collection of essays seeks to begin
to engage Carlyle in the context of the twenty-first century. Kerry and Hill define Carlyle in a
compelling manner from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century as a unique
contributor to political theory in terms that are largely synonymous with the characterizations
of Carlyle’s contemporaries:
In a world that prefers to keep its labels straight—where liberals are liberals and conservatives
are conservatives—Thomas Carlyle presents a distinctly awkward fit. Just when he seems to
prove himself a conservative, he speaks up on the part of revolutionaries…He speaks movingly
of the plight of the poorer classes, and then he advocates strong central rulers; he denounces
capitalism and yet seeks to woo the new leading class, ‘the captains of industry.’…He is a
communitarian who prefers a curmudgeonly solitude; a political thinker who prefers to avoid
actual politics; a revolutionary and rebel who longs for the stability of a good and noble
tradition.80
I seek to advance the thesis that embedded in Carlyle’s political philosophy is a noble
tradition that can only be ascertained by synthesizing Carlylean philosophy with contemporary
political philosophy. By so doing, I offer a theory of transcendentalism as a synthesis of Carlyle
with the philosophical contributions of Ellul, MacIntyre, and Qutb, among other post-Carlylean
philosophers.
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Carlylean philosophy is compatible with the important conclusions Ellul and MacIntyre
contribute in their work and I will seek to demonstrate how Ellul and MacIntyre offer
philosophical accounts in the twentieth century that largely recite what Carlyle had already
theorized in the nineteenth century. Like Carlyle, MacIntyre and Ellul are “negators” in the
sense that they each offer theories that discredit predominant and hegemonic theories but, in
so doing, offer solutions that are nebulous. Bringing the work of MacIntyre and Ellul into
conversation with Carlylean philosophy, in particular with Carlylean transcendentalism,
underscores the conclusion that Carlylean transcendentalism is a compelling theory that can
resolve the deep-seated and seemingly intractable problems MacIntyre and Ellul theorize to be
associated with modernity.
James Anthony Froude provides an account of Carlyle’s place in the history of political
thought that sheds light on the fact that the time has yet to come when a determination can be
made with respect to whether Carlyle’s political philosophy can be either vindicated or
invalidated:
[Carlyle] has told us that our most cherished ideas of political liberty, with their kindred
corollaries, are mere illusions, and that the progress which has seemed to go along with them is
a progress towards anarchy and social dissolution. If he was wrong, he has misused his powers.
The principles of his teaching are false. He has offered himself as a guide upon a road of which
he had no knowledge; and his own desire for himself would be the speediest oblivion both of
his person and his works. If, on the other hand, he has been right; if, like his great predecessors,
he has read truly the tendencies of this modern age of ours, and his teaching is authenticated
by facts, then Carlyle, too, will take his place among the inspired seers, and he will shine one,
another fixed star in the intellectual sky.81
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Carlyle’s political philosophy piques interest in liberal democracy and the recent debates
over whether it in fact represents the end of political development. While Fukuyama’s end-ofhistory thesis proclaimed liberal democracy to be the endpoint of a long evolution in political
history whereby liberal democracy is the culmination of evolution (alongside a corresponding
defeat of democracy’s external enemies), Carlyle causes us to re-think such a view by pointing
out the vulnerabilities inherent in liberal democracy. 82 At a minimum, an appreciation of
Carlyle’s contributions is a dramatic reminder that the question of liberal democracy’s
sustainability has yet to be answered with full confidence, is still being answered as time
unfolds, and will continue to be answered into the future. Fukuyama questions the prospects of
liberal democracy as follows:
But the deeper and more profound question concerns the goodness of liberal
democracy itself, and not only whether it will succeed against its present-day rivals.
Assuming that liberal democracy is, for the moment, safe from external enemies, could
we assume that successful democratic societies could remain that way indefinitely? Or is
liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions too serious that
they will eventually undermine it as a political system? 83
In 1939, to introduce her Thomas Carlyle and the Art of History, Louise Merwin Young
wrote, “[Carlyle’s] political and social criticism, in many respects too advanced for his own day,
has been winning increasing attention as the perspective of time has revealed its constructive
value.”84 For Young, “the disintegration of modern governmental authority and the rise of a
dictator class Carlyle would probably regard less as a vindication of his theories of authority
(though they are that), than as a fulfillment of his prophetic warnings regarding the
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shortcomings of democracy.”85 F.A. Lea investigated Carlyle and published Carlyle: Prophet of
To-day in 1943, in the midst of World War II. Such a project was an account of Carlyle’s
philosophy coming to a realization long after his death. The title itself connotes that Carlyle
prophesied what the world would be like in the future, and in so doing was vindicated.
Fukuyama himself conceded in a 2006 afterword to a second edition of The End of
History and the Last Man that there are “many challenges to the optimistic evolutionary
scenario” of liberalism’s predominance, among these “the unanticipated consequences of
technology.”86 Technology poses as a possible internal contradiction to liberalism since “the
historical process that is driven by technological advance [could] ultimately be consumed by it
[and] there are an endless variety of scenarios by which this could happen.”87 This dissertation
will account for Carlyle’s early criticism of technology and how Jacques Ellul’s criticism of
technology in the twentieth century embodies largely a re-articulation of Carlyle’s earlier
claims.
For example, Carlyle asserts the following about technology and industrialism: “By our
skill in Mechanism, it has come to pass, that in the management of external things we excel all
other ages, while in whatever respects the pure moral nature, in true dignity of soul and
character, we are perhaps inferior to most civilised ages.”88 He insists that, if we look deeper,
“we shall find that this faith in Mechanism has now struck its roots down into man’s most
intimate, primary sources of conviction” and that “men have lost their belief in the Invisible,

85

Louise Merwin Young, Thomas Carlyle and the Art of History (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1939), 88.
86
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 347.
87
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 353.
88
Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, vol. II (London: Chapman and Hall,
1889), 332.

46

and believe, and hope, and work only in the Visible; or, to speak it in other words: This is not a
Religious age.”89 Carlyle concludes with a bold proclamation: “Only the material, the
immediately practical, not the divine and spiritual, is important to us. The infinite, absolute
character of Virtue has passed into a finite, conditional one; it is no longer a worship of the
Beautiful and Good; but a calculation of the Profitable.”90 This fundamental and allencompassing indictment of industrial materialism serves as the central basis for Carlyle’s
criticism of modernity.
Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre are each prolific philosophers whose work can be
synthesized and collectively applied to inform a comprehensive view of the vulnerabilities of
modern political society that is defined largely by the hegemony of liberal democracy and
capitalism. For example, Carlyle’s transcendentalism provides a potential solution to the
predicament MacIntyre theorizes modernity finds itself in. MacIntyre theorizes on the bleak
nature of contemporary moral and political debates:
Moral philosophy, as it is dominantly understood, reflects the debates and disagreements of
the culture so faithfully that its controversies turn out to be unsettlable in just the way that the
political and moral debates themselves are.
It follows that our society cannot hope to achieve moral consensus.91
I will argue that Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism, as theorized in Sartor
Resartus, offers a means by which moral consensus has the potential to be achieved, in that
transcendentalism inherently embodies a resolution to political and moral philosophical
debates. Carlyle’s philosophy of transcendentalism is not merely another thread in
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philosophical debates but rather offers intrinsic resolution by sowing together rival and
disparate philosophical accounts into a singular and comprehensive philosophy. In so doing,
transcendentalism accounts for the shortcomings of all preceding disparate philosophies. In
short, the political prospects of transcendentalism have been grossly unrecognized and
unappreciated.
Moral consensus has the potential to be achieved if the viewpoint of Teufelsdrӧckh
naturally becomes the viewpoint adopted by all. Unlike other philosophies, Carlyle provides a
constructivist account as to how transcendentalism could be adopted by all as a moral
consensus in the wake of the prospective diminishing returns of dogmatic and materialist
ideologies. Such a construction has simply not yet been refined or applied within the context of
politics so as to be readily apparent. MacIntyre concludes that “modern systematic politics,
whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint
that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern politics itself expresses
in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition.”92 Moral and political
philosophy, mired in incommensurable and interminable debates, is representative of a
rejection, or at a minimum ignorance, of the prospects of transcendentalism to provide a
singular comprehensive doctrine just as transcendentalism itself can be cast as the rejection of
and termination of all previous debates.
G.B. Tennyson, in the preface to his 1965 book Sartor Called Resartus, commented with
respect to Carlyle’s reputation: “a new Carlyle may be palingenetically stirring in the ashes of
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the old.”93 He also acknowledged that “as we survey the history of the time since Carlyle wrote,
we should be more inclined to acknowledge his prophetic gifts than we have been.”94 On this
basis, Carlyle’s political philosophy and prophesy should be acknowledged in the context of the
twenty-first century, whereby his philosophy can be brought into dialogue with important
developments in contemporary political philosophy.
Eric Bentley, in “The Premature Death of Thomas Carlyle (1795-1945): An Obituary and a
Footnote,” offers a timeline of the evolution of Carlyle’s political reputation and persona.
Bentley reflects on Carlyle’s unpopularity and fall from grace as a result of how he was
illegitimately associated with and appropriated by the National Socialist regime and thus
branded as a guilty party for the catastrophe of World War II. It should be acknowledged that
Carlyle did in certain instances demonstrate bigotry and illiberalism when it came to issues such
as slavery and racial equality, and this provided fodder for linking Carlyle to the Nazis.95
Numerous German publications in the Nazi era sought to associate Carlyle with Nazism.96 Yet
what is especially noteworthy, some more incisive studies by Nazi scholars tended to separate
Carlyle from National Socialism.97 For example, Theodor Deimel, in Carlyle und der
Nationalsozialismus, expounds on Carlyle’s fundamental philosophical differences with National
Socialism:
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With this it must be pointed out with emphasis, how Carlyle’s thought separates from that of
National Socialism. Despite all commonality, the foundations of both worldviews are different.
Carlyle makes a personally shaped religious idea into the origin and end of all criticism and
reform. National Socialism, on the other hand, as a weltanschaulich political movement begins
with the völkisch idea and establishes this as the basis of its entire politics. With this profound
difference…it is mistaken despite all the similarities, to designate Carlyle, as has been done, as
the “first National Socialist.”98
The magnitude of this passage cannot be overstated, in that it may be one of only a few
instances in the intellectual history of Thomas Carlyle whereby his theory of transcendentalism
is constructed as a function of differentiating it from another ideology, in this case National
Socialism. Deimel noted how National Socialism began with the völkisch idea and this became
the basis of its entire politics that are literally rooted in racism and nationalism. In contrast,
Carlyle made a “religious idea into the origin and end of all criticism and reform.” While Deimel
likely is referring to the “philosophy of clothes” or, more specifically, the “Everlasting Yea” as
the “religious idea” he has in mind, what must be underscored is the realization that National
Socialism departed on a political project other than Carlyle’s from a starting position not shared
by Carlyle. The Nazis could have undertaken Carlylean transcendentalism as their political
project, but they simply did not do so. While it is not entirely clear as to why the Nazis did not
adopt Carlyle’s transcendentalism as the basis for their political project, the Nazis used race,
racism, and nationalism as the bases for their populist rallying cry against liberalism and
communism.
Despite the gaping mutual exclusivity that exists between Carlyle and Nazism, Carlyle’s
reputation was degraded by being associated with the Nazi brand, and this relegated him to
becoming largely a defunct philosopher after World War II in the sense that he was no longer
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called upon in either popular or academic discourse with the exception of a small cadre of
devoted Carlyle scholars. McCollum has concluded that academicians who interpret Carlyle
through the lens of his appropriation by the Nazis are in essence perpetuating Nazi propaganda
as it was disseminated in the Nazi era of reckless scholarship.99 What is more, “a veritable
maelstrom of geopolitical catastrophes surrounds Carlyle and impairs our judgment on his
works….”100
McCollum cites two instances that confirm Carlyle’s influence on Hitler, and these
instances play an outsized role in tarnishing Carlyle’s reputation by tying him directly to the
highest levels of the Nazi regime. During Hitler’s trial for treason for his involvement in the Beer
Hall Putsch, he repudiated the charges of treason to the judge by citing Carlyle’s biography of
Frederick the Great: “It is wonderful, when the English historian Carlyle, speaking of Frederick
the Great, emphasized that this great king only possessed a life of work in the service of his
people. Do you now believe that that which in November 1918 rose to power in the German
Reich possessed the pure hands, the authority of a Frederick, to conserve this state
authority?”101 By doing so, Hitler sought to de-legitimize the German government and
legitimize his political project and couch it as being in the tradition of Frederick the Great.
Additionally, McCollum cites Joseph Goebbels’s reading from Carlyle’s History of
Frederick the Great to Hitler in his Berlin bunker in the midst of the final days of the Nazi
regime. McCollum writes that “those last inglorious days in the bunker mark not only the final
defeat of Hitler’s Germany but the culmination of Thomas Carlyle’s degradation and
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debasement from his once-dignified status in Victorian England.”102 These confirmed instances
of Nazi leadership drawing on Carlyle directly for inspiration have more than tainted his
reputation and led to a drought of scholarship on Carlyle in the wake of World War II.
Bentley maintained that the philosophical “death” of Carlyle alongside the death of the
Nazi regime is premature, since Carlyle’s illiberalism comprises only a fraction of his legacy.
Bentley reflects on Carlyle’s profile so as to demonstrate that it is simply invalid to conclude the
scope of Carlyle’s reputation and legacy should be entirely negative:
Germany has offended. But I believe there is another Germany. Carlyle has offended. But I
believe there is another Carlyle. There is the Carlyle whom Friedrich Engels praised and
translated, the Carlyle to whom Dickens dedicated Hard Times and Ruskin Munera Pulveris, the
Carlyle who in America stirred the very different hearts of Emerson and Whitman, the Carlyle
who in England was still able at the end of the century to spur on the young Havelock Ellis and
the younger Patrick Geddes. There is the Carlyle who, for all his provinciality, made his presence
felt in Paris, Madrid, Rome, and Berlin for at least half a century (excluding the use of Carlyle by
the Nazis and the fascists). This was a man who said things that needed to be said, though
nobody was saying them. Here was a man who clung tenaciously to truths that were being
denied or forgotten. Here was a man whose life was one long tempestuous voyage through the
dangerous currents of a revolutionary age. Here was a man who questioned not only the
respectable ideas of the time, as every critic is expected to do as part of his regular routine, but
also the most “advanced” ideas of the time. This takes courage.103
It cannot be said that Carlyle’s political philosophy is defunct, as there are indications
that his philosophy is merely in the initial stages of being vindicated. In Carlyle and the Idea of
the Modern, for example, Albert J. LaValley notes Carlyle’s criticisms of modernity in its
facilitation of atomization of the individual, the alienation of the individual from his work and
from his fullest self, the rapidity of social and technological change, and the unleashing of greed
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in the anarchic pursuit of money.104 Such grievances, rather than having been resolved or
discounted, have been magnified over the course of nearly a century and a half since Carlyle
levelled them. The evidence for this lies in growing economic inequality, the looming threat of
cyberattacks or other forms of technological/environmental devastation, and increasing crime
rates, among other forms of evidence. Rates of crime can be used as measures of social
atomization and alienation.
In the introduction to a 2012 special issue of Studies in the Literary Imagination devoted
exclusively to Thomas Carlyle’s politics, Tom Toremans and Tamara Gosta report the impetus
for such a compendium: “Far from a belated attempt at apologetic restoration, the issue results
from a shared conviction among the contributors that there is at present an acute need to reexamine critically Carlyle’s politics after the often uncritical assumption of his adherence to a
totalitarian ideology that dominated the twentieth-century reception of his work.”105 This call
for an academic re-examination of Carlyle is only one among many that seek to revisit Carlyle’s
political reputation by untethering him from twentieth-century totalitarianism.
Recent Carlyle scholarship such as edited volumes Thomas Carlyle Resartus and Thomas
Carlyle and the Idea of Influence have embodied the spirit of the many calls to acknowledge
Carlyle’s prophetic forecasts and his rebirth in the contemporary era.106 Carlyle informs
discussions with respect to developments in the philosophy of liberalism, the rise of Islamism,
and the resurgent critiques of democracy and technology alongside the recent resurrections of
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authoritarianism and populism on the global political stage. Specifically, Carlyle’s philosophy
informs the work of preeminent philosophers of the latter half of the twentieth century in
these spheres, notably John Rawls, Sayyid Qutb, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Jacques Ellul. By
dialoging Carlylean philosophy with the work of these philosophers, Carlyle’s contributions
become “reborn,” in that they are not only more coherent and lucid but can be applied toward
the derivation and synthesis of new philosophical conclusions.
Carlyle’s philosophy offers radical insights when bringing it into conversation with
contemporary political philosophy and political events of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. By making inferences and drawing conclusions from Carlyle, new political theory can
be constructed on the foundations Carlyle laid in the nineteenth century. I will make a
normative argument on behalf of the theory of transcendentalism that Carlyle established in
Sartor Resartus by seeking to justify how it offers applications to seemingly intractable political
problems in the twenty-first century.
Thoreau and Emerson were American Transcendentalists who built on Carlyle much as
Lenin built on Marx. But, unlike in Marxism, Carlylean transcendentalism has yet to be
attempted in practical politics to serve a collective political society. This may be because the
theoretical work necessary to make Carlylean transcendentalism a viable and practical political
program has not yet been conducted. Carlyle, Emerson, and Thoreau never sought to promote
transcendentalism so as to proselytize those beyond their narrow intellectual community of
transcendentalists to a popular audience. That may be why, as of the twenty-first century,
Carlylean transcendentalism and the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau are not seen
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collectively as a coherent political ideology and remains instead a largely abstract, cryptic,
historic, and impenetrable intellectual movement from the nineteenth century.
Carlyle stimulated not only Emerson and Thoreau but the wider American
Transcendentalist movement, and Carlyle’s American reception amounted to what was his
largest, most concentrated, and most famous following.107 Emerson was instrumental in seeing
to Sartor Resartus’s initial publication in book form in Boston in 1836.108 Sartor Resartus was
especially popular in America, and by 1846 it had gone through five editions and multiple
reprintings.109 Thoreau’s only literary criticism took Carlyle as its subject and he composed
“Thomas Carlyle and His Works” during the beginning of his stay at Walden Pond.110
I will argue that Carlylean transcendentalism can be promoted and re-theorized as a
practical political ideology to mitigate the social, economic, religious, and ethnic/racial conflict
that grips liberal democratic capitalism and as such can inspire unity and tame division. Division
and conflict show no signs of ceasing but rather show signs of growing in the context of liberal
democratic capitalism. Post-liberalism has the potential to take the form of Carlylean
transcendentalism in that transcendentalism can be cast so as to naturally gain support in
liberalism’s marketplace of ideas and ideologies. This project would likely need to take place
over the course of decades and possibly generations. Liberalism can evolve naturally and
gradually into Carlylean transcendentalism as post-liberalism, so that after the span of
generations liberalism and Carlylean transcendentalism can become essentially fused together
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and indistinguishable from one another. The prospects for the stream of political development
taking this path rest on Carlylean transcendentalism itself, and its ability or inability to mobilize
mass political support both at the intra-national and international political scales. Carlyle
himself forecasted transcendentalism as embodying post-liberalism in Sartor Resartus in a
fashion analogous to how Marx forecasted communism as embodying post-liberalism in his
body of writings. I will also argue that Carlylean transcendentalism proves itself to be capable of
preserving the achievements of liberalism while also resolving what liberalism itself cannot
resolve, namely the unceasing growth in hyperpluralism, economic inequality, identity politics,
consumption/consumerism, and environmental degradation.
Carlyle is among the earliest theorists of alienation. Carlyle put forward the phrase
“destruction of moral force” and this is akin to what would later be known as “alienation.”111
When Carlyle refers to humanity as having grown “mechanical in head and heart,” he means
that their behavior is increasingly determined externally by invisible, abstract, social forces alien
to their internal impulses.112 Carlyle makes us question the legitimacy of political participation
and whether political change can be led from outside of institutionalized settings. S. Law Wilson
has characterized Carlyle’s place in the context of political history: “[Carlyle] was a prophet; and
whilst we recognise in the prophet the true king of men, nevertheless it is not exactly to that
high functionary we turn for help when in want of practical solutions of pressing everyday
problems.”113 Wilson continues his critique of Carlyle:
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He does not count for much as an emancipator who only takes his stand outside our dungeon
gates to tell us how unfortunate is our lot, how dark is our prison, how fettering are our
manacles, and how impossible it is to get out. Or, to vary the figure, if our national and social
affairs are in a state of impending shipwreck, we poor wrestlers with the troubled sea will be
glad of any hand of rescue reached out to us from the shore; but if our would-be deliverer,
instead of bringing on the scene some life-saving apparatus, can only bring a Diogenes lantern
from which to flash a lurid light upon the tragic spectacle, or a camera, it may be, with which to
take snapshot views of it, or pencil and paper with which to take notes for a thrilling and
picturesque description of it, we must be excused if we fail to see that such a one has wrought
any real deliverance on the earth.114
The early twenty-first century has witnessed discussion of what post-liberalism might entail
with such controversial texts as Why Liberalism Failed, by Patrick Deneen, and The Politics of
Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future, by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst.
Carlyle seemingly undertook social inquiry and political philosophy in the manner
Teufelsdrӧckh in Sartor Resartus examined humanity: “with a strange impartiality, a strange
scientific freedom; like a man unversed in the higher circles, like a man dropped thither from
the Moon.”115 As such, Carlyle recognized the basis for philosophy but nonetheless
simultaneously bemoaned its failings:
ever, from time to time, must the attempt to shape for ourselves some Theorem of the
Universe be repeated. And ever unsuccessfully: for what Theorem of the Infinite can the Finite
render complete? We, the whole species of Mankind, and our whole existence and history, are
but a floating speck in the illimitable ocean of the All; yet in that ocean; indissoluble portion
thereof; partaking of its infinite tendencies: borne this way and that by its deep-swelling tides,
and grand ocean currents;--of which what faintest chance is there that we should ever exhaust
the significance, ascertain the goings and comings?116
Carlyle theorizes from the premise that philosophy, which encompasses political philosophy,
has reached its limits:
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Once in destroying the False, there was a certain inspiration; but now the genius of Destruction
has done its work, there is now nothing more to destroy. The doom of the Old has long been
pronounced, and irrevocable; the Old has passed away: but, alas, the New appears not in its
stead; the Time is still in pangs of travail with the New.117
I seek to formulate and construct Carlylean transcendentalism as a new political philosophy in a
manner Carlyle himself fell short of accomplishing. The “Time” is no longer still in “pangs of
travail with the New” as the passage of time has led to conditions favorable to Carlylean
transcendentalism’s emergence. I seek to provide a normative argument as to why Carlylean
transcendentalism should replace the hegemony of liberal democratic capitalism as a postliberal solution to liberalism’s inherent shortcomings.
Almost two centuries have passed since Carlyle concluded in 1831 that “the Time is still
in pangs of travail with the New.”118 In this period of time, the modern ideologies of liberalism,
communism, and fascism took shape. While liberalism has become hegemonic on the global
stage (in particular since the end of the Cold War), recently there is significant evidence and
speculation that liberalism cannot survive much longer. The basis for such a conclusion rests, I
contend, principally on two texts that theorize of the shortcomings of liberalism that have only
continuously grown more pronounced and more irresolvable by liberalism itself: MacIntyre’s
After Virtue and Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed.119
Lea reflects:
Carlyle’s doctrine certainly does not lie on the surface. To penetrate to the heart of it is no easy
matter even for one not pre-convinced of its falsehood; for one who is, it is impossible. His
books are full of brilliant intuitions, psychological, historical and social, brilliantly conveyed; the
coherent world-view to which they belong is nowhere explicitly formulated. His quick-sketches
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are bursting with light and colour; the composition into which they might have been introduced
is left largely to conjecture.120
I seek to inform and amend Harold Bloom’s deeply un-nuanced account of Carlyle:
In [Carlyle’s] profound anxiety to overturn the empirical view of the cosmos as a vast machine,
Carlyle divinised nature and debased man. It is Carlyle, and not his critic Nietzsche, who is the
forerunner of twentieth-century fascism, with its mystical exaltation of the state and its
obliteration of compassion and the rights of the individual. That shadow cannot be removed
from the later Carlyle,…uncritical idolater of those iron men, Oliver Cromwell and Frederick the
Great. It is the Carlyle who wrote during the fifteen years from 1828 to 1843 who still matters
to us. The author of “Signs of the Times” (1829) and “Characteristics” (1831), of Sartor Resartus
(completed 1831) and Past and Present (1843) remains the sage who fathered Ruskin, inspired
Emerson, and stimulated the social prophecy of William Morris. If time has darkened Carlyle, it
has shown also that there is a perpetual remnant of vision in him, a voice that still rises out of
the wilderness.121
I will argue that Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, in particular, still matters to us because it is the text in
which he theorizes transcendentalism and that his transcendentalism is precisely the
“perpetual remnant of vision in him” that still “rises out of the wilderness.”
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Chapter 1
The Scope of Thomas Carlyle in the History of Political Thought

Thomas Carlyle is an enigma in the history of political thought. His autobiographical yet
fictitious character Professor Teufelsdrӧckh in Sartor Resartus captures Carlyle’s cryptic
persona. Carlyle writes, “for the shallow-sighted, Teufelsdrӧckh is oftenest a man without
Activity of any kind, a No-man; for the deep-sighted, again, a man with Activity almost
superabundant, yet so spiritual, close-hidden, enigmatic, that no mortal can foresee its
explosions, or even when it has exploded, so much as ascertain its significance.” 1 Carlyle’s own
scope in the history of political thought can be characterized likewise, as he has been largely
discounted as a “No-man” in both academic and popular philosophical discourse.2 Carlyle’s
autobiographical sketch, first published in 1833 at age 38, captures his reputation as a
philosopher and political theorist only more so ever since as a function of his influence and
name-recognition becoming less salient during the latter half of the twentieth century and early
part of the twenty-first. Yet, I will argue, Carlyle’s significance remains “superabundant.” Such
significance, however, is difficult to make tangible and material and requires applying his
philosophy in the context of the twenty-first century, a century whose politics Carlyle was not
hesitant to forecast.3

1

Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 78.
While Carlyle is still studied by a comparatively small scholarly community that specializes in Carlyle studies, he is
not particularly salient in political theory scholarship relative to other political philosophers. I will argue that this is
partially because Carlyle did not advance and promote a coherent political doctrine of his own but rather advanced
critiques of dogma and materialist philosophy (such as utilitarianism) emerging in his own time.
3
Carlyle, in Sartor Resartus, forecasted “the phoenix” to take place in the twenty-first century, an alternative
historical narrative to the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic or other prominent “end of history” accounts such as those
offered by Fukuyama, Weber, or Nietzsche. Carlyle’s conception of “the phoenix” is when the age of liberal
2

60

Carlyle, again just as he characterized Teufelsdrӧckh, was himself a “radical” in his
adoption of German Idealism as opposed to British empirical philosophy and utilitarianism.4 As
a work of imaginative fiction based on Carlyle’s own biography, Sartor Resartus, via protagonist
Professor Teufelsdrӧckh, offers a philosophical doctrine based on the themes of German
Idealism as a contrast to the hegemonic eighteenth-century British empirical philosophy and
nineteenth-century utilitarianism.5
What perhaps has gone most unacknowledged and unappreciated heretofore in the
study of Carlyle is that he looked on politics, just as he did all of existence, from the perspective
of a “philosophy of clothes.” According to John MacCunn’s synthesis of Carlyle’s political
perspective, Carlyle’s orientation was such that “all ranks, dignities, institutions, creeds, are but
the clothes, often threadbare enough, wherewith the human spirit patches its nakedness and
masquerades in the world’s eye.”6
One statement from Carlyle in particular captures his all-encompassing social criticism
while also implicitly capturing the essence of his theory of transcendentalism as a solution: “It is
by tangible, material considerations that we are guided, not by inward and spiritual.”7 Such a
statement, from Carlyle’s 1829 essay “Signs of the Times,” not only diagnoses modernity but
also in many ways negates modernity and its devotion to the comparatively pedestrian material
when compared to transcendentalism’s devotion to the spiritual. The inevitable failure of being
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guided primarily by material considerations, I intend to demonstrate, will compel the adoption
of Carlylean transcendentalism. Carlyle remarks further:
Self-denial, the parent of all virtue, in any true sense of that word, has perhaps seldom been
rarer: so rare is it, that the most, even in their abstract speculations, regard its existence as a
chimera. Virtue is Pleasure, is Profit; no celestial, but an earthly thing. Virtuous men,
Philanthropists, Martyrs are happy accidents; their ‘taste’ lies the right way! In all senses, we
worship and follow after Power; which may be called a physical pursuit. No man now loves
Truth, as Truth must be loved, with an infinite love; but only with a finite love.8
Carlyle articulates a theory as to how modernity puts humanity in a cage, thereby preempting Max Weber’s famous iron cage thesis at the conclusion of The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism in 1905. In so doing, Carlyle also emphasizes the weight public opinion
carries in determining human behavior in the context of modernity:
By arguing on the “force of circumstances,” we have argued away all force from ourselves; and
stand leashed together, uniform in dress and movement, like the rowers of some boundless
galley. This and that may be right and true; but we must not do it. Wonderful “Force of Public
Opinion”! We must act and walk in all points as it prescribes; follow the traffic it bids us, realise
the sum of money, the degree of “influence” it expects of us, or we shall be lightly esteemed;
certain mouthfuls of articulate wind will be blown at us, and this what mortal courage can
front? Thus, while civil liberty is more and more secured to us, our moral liberty is all but lost.
Practically considered, our creed is Fatalism; and, free in hand and foot, we are shackled in
heart and soul with far straiter than feudal chains. Truly may we say, with the Philosopher, “the
deep meaning of the Laws of Mechanism lies heavy on us;” and in the closet, in the
marketplace, in the temple, by the social hearth, encumbers the whole movements of our
mind, and over our noblest faculties is spreading a nightmare sleep.9
Such a diagnosis could perhaps be cast as a thesis that defines Carlyle’s decades-long
nineteenth-century intellectual career and is the fodder on which rests his multi-faceted
antagonism to the hegemonic world order of liberal democratic capitalism that began to
emerge during his lifespan.
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Neff provides a narrative of the advent of modernity that Carlyle faced in Victorian
England, which in many ways is an articulation of the rationalization and disenchantment of the
world that Max Weber would later theorize:
Attempts to account for the development of genius, psychological explanations of poetic
inspiration, and “natural histories of religion,” were not only destroying reverence for the
sublime and mysterious elements of human life, but were also removing the inspiration to rise
above mediocrity. Contemporary thought was being diverted from “moral science” to “physical
science,” and morality, deprived of its divine content, was being treated as only the product of
profit-and-loss calculation. These cumulative influences were drying up the fountains of
national life; all that has been free, natural and spontaneous was cabined, cribbed, and
confined. Through being treated as lifeless machinery, institutions were actually becoming it.
“The time,” Carlyle summarized, “is sick and out of joint. Many things have reached their
height.”10
The description of the zeitgeist of modernization that Neff offers illustrates that there was a
growing void of spirituality as a function of the emerging hegemony of mechanized materialism.
Carlyle sought to point this dynamic out by contesting the prioritization of materialism.
What is more, Neff also provides an abstract that characterizes Carlyle’s unique position
as a critic of utilitarianism and rationalism that has wide implications for political theory in
general:
So sure was Carlyle’s understanding of the springs of human action, that Professor Cazamian
has justly called him the greatest of Utilitarians. Those who arrogated to themselves the name
were utopian idealists who dreamed that men were ready to follow intellectual truth at all
costs, and that the railroads, steamships, and trade which were bringing nations into ever
closer contact would soon bind them in a league of perpetual peace. They expected the world
to resign itself to the iron laws of Ricardian economics, to cast off without a murmur customs
and beliefs shown to be irrational, and to accept the findings of a science which proclaimed the
universe a soulless and relentless mechanism and man an animal. Carlyle knew that most men
would call the truth an enemy when it threatened to belie their most cherished beliefs and
check their habitual actions, and would discover in faith and intuition the comfort in selfjustification which the intellect denied them…While the partisans of the greatest happiness
principle were offering cold comfort, he strove continually to augment the sources of
happiness; faith, hope, admiration, reverence, vigorous activity, colorful imagination, and
10
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exuberant health….He saw with remarkable clearness the needs of the moment, and advocated
the most direct means to satisfy them.11
Neff thus shows us how the contrast between rationalism and Carlyle’s philosophy was broad
and deep. As Neff characterized Carlyle’s view, “the reform of society depended upon the
individual’s willingness to reform his own moral nature. And toward this end Carlyle, in his
usual fervent peroration, urged each of his readers to strive.”12 Carlyle’s concluding sentence in
“Signs of the Times” reflects this: “To reform a world, to reform a nation, no wise man will
undertake; and all but foolish men know, that the only solid, though a far slower reformation, is
what each begins and perfects on himself.”13 It is in this context that I offer a normative
argument for the adoption of Carlylean transcendentalism at the individual level as a means for
social and political reform at the collective level. Carlylean transcendentalism, at least implicitly,
calls on individuals to adopt and internalize transcendentalism so as to alter the collective
political culture.
Despite his diagnosis of what he took to be the social ills plaguing Victorian England,
Carlyle nonetheless maintained an optimistic tone and a progressive outlook:
Neither, with all these evils more or less clearly before us, have we at any time despaired of the
fortunes of society. Despair, or even despondency, in that respect, appears to us, in all cases, a
groundless feeling. We have a faith in the imperishable dignity of man; in the high vocation to
which, throughout this his earthly history, he has been appointed. However it may be with
individual nations, whatever melancholic speculators may assert, it seems a well-ascertained
fact, that in all times, reckoning even from those of the Heraclides and Pelasgi, the happiness
and greatness of mankind at large have been continually progressive. Doubtless this age also is
advancing. Its very unrest, its ceaseless activity, its discontent contains matter of promise.
Knowledge, education are opening the eyes of the humblest; are increasing the number of

11

Neff, Carlyle and Mill, 321.
Neff, Carlyle and Mill, 163-164.
13
Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 342.
12

64

thinking minds without limit. This is as it should be; for not in turning back, not in resisting, but
only in resolutely struggling forward, does our life consist.14
Carlyle does not think merely reforming the structures of political institutions will be
sufficient to yield ideal outcomes. He opposed reform that seeks to adjust what he terms “mere
political arrangements” such as “a good structure of legislation, a proper check upon the
executive, a wise arrangement of the judiciary” that in and of themselves are superficial and in
no way lead to substantive changes.15 He scoffs at those who think such reforms are “all that is
wanting for human happiness,” as Carlyle again thinks the individual must change himself or
herself at a personal level in order to yield change personally and by so doing collectively.16
Levin offers a valuable synopsis of Carlyle’s perspective on the modern era inaugurated
as a function of industrialism in Victorian England: “‘The monster ‘UTILITARIA’ was breaking the
social aggregate into individual fragments and then, having pitted one man in competition
against the other, in effect declaring one man the enemy of another, goes on to pronounce that
the object of life is the pursuit of the greatest happiness.”17 Such a critique of modernity
exposes the inherent contradiction, or at the very least antinomic relationship, of an economy
and society that prizes the pursuit of the greatest happiness as an end yet prizes unconsciously
the declaration of men as enemies in competition as the means of attaining happiness.
In The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, Leo Marx
frames Carlyle’s nexus with Karl Marx and Ralph Waldo Emerson by presenting the inherent
compatibility of all three philosophers’ grievances with respect to the hegemonic world order.
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He quotes Timothy Walker, who provides a valuable synopsis of Carlyle’s position: “What
worries Carlyle…[is that] mind will become subjected to the laws of matter; that physical
science will be built up on the ruins of our spiritual nature; that in our rage for machinery, we
shall ourselves become machines.”18 Leo Marx writes that Karl Marx uses language in his
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts describing the modern economic situation which gives
rise to alienation that is “strikingly similar to Carlyle’s.”19 For example, he references as
evidence Karl Marx’s general appraisal of the state of the modern economy: “The devaluation
of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase in value of the world of
things.”20 Leo Marx informs his readers that three years after Karl Marx’s essay on alienation,
Emerson wrote the following poem:
Things are in the saddle,
And ride mankind.
There are two laws discrete,
Not reconciled,-Law for man, and law for thing;
The last builds town and fleet,
But it runs wild,
And doth the man unking.
This poem captures the sentiment that not only is humanity beholden to a state of alienation,
but that materialism generates irregularities that will eventually have a tremendously negative
impact on humanity.
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In addition to his ruminations on economic alienation, Carlyle anticipates the postFreudian version of alienation.21 For example, Carlyle pre-figures a post-Freudian view when he
speaks of “mechanism” as stifling the “primary, unmodified forces and energies of man,” or
when he pits the machine in opposition to the “mysterious springs of Love.”22 When Carlyle
speaks of the “dynamical” as being subordinate to the “mechanical” in modern life, Leo Marx
argues that he is congruent to Herbert Marcuse who, in Eros and Civilization, attributes psychic
powerlessness on the part of individuals to the increasing repression of instinctual drives made
necessary by a more and more complicated technological order.23 Mechanized society requires
humanity to endure an intolerable curbing of their spontaneous selves and this facilitates an
alienation that is bound to grow as mechanized society becomes more dominant over human
life.24 Carlyle’s animus toward “industrial society” at the point of its advent in nineteenthcentury Britain foreshadows later twentieth-century critiques of technology by Jacques Ellul
and Theodore Kaczynski, Ellul’s unauthorized and criminal disciple, that are essentially mimicry
of Carlyle’s original criticisms.25
Carlyle made significant contributions to political philosophy through his critique of
Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, providing a stark rebuttal to the theory of “the greatest good
for the greatest number” in Victorian England, which Carlyle characterized as spreading like a
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“dog-madness: till the whole World-kennel will be rabid.”26 Carlyle complained that “the
Philosopher of this age is not a Socrates, a Plato, a Hooker, or Taylor, who inculcates on men
the necessity and infinite worth of moral goodness, the great truth that our happiness depends
on the mind which is within us, and not on the circumstances which are without us; but a
Smith, a De Lolme, a Bentham, who chiefly inculcates the reverse of this,--that our happiness
depends entirely on external circumstances; nay, that the strength and dignity of the mind
within us is itself the creature and consequence of these.”27 Carlyle laments that “it is no longer
the moral, religious, spiritual condition of the people that is our concern, but their physical,
practical, economical condition” and “men are to be guided only by their self-interests.”28
Carlyle found Bentham’s chief fault to be:
that he can affirm nothing, except that money is pleasant in the purse and food in the stomach,
and that by this simplest of all Beliefs he can reorganise Society. He can shatter it in pieces; no
thanks to him, for its old fastenings are quite rotten: but he cannot reorganise it; this is work for
quite others than he.29
Carlyle attacked Bentham’s utilitarianism as being closely allied to what he took to be the twin
evils of “Atheism” and “Egoism,” and persisted in writing how he reckoned “Jeremiah Bentham
no Philosopher, and the Utilitarian system little better than the gross Idol-worship of a
generation that has forsaken and knows not the ‘Invisible God’.”30 This statement epitomizes
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Carlyle’s yearning for a philosophy and politics that pursues the transcendental rather than
merely the material.
Bentham’s utilitarianism was a point of juncture between Carlyle and John Stuart Mill,
and this juncture has persisted in the subsequent history of political philosophy. Political
theorists subsequent to Bentham, most notably Rawls, have sought to refute utilitarianism with
the use of analytical reasoning, while Carlyle, a theorist in the “romantic” fold, deemed
utilitarianism to be simply unworthy of consideration and rejected it out of hand.31 In his dual
biographical account of Carlyle and John Stuart Mill entitled Carlyle and Mill: Mystic and
Utilitarian, Neff vividly portrays Carlyle’s aversion to utilitarianism:
[Carlyle] demanded a polarity of vice and virtue which precluded any calculation of the relative
amounts of good and evil involved in a proposed act. Advocates of the hedonistic calculus
seemed so base and vicious that he would not condescend to meet them with argument. His
outraged conscience loosed on Utilitarian ethics the vials of its wrath; crudely abusive epithets,
unfair caricature, and ugly sarcasm mingled strangely with rapt display of revered symbols
which might lift men’s gaze from the trough of sensualism. He had no patience with an analysis
which tried to tear away the veil from that holy of holies, man’s heart, wherein God’s spirit was
wont sensibly to dwell, and professed to exhibit only a mechanism for the weighing of pains
and pleasures…The effect of these assaults on the popular mind was enormous. If to this day
[1924] the epithet “utilitarian” retains a somewhat opprobrious connotation, it is to no
inconsiderable degree the result of Carlyle’s writings.32
Neff presented the paradoxes inherent in utilitarianism, paradoxes that can be used to show
that Carlyle’s “mysticism” seems rational in comparison to utilitarianism. Neff writes about the
Bentham school of utilitarianism: “these cold rationalists were zealous for the welfare of
humanity; these cautious skeptics were advocates of universal peace; these contemners of
religion had fanatic faith in the power of reason to perfect mankind.”33 In addition to Bentham,
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Carlyle dismissed John Locke in that he commented that “his whole doctrine is mechanical, in
its aim and origin, in its method and its results.”34
Carlyle’s rejection of Bentham and utilitarianism is accentuated by the comparison he
undertakes of Bentham and Muhammad and Carlyle’s endorsement of Muhammad when
pitting him against Bentham. In an 1840 lecture, “The Hero as Prophet,” Carlyle observed that
Muhammad, unlike Bentham, did not reduce virtue to an arithmetical calculation in pursuit of
discovering the chief end of humanity. Carlyle unpacks and defends his position that “enjoying
things which are pleasant; that is not the evil: it is the reducing of our moral self to slavery by
them that is”:
[Mahomet] does not, like a Bentham, a Paley, take Right and Wrong, and calculate the profit
and loss, ultimate pleasure of the one and of the other; and summing all up by addition and
subtraction into a net result, ask you, Whether on the whole the Right does not preponderate
considerably? No; it is not better to do the one than the other; the one is to the other as life is
to death,--as Heaven is to Hell. The one must in nowise be done, the other in nowise left
undone. You shall not measure them; they are incommensurable: the one is death eternal to a
man, the other is life eternal. Benthamee Utility, virtue by Profit and Loss; reducing this God’s
world to a dead brute Steam engine, the infinite celestial Soul of Man to a kind of Hay-balance
for weighing hay and thistles on, pleasures and pains on:--If you ask me which gives, Mahomet
or they, the beggarlier and falser view of Man and his Destinies in this Universe, I will answer, It
is not Mahomet!35
Carlyle invokes Plato by naming a collection of his essays critical of democracy LatterDay Pamphlets. Carlyle makes the case that his contemporary Victorian era in England is indeed
representative of what Plato had in mind—democracy taking hold in the latter-days of a
political community’s existence as both a vehicle for and symbol of precipitous decline whereby
political dissolution follows.
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Carlyle promoted the “philosophy of clothes”/transcendentalism as an entirely “new
Branch of Philosophy” that would lead to “as yet undescried ulterior results.” 36 The discloser of
such a philosophy, Teufelsdrӧckh, is described by Carlyle as a “quite new human Individuality,
an almost unexampled personal Character.”37 Carlyle, in this manner, is promoting not only the
“philosophy of clothes” but also the philosopher of clothes as not only compelling but
essentially as the most compelling development in philosophy by the most compelling
philosopher. Teufelsdrӧckh is described as the philosopher whom “the secrets of man’s Life
were laid open to…[who] sawest into the mystery of the Universe, farther than another.” 38 In
such a characterization, Carlyle elevates Teufelsdrӧckh to a position higher than not only all
other philosophers, but also a position higher than those persons in highest esteem in the
context of divinity on the global and historical stages—namely Christ and Muhammad.
Teufelsdrӧckh, a quite literal reading of Carlyle would assert, saw farther into the mystery of
the Universe than either Christ or Muhammad or Plato, among others.
Carlyle’s “philosophy of clothes” is a construction whereby the clothing figuratively
represents the institutions, beliefs, customs, and conventions of man and society.39 Tennyson
provides an insight into the purpose of Sartor Resartus:
Yet a further purpose of the painstaking identification of clothing with the practices of society is
to strip the clothes off. Carlyle fashions the clothes metaphor less to apparel society than to
denude it. Swift creates his clothes metaphor in A Tale of a Tub to comment on a particular set
of beliefs, Christianity, and to show that one set of beliefs is superior to its rivals, that one suit
of clothes fits man better than any other. Carlyle’s metaphor is both more intensive and more
extensive. All of society’s old clothes are ill fitting and must be removed. Sartor abounds in
allusions to nakedness, stripping away, disrobing—all designed to make us look at the
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fundamental object, man, so that we too see that he and his society are wearing tatters in this
“Ragfair of a World.”…If we can but peer beneath the outer coverings, the “hulls,” “husks,” and
“garnitures,” and other pejorative terms Carlyle employs to make these externals appear
contemptible, we will see that a living unity lies revealed.40
It is along the lines of this narrative that the individual and society must examine themselves
and “go back to the fundamentals to build up belief from the elementary qualities of
existence.”41 Transcendentalism might be defined as such a return to the fundamentals,
whereby the ideal condition for living may be ascertained from the elementary qualities of
existence, particularly in the context of humanity’s relations with nature. All such institutions,
beliefs, customs, and conventions are discounted from each, individually and internally,
providing a full and comprehensive doctrine to guide humanity because they are each paltry
when compared to the articulation of the “philosophy of clothes” itself. In this regard, Carlyle is
re-articulating, though not explicitly, Plato’s allegory of the cave. The institutions, beliefs,
customs, and conventions are shadows on the wall and the “philosophy of clothes” is the true
interpretation of the world.
In this way, Teufelsdrӧckh as “philosopher of clothes” is analogous to the dweller in
Plato’s cave who leaves and sees sunlight for the first time:
And suppose someone were to drag him away forcibly up the steep and rugged ascent and not
let him go until he had hauled him out into the sunlight, would he not suffer pain and vexation
at such treatment, and, when he had come out into the light, find his eyes so full of radiance
that he could not see a single one of the things that he was now told were real?42
Plato’s analogizing the cave to the world perceived by humans with their material senses offers
an application to Carlylean transcendentalism in that a transcendentalist seeks to not merely
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perceive and describe the “clothing” of the universe but to ascertain the intrinsic and higher
meaning embedded within the “clothing”:
The prison dwelling [of the cave] corresponds to the region revealed to us through the sense of
sight, and the fire-light within it to the power of the Sun. The ascent to see the things in the
upper world you may take as standing for the upward journey of the soul into the region of the
intelligible; then you will be in possession of what I surmise, since that is what you wish to be
told. Heaven knows whether it is true; but this, at any rate, is how it appears to me. In the
world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential
Form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is
the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord
of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and
truth. Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either in his own
life or in matters of state.43
The analogy to Plato’s allegory of the cave is an applicable conclusion that can be drawn
by also building on Tennyson’s own conclusion with respect to the philosophy of clothes: “once
the clothes metaphor in its widest extension is firmly planted in the reader’s mind, Carlyle is
able to play on the contrast between outer and inner, material and spiritual, real and ideal,
dead and living, as on an instrument of which he is the designer and sole performer.”44 This is
because institutions, beliefs, customs, and conventions are not taken to be representative of a
singular, transcendent, and immaterial divine idea of the world. And, unconscious of Carlyle’s
theory of transcendentalism, this is why individuals transact in them. If Carlyle’s
transcendentalism were to be widely diffused so as to enter the consciousness of the entirety
of humanity, it is likely (or at least possible) that humanity would give up its incommensurable
and interminable ideological, political, and religious conflicts and subscribe to Carlyle’s
transcendentalism. In other words, they would give up their ways and their viewing of the

43
44

Plato, The Republic of Plato, 231.
Tennyson, Sartor Called Resartus, 287.

73

shadows and be convinced by Teufelsdrӧckh as the one who returns to the cave to inform them
that they have been transacting their lives in shadows the whole time. Every person would
become a transcendentalist and seek to ascertain the divine idea of the world that lies
embedded in the philosophy of clothes as the preliminary divine idea of the world. This means
that transcendentalists, upon accepting the philosophy of clothes as the divine idea of the
world, would spend their efforts interpreting the clothing that comprises the universe for its
inner and symbolic meaning. Essentially, this is the definition of what a Carlylean
transcendentalist is.
The first step toward ascertaining the divine idea of the world is the negation of the
possibility that ideologies and theologies apart from Carlyle’s transcendentalism are themselves
valid as comprehensive doctrines and the realization that Carlyle’s transcendentalism is the
only valid comprehensive doctrine because it is the only doctrine that accounts for, embodies,
and terminates all other ideologies and theologies. Carlylean transcendentalism has the
capacity to unite humanity and end ethnic, racial, religious, political, ideological, and
international relations conflict by exposing the pettiness of squabbles that results from
differences along the lines of race, nation, ideology, and religion.
Essentially, Carlyle suggests that philosophy will be forever altered as a result of the
articulation of the “philosophy of clothes” and the proselytization that will, he forecasts,
naturally follow. Carlyle explicitly sought to proselytize, describing “man” as “emphatically a
Proselytising creature.”45 Carlyle asked, through the voice of the Editor as a character in Sartor
Resartus, “How might [the philosophy of clothes] be imparted to others, perhaps in equal need
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thereof” as Teufelsdrӧckh, the discoverer and discloser of the philosophy?46 The question
becomes, “how could the Philosophy of Clothes and the Author of such Philosophy be brought
home, in any measure, to the business and bosoms of our own English nation?”47 Carlyle
characterizes Teufelsdrӧckh as being “not without some touch of the universal feeling, a wish
to proselytise.”48 Such statements illustrate how Carlyle intended for his philosophy of clothes
not only to be taken seriously as a legitimate philosophical discourse, but also to serve a
practical purpose and be lived by, “for if new-got gold is said to burn the pockets till it be cast
forth into circulation, much more may new Truth.”49
Carlyle recognized the difficulties of proselytization that would confront him instantly,
as the next sentence Carlyle writes after proclaiming the need for truth to be cast into
circulation is literally such a recognition: “Here, however, difficulties occurred.”50 Carlyle
immediately came to terms with how radical his “philosophy of clothes” is and how it would be
received as such by those whose interests would lie in upholding the status quo of all aspects of
human society that are unconscious of the philosophy of clothes. Carlyle makes known to his
readers that the “high Platonic Mysticism” of Teufelsdrӧckh is the “fundamental element of his
nature.”51 Carlyle characterizes Teufelsdrӧckh as someone who “exalted Spirit above all earthly
principalities and powers, and worshipped it, though under the meanest shapes, with a true
Platonic Mysticism.”52 As such, Carlyle conceived of the philosophy of clothes as an antithesis,
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in its purest form, to the human society dominated by dogma and materialism (and wholly
bereft of and ignorant of the philosophy of clothes).
Upon contemplating the circulation of the philosophy of clothes as widely as possible in
as many journals and newspapers as possible, the conclusion becomes:
But, on the other hand, was it not clear that such matter as must here be revealed and treated
of might endanger the circulation of any Journal extant? If, indeed, the whole Parties of the
State could have been abolished, Whig, Tory, and Radical, embracing in discrepant union; and
the whole Journals of the Nation could have been jumbled into one Journal, and the Philosophy
of Clothes poured forth in incessant torrents therefrom, the attempt had seemed possible.53
This conclusion is overwhelmingly consequential on two accounts. The first is that Carlyle
identifies the resistance that the philosophy of clothes would meet with as a function of it being
a heresy to not only some but all of the ideologies and political parties of England both
individually and collectively. The political parties would not give up their ideologies and thus
their prospects of attaining political power to a new-fangled and competitor philosophy of
clothes hostile to their very existence. The second way in which Carlyle’s account of the
prospective resistance toward the philosophy of clothes is consequential is that he implicitly
theorizes the totalizing/totalitarian nature of the philosophy of clothes. His account of how the
philosophy of clothes could proselytize effectively is one in which all other parties are abolished
and all come to embrace the philosophy of clothes in unison. Carlyle’s phrase “embracing in
discrepant union” must be interpreted, as it is highly cryptic. The phrase seems to connote how
political parties would abandon their particular and limited platforms under different terms and
embrace the philosophy of clothes in unity. Carlyle’s description of all the journals “jumbled
into one journal” also is illustrative of a totalizing measure he deems as a necessary
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prerequisite to the possibility of converting readers to the philosophy of clothes. Essentially, the
incessant competition that takes place in the context of pluralistic liberalism makes it such that
the philosophy of clothes would ostensibly be incapable of gaining requisite traction in a
political environment itself intrinsically inimical to the prospect of ceding legitimacy and
authority to the philosophy of clothes. In short, a liberal political environment stands as
anathema to the formation of a consensus in support of the philosophy of clothes,
transcendentalism, and Platonic mysticism as synonymous concepts. As such, the philosophy of
clothes, Carlyle thinks, would not gain a foothold, much less attract a consensus in an
environment that does not promote the philosophy of clothes with anything short of a
totalitarian approach. In other words, transcendentalism would be just one more
ideology/theology that liberal pluralism allows for but resists as a potential successor to
displace its own hegemony.
Carlyle highlights the broad distinction between the philosophy of clothes and other
philosophies that fall under the conventional label of radicalism when he frames the philosophy
of clothes as something far more radical than what is commonly defined as radical and whose
advent is an altogether revolutionary moment in not only the history of philosophy but of world
history. Teufelsdrӧckh, prior to his articulation of the philosophy of clothes, was thought to fit
in the fold of conventional radicalism, as he is characterized as such: “if through the high silent,
meditative Transcendentalism of our Friend we detected any practical tendency whatever, it
was at most Political, and towards a certain prospective, and for the present quite speculative,
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Radicalism….But, at all events, nothing Moral, still less any thing Didactico-Religious, was looked
for from him.”54
Carlyle’s moral philosophy is new and idiosyncratic as he is a post-Christian who is in no
way formally or explicitly an Aristotelian. Carlyle proposes transcendentalism ostensibly as an
articulation of a new and final doctrine, which embodies a teleological purpose apart from all
other non-Platonic political and religious doctrines. Carlyle constructs a moral philosophy with
nuance and fine detail so as to be able to make appeal to its precepts rational and so the appeal
does not appear as a mere instrument of arbitrary individual desire and will.55
Carlyle uses alienation as a basis for constructing transcendentalism. Without an ornate
narration of Professor Teufelsdrӧckh’s biography that is defined by his alienation, his
transcendentalism would have no “rational” basis and would be vulnerable to accusations of
subjectivity. In this sense, Carlyle’s constructivism is through and on the basis of what might be
called a “veil of alienation” that stands in contradistinction to Rawls’s veil of ignorance.56 A telos
offered by Carlyle’s transcendentalism is renunciation of the pursuit of insatiable consumption
and materialistic pleasure, which stands in polar contrast to the telos offered by Bentham’s
utilitarianism—maximum pleasure and absence of pain.57 For Carlyle, renunciation is a
prerequisite to living the highest form of life. Renunciation, or what Carlyle calls the
“Annihilation of Self,” is “the first preliminary moral Act.”58 It is necessary to achieve
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transcendence in the sense that the annihilation of self makes possible the recognition that the
entire universe, including one’s own self, is a transcendental phenomenon. Through the
annihilation of self, the universe can be ascertained and accounted for to the highest degree
possible that human sensory perception affords. Upon such an experience of the annihilation of
self, Carlyle writes of Teufelsdrӧckh’s transformation and how it fundamentally altered his
outlook: “‘my mind’s eyes were now unsealed, and its hands ungyved.’”59
Carlyle provides an account as to how renunciation is actually rational and logical
because one ultimately has to choose between either pursuing renunciation or pursuing
insatiable consumption as their two options:
Man’s Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in
him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance
Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in joint-stock
company, to make one Shoeblack HAPPY? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two; for
the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and would require, if you consider
it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less:
God’s infinite Universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as
fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a Throat like that Ophiuchus! Speak not of them; to the
infinite Shoeblack they are as nothing. No sooner is your ocean filled, than he grumbles that it
might have been of better vintage. Try him with half of a Universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets
to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and declares himself the most maltreated of
men. –Always there is a black spot in our sunshine: it is even, as I said, the Shadow of
Ourselves…So true is it, what I then said, that the Fraction of Life can be increased in value not
so much by increasing your Numerator, as by lessening your Denominator. Nay, unless my
Algebra deceive me, Unity itself divided by Zero will give Infinity. Make thy claim of wages a
zero, then; thou hast the world under thy feet. Well did the Wisest of our time write: ‘It is only
with Renunciation (Entsagen) that Life, properly speaking, can be said to begin.’60
Such a philosophical account has real-world relevance in the context of the twenty-first century
and, indeed, in any time period. By not choosing renunciation, one is choosing to not be
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satisfied until they have consumed the entirety of the universe. Ostensibly, since the scarcity of
resources precludes individuals and the collective from even the possibility of indefinitely
pursuing insatiable consumption, renunciation is a necessity. In other words, the nature of the
economy is such that it forces individuals to renounce because no economy has been able to
allow for all individuals within its purview to achieve infinite consumption. Such consumption is
merely what economic actors in the context of capitalism are pursuing—the continuous growth
of income and capital—against the resistance of finite resources. Carlyle demonstrates how it is
actually rational to pursue renunciation because diminishing returns and dissatisfaction will be
the only products of not at a minimum incorporating renunciation as a virtue in one’s personal
philosophy.
Since renunciation is a virtue antagonistic toward and ignored in the context of liberal
democratic capitalism it follows that, as liberal democratic capitalism persists into the future, it
will yield diminishing returns and dissatisfaction. This is because capitalism is built on the
perpetual increasing of consumption as a driver of profits and economic growth. Renunciation
is absent from democracy in the sense that the persistence of identity/interest group/partisan
politics illustrates individuals not renouncing but rather exerting their identity and interests to
antagonize political competitors who embody a disparate identity/interest group/political
party. It follows that if renunciation is not incorporated in the context of liberal democratic
capitalism, at least to some extent, what it amounts to is that one must be satisfied with
political clashes that will have no means to subside but rather maintain, if not increase, in their
bitterness and hostility. An economy resting on the hegemonic mindset to continuously pursue
growth while pursuing consumption can be sustained, but only for a time. Individual economic
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actors and the collective economy cannot overcome the scarcity of resources in the long term
by not adopting renunciation.
Carlyle provides a non-theological and non-doctrinal account of transcendentalism,
whereby divinity is philosophized to rest in the universe as clothing: “The Universe is not dead
and demoniacal, a charnel-house with spectres; but god-like, and my Father’s!”61 The two
mutually reinforcing premises of 1) renunciation in the form of Annihilation of Self and 2)
recognition of the universe as clothing symbolic of a transcendent/divine order leads
Teufelsdrӧckh to a grand conclusion that can be applied in the context of politics as an
ideological viewpoint:
With other eyes too could I now look upon my fellow man; with an infinite Love, an infinite Pity.
Poor, wandering, wayward man! Art thou not tried, and beaten with stripes, even as I am? Ever,
whether thou bear the Royal mantle or the Beggar’s gabardine, art thou not so weary, so
heavy-laden; and thy Bed of Rest is but a Grave. O my Brother, my Brother! why cannot I
shelter thee in my bosom, and wipe away all tears from thy eyes.62
The universal adoption of this viewpoint, ostensibly, would yield a communitarian
society based on mutual solidarity. If Carlylean transcendentalism achieved universal adoption,
renunciation and mutual solidarity would replace insatiable competition and interminable
conflict. Such a prospect is difficult to entertain because economic production has rested upon
competition and competition has yielded valuable economic results to improve the quality of
life of billions globally as a function of the advent of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth
century. The challenge for the adoption of transcendentalism as post-liberalism would be in the
maintenance of economic production which ensures a decent standard of living for the
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population while simultaneously incorporating renunciation as an ethos. Both would be
necessary to preserve and “plateau” capitalism so that it does not burn out as a result of
resource depletion and environmental degradation, both of which are externalities to the
continuous increase in production and consumption. Such a passage from Carlyle also
underscores how transcendentalism as an ideology would not be able to offer much in the
context of a developing economy, such as Carlyle’s own Victorian England. In the climate of a
developing economy, increasing production and consumption are necessities in order to cross
the threshold of providing a decent standard of living to all of the population. In late, or latter
stage capitalism, transcendentalism has an application in that it can “pump the brakes” on the
sole pursuit of economic growth so as to preserve and plateau the hard-fought gains of
industrial capitalism since the nineteenth century.
Carlyle’s conception of what he calls the “Everlasting Yea” is derivative of his
philosophical construction, and the Everlasting Yea is a state “wherein all contradiction is
solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him.”63 The Everlasting Yea is
simultaneously the nexus and product when renunciation, the philosophy of clothes, and
mutual solidarity are combined. As such, the Everlasting Yea provides a comprehensive doctrine
for individuals to live by as individuals and as individuals who are members of a collective
populace. The Everlasting Yea is a conclusion derived from transcendentalism as a political
doctrine that has gone unrecognized for its political application. This shows how Carlylean
transcendentalism has gone untried, unimplemented, and unfulfilled as a prospective political
ideology. Carlyle’s philosophical construction casts transcendentalism, it can be inferred, as a
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competitor (that has gone unnoticed as a competitor) to liberal democratic capitalism,
communism, fascism, and all other ideologies and doctrines existent in the history of political
philosophy.
After laying out Carlyle’s philosophical construction, the comparison of Carlyle’s
transcendentalism with Marx’s communism is particularly noteworthy. Carlyle provides a
philosophical construct for a communal society that stands not only in stark contrast to but
essentially as the inverse of Marx’s account. From Carlyle’s perspective, the mutual solidarity of
humanity is achieved as a function of individuals at their own individual and personal level
assenting to Carlyle’s transcendentalism and the conclusions (such as the concept of the
Everlasting Yea) that are derivative from it. Mutual solidarity is established through
renunciation and recognition of a divine/transcendent order. Marx’s theory of mutual
solidarity, or communism, is achieved not through a renunciation on the part of each and every
individual, but rather through the climax of class antagonism in the form of a proletarian
revolution. Moreover, Marx’s philosophy is materialist and wholly unconscious of the
philosophy of clothes and as such it is not transcendentalist. Much like capitalism, communism
is bound within the limits of the pursuit of materialist consumption and both capitalism and
communism are thus vulnerable to the inherent problem of the insatiability of material
appetites that Carlyle theorizes. Carlyle thinks a transcendentalist mindset is not only necessary
but is the only means possible to foster mutual solidarity among humanity: “for only in looking
heavenward, take it in what sense you may, not in looking earthward, does what we can call
Union, mutual Love, Society, begin to be possible.”64
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Despite such dissonance between Carlyle and Marx, they agree in some particulars.
Marx uses language that is largely synonymous with that of Carlyle, particularly of Carlyle in
Sartor Resartus, and even quotes Carlyle in The Communist Manifesto in what is perhaps Marx’s
most famous thesis. Carlyle laments human affairs being governed by the principles of “laissezfaire” and “cash payment”:
Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under due Laws-of-war, named “fair
competition” and so forth, it is a mutual hostility. We have profoundly forgotten everywhere
that Cash-payment is not the sole relation of human beings; we think, nothing doubting, that it
absolves and liquidates all engagements of man. “My starving workers?” answers the rich Millowner: “Did not I hire them fairly in the market? Did I not pay them to the last sixpence the sum
covenanted for? What have I to do with them more?”—Verily Mammon-worship is a
melancholy creed.65
He bemoans the disintegration of the community that he sees taking place in another
context:
From the “Sacrament of Marriage” downwards, human beings used to be manifoldly related,
one to another, and each to all; and there was no relation among human beings, just or unjust,
that had not its grievances and difficulties, its necessities on both sides to bear and forbear. But
henceforth, be it known, we have changed all that, by favour of Heaven: “the voluntary
principle” has come-up, which will itself do the business for us; and now let a new Sacrament,
that of Divorce, which we call emancipation, and spout-of on our platforms, be universally the
order of the day!—Have men considered whither all this is tending, and what it certainly
enough betokens?66
Such passages can be compared with Marx’s own:
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal,
idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his
“natural superiors,” and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked
self-interest, than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of
religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of
egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the
numberless and feasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—
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Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked,
shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.67
This comparison leads to the question as to how much was Marx influenced by Carlyle? At a
minimum, both offer criticism of the hegemony of liberalism and its facilitation of what they
perceive as atomization and alienation of the individual.
Carlyle derives a narrative of the prospects of political development as a function of the
Everlasting Yea that could be described at minimum as proto-Marxist/proto-communist.
Teufelsdrӧckh contemplates and agrees with Rousseau’s theory of property. In so doing,
Teufelsdrӧckh concludes that just as property has grown into a human institution worldwide
from one single person’s initial claim to property, similarly the precepts of Teufelsdrӧckh’s
philosophy too could potentially grow into institutions entrenched and taken for granted.68
Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophy—elementally comprised of the philosophy of clothes
(transcendentalism), renunciation, and the Everlasting Yea—consists of the necessary
prerequisites to be able to construct a philosophical theory for the reversal of private property
into communitarian/communal ownership. Capitalism and private property can be maintained,
but the fusion of the ethos of the Everlasting Yea would amount to injecting a spirit of mutual
solidarity such that cash-payment relations would take place in the context of an evolved ethos.
Economic relations fused with a spirit of mutual solidarity would be a means to achieve
Aristotle’s conception of ideal property relations. Aristotle theorized how “moral goodness will
ensure that the property of each is made to serve the use of all, in the spirit of the proverb
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which says ‘Friends’ goods are goods in common.’”69 Aristotle then concluded, “the better
system is that under which property is privately owned but is put to common use; and the
function proper to the legislator is to make men so disposed that they will treat property in this
way.”70
The mindset individuals and collective society holds toward property can evolve if and
when each and every individual recognizes, subscribes to, and practices renunciation and the
Everlasting Yea.71 Teufelsdrӧckh theorizes, much like Marx would, that property is an
“Institution…not unsuitable to the wants of the time.’”72 Though property is suitable to the
nineteenth century, Teufelsdrӧckh provides a communitarian (and what also could be
characterized as proto-communist) narrative that is a context under which property as an
institution might evolve:
At a time when the divine Commandment, Thou shalt not steal, wherein truly, if well
understood, is comprised the whole Hebrew Decalogue, with Solon’s and Lycurgus’s
Constitutions, Justinian’s Pandects, the Code Napoleon, and all Codes, Catechisms, Divinities,
Moralities whatsoever, that man has hitherto devised (and enforced with Altar-fire and
Gallows-ropes) for his social guidance: at a time, I say, when this divine Commandment has all
but faded away from the general remembrance; and, with little disguise, a new opposite
Commandment, Thou shalt steal, is every where promulgated,--it perhaps behoved, in this
universal dotage and deliration, the sound portion of mankind to bestir themselves and rally. 73
Carlyle thus provides a radical theory hostile to private property as an institution that
bespeaks of a type of communal association as the successor to private property. The extent of
Carlyle’s influence on Karl Marx’s theory of communism, in particular, is perhaps lost to
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intellectual history. However, other passages from Marx’s early writings, particularly in
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, sound reminiscent of Carlyle. For example, Marx writes
that “communism is the positive expression of annulled private property…[and] the relationship
of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things.”74
Carlyle asserts metaphorically: “‘Hangmen and Catchpoles may, by their noose-gins and
baited fall-traps, keep down the smaller sort of vermin: but what, except perhaps some such
Universal Association, can protect us against whole meat-devouring and man-devouring hosts
of Boa Constrictors?”75 Carlyle provides this curious statement that is proto-communist and a
type of prophesy as to the context whereby the dissolution of property as an institution might
come about out of the pure necessity for it to have to come about. It is a statement rich in
meaning that needs to be unpacked, especially since Carlyle does not provide a further
description of what he means specifically. His philosophy is different from that of Marx, in this
instance, in that he conceives of economic parasites as being not only wealthy propertyowners—the “boa constrictors”—but also what could be inferred to be the parasitic poor,
whom Carlyle refers to as “the smaller sort of vermin.” By his phrasing, Carlyle asserts that both
groups will be problematic, but the wealthy, devouring property owners will be more
problematic.
The inference can be made that Carlyle is also seeking to underscore the magnitude of
the negative impact wealthy property owners will have when they accumulate and compound
their wealth in a type of exponential fashion which entails squeezing all those in humanity who
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are not the wealthy as their prey to consume the labor of and exploit the product of such labor.
Private property can persist as a hegemonic institution that dominates political economy when
all it has to do is guard against criminals who are by their nature petty compared with the
wealthy “boa-constrictors.” Only what Carlyle calls “Universal Association” can protect us from
the all-consuming wealthy, hellbent on squeezing and exploiting labor to increase their
holdings. For Carlyle, the advent of “boa-constrictors” connotes the advent of association as a
reaction to replace private property out of pure necessity as a safeguard from runaway
inequality that is bound to take shape under a system of private property. From the perspective
of the twenty-first century, Carlyle’s discussion of and use of the term “association” is
reminiscent of Marx’s use of “association” in one of his most iconic descriptions of communism:
“In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an
association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of
all.”76
As can be seen from his philosophical construction of renunciation, the Everlasting Yea,
and mutual solidarity, Carlyle seeks to advance his view that “it is the noble People that makes
the noble Government; rather than conversely” and “on the whole, Institutions are much; but
they are not all.”77 Carlyle bemoans the fixation placed on creating institutions when such
institutions would be unnecessary if the people were to be sufficiently what he terms
“Dynamic.” Carlyle observes:
To judge by the loud clamour of our Constitution-builders, Statists, Economists, directors,
creators, reformers of Public Societies; in a word, all manner of Mechanists, from the
Cartwright up to the Code-maker; and by the nearly total silence of all Preachers and Teachers
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who should give a voice to Poetry, Religion and Morality, we might fancy either that man’s
Dynamical nature was, to all spiritual intents, extinct, or else so perfected that nothing more
was to be made of it by the old means; and henceforth only in his Mechanical contrivances did
any hope exist for him.78
In a critique deeply reminiscent of Carlyle, Weber opined: “This passion for bureaucracy…is
enough to bring us to the point of despair….The key question is not how to further and
stimulate this tendency, but how to oppose this machine-mentality and keep a part of
humanity free from such fragmentation of the soul, from ultimate domination by the
bureaucratic form of life.”79 In summarizing the technological contradiction inherent in
liberalism from the point of view of liberalism’s critics, Stephen Holmes argues in a fashion
congruent to Carlyle: “science has set the stage for an endless explosion of appetites [and]
since desires grow endlessly whenever they are satisfied, the whole ‘modern project’ [of
liberalism] is absurdly Sisyphean—doomed from the start.”80 Such assessments of modernity
described by Weber and Holmes were originally put forth by Carlyle and are only becoming
increasingly evident in the twenty-first century.
In addition to comparing Carlyle’s philosophy with that of Karl Marx, the dialogue of
Carlyle with John Stuart Mill also proves valuable. Such a comparison with Mill’s liberal
philosophy is useful in further constructing transcendentalism as a political philosophy. John
Stuart Mill’s endorsement of Carlyle’s philosophy, albeit partial, provides a valuable window
into how Carlyle’s political philosophy is at a minimum worthy of contemplation in the realm of
liberal political philosophy. That Mill, one of the most if not the preeminent liberal political
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philosopher, not only entertained Carlyle’s philosophical views but conceded his own
philosophical limitations when comparing himself to Carlyle demonstrates how Carlyle should
not be exempted from consideration in the context of liberalism’s criticism and discerning the
prospects of post-liberalism.
Carlyle and Mill were both friends and adversaries. “Of male favorites, Mill stands at the
top,” wrote Carlyle in 1832.81 Mill returned the regard to Carlyle, writing in a letter to Sterling
about how his opinion of Carlyle rose the more he got to know him. He writes, “Carlyle passed
the whole of a long winter in London and rose in my opinion more than I know how to express,
from a nearer acquaintance. I do not think you estimate him half highly enough; but neither did
I when I last saw you.”82 In another letter, Mill announced that “Carlyle has by far the widest
liberality and tolerance (not in the sense that Coleridge justly disavows, but in the good sense)
that I have ever met in anyone.”83 He reviewed Carlyle’s History of the French Revolution
favorably: “No work of greater genius, either historical or poetical, has been produced in this
country for many years.”84 Mill wrote his praise of Carlyle to Carlyle himself:
You I look upon as an artist, perhaps the only genuine one now living in this country; the
highest destiny of all lies in that direction; for it is the artist alone in whose hands Truth
becomes impressive and a living principle of action….My vocation, as far as I yet see it, lies in a
humbler sphere;…to make those who are not poets understand that poetry is higher than logic,
and that the union of the two is philosophy.85
Carlyle saw a lot of common ground between himself and Mill, but also noted one key
difference between them—that Mill was beholden overwhelmingly to logic and Carlyle was not.
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Carlyle notes, “The creed you write down is singularly like my own in most points—with this
single difference, that you are yet consciously nothing of a Mystic; your very Mysticism (for
there is enough of it in you) you have to translate into Logic before you give it place.”86
Though Mill was indoctrinated into Benthamism by his father James Mill and Jeremy
Bentham, once he encountered opposing viewpoints, he became convinced of the negative
character inherent in the principles of liberty and equality and the necessity of new ideals for
the reconstruction of society.87 In a sentence that foreshadows Rawls drawing upon and
amending Mill’s philosophy, Neff characterizes Mill’s view with respect to establishing the
ideals to be used to reconstruct society: “But these ideals were to be sought, not by intuition,
as Carlyle and the Germans proclaimed, but through a careful study of scientific laws, which
would result in a stable science of society.”88
The compatibility of Mill and Carlyle was short-lived, as they began to part ways from
one another philosophically. While Carlyle lamented the dysfunction of representative
government and shallowness of institutions with the publication of Latter-Day Pamphlets, Mill
advocated individualism in his On Liberty and advocated a modified democracy in his
Representative Government.89 For all of Carlyle’s differences with Mill, on hearing the news of
Mill’s death, Carlyle exclaimed to Charles Eliot Norton: “I never knew a finer, tenderer, more
sensitive or modest soul among the sons of men. There never was a more generous creature
than he, nor a more modest.”90
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Carlyle had a lasting impact and legacy in influencing Mill’s political thought. In
Utilitarianism, for example, Mill championed a spiritualized utilitarian ethical system that was
compatible with Carlyle’s criticism levelled in Sartor Resartus thirty years earlier.91 As Neff
characterized it, “it was a tribute to the weight and persuasiveness of Carlyle’s objections, that
Mill devoted the larger part of his space to an attempt to clear away these (as he styled them)
misconceptions, which were the ‘chief obstacle’ to the favorable consideration of the Utilitarian
ethics.”92 Mill gave ground to Carlyle on Carlyle’s accusation of utilitarianism amounting to “pig
philosophy” by acknowledging the qualitative difference in pleasures.93 Though Mill drew on
Carlyle to inform his philosophy, Mill stopped short of recognizing Carlylean philosophy—
transcendentalism--as the basis for a new political doctrine to rival liberalism or utilitarianism.
As liberal, utilitarian, and mystic, Mill informs with respect to the limitations of Rawlsian
political philosophy. F.R. Leavis writes:
The thinker [Mill] who could write these complementary appreciations of the two great
opposites [Bentham and Coleridge] might call himself Utilitarian, and avow that in respect of
the philosophical issue he stands with Locke as against the transcendentalists, but he was
clearly no unqualified Benthamite. In fact, as we know, he spent his life in a strenuous
endeavour, pursued with magnificent integrity, to justify his contention that the Benthams and
the Coleridges, ‘these two sorts of men, who seem to be, and believe themselves to be,
enemies, are in reality allies’: the side from which he inevitably worked having been
determined by his upbringing, he worked indefatigably to correct and complete Utilitarianism
by incorporating into it the measure of truth attained by the other side.94
The extent to which Mill was a Romantic is difficult both to ascertain and agree upon.95
As Glenn W. Olsen remarked, “there are deep contradictions in Mill’s thought and it is not clear
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that his utilitarianism, his belief that happiness is the test of right and wrong, is at all
compatible with his devotion to individual freedom.”96 Mill noted the limits that obstruct the
development of political philosophy as being a result of the limitations on the part of
philosophers themselves. On the political philosopher, Mill comments:
If in his survey of human nature and life he has left any element out, then, wheresoever that
element exerts any influence, his conclusions will fail, more or less, in their application. If he has
left out many elements, and those very important, his labours may be highly valuable; he may
have largely contributed to that body of partial truths which, when completed and corrected by
one another, constitute practical truth; but the applicability of his system to practice in its own
proper shape will be of an exceedingly limited range.
Human nature and human life are wide subjects, and whoever would embark in an
enterprise requiring a thorough knowledge of them, has need both of large stores of his own,
and of all aids and appliances from elsewhere. His qualifications for success will be proportional
to two things: the degree in which his own nature and circumstances furnish him with a correct
and complete picture of man’s nature and circumstances; and his capacity of deriving light from
other minds.97
Mill’s charge that Bentham was deficient in imagination and life experience provides a
basis for a litmus test to assess contemporary political philosophers and the philosophy
generated by them. On Bentham, Mill ruminates that he should be disqualified from being
considered a “philosopher” because he consciously disregarded (with contempt) other schools
of thought and his mind was incomplete as a representative of universal human nature.98
Specifically, Mill charges:
In many of the most natural and strongest feelings of human nature [Bentham] had no
sympathy; from many of its graver experiences he was altogether cut off; and the faculty by
which one mind understands a mind different from itself, and throws itself into the feelings of
that other mind, was denied him by his deficiency of Imagination….The Imagination which he
had not, was that to which the name is generally appropriated by the best writers of the
present day; that which enables us, by a voluntary effort, to conceive the absent as if it were
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present, the imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it in the feelings which, if it were indeed
real, it would bring along with it.99
Mill attributes the shortcomings of Bentham’s philosophy to Bentham’s personal life experience
and social constitution, shortcomings Mill attributes to his own life experience as well. It is
crucial to appreciate how Mill adjudicates Bentham by engaging such deeply personal
attributes:
By these limits, accordingly, Bentham’s knowledge of human nature is bounded. It is wholly
empirical; and the empiricism of one who has had little experience. He had neither internal
experience nor external; the quiet, even tenor of his life, and his healthiness of mind, conspired
to exclude him from both. He never knew prosperity and adversity, passion nor satiety. He
never had even the experiences which sickness gives; he lived from childhood to the age of
eighty-five in boyish health. He knew no dejection, no heaviness of heart. He never felt life a
sore and a weary burthen. He was a boy to the last…He had never been made alive to the
unseen influences which were acting on himself, nor consequently on his fellow-creatures…He
saw accordingly in man little but what the vulgarest eye can see; recognised no diversities of
character but such as he who runs may read. Knowing so little of human feelings, he knew still
less of the influences by which those feelings are formed: all the more subtle workings both of
the mind upon itself, and of external things upon the mind, escaped him; and no one, probably,
who, in a highly instructed age, ever attempted to give a rule to all human conduct, set out with
a more limited conception either of the agencies by which human conduct is, or of those by
which it should be, influenced.100
Mill shines a spotlight on the lingering problem of incommensurability in political
theory. He acknowledges his own incommensurability with Carlyle and the limits on his own
political philosophy that this portends. In his autobiography, Mill discusses the extent to which
Carlyle perplexed him:
I did not, however, deem myself a competent judge of Carlyle. I felt that he was a poet, and
that I was not; that he was a man of intuition, which I was not; and that as such, he not only
saw many things long before me, which I could only, when they were pointed out to me, hobble
after and prove, but that it was highly probable he could see many things which were not
visible to me even after they were pointed out.101
99

Mill, “Bentham,” 61-62.
Mill, “Bentham,” 62-63.
101
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1887), 176.
100

94

Neff characterized Carlyle’s influence on Mill such that “the fire, the moral earnestness, the
vivid verbal imagery of the Scotch mystic [Carlyle] were grateful to [Mill] who had been, not
long since, a ‘reasoning machine.’”102 Carlyle believed that his writings had been the basis of
Mill’s conversion from a strict utilitarianism to a utilitarianism informed by romanticism.103
Writing to his brother, Carlyle instructed, “When you return to London, you must see Mill; he is
growing quite a believer, mystisch gesinnt, yet with all his old utilitarian logic quite alive in
him.”104
Mill’s commentary on both Carlyle and Bentham is valuable to synthesize in that he
acknowledges the limits of Bentham’s political philosophy while acknowledging his own limits
as a result of his exposure to Carlyle’s philosophy. Mill’s engagement with and commentary on
both Carlyle and Bentham also provides a foundation to discuss Carlyle’s incommensurability
with John Rawls. Mill’s remarks on Carlyle and Bentham provide a framework to analyze
Rawls’s philosophy. A conclusion that can be made as a result of synthesizing Mill’s views
toward both Bentham and Carlyle, and accepting his views, is that Rawls’s philosophy is lacking
because it does not contend with Carlyle’s philosophy or, at a minimum, any Romantic
philosophical vantage point.
The synthesis of Mill’s views on both Carlyle and Bentham can be applied to show that
Rawls’s theory of justice is susceptible to the same skepticism Rawls himself has toward
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intuitionism: “not only are our everyday ideas of justice influenced by our own situation, they
are also strongly colored by custom and current expectations.”105 Mill critiques Bentham as
possessing a mind that “contained so few and so poor types of individual character” and thus
Bentham could not be relied upon to assess a collective’s, a nation’s, character.106 Mill
downplays the scale of Bentham’s contribution, relegating it to be something that merely “can
teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely business part of the social
arrangements.”107 Mill’s acknowledgement that he was deficient compared to Carlyle when it
came to having a talent for intuition provides a lens to view Mill’s critiques of Bentham. Such a
lens can be applied to assess Rawls’s philosophy, especially since Mill was a preeminent liberal
political philosopher like Rawls.
Mill’s assertion of the lack of moral philosophy underpinning Bentham’s philosophy is
particularly striking: “whatever can be understood or whatever done without reference to
moral influences, [Bentham’s] philosophy is equal to; where those influences require to be
taken into account, it is at fault.”108 What is more, according to Mill, Bentham “committed the
mistake of supposing that the business part of human affairs was the whole of them; all at least
that the legislator and the moralist had to do with. Not that he disregarded moral influences
when he perceived them; but his want of imagination, small experience of human feelings, and
ignorance of the filiation and connexion of feelings with one another, made this rarely the
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case.”109 The following critique of Bentham that Mill offers can supply a framework to assess
Rawls’s philosophy, particularly in the context of Carlyle’s philosophy:
[Bentham] could, with close and accurate logic, hunt half-truths to their consequences and
practical applications, on a scale both of greatness and of minuteness not previously
exemplified; and this is the character which posterity will probably assign to Bentham.
We express our sincere and well-considered conviction when we say, that there is
hardly anything positive in Bentham’s philosophy which is not true: that when his practical
conclusions are erroneous, which in our opinion they are very often, it is not because the
considerations which he urges are not rational and valid in themselves, but because some more
important principle, which he did not perceive, supersedes those considerations, and turns the
scale. The bad part of his writings is his resolute denial of all that he does not see, of all truths
but those which he recognises. By that alone has he exercised any bad influence upon his age;
by that he has, not created a school of deniers, for this is an ignorant prejudice, but put himself
at the head of the school which exists always, though it does not always find a great man to
give it the sanction of philosophy: thrown the mantle of intellect over the natural tendency of
men in all ages to deny or disparage all feelings and mental states of which they have no
consciousness in themselves.110
Though he is scathingly critical of Bentham, Mill also comes around to showering him
with praise. Although he previously would not bestow upon Bentham the title of “philosopher,”
Mill holds nothing back in his acclaim of Bentham under certain respects: “He has swept away
the accumulated cobwebs of centuries—he has untied knots which the efforts of the ablest
thinkers, age after age, had only drawn tighter; and it is no exaggeration to say of him that over
a great part of the field he was the first to shed the light of reason.”111 In other words,
Bentham’s materialist philosophy is valuable in negating what is untenable, such as a politics
informed by dogmatic theological doctrines. But, by the same token, commitment to materialist
utilitarianism is by itself philosophically shallow and in need of some form of a positivist moral
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philosophy. It is in this context that Mill’s acknowledgement of Carlyle’s talent for intuition may
be most relevant.
Rawls’s dissatisfaction with deriving a moral philosophy via intuition rather than through
a rationalistic discourse anchors him to Bentham because both Bentham and Rawls are
rationalists while being materialists. Unlike Carlyle, neither is willing to concede that things such
as intuition, Romanticism, Platonism, or anything that bespeaks of the transcendental has much
that is particularly valuable to offer political philosophy. For example, Mill’s criticism of
Bentham’s neglect of the spiritual/transcendental can be applied to Rawls: “Man is never
recognised by [Bentham] as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of
desiring, for its own sake, the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence,
without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness.”112
Ostensibly, Mill is advocating that philosophy that is transcendental and spiritual be seen
intrinsically as on a higher plane than philosophy that deliberates on what is material and
external from the flourishing of “man’s” inward consciousness. Sartor Resartus’s plot can be
summarized as Teufelsdröckh’s pursuit of spiritual perfection as an end, and this underscores
the contrast between purely materialist philosophy and Carlyle’s Romantic and Platonic
philosophy.
Rawls maintains that it is essential to assign weights to principles of justice in what
amounts to a direct contradiction to Mill:
If we cannot explain how these weights are to be determined by reasonable ethical criteria, the
means of rational discussion have come to an end. An intuitionist conception of justice is, one
might say, but half a conception. We should do what we can to formulate explicit principles for
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the priority problem, even though the dependence on intuition cannot be eliminated
entirely.113
While Mill seeks to propose how Bentham missed important principles that connote
intuitionism, Rawls maintains that “a refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of
constructive criteria that are said not to exist.”114 Rawls concedes, though, that “no doubt any
conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree.”115
The intuition relied on by Carlyle and Rawls are incommensurable, which leads them
subsequently to incommensurable conceptions of justice. MacIntyre provides an insightful
frame that can be applied to a consideration of the incommensurability of Carlyle and Rawls:
Our judgments on specific moral issues may be supported by the invocation of more general
principles. But in the end our most general and ultimate principles, because they are that in
terms of which all else is justified, stand beyond any rational justification. In particular, they
cannot be justified by any appeal to facts, historical or otherwise…it follows that moral
assertions cannot be backed up rationally at all by factual or any other non-moral assertions.
And this has as its central consequences the view that on ultimate questions of morality we
cannot argue, we can only choose. And our choice is necessarily arbitrary in the sense that we
cannot give reasons for choosing one way rather than another; for to do this we should have to
have a criterion in moral matters more ultimate than our ultimate criterion.116
I will use MacIntyre’s framework as one of the means to address the contrast and
incommensurability between Carlyle and Rawls in chapters 4 and 5.
Rawls’s determination of the principles of justice that would be agreed to in the original
position are principles wedded to utilitarian calculation and rational choice. He defines the
original position as a hypothetical state in which those tasked with determining the principles
of justice are blind to the particular attributes of their lives such that “no one should be
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advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of
principles.”117 He articulates the following two principles of justice he believes would be chosen
in the context of the original position:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all.118
Mill writes with respect to Bentham that “man, that most complex being, is a very simple one in
his eyes” and such a sentiment could define the occupant of the Rawlsian original position who
derives principles of justice drawing on utilitarian calculation and rational choice.119
Mill discusses Bentham’s disdain toward poetry and invokes Carlyle’s criticism of
Bentham in so doing. Mill writes that poetry, “that which employs the language of words,
[Bentham] entertained no favour. Words, he thought, were perverted from their proper office
when they were employed in uttering anything but precise logical truth.”120 Mill continues,
invoking Carlyle:
Another aphorism is attributed to [Bentham], which is much more characteristic of his view of
this subject: “All poetry is misrepresentation.” Poetry, he thought, consisted essentially in
exaggeration for effect: in proclaiming some one view of a thing very emphatically, and
suppressing all the limitations and qualifications. This trait of character seems to us a curious
example of what Mr. Carlyle strikingly calls “the completeness of limited men.” Here is a
philosopher who is happy within his narrow boundary as no man of indefinite range ever was:
who flatters himself that he is so completely emancipated from the essential law of poor
human intellect, by which it can only see one thing at a time well, that he can even turn round
upon the imperfection and lay a solemn interdict upon it.121
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Mill asks explicitly, “If Bentham’s theory of life can do so little for the individual, what
can it do for society?”122 Mill answers his own question, “It will enable a society which has
attained a certain state of spiritual development, and the maintenance of which in that state is
otherwise provided for, to prescribe the rules by which it may protect its material interests.” 123
The protection of material interests in the context of a society whose state of spiritual
development is limited is a goal inimical to Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism as developed
in Sartor Resartus. This is because transcendentalism, as a Platonic philosophy, seeks to foster
spiritual development so as to pursue accounting for the reality of the universe, and minimize
attention to what is comparatively material and mundane. Mill offers a conclusion with respect
to Benthamism:
[it] will do nothing (except sometimes as an instrument in the hands of a higher doctrine) for
the spiritual interests of society; nor does it suffice of itself even for the material interests. That
which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any body of human
beings to exist as a society, is national character: that it is, which causes one nation to succeed
in what it attempts, another to fail; one nation to understand and aspire to elevated things,
another to grovel in mean ones; which makes the greatness of one nation lasting, and dooms
another to early and rapid decay.124
Mill holds that “a philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national
character, is an absurdity.”125 Mill’s assessment is particularly noteworthy in its similarity to
Carlyle’s own determination that spirituality, at least in some form, is essential for sustaining a
political and social order:
For if Government is, so to speak, the outward SKIN of the Body Politic, holding the whole
together and protecting it; and all your Craft-Guilds, and Associations for Industry, of hand or of
head, are the Fleshly Clothes, the muscular and osseous Tissues (lying under such SKIN),
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whereby Society stands and works;--then is Religion the inmost Pericardial and Nervous Tissue,
which ministers Life and warm Circulation to the whole. Without which Pericardial Tissue the
Bones and Muscles (of Industry) were inert, or animated only by a Galvanic vitality; the SKIN
would become a shriveled pelt, or fast-rotting raw-hide; and Society itself a dead carcass,-deserving to be buried. Men were no longer Social, but Gregarious; which latter state also could
not continue, but must gradually issue in universal selfish discord, hatred, savage isolation, and
dispersion;--whereby, as we might continue to say, the very dust and dead body of Society
would have evaporated and become abolished.126
Mill and Carlyle call for a type of communitarian philosophy to resolve, and even pre-empt, the
deleterious effects atomization has on a polity.
In Carlyle and Mill: Mystic and Utilitarian (published in 1924), Neff concluded that
“Carlyle and Mill were ‘halves of a dissevered world.’”127 Neff calls on his readers to ponder the
commonality of Carlyle’s and Mill’s political philosophies and in so doing provides a vivid
account of the views Carlyle as “mystic” shared with Mill, whose reputation is that of perhaps
the most venerated “liberal” philosopher in the history of political thought:
If Carlyle’s firm grasp of actuality could have allied itself with Mill’s vision of potentiality, if
Mill’s liberating ideas could have been clothed in the glamour and vitality of Carlyle’s art, which,
as Mill said, could make truth “impressive and a living principle of action,” England might have
answered many of the questions which divide her to-day. Such a union at first seemed possible,
for they had good bases of agreement. Both saw that the economic problem underlay the
political. They knew that the system of irresponsible private property and free competition,
which enslaved the many and materialized the few, was impoverishing the nation physically,
morally, and intellectually, and sowing the seeds of class war. Although they therefore
sympathized with the demand by the exploited masses for the suffrage as a means of selfprotection, they feared its misuse by men so ignorant and debased. They hoped to persuade
them to rely upon the judgement of men of conspicuous talent until national education, juster
laws and a humaner economic order would give them sufficient leisure and knowledge to
participate wisely in the nation’s councils. Of this humaner economic order they had much the
same vision. They wished to influence industrial and commercial practice by ethical and
aesthetic considerations, to unite men by a closer tie than cash payment, and to substitute for
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the exploitation of man by man the exploitation of the forces of nature by a united humanity.
This devotion to the welfare of humanity gave a decidedly practical turn to their thinking. 128
Such a conclusion has broad implications for political theory and the trajectory of the
history of political thought. It underscores romanticism and liberalism as being dichotomous
rather than complementary, as Neff argues the fact that Carlyle and Mill “finally regarded one
another as opposed rather than complementary was England’s loss and their own.”129 Such a
reflection speaks of the prospects of Carlyle’s philosophy being synthesized with other schools
of political thought in order to yield both practical and philosophical results. This conclusion
forms a basis for bringing Carlyle into dialogue with contemporary political philosophy.
Mill and Neff each articulate why it is misguided to discount Carlyle in pursuit of deriving
solutions to seemingly intractable problems that confront political philosophy. In the remainder
of my dissertation, I will seek to demonstrate that Carlyle not only should be drawn upon as a
source to solve political problems, but can be applied to synthesize new political theory. Neff
commented in a manner that corroborates the argument of this dissertation, namely that the
political and social problems Carlyle and Mill took up to solve “remain our problems, and we
have not notably improved upon the solutions which they offered for them.” 130 Neff’s
conclusion also embodies the spirit of this dissertation in that he maintained in 1924 what is
also still applicable in the early twenty-first century, that a more detailed study of the genesis
and development of the solutions offered by Carlyle (and Mill) promises to provide “assistance
in meeting the problems of our own day.”131
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In the next chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how Carlyle’s later reactionary
political theory, embodied largely in his Latter-Day Pamphlets, derailed the prospects of
applying and developing transcendentalism as a potentially viable school of thought to inform
popular political discourse. Carlyle’s brand increasingly departed from being associated with
transcendentalism-- and as an inspiration for Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and
American Transcendentalism--and more so became associated with the reactionary
authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century, which appropriated and bastardized elements
of Carlyle to serve their own purposes. Carlyle’s legacy became that of a proto-Nazi on the basis
of his turn toward the reactionary. More importantly, it extinguished any prospects for turning
to Carlyle as a resource to construct and theorize transcendentalism in the twentieth century in
a manner similar to how Marx’s nineteenth-century theory of communism was further
developed and theorized by so many in the twentieth century.
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Chapter 2
Carlyle’s Latter-Day Pamphlets and the Limits of Political Theory

An exposition of Carlyle’s reactionary political thought is essential to be able to
contextualize his theory of transcendentalism in a larger scope of his work. Ignoring Carlyle’s
reactionary thought would make it impossible to present a full picture of Carlyle as a political
thinker. By presenting Carlyle’s reactionary ideas, the evolution of his reputation can also be
more fully understood. Carlyle’s criticism of democracy and liberal institutions has
overshadowed his brand as a theorist of transcendentalism and it is important to account for
how and why this came to be.
In The Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters, John Gross claims that if Carlyle had been
fortunate to have died at age fifty, before writing what Gross called the “diatribes” of his later
years, he would have had an almost spotless reputation.1 But Carlyle’s later works, Gross points
out, “bring the rest of his work into disrepute,” particularly “after Hitler.”2 Carlyle’s political
persona is vividly captured by John McCunn, who holds nothing back when he states: “for
beyond a doubt Carlyle is a radical of the first magnitude.”3 Carlyle’s reactionary Latter-Day
Pamphlets, more than any other work, is the basis on which such remarks rest and illustrate
how his theory of transcendentalism has been obscured in his legacy, partly by his own doing
and partly by the Nazi appropriation of his work.
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Nonetheless, Carlyle’s discontent with the dysfunction of legislatures, the mesmerizing
nature of stump oratory, and the ill-conceived nature of reform efforts make Latter-Day
Pamphlets as much of a text to contend with in the early twenty-first century as it was in 1850.
Carlyle provides a general indictment of liberal political economy that captures the essence of
his broad political perspective and implies a communitarian solution will eventually be a
necessity:
Certainly the notion everywhere prevails among us too, and preaches itself abroad in every
dialect, uncontradicted anywhere so far as I can hear, That the grand panacea for social woes is
what we call “enfranchisement,” “emancipation;” or, translated into practical language, the
cutting asunder of human relations, wherever they are found grievous, as is like to be pretty
universally the case at the rate we have been going for some generations past. Let us all be
“free” of one another; we shall then be happy. Free, without bond or connection except that of
cash-payment; fair day’s wages for the fair day’s work; bargained for by voluntary contract, and
law of supply-and-demand: this is thought to be the true solution of all difficulties and injustices
that have occurred between man and man.4
Carlyle laid the groundwork for Latter-Day Pamphlets in his 1839 essay, “Chartism,” in
which he levelled a systematic critique of democracy and laid out what he took to be the
intrinsic fallibility of what at the time was a newly emerging form of government:
Democracy, we are well aware, what is called “self-government” of the multitude by the
multitude, is in words the thing everywhere passionately clamoured for at present. Democracy
makes rapid progress in these latter times, and ever more rapid, in a perilous accelerative ratio;
towards democracy, and that only, the progress of things is everywhere tending as to the final
goal and winning-post. So think, so clamour the multitudes everywhere. And yet all men may
see, whose sight is good for much, that in democracy can lie no finality; that with the
completest winning of democracy there is nothing yet won,--except emptiness, and the free
chance to win! Democracy is, by the nature of it, a self-cancelling business; and gives in the
long-run a net result of zero. Where no government is wanted, save that of the parishconstable, as in America with its boundless soil, every man being able to find work and
recompense for himself, democracy may subsist; not elsewhere, except briefly, as a swift
transition towards something other and farther. Democracy never yet, that we heard of, was
able to accomplish much work, beyond that same cancelling of itself. Rome and Athens are
themes for the schools; unexceptionable for that purpose. In Rome and Athens, as elsewhere, if
4
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we look practically, we shall find that it was not by loud voting and debating of many, but by
wise insight and ordering of a few that the work was done. So is it ever, so will it ever
be….Democracy, take it where you will in our Europe, is found but as a regulated method of
rebellion and abrogation; it abrogates the old arrangement of things; and leaves, as we say,
zero and vacuity for the institution of a new arrangement. It is the consummation of Nogovernment and Laissez-faire. It may be natural for our Europe at present; but cannot be the
ultimatum of it. Not towards the impossibility, “self-government” of a multitude by a multitude;
but towards some possibility, government by the wisest, does bewildered Europe struggle. The
blessedest possibility: not misgovernment, not Laissez-faire, but veritable government!5
In Past and Present, Carlyle critiques what he takes to be the fallacy of liberty: “the
liberty especially which has to purchase itself by social isolation, and each man standing
separate from the other, having ‘no business with him’ but a cash-account: this is such a liberty
as the Earth seldom saw;--as the Earth will not long put up with, recommend it how you may.”6
Carlyle defines democracy as “the chase of Liberty in that direction” and thus as a modern
political phenomenon that “shall go its full course.”7
Carlyle aimed for Latter-Day Pamphlets to be a consummate articulation of his political
philosophy. Such an articulation was “negative” in that it sought to negate the view that any
one political sect or ideology manifest in England or elsewhere in Carlyle’s contemporary era
held the possibility of resolving entrenched political problems. While negating other political
doctrines, Latter-Day Pamphlets simultaneously was reactionary in the sense that it offered no
prospects of a new philosophical doctrine to be able to solve the problems of democracy. In
this way, it neglected refining transcendentalism for popular political consumption into a
solution for the ills of democracy. Essentially, Latter-Day Pamphlets underwrote Carlyle’s
contention that the most compelling political philosophy would merely make known that
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democracy shall go its full course until the isolation and alienation liberty precipitates among
individuals as atoms who have no bonds with their fellows becomes no longer sustainable.
Anticipating censure to be the reading public’s response to Latter-Day Pamphlets,
Carlyle came to terms with the negative response he in fact would go on to receive and wrote
prophetically: “I shall be too happy if I can but get my say said, and so leave it [as] there will
perhaps be more agreement upon it 20 years hence than can be now.”8 Such a forecast that
prophecies Latter-Day Pamphlets reaching a type of maturity date, in which its claims will come
to full realization, implies Carlyle himself viewed this collection of essays as requiring only a
matter of time before it would be vindicated.9 Bentley unpacks Carlyle’s political theory by
noting how democracy itself is quite aristocratic in its nature, as Bentley reminds us that as
soon as government is merely representative and not inclusive of the whole populace, it can be
argued that “democracy is impure or non-existent.”10 This is because, upon commitment to
government by leaders rather than by direct democracy, finding the best leaders, as Carlyle
noted, becomes a prime task.11 Thus, locating the best leaders in the context of democracy can
act to mitigate crises within democracy and sustain it as a political system.
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Reflecting on Latter-Day Pamphlets in 1943, 93 years after its publication and in the
midst of World War II, F. A. Lea unpacked not only the interminable nature of Carlyle’s critique
of democracy but also its service in the perpetual cause of reform:
A democracy that took his criticism to heart and made it its own would either be killed or cured.
It would either emerge from the ordeal purged, the element of truth in its claims shining free
from impurities—if there is an element of truth; or, if there is not, it would be burned away
entirely, and the sooner the better.12
Carlyle’s Latter-Day Pamphlets were born from his despair at the condition of both
England and Europe.13 In seeking to ascertain as to whether liberal democracy is intrinsically
good, Carlyle inquires: “But as to universal suffrage, again,--can it be proved that, since the
beginning of the world, there was ever given a universal vote in favour of the worthiest man or
thing?”14 Carlyle answers his own question: “I have always understood that true worth, in any
department, was difficult to recognise; that the worthiest, if he appealed to universal suffrage,
would have but a poor chance.”15 In a critique that is as primordial as it is Platonic, Carlyle
nullifies democracy’s image of being inherently superior and legitimate by presenting a
hypothetical dialogue whereby voting is under consideration:
“If of ten men nine are recognisable as fools, which is a common calculation,” says our
Intermittent Friend, “how, in the name of wonder, will you ever get a ballot-box to grind you
out a wisdom from the votes of these ten men? Never by any conceivable ballot-box, nor by all
the machinery in Bromwicham or out of it, will you attain such a result. Not by any method
under Heaven, except by suppressing, and in some good way reducing to zero, nine of those
votes, can wisdom ever issue from your ten.
“Why men have got so universally into such a fond expectation? The reason might lead
us far. The reason, alas, is, men have, to a degree never before exampled, forgotten that there
is fixed eternal law in this Universe; that except by coming upon the dictates of that, no success
is possible for any nation or creature. That we should have forgotten this,--alas, here is an abyss
12
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of vacuity in our much-admired opulence, which the more it is looked at saddens the thinking
heart the more.
“And yet,” continues he elsewhere, “it is unavoidable and indispensable at present.
With voting and ballot-boxing who can quarrel, as the matter stands? I pass it without quarrel;
nay say respectfully, ‘Good speed to you, poor friends: Heaven send you not only a good votingbox, but something worth voting for!’”16
Carlyle delivers fundamental critiques of democracy that are difficult to dispute, though
they are also difficult to prove with quantitative or qualitative data. For example, Carlyle takes
up the role of oratory in candidates seeking to win votes from voters in a democracy. Carlyle
reflects that “wisdom dwells not with stump-oratory; to the stump-orator Wisdom has waved
her sad and peremptory farewell.”17
Can Carlyle’s fundamental claims against democracy be vindicated more so in the early
twenty-first century than in 1850? If they can, this means that Carlyle speaks more to the
sociopolitical condition of the twenty-first century than that of his own Victorian England and
that his prophecies have needed time to mature. In other words, an extensive period of time is
needed for democracy to fully cancel itself and eventually yield a sum of zero.
In his third latter-day pamphlet, “Downing Street,” Carlyle articulates what can be taken
as his objective for all eight pamphlets, an objective that is prescient for the state of global
politics and democracy in the early twenty-first century:
Let us brush the cobwebs from our eyes; let us bid the inane traditions be silent for a moment;
and ask ourselves, like men dreadfully intent on having it done, “By what method or methods
can the able men from every rank of life be gathered, as diamond-grains from the general mass
of sand: the able men, not the sham-able;--and set to do the work of governing, contriving,
administering and guiding for us!” It is the question of questions. All that Democracy ever
meant lies there: the attainment of a truer and truer Aristocracy, or Government again by the
Best.
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Reformed Parliaments have lamentably failed to attain it for us; and I believe will and
must forever fail.18
In the twenty-first century, the task of locating and elevating the ablest, in the contexts of
voting and legislative politics, remains an utmost challenge.
Carlyle sets a simple purpose for politics: “In Parliament and out of Parliament, and
everywhere in this Universe, your one salvation is, That you can discern with just insight, and
follow with noble valour, what the law of the case before you is, what the appointment of the
Maker in regard to it has been.”19 According to Carlyle, parliament lacks “the art of getting work
done” and “produces talk merely.”20 Carlyle unveils a prophecy with respect to the dysfunction
of parliament:
My own private notion, which I invite all reformed British citizens to reflect on, is and has for a
long time been, That this dim universal experience, which points towards very tragic facts, will
more and more rapidly become a clear universal experience, and disclose a tragic law of Nature
little dreamt of by constitutional men of these times. That a Parliament, especially a Parliament
with Newspaper Reporters firmly established in it, is an entity which by its very nature cannot
do work, but can do talk only,--which at times may be needed, and at other times again may be
very needless.21
Carlyle goes on to elaborate his critique such that he portrays members of parliament as lacking
earnestness when it comes to getting business done, and only being earnest when it comes to
“making money each member of it for himself.”22 For Carlyle, the individual pursuit of money is
the only earnest business that a member of parliament takes up, and parliament “will do no
business except such as can be done in sport.”23 Carlyle’s concluding thesis is that parliaments,
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“admirable as Advising Bodies, and likely to be in future universally useful in that capacity, are,
as Ruling and Sovereign Bodies, not useful, but useless or worse.”24
Carlyle references the United States Congress as an instance of a parliament that could
be an exception to his thesis:
Only perhaps in the United States, which alone of countries can do without governing,--every
man being at least able to live, and move-off into the wilderness, let Congress jargon as it will,-can such a form of so-called “Government” continue, for any length of time, to torment men
with the semblance, when the indispensable substance is not there….If indeed America should
ever experience a higher call, as is likely, and begin to feel diviner wants than that of Indian
corn with abundant bacon and molasses, and unlimited scope for all citizens to hunt dollars,-America too will find that caucuses, division-lists, stump-oratory and speeches to Buncombe
will not carry men to the immortal gods; that the Washington Congress, and constitutional
battle of Kilkenny cats is, there as here, naught for such objects; quite incompetent for such;
and, in fine, that said sublime constitutional arrangement will require to be (with terrible
throes, and travail such as few expect yet) remodeled, abridged, extended, suppressed; torn
asunder, put together again;--not without heroic labour, and effort quite other than that of the
Stump-Orator and the Revival Preacher, one day!25
For Carlyle, the stakes are high with respect to discovering the fixed external law of the
Universe and governing in accord with it, such that it is the case that if one “get[s] this [law] out
of one man, you are saved; fail to get this out of the most August Parliament wrapt in the
sheepskins of a thousand years, you are lost.”26 Carlyle underscores what he takes to be the
importance of achieving a consensus in support of an ideal, as the consequences of not doing
so manifest as disintegration of the polity into a state of discord.
Carlyle is persistent in his claim that ideal political leadership will not and cannot be
found through the ballot box:
By ballot-boxes we alter the figure of our Quack; but the substance of him continues. The ValetWorld has to be governed by the Sham-Hero, by the King merely dressed in King-gear. It is his;
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he is its! In brief, one of two things: We shall either learn to know a Hero, a true Governor and
Captain, somewhat better, when we see him; or else go on to be forever governed by the
Unheroic;--had we ballot-boxes clattering at every street-corner, there were no remedy in
these.”27
In “The Present Time,” Carlyle constructs an anecdote to dispel the notion that
democratic voting is a cure-all:
Your ship cannot double Cape Horn by its excellent plans of voting. The ship may vote this and
that, above decks and below, in the most harmonious exquisitely constitutional manner: the
ship, to get round Cape Horn, will find a set of conditions already voted for, and fixed with
adamantine rigour by the ancient Elemental Powers, who are entirely careless how you vote. If
you can, by voting or without voting, ascertain these conditions, and valiantly conform to them,
you will get round the Cape: if you cannot,--the ruffian Winds will blow you ever back again; the
inexorable Icebergs, dumb privy-councillors from Chaos, will nudge you with most chaotic
‘admonition;’ you will be flung half-frozen on the Patagonian cliffs, or admonished into shivers
by your iceberg councilors, and sent sheer down to Davy Jones, and will never get round Cape
Horn at all! Unanimity on board ship;--yes indeed, the ship’s crew may be very unanimous,
which doubtless, for the time being, will be very comfortable to the ship’s crew, and to their
Phantasm Captain if they have one: but if the tack they unanimously steer upon is guiding them
into the belly of the Abyss, it will not profit them much!—Ships accordingly do not use the
ballot-box at all; and they reject the Phantasm species of Captains: one wishes much some
other Entities,--since all entities lie under the same rigorous set of laws,--could be brought to
show as much wisdom, and sense at least of self-preservation, the first command of Nature.
Phantasm Captains with unanimous votings: this is considered to be all the law and all the
prophets, at present.28
Carlyle offers the conclusion to be had from his example of a ship at sea:
A divine message, or eternal regulation of the Universe, there verily is, in regard to every
conceivable procedure and affair of man: faithfully following this, said procedure or affair will
prosper, and have the whole Universe to second it, and carry it, across the fluctuating
contradictions, towards a victorious goal; not following this, mistaking this, disregarding this,
destruction and wreck are certain for every affair.29
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This is a means by which, according to Carlyle, democracy is “by the nature of it, a selfcancelling business; and gives in the long-run a net result of zero.”30 Voting’s stock has declined
in that though it was “never a divine Apollo,” the voter was once in a “sane and sincere state,”
that made him “worth consulting about several things.”31 It must follow that the voter has lost
his sanity and sincerity, as he is “enveloped now in mere stump-oratory.”32 Carlyle persists in
maintaining that votes are nonetheless valuable in conveying the instincts of the population.
When it comes to collecting votes, he reflects:
True, their opinions are generally of little wisdom, and can on occasion reach to all conceivable
and inconceivable degrees of folly; but their instincts, where these can be deciphered, are wise
and human; these, hidden under the noisy utterance of what they call their opinions, are the
unspoken sense of man’s heart, and well deserve attending to. Know well what the people
inarticulately feel, for the Law of Heaven itself is dimly written there; nay do not neglect, if you
have opportunity, to ascertain what they vote and say.33
Carlyle takes up stump-oratory as inherently facilitating the ineffectiveness of
democracy. He makes an ominous forecast with respect to the consequences of being
entranced by oratory that is sham-excellent, a forecast that is the thesis of his latter-day
pamphlet “Stump-Orator”: “My friend, if you can, as heretofore this good while, find nobody to
take care of your affairs but the expertest talker, it is all over with your affairs and you.”34
Carlyle demarcates the dividing line that separates oratory from good governance by
unveiling a succession of three principles. He holds in his first principle that “excellent speech,
even speech really excellent, is not, and never was, the chief test of human faculty, or the
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measure of a man’s ability, for any true function whatsoever.”35 Upon this first principle, he
adds a second stipulation that really excellent speech
is terribly apt to get confounded with its counterfeit, sham-excellent speech! And furthermore,
that if really excellent human speech is among the best of human things, then sham-excellent
ditto deserves to be ranked with the very worst. False speech,--capable of becoming, as some
one has said, the falsest and basest of all human things:--put the case, one were listening to
that as to the truest and noblest! Which, little as we are conscious of it, I take to be the sad lot
of many excellent souls among us just now. So many as admire parliamentary eloquence, divine
popular literature, and suchlike, are dreadfully liable to it just now: and whole nations and
generations seem as if getting themselves asphyxiated, constitutionally, into their last sleep, by
means of it just now!36
Carlyle provides a compelling synthesis of his first two principles with his third principle. He
puts forward what he takes to be a stark truth:
That in these times, and for several generations back, there has been, strictly considered, no
really excellent speech at all, but sham-excellent merely; that is to say, false or quasi-false
speech getting itself admired and worshipped, instead of detested and suppressed. A truly
alarming predicament; and not the less so if we find it a quite pleasant one for the time being,
and welcome the advent of asphyxia, as we would that of comfortable natural sleep;--as, in so
many senses, we are doing!37
Carlyle reflects on his three principles by acknowledging what he takes to be the spiritual loss
that is as a result of such unconscious fealty given to sham-excellent speech. He remarks that
“the spiritual detriment we unconsciously suffer, in every province of our affairs, from this our
prostrate respect to power of speech is incalculable.”38
Michael Levin offers a concise synopsis of Carlyle’s perspective on democracy that
integrates and synthesizes Carlyle’s quotes on the subject:
In echo of Burke, Carlyle finds all egalitarian creeds false and unavailing, for in every known
society, however republican in intent, some form of aristocracy and priesthood had always
35
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emerged. The facts were massively inexorable. In its essence society clearly had to have
leadership. Consequently “democracy is by the nature of it, a self-cancelling business”, an
“emptiness” that always leads to something else. Democracy curbs and undermines authority.
No wonder it fails to bring real leaders to the top! Yet “at bottom is the wish and prayer of all
human hearts, everywhere and at all times: ‘Give me a leader; a true leader, not a false-sham
leader’”. In this request, then, we have the essence of Carlyle’s proposed alternative to
democratic politics.39
Such a description of the predicament of democracy also underscores the greater problem of
replacing democracy with an alternative political arrangement. The fact that Carlyle offers no
coherent alternative to democracy in this context does not resolve the problem of the internal
destabilization of democracy as a political system.
James Anthony Froude provides a valuable synthesis of Carlyle’s indictment of liberal
democracy:
In politics as in all else, Carlyle insisted always that there was a right way of doing things and a
wrong way; that by following the right way alone could any good end be arrived at; and that it
was foolish to suppose that the right way of managing the affairs of a nation could be
ascertained by a majority of votes, as the right way of discovering the longitude, of cultivating
the soil, of healing diseases, or of exercising any one of the million arts on which our existence
and welfare depend.40
This passage can be applied to consider the fundamental conflict between Platonic idealism and
voting since Platonic idealism holds that there is a singular ideal that needs to be ascertained
and implemented while voting allows for a choice that is determined by the majority of the
voting public.41 Froude is casting Carlyle as a skeptic of democracy since there is no means of
ensuring that voting will determine the ideal in all instances. At a more general level, Froude is
describing how political science is more difficult of an undertaking than the natural sciences.

39

Levin, The Condition of England Question, 52.
Froude, Thomas Carlyle: A History of His Life in London, 1834-1881 (Volume I), 308-309.
41
For a discussion of Platonism in this context, see Versluis, Platonic Mysticism, 9-33.
40

116

The inherent normative character of political science makes it different from the science that
seeks to discover how to cultivate the soil or heal disease, but nonetheless, as Froude
maintains, Carlyle thinks there is as much of a right way in politics as there is in agriculture and
medicine.
In his fourth latter-day pamphlet, “The New Downing Street,” Carlyle devised what a
reformed and robust government would entail. Carlyle has in mind that the “State in all
European countries, and in England first of all, as I hope, will discover that its functions are now,
and have long been, very wide of what the State in old pedant Downing Streets has aimed at.” 42
Carlyle continues, “The State is a reality, and not a dramaturgy; it exists here to render
existence possible, existence desirable and noble, for the State’s subjects.”43 Carlyle forecasts,
in a Hegelian vein, on when the state will be a compatible partner and facilitator of civil society
and ameliorator of economic plight. Carlyle theorizes: “In the course of long strenuous
centuries, I can see the State become what it is actually bound to be, the keystone of a most
real ‘Organisation of Labour,’—and on this Earth a world of some veracity, and some heroism,
once more worth living in!”44
In a letter to Emerson two years after the publication of Latter-Day Pamphlets, Carlyle
attempts to situate Latter-Day Pamphlets in the context of the larger Platonic political theory
tradition: “I was much struck with Plato and his ideas about Democracy, mere Loiter Day
Pamphlets saxa et faces refined into empyrean radiance and lightning of the Gods!”45 Carlyle
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employs the Latin phrase “saxa et faces” which translates to “rocks and torches” to characterize
his own Latter Day Pamphlets when it is compared to the refinement of Plato’s critique of
democracy. The magnitude of Carlyle’s critique of democracy cannot be overstated, as it has
been poignantly articulated, “since Plato wrote the eighth book of the Republic there has been
no such satirist of democracy as this ‘spiritual radical’ [Carlyle].”46 Such a statement was offered
by H.J.C. Grierson to introduce a lecture entitled “Carlyle and the Hero” that he delivered at the
University of Manchester in 1930, a lecture later republished as Carlyle & Hitler in 1933,
following Hitler’s rise to power.
I will argue that a review of both primary and secondary literature allows for the
conclusion that Carlyle’s project is very similar to that of Plato’s in that both seek the best
rulers, which amounts to rule by the wisest. Carlyle’s faith in aristocracy, like Plato’s, must be
qualified, such that their endorsements of the natural aristocracies of wisdom and of worth are
by the same token their rejections of the aristocracies of titles, pedigrees, sport and luxury.47
Since both Plato and Carlyle also agree that human beings are fundamentally unequal, both
discount democracy as being able to locate the best rulers. Put succinctly, Carlyle informs the
criticism of democracy that the public prefers to be led by a person who “bamboozles” them
rather than by one who is rigidly honest with them by telling them uncomfortable truths while
trying to make them do what they ought to do instead of what appeals to their illogical
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sentiments.48 A democracy is also inherently contradictory in that, according to its critics, it is
only a plutocracy in disguise, and in a plutocracy the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. 49
Carlyle’s contempt for democracy was not facilitated by a natural aristocratic contempt
for the lower classes, as he did not seek to win for himself a place among the privileged, whom
birth and fortune allow to cultivate the splendors of life.50 He exemplifies this, among other
occasions, in a discussion of social class on how to determine who is equipped to be a member
of Parliament: “Lord Tommy and the Honourable John are not a whit better qualified for
Parliamentary duties, to say nothing of Secretary duties, than plain Tom and Jack; they are
merely better qualified, as matters stand, for getting admitted to try them.”51 Carlyle extends
such a view to claim that there is “no shadow of a reason…but rather there is quite the reverse”
to assume that aristocrats will be better equipped to administrate the government compared
to non-aristocrats.52 With intelligence being equal, Carlyle actually favors the non-aristocrats
over the aristocrats, “for Tom and Jack have been at least workers all their days, not idlers,
game-preservers and mere human clothes-horses, at any period of their lives; and have gained
a schooling thereby, of which Lord Tommy and the Honourable John, unhappily strangers to it
for most part, can form no conception! Tom and Jack have already, on this most narrow
hypothesis, a decided superiority of likelihood over Lord Tommy and the Honourable John.”53
These statements attest to the fact that Carlyle sought to emphasize the importance of locating
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the most equipped to lead from all social classes so as to form a genuine and meritocratic class
of leaders.
In fact, Carlyle engaged in a disparagement of the nobility when they were found to
engage in hedonist dissipation by its nature immune from the social strife and poverty that
engulfed society on an at-large basis. With respect to the Scottish nobility, Carlyle remarks on
their “despicable behaviour” to metaphorically characterize them: “A selfish, famishing,
unprincipled set of hyaenas…mischievous and greedy beyond limit.”54 In fact, Carlyle took as his
preoccupation the cause of the poor, but it did not make him a democrat or a philanthropist of
the kind he saw around him.55 Rather than being satisfied with charities and poor laws to
resolve the poverty generated as a function of the liberal economy, Carlyle sought to
emphasize the importance of facilitating social solidarity among what he took to be a natural
hierarchy of social classes. Carlyle sought to teach his readers that “ ‘indolent Laissez-faire plus
a Poor-Law’ is not, by any manner of means, the solution of Human Society; that actual
command of the Foolish Multitude by the Wise Few is once more (in spite of all our modern
philanthropies) becoming clearly, what it always from the beginning of the world till late times
was, the indispensable necessity, if human beings would live together in any but the savage
state.”56
Kenneth Marc Harris provides a valuable synopsis of Carlyle’s reservations about
democracy such that Carlyle felt “democracy is the political analogue of laissez-faire economics
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and the cash nexus and is symptomatic of the breakup of the social family.” 57 Albert LaValley
offers an insightful synopsis of Carlyle’s critique of modern society in that Carlyle fears the
“atomization of the individual within the whirlpool of the city, the alienation of man from his
work and from his fullest self, the giddiness of rapid social and technological change, the
destruction of the classes, and the unleashing of greed in the anarchic pursuit of money.” 58 Lea
asserts that Carlyle personally overcame all of these maladies: “In himself, Carlyle had
overcome this bourgeois consciousness: its rationalism and its individualism, its materialism
and its atomism.”59 In so doing, Carlyle “had become capable of envisaging society as an
organism.”60 This is noteworthy because it illustrates Carlyle’s commitment to social solidarity
as the only solution to what he took to be the unsustainable and anarchic nature of social
atomization. The vision of society as an organism is one in which all of society’s constituent
elements are integrated into a cohesive whole so that it can sustain its vitality.
The publication of Latter-Day Pamphlets in 1850 caused a storm of criticism in which
Carlyle’s reputation took a hit. Reviewers complained that while he was good at pointing out
defects and shortcomings, he seemed incapable of suggesting remedies.61 Such criticism and
the resulting diminishment of Latter-Day Pamphlets demonstrates Carlyle’s antagonism to the
hegemonic status quo of political discourse. But what is most hidden and profound in LatterDay Pamphlets is the notion of Carlyle having reached what may be called the “limits of political
theory.” This phrase can be associated with Carlyle because Carlyle diagnosed the defects and
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shortcomings of democratic capitalism while he was unable to devise solutions toward
achieving a next stage of political development or a new political economy.
The generally negative reviews toward Latter-Day Pamphlets did not distress Carlyle. As
Leslie Stephen characterized Carlyle’s view, in an obituary, “the fact that an opinion did not
make its way in the world was not even a presumption against its truth and importance in a
world daily growing more and more chaotic, plunging wildly over Niagaras, falling more
hopelessly under the dominion of shams and pursuing wilder phantasms into more boundless
regions of distracted bewilderment.”62 Such may be the terms in which to characterize the state
of the world, only increasingly, since Carlyle’s passing and the subsequent fading of his
reputation from both popular and academic consciousness and contemplation.
Emerson had positive feedback to send Carlyle when he wrote in a letter: “Indeed I
inferred so much from the sturdy tone of these wonderful ‘Pamphlets,’ all which I have duly
read as they arrived.”63 Carlyle nonetheless maintained support in the wake of Latter-Day
Pamphlets. Even after the publication of such a controversial text, Charles Dickens wrote in a
letter to Carlyle: “I am always reading you faithfully, and trying to go your way.”64 Dickens
wrote to Carlyle and told him that “no man knows your books better than I” while inquiring in
the same letter as to whether he could dedicate Hard Times to him.65
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Carlyle’s influence on Dickens is found in A Christmas Carol in which the theme of
economic selfishness derives from Carlyle’s description of the cash nexus, and the ghost of
Christmas showing Scrooge the two wolfish children, Want and Ignorance, reflects Carlyle’s
warnings found in “Chartism” and the History of the French Revolution.66 Carlyle advised
Dickens during his composition of A Tale of Two Cities and Dickens praised Carlyle’s history of
the French Revolution which had been one of Dickens’s principal sources.67 Dickens credits
Carlyle in the preface to the first edition of A Tale of Two Cities, writing specifically as to how “it
has been one of my hopes to add something to the popular and picturesque means of
understanding that terrible time, though no one can hope to add anything to the philosophy of
Mr. Carlyle’s wonderful book.”68
Critics of Carlyle lambasted him as mad when he published Latter-Day Pamphlets but
reviews lacked substantive criticism of Carlyle’s arguments. Democracy’s ascendency in Europe
and the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century naturally crippled any legitimate
contemplation of Carlyle’s criticism of democracy as a form of government that intrinsically
embodies substantial faults and fallacies. This illustrates again, in a sense, how Carlyle was a
political theorist who felt as though he reached the “limits of political theory,” in that he
theorized how democracy was ascendant in generating universal acclaim but that it would
eventually (and naturally) devolve into another system of government that could not be
explicitly forecasted or described.
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Carlyle’s attack on the –isms swirling about him in Victorian times informs us about the
vulnerabilities of all –isms and systems in any era, but in particular the modern era of the early
twenty-first century, when the number of ideologies and doctrines competing for adherents
has grown exponentially since Carlyle’s era. The general critique of ideologies independent of a
transcendentalist critique of ideologies illustrates there are multiple means of demonstrating
the deficiencies inherent in doctrinal dogmas. In his contemporaneous review of Latter-Day
Pamphlets, David Masson concludes: “In these Pamphlets, for example, not only is there a blow
in the face all round for Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchy, Political Economy, Protectionism,
Mammon-worship, and such other recognized interests and social entities as have already been
more or less accustomed to be girded at; but other interests and entities that thought
themselves safe and consecrated from attack by the high guardianship of universal opinion,
have found themselves ridiculed and made a mock of.”69 Masson also underscores the scope
and seriousness of Carlyle’s political theory project and it is immensely valuable to present
Masson’s well-articulated description of the magnitude of Carlyle’s political philosophy in
defense of the thesis that Carlyle’s political philosophy remains relevant in the twenty-first
century:
It is not Mr. Carlyle’s aim in these Pamphlets to entertain his readers with a succession of
agreeable thoughts and conceptions, each touched off just to that degree of fullness at which it
can be easily apprehended; it is his aim to insist energetically on certain generalities of doctrine,
to compel them into public belief, and to take care that they shall be too effectually taught to
be readily forgotten. Hence he necessarily iterates and reiterates; rolls his main notions into
view again and again, and, almost of set purpose, conveys them worked up into such profuse
heaps of words, that there is induced in the reception of them a sense of surfeit and fatigue. As
things may be intellectually a commonplace, long before it is morally familiar; and as boys used
to be taught to remember facts of parochial consequence by receiving beatings
contemporaneously with them, so one is none the worse for being belaboured with an
69
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important truth through many more sentences, and in much more ponderous language, than
might suffice for its mere intellectual conveyance. If, when you have changed your lodging, the
postman make a mistake in the delivery of your letters, it may not be sufficient simply to tell
him once more the alteration you wish him to remember; but if you detain him in the street,
hold him for ten minutes by the button, and punish him for his mistake by monotonously
talking about the matter over and over again, till he actually perspires under your redundancy,
you will have a sufficient security in the poor fellow’s sensations against any similar blundering
in future. And so sometimes with Mr. Carlyle. His pamphlets are, in fact, in many passages,
exactly such street lectures to the postman. The reader would fain be off; like the postman he
has his letters to deliver along the streets, and his other business to do; and he protests that he
perfectly understands what Mr. Carlyle has been good enough to tell him, and that he will not
forget it; but all in vain; again and again the information is repeated; the phrases ‘justice,’ ‘the
immensities,’ ‘the eternal fact of things,’ are tumbled upon him with a frequency unexampled
except in the Koran; and, when at last he is released, it is with a ringing in the ears, a universal
sense of stupor, and knees absolutely knocking against each other for faintness. Nay, having
laid aside, as Mr. Carlyle seems to have now done, the mere literary or artistic function
altogether, the probability is that everything he may hereafter write will, to some degree, have
this characteristic.70
Carlyle’s critique of democracy is harsh and all-encompassing. He does offer an
alternative to democracy: “Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise him to
the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country;
no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery
whatsoever can improve it a whit.”71 Carlyle continues: “I say, Find me the true Konning, King,
or Able-man, and he has a divine right over me. That we knew in some tolerable measure how
to find him, and that all men were ready to acknowledge his divine right when found: this is
precisely the healing which a sick world is everywhere, in these ages, seeking after!”72
Moreover, Carlyle critiques democracy for its manner of displacing a true commitment
to social reform. For example, Carlyle is displeased that the “‘Reform’ movement” seeks the
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extension of the suffrage as a panacea for social problems.73 According to Carlyle,
“Reformation” as a political movement in nineteenth-century England entailed nothing of
amending one’s own “foul courses…no thought of that whatever, though that, you would say, is
the one thing to be thought of and aimed at.”74 Reform taking the shape of extending the
suffrage is taken to be what will “clear away the universal rottenness, and quagmire of
mendacities, in which poor England is drowning; let England only vote sufficiently, and all is
clean and sweet again.”75 This is precisely what Carlyle objects to. Carlyle fears the day when
“England would have to take the Niagara leap of completed Democracy,” and compares a
political community governed fully by democracy to shooting Niagara Falls in a barrel.76
Carlyle’s Latter-Day Pamphlets and Karl Marx’s review of Latter-Day Pamphlets brings to
the foreground a contentious topic within the history of political thought: if democracy is
doomed to failure, then what political system should and/or will claim authority as its successor
either evolving or devolving from it? Carlyle’s chief criticism of democracy, succinctly put, is
that in a democracy the will of the majority is determined to be infallible, in that the “Count of
Heads [is] to be the Divine Court of Appeal on every question and interest of mankind” and that
the majority opinion in a democracy is likely to be that of a ship of fools.77 Carlyle’s major
weakness is his inability to coherently formulate a political system that would replace
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democracy.78 Though this is a significant shortcoming, it in no way discounts or delegitimizes
the thesis that democracy is vulnerable to internal faults and weaknesses that keep it from
being intrinsically and internally good.79
Marx’s review of Latter-Day Pamphlets is valuable in that it highlights how Carlyle’s
social criticism shines a spotlight on the limits of the newly-emerging modern world order but
yet lacks an accompanying alternative to displace liberal democracy. Engels commented as well
that “[Carlyle] has sounded the social disorder more deeply than any other English bourgeois,
and demands the organisation of labour.”80 Engels wrote an interpretive essay on Carlyle’s Past
and Present while Marx consulted Carlyle’s works such as Chartism for statistical information on
the condition of the English working class.81
Marx summarizes what he takes to be Carlyle’s philosophy: “As for every individual, so
for society it is just a matter of discovering the true regulations of the Universe, the everlasting
laws of nature relative to the task in hand at each moment, and acting accordingly.”82 Marx
continues his reflection on Carlyle’s political theory with an inquiry: “Whoever reveals these
eternal laws to us, him shall we fallow, ‘were it the Russian Autocrat or Chartist Parliament, the
Archbishop of Canterbury or Grand Lama’. But how do we discover these eternal, divine
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precepts?”83 Moreover, Marx reflects on Carlyle’s skepticism to rely on universal suffrage: “At
all events universal suffrage, which gives each man a ballot paper and counts heads, is the
worst method of doing so. The Universe is of a very exclusive nature and has ever disclosed its
secrets but to a few elect, a small minority of wise and noble-minded alone. That is why no
nation was ever able to exist on the basis of democracy.”84
The tone of Marx’s review of (and rebuttal to) Carlyle becomes quite mocking. Marx
challenges:
But how are the noble and the wise to be discovered? They are not revealed by any celestial
miracle; they have to be looked for. And here the historical class distinctions which have been
made into purely natural distinctions once more rear their heads. The noble man is noble
because he is wise and knowledgeable. He will therefore have to be sought among the classes
which have the monopoly of education—among the privileged classes, and it will be the same
classes who will have to seek him out in their midst and to judge his claims to the rank of a
noble and wise man. In so doing the privileged classes automatically become, if not precisely
the noble and wise class, at least the “articulate” class; the oppressed classes are of course the
“silent, inarticulate” and class rule is thereby sanctioned anew.85
Such a passage demonstrates Marx’s ignorance of Carlyle’s demands to find the best
leaders from among all social classes and Carlyle’s own contempt toward the phenomenon of
the wealthy class automatically assuming the mantle of leadership. It also demonstrates Marx’s
neglect of transcendentalism as a prospective ideology to displace materialist class hostilities.
Carlyle emphasizes the need for personalities to promote and enact a political agenda as
a means of departure from the malaise democracy can potentially foster and wants to make
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known that politics will be stymied if compelling personalities do not emerge to assume the
mantle of authority and lead. Carlyle inquires:
Who will begin the long steep journey with us; who of living statesmen will snatch the standard,
and say, like a hero on the forlorn-hope for his country, Forward! Or is there none; no one that
can and dare? And our lot too, then, is Anarchy by barricade or ballot-box, and Social Death?—
We will not think so.86
Though a critic of democracy, Carlyle is also what may be defined as “supra-democratic”
in that he sought government to achieve, if not the people’s “spoken wishes, yet their dumb
wants, and what they would at last find to have been their instinctive will.”87 Carlyle does not
have faith in the “spoken wishes” of the people being as lofty and genuine as their unspoken
wants, much less their “instinctive will.” That Parliament is incapable of enacting the
“instinctive will” of the people necessarily implies that it is a compromised form of government,
or at least a government that cannot credibly say that it is truly representative of the people.
Carlyle’s reactionary discontent with democracy and liberal political economy can be
applied to discern both the present and future health of liberal democratic capitalism as the
hegemonic social order that has lasted from Carlyle’s time thru the early twenty-first century,
having withstood fascism and communism as rival external threats in the twentieth century. His
scathing commentary provided fodder that was explicitly adopted and appropriated to some
extent by both Marx and Engels and National Socialism. Though communism and fascism as
external rivals proved to be themselves internally problematic and unsustainable, the critiques
of liberal democratic capitalism’s own internal functioning maintain their relevance to at least
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some extent because the long-term prospects of liberal democratic capitalism are yet to be
seen.
In the next chapter, I turn to constructing transcendentalism as a unique and viable
ideology that can be positioned in relation to and can inform MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism
and his Aristotelianism, Nietzsche’s nihilism, and Qutb’s Islamism. By doing this, Carlyle’s
transcendentalism can be discerned as a modern reincarnation of Platonism in that it is an
embodiment of what may be characterized as a dialectical synthesis of Platonism. By dialoging
Carlyle’s transcendentalism with Islamism, a late twentieth-century and early twenty-first
century rival to Western liberal democratic capitalism, I intend to illustrate how
transcendentalism parallels Islamism in that they are both “transcendental” ideologies.
Moreover, Carlyle himself praises Islam, which allows for the bold assertion to be made—that
Carlyle’s transcendentalism can be couched as a modern development within the Islamic
tradition while also being an evolution from the Islamic tradition toward a dialectical return to
Platonism.
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Chapter 3
Carlyle’s Transcendentalism as a Platonic Political Philosophico-Religion: A Comparison of
Transcendentalism with Islam and Islamism

Carlyle’s transcendentalism needs to be differentiated from Islam and Islamism so as to
pre-emptively resolve potential criticisms of transcendentalism. The conflation of
transcendentalism with Islamism is a possible criticism of transcendentalism that needs to be
refuted. This provides the rationale for why it is essential to discuss and situate
transcendentalism in the contexts of Islam and Islamism. The prospective political application of
transcendentalism may, at least at the surface, look quite similar to the political application of
Islam, or Islamism. The charge may be levelled, like it is against Islamism, that
transcendentalism embodies theocratic totalitarianism. It is at this juncture that the
fundamental difference between transcendentalism and Islamism can be emphasized—that
transcendentalism embodies non-dogmatism while Islamism embodies dogmatism. That
Islamism competes politically on the plane of dogma against other political and theological
dogmatic conceptions (i.e. Marxism and Christianity) is in contrast with transcendentalism’s
character as a non-dogmatism. By contrasting transcendentalism with Islamism,
transcendentalism’s non-dogmatism can be underscored. While transcendentalism and
Islamism have a fundamental difference, they also share an important commonality in that
both emphasize the value of spirituality and its social and political applications.
The difficulty in contrasting Carlyle’s transcendentalism with Islamism is that Islamism
cannot easily be defined. Islamism is a term that encompasses many different political
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applications of Islam. There is no singular Islamism. Nonetheless, Sayyid Qutb’s Islamic political
thought can be compared with Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism. As a principal and
influential Islamic political theorist, Qutb’s construction of and promotion of Islamism can be
contrasted with transcendentalism. The comparison of transcendentalism with Islam/Islamism
need not include a comparison of transcendentalism with Judaism and Christianity. This is
because Islam has been appropriated to inform politics and governance as an ideology, while
Judaism and Christianity have not been politicized to the same extent. For example, there are
no viable Jewish or Christian political movements that seek to achieve a purely theocratic
governance on the basis of either Jewish or Christian theology.
Carlyle proposes the power of transcendentalism as a philosophy to supersede all
previous philosophies, beliefs and customs that have been constructed by humanity: “what is
Philosophy throughout but a continual battle against Custom; an ever-renewed effort to
transcend the sphere of blind Custom, and so become Transcendental?”1 Thus, it can be
inferred that Carlyle’s transcendentalism is offered as an end-of-history narrative whereby all
other competing philosophies would be simultaneously negated through and subsumed within
transcendentalism. In other words, a turn toward transcendentalism would be a return to
Platonism, since the ideologies and theologies that transcendentalism would both negate and
subsume are developments subsequent to Plato and departures from Platonism.
Transcendentalism serves as a type of dialectical synthesis of the decay of Platonism’s
hegemony and the subsequent vulnerability of pluralism, comprised of incommensurable
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ideologies and theologies, to yielding increasing levels of contention and destabilization in the
political sphere.
The many parallels between Carlyle’s transcendentalism and modern Islamism, most
notably the Islamism theorized by Qutb, are the bases upon which the incommensurability of
Islam/Islamism with other particularistic theological and ideological traditions could potentially
be resolved in a “reformation” of Islam/Islamism toward transcendentalism. Such a proposal
necessarily requires the differentiation of Islam and transcendentalism, as a religion and
“philosophico-religion,” respectively, from Islamism and transcendentalism as political
ideologies.2 I will contend that transcendentalism is compatible with Islam in the sense that it
preserves Islam in the form of a post-Islamic philosophico-religion, and it cannot be said that
transcendentalism is simply anti-Islamic. Just as Carlyle constructed transcendentalism as postChristian in Sartor Resartus, transcendentalism can be constructed as post-Islamic as well. Such
an acknowledgement intends to illustrate that it is possible for a Christian and a Muslim to
maintain their respective faiths while adopting transcendentalism as an overlapping and shared
consensus. What is more, a Muslim can maintain his/her faith while adopting
transcendentalism as an alternative political doctrine to Islamism, or any other political
doctrine that is subscribed to by a Muslim. Additionally, a Muslim could convert from Islam and
Islamism to transcendentalism.
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Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism can be cast as post-Islamic based on the
method Carlyle uses to cast transcendentalism as post-Christian. Carlyle cryptically promotes
transcendentalism by asserting that the Enlightenment successfully invalidated the theological
claims of Christianity. Through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh, Carlyle directs a question he would
hypothetically ask of Voltaire: “‘Sufficiently hast thou demonstrated this proposition,
considerable or otherwise: That the Mythus of the Christian Religion looks not in the eighteenth
century as it did in the eighth….But what next? Wilt thou help us to embody the divine Spirit of
that Religion in a new Mythus, in a new vehicle and vesture, that our Souls, otherwise too like
perishing, may live? What! thou hast no faculty in that kind?’”3 Carlyle thus demonstrates his
dissatisfaction with both Christianity as a dogmatic theology and Enlightenment atheism. Such
dual dissatisfaction is the basis on which Carlyle innovates and inaugurates transcendentalism
as post-Christian, and Carlyle’s philosophical construction can also be applied to Islam so as to
cast transcendentalism as post-Islamic. The relationship between Islam, Islamism, and
transcendentalism needs to be parsed delicately and with nuance. Thus, I intend to get a
conversation started while recognizing that much more scholarship is needed beyond the scope
of this dissertation to fully elucidate the complex religious, philosophical, and political nexuses
that exist between Islam, Islamism, and transcendentalism.
Carlyle’s commitment to renunciation of materialistic consumption as perhaps the
foremost and bedrock principle he offers to cure the social and political maladies afflicting
society portrays an affinity with Islam and Islamic political thought. While Islam embraces
materialism, its prioritization of spirituality inherently diminishes the emphasis placed on
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materialism relative to the emphasis placed on it by purely atheistic capitalism or Marxism.
Carlyle defines Muhammad as a “Hero as Prophet” in his public lectures collected in On Heroes,
Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus reads as if it is the
embodiment of a non-theological and secularized version of Islam, an Islam translated from
theology to philosophy with its principles intact. I contend that Carlyle offers, in Sartor
Resartus, a comprehensive philosophy that is simultaneously a moral, social, and political
philosophy in much the same fashion as how Islam has been converted into the political
ideology of Islamism.
In addition to transcendentalism’s relationship with Islam and Islamism,
transcendentalism can be situated in the context of contemporary Western moral philosophy
that grapples with Aristotelianism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment. The thesis in Carlyle’s
Sartor Resartus mirrors that of MacIntyre’s in After Virtue in that both contend that the
Enlightenment has failed to provide justification for morality. MacIntyre suggests that, given
the failure of the Enlightenment project for the justification of morality, it might appear that
“an appropriate strategy would be to wait until some more powerful mind applied itself to the
[project].”4 Though Carlyle was a “romantic” rather than an Enlightenment philosopher, it
should still be recognized that he applied himself to such a project. Carlyle’s justification for
morality, just like the moral philosophy itself, has to be inferred from the cryptic presentation
that so sweepingly characterizes Sartor Resartus in its entirety.
MacIntyre characterizes Enlightenment philosophers as constructing their divergent
arguments in a manner that nonetheless follow the same approach. According to MacIntyre,
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the philosophers Diderot, Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard move from premises concerning human
nature to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts.5 MacIntyre emphasizes
that a project that employed such an approach “was bound to fail, because of an ineradicable
discrepancy between their shared conception of moral rules and precepts on the one hand and
what was shared—despite much larger divergences—in their conception of human nature on
the other.”6
Carlyle’s philosophy and philosophical approach stand in stark contrast. Carlyle’s
philosophy is premised on the failure of all previous philosophies to serve as comprehensive
doctrines to guide humanity and provide answers to all moral and political questions. I will
argue by inference from Sartor Resartus that Carlyle’s philosophy is constructed from three
premises: 1) the Enlightenment failed; 2) Hegelian philosophy failed; and 3) the necessity to
look upon the state of the world with a gaze of pure alienation in order to construct a means to
seek to attain objective truth. Thus Carlyle constructs the biographical backstory of Professor
Teufelsdrӧckh, the protagonist whom Carlyle seeks to prove embodies the viewpoint of a
purely alienated individual. By being purely alienated, Teufelsdrӧckh has the highest capacity to
be a philosopher in the purest way. Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus seeks to impart the notion that
alienation is a valuable vantage point to be an objective social observer, social scientist, and
philosopher.
Sartor Resartus implicitly provides an alternative narrative to the narrative
Aristotelianism offers. MacIntyre summarizes Aristotelian ethics as “the threefold structure of
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untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-itstelos and the precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the other.”7
Carlyle does not explicitly parallel such an Aristotelian philosophical account with the exposition
of his “philosophy of clothes,” but the existence of such a parallel can nonetheless be inferred
and applied to a discussion of how Carlylean philosophy contrasts with Aristotelian philosophy.
The threefold structure of humanity in the context of Carlyle’s philosophy of clothes might
consist of humanity before its universal awareness of and acceptance of the “philosophy of
clothes,” humanity after its universal awareness of and acceptance of the “philosophy of
clothes,” and the romanticist/transcendentalist ethics as the means for the transition from one
to the other. The parallels between Carlyle’s “philosophy of clothes” and Aristotelian philosophy
are quite precise in that one can infer that Carlyle viewed the “philosophy of clothes” as a
radical break—the ultimate break—from humanity’s perception of itself, its world, and its
history to humanity’s perception of itself, its world, and its history that it could have if it
universally gained awareness of and accepted the “philosophy of clothes.”
The universal awareness of and acceptance of the “philosophy of clothes” could
presumably connote the realization of collective humanity’s telos and in so doing also connote
the end of history, philosophy, theology, and politics. What this amounts to is that humanity
would come to a consensus that transcendentalism/Platonism stands as the highest form of
philosophy. The pursuit of the transcendental rather than the material can also be a political
ideal and could be undertaken within the context of a developed economy more easily than a
developing economy. The acceptance of transcendentalism would connote a “dialectical
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synthesis” of philosophy in the sense that Plato inaugurated transcendental philosophy, then
materialist (communist and capitalist) and theological (Christian and Islamic) traditions arose to
counteract Platonism, and a dialectical return to Platonism is rational as a function of
diminishing returns within strict adherence solely to materialism and the incommensurable
dogmatism inherent in both Christianity and Islam. In short, modernization has allowed for
humanity to undertake discovering a true account of reality and collectively become
transcendentalists/Platonic mystics in the mold of Teufelsdröckh himself.
I will assert that Carlylean transcendentalism is exceptional when compared to all other
political and philosophical doctrines because it is the only one of them to intrinsically point out
the same shortcoming—an indefensible and illegitimate claim of supremacy--that all other
philosophies necessarily share in common. In this way, Carlyle’s transcendentalism is nihilistic
but not fully nihilistic. This is because transcendentalism asserts that all philosophies other than
transcendentalism are unprovable. Carlylean transcendentalism is concurrent with
(Nietzschean) nihilism in the sense that Carlyle voids all other possible philosophies: “Which of
your Philosophical Systems is other than a dream-theorem; a net quotient, confidently given
out, where divisor and dividend are both unknown?”8 Carlyle makes this claim on the basis that,
it can be inferred, other philosophies have themselves not discerned the philosophy of clothes
and not come to terms with it.
The “divisor” and “dividend” of any philosophical system are unknown because it is
unknown what each ultimately symbolizes as “clothing.” Such a conclusion is analogous to the
conclusion derived in Plato’s allegory of the cave in that each of the articles of clothing in the
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universe, and thus the universe in its entirety, is analogous to the shadows on the wall of the
Platonic cave. Carlyle asserts that philosophical wisdom of the highest order is that which
concludes that the entire universe is clothing. Consequently, if everyone went from believing
his or her particular philosophy to believing the philosophy of clothes, everyone would reach
the highest philosophical summit possible. As an inference, I contend that they would undergo
a conversion such that they would convert from believing their particularistic philosophy to
believing that not only their previous philosophy but all other philosophies not the philosophy
of clothes are by themselves insufficient and non-comprehensive “dream-theorems.” The
philosophy of clothes, or the philosophy of “things-in-general,” is the only alternative to all
other particularistic, narrow, and incommensurable philosophies that, by themselves and in the
absence of transcendentalism, are fodder for incessant conflict. Carlyle asks:
What are all your national Wars, with their Moscow Retreats, and sanguinary hate-filled
Revolutions, but the Somnambulism of uneasy Sleepers? This Dreaming, this Somnambulism is
what we on Earth call Life; wherein the most indeed undoubtingly wander, as if they knew right
hand from left; yet they only are wise who know that they know nothing.9
By asking this, Carlyle implicitly concludes that wars and revolutions, the climactic
confrontations of all other particularistic and incommensurable philosophies, take place only
because those participating are asleep to (and unconscious of) the philosophy of clothes. The
inference can be made that wars and revolutions, just like political conflict of every sort, will
persist only until the philosophy of clothes proselytizes all of humanity. If everyone were to be
awake to the philosophy of clothes and thus be themselves transcendentalists, wars and
revolutions would cease. Transcendentalists would conclude that wars and revolutions took
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place in a prehistoric context to the advent of the philosophy of clothes—when humanity was
sleepwalking--as wars and revolutions epitomize more greatly than any other constructs the
non-discernment of the philosophy of clothes. Those antagonistic in the context of a war or
revolution would reach accord through the philosophy of clothes and recognize that war and
revolution are each instances of human behavior by humans wholly uninformed of the
prospects of transcendentalism. I will assert that transcendentalism provides a means to
achieve a shared consensus among otherwise conflicted ideologies and theologies. As such, it is
possible for transcendentalism to co-exist alongside other ideologies and theologies and
facilitate conflict resolution. It is important to recognize that there are multiple prospective
scenarios, rather than a single scenario, as to how transcendentalism could be adopted in the
context of practical politics.
The analogy to Plato’s allegory of the cave is valuable in this context because the
philosopher descending back into the cave to bring wisdom to the cave-dwellers can be seen as
analogous to a transcendentalist informing the uneasy sleepers of their somnambulism:
You must go down, then, each in his turn, to live with the rest and let your eyes grow
accustomed to the darkness. You will then see a thousand times better than those who live
there always; you will recognize every image for what it is and know what it represents,
because you have seen justice, beauty, and goodness in their reality; and so you and we shall
find life in our commonwealth no mere dream, as it is in most existing states, where men live
fighting one another about shadows and quarrelling for power, as if that were a great prize;
whereas in truth government can be at its best and free from dissension only where the
destined rulers are least desirous of holding office.10
An inference and conclusion from Carlyle (and Plato) is that a human who thinks the
universe in its entirety is symbolic of a transcendent order (and universally embodying the
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divine) does not wage war or partake in a revolution. It is in this light that one can entertain the
consideration that Carlylean transcendentalism comprises a “Didactico-Religion.”11 Carlyle’s
conclusion that “they only are wise who know that they know nothing” underscores his view
that transcendentalism is the apex of philosophy. Specifically, the conclusion that the entire
universe is symbolic of a transcendent order is the highest point of philosophical wisdom that
can be attained in philosophy. Carlyle defends such a proposition with the following argument:
Pity that all Metaphysics had hitherto proved so inexpressibly unproductive! The secret of
Man’s Being is still like the Sphinx’s secret: a riddle that he cannot rede; and for ignorance of
which he suffers death, the worst death, a spiritual. What are your Axioms, and Categories, and
Systems, and Aphorisms? Words, words. High Air-castles are cunningly built of Words, the
Words well bedded also in good Logic-mortar; wherein, however, no Knowledge will come to
lodge.12
Transcendentalism departs from nihilism in that it claims the universe is symbolic and
universally embodies the divine, whereas nihilism claims the universe is void of any meaning
and purpose. As Nietzsche concludes, “if the universe had a goal, that goal would have been
reached by now. If any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would have been
reached.”13 Nietzsche simply has no evidence to support these positions, other than a religious
devotion to materialism and nihilism, coupled with an unsubstantiated ignoring and/or
dismissal of Platonic and Carlylean philosophy. In fact, the “goal of the universe,” to use
Nietzsche’s phrase, could be to see that transcendentalism is adopted universally rather than
nihilism, among an infinity of other as-yet-undisclosed possibilities. Nietzsche brushes aside
Carlyle: “all attempts to conceive of a new species come to nothing (“romanticism,” the artist,
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the philosopher; against Carlyle’s attempt to lend them the highest moral values).” 14 In another
critique of Carlyle, Nietzsche contends that he is simply confused: “psychological confusions:
the desire for belief is confounded with the “will to truth” (for instance, in Carlyle).”15 Though
Nietzsche does not directly engage with Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism or with
Sartor Resartus, these statements read as veiled swipes at Carlyle’s dedication to the pursuit of
a post-Christian and Platonic philosophy. After all, for Nietzsche, Plato “placed appearance
before Being! And therefore lies and fiction before truth! Unreality before actuality!”16 Such a
statement confirms Nietzsche’s commitments to materialism and nihilism and his voidance of
any form of spiritual construction of an ideal state of human affairs.
I contend that nihilism’s assertion that the universe is not symbolic of a divine order is as
much a positivist philosophical conclusion as that the universe is symbolic. The conclusion is
ultimately unprovable in that there is no systematic evidence to either prove or disprove one
side over the other and Plato/Carlyle and Nietzsche each choose the opposite position from the
other more or less as a default. This is because they were the philosophers cast in such a mold
to discover the possibilities of either spiritual or nihilist philosophical accounts. In other words,
each offers a plausible position, and it is logical to assume each position would have naturally
been derived over the course of the history of philosophy. I have illustrated the implications of
transcendentalism’s adoption to be valuable and, in so doing, have constructed Carlyle’s
transcendentalism as being instrumental. Have the valuable implications of nihilism been
articulated or practiced?
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Just as there is no irrefutable evidence to support Nietzche’s nihilism, there is no
irrefutable evidence to support Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism. Likewise, there is no
irrefutable evidence to support Plato’s conclusions derived from his allegory of the cave—
namely that the visible world made visible to humanity by the sun is akin to being trapped
inside a dark cave seeing shadows on the wall and mistakenly thinking them the extent of
reality. In contrast to Nietzsche, Carlyle and Plato leave open the possibility of the conclusion
that a meaningful “divine idea of the world” can eventually be ascertained as a function of
being embedded intrinsically in their philosophical constructs which themselves are ostensibly
“divine ideas of the world.” In other words, the inference is that by studying and perceiving the
clothing of the universe (for Carlyle) and studying and perceiving the “shadows” that comprise
the entirety of the visible world (for Plato), a higher meaning intrinsic to what is perceived as
merely material can eventually be derived.
Transcendentalism is a comprehensive doctrine that will largely remain ineffective (as it
currently is) so long as it remains merely one doctrine among many that exist in the context of
liberalism. For it to be effective, it will have to be adopted more popularly as a movement,
more than it was in the nineteenth century by a very limited number of American
Transcendentalists. Transcendentalism offers the basis for a viable post-liberal order in that as a
prospective successor to liberalism its philosophy is tailor-made to preserve the achievements
of liberalism while transitioning humanity to a next stage of political development. The time has
come when transcendentalism, heretofore representative of nothing more than abstract
philosophy, can and should become practical.
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The juxtaposition of Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones with Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus is valuable
in illustrating the deep political application that can be made of Carlyle’s transcendentalism.
Though there is no official representative of Islamism, Qutb can be cast as a principal
representative of it. “Islamism” as a term describes the wide range of attempts to revive Islam’s
political legacy after the end of the Caliphate of Constantinople in 1924 that have taken the
form of grassroots political organizing in the context of political parties/electoral politics as well
as violent terrorism.17
Within Islamism, certain movements take the form of “radical Islamism” in that they
begin with a radical critique of liberal western political thought, pursue a battle (sometimes
violent) with “the West,” and are determined to build an Islamic society obedient to the laws of
the Quran.18 Qutb was a leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and this
group had influence on numerous radical Islamic groups.19 Since al-Qaeda has been a dominant
and important radical Islamist organization, and Qutb is considered to be the spiritual father of
al-Qaeda, Qutb’s philosophy is a valuable embodiment and representative of Islamism.20 For
example, Osama bin Laden studied at the University of Jedda in Saudi Arabia, where he was a
student of Sayyid Qutb’s brother Muhammad Qutb and introduced to the political philosophy
of the Muslim Brotherhood.21 While the exact amount of direct influence Sayyid Qutb had on
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al-Qaeda is unclear, Qutb’s political theory suggests the theoretical foundations of the
organization’s terrorism.22
Qutb’s Islamic thought can be cast as a principal source for understanding Islamism, but
with the recognition that he is by no means a singular foundational influence on all Islamism.
Islamism is defined by a pluralism of intellectual and political actors, ranging from various
Islamic philosophers, in addition to Qutb, to various political parties and politicians in the many
countries that comprise the Islamic world. Such pluralism exists within the context of the
multiple denominations of Islam that are practiced.
In this context, Carlylean transcendentalism can be applied as an intellectual lens to act
against radical Islamism and Islamic terrorism to reduce the appeal and support of radical
Islamism as an ideology.23 The intellectual exposure of radical Islamism will largely be a task for
Muslim religious leaders, since they have knowledge of Islamic belief and moral authority
among their people.24 By placing Islam in a larger context of philosophy and theology, such an
intellectual effort can also take place in the form of a comparison of Qutb’s Islamism with
Carlyle’s transcendentalism.
There is a nexus between Carlylean philosophy and Islam/Islamism in that Carlyle
praises Muhammad on multiple occasions and in so doing makes possible the inference that
Carlylean transcendentalism can both be cast as and situated as an evolutionary development
within the context of the Islamic tradition. Though himself not a Muslim, Carlyle’s praise of
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Islam demonstrates a consensus between himself and Islam with respect to valuing the spiritual
and divine over the material, earthly, and utilitarian. Thoreau equated Carlyle with Muhammad
as a means of underscoring what he took to be the magnitude of Carlyle’s influence: “[Carlyle]
has the earnestness of a prophet. In an age of pedantry and dilettantism, he has no grain of
these in his composition. There is no where else, surely, in recent readable English, or other
books, such direct and effectual teaching, reproving, encouraging, stimulating, earnestly,
vehemently, almost like Mahomet, like Luther.”25
Carlyle never provided a systematic critical analysis of Islam as a theology and its
prospects for supplying the foundation for governance. He did offer praise toward Muhammad
and Islam in a manner that suggested he was in accord with what Islam embodied and offered,
compared to other ideologies/theologies. For example, rather than offering a theory of justice
and political liberalism, as Rawls did to counter utilitarianism, Carlyle instead sought to
illustrate how Islam shed light on utilitarianism’s weaknesses and its petty nature:
Benthamee Utility, virtue by Profit and Loss; reducing this God’s world to a dead brute Steam
engine, the infinite celestial Soul of Man to a kind of Hay-balance for weighing hay and thistles
on, pleasures and pains on:--If you ask me which gives, Mahomet or they, the beggarlier and
falser view of Man and his Destinies in this Universe, I will answer, It is not Mahomet!26
Carlyle also publicly lectured on Muhammad as “The Hero as Prophet” in the context of his
lectures On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. Much as I seek to relate Carlylean
transcendentalism and Islam so that Carlylean transcendentalism can be cast in evolution from
Islam, Carlyle cast Islam as an evolution from paganism. According to Carlyle, the “advance to a
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very different epoch of religion” from paganism to Islam is a “great change” and Carlyle
remarks “what a change and progress is indicated here, in the universal condition and thoughts
of men!”27 Casting Islam as “a change and progess” inherently casts it as merely a milestone in
the continuous evolution of how humanity theorizes with respect to the divine. Rather than
promoting Islam as the final form of religion, Carlyle’s characterization of Islam as “progress”
can be inferred as illustrating that there are future stages of progress to be made in the
construction of religion.
Carlyle characterizes Muhammad as “by no means the truest of Prophets; but I do
esteem him a true one.”28 Carlyle explicitly discloses the limits of the extent to which he will
endorse Islam: “as there is no danger of our becoming, any of us, Mahometans, I mean to say
all the good of [Muhammad] I justly can.”29 Theorizing as to how Islam has lasted for twelve
centuries and how as of the nineteenth century there are 180 million Muslims, Carlyle remarks
how Muhammad’s Islam has conformed to the laws of nature in a sublime fashion so as to have
such longevity and such a wide following: “A man must conform himself to Nature’s laws, be
verily in communion with Nature and the truth of things, or Nature will answer him, No not at
all!”30 For Carlyle, a quack can prosper by spouting his “quackery,” but only for a day.31
Carlyle discusses the teachings of Islam, and their congruence with his description of
transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus is evident. Carlyle himself never compares Islam with his
conception of transcendentalism, but, nonetheless, such a comparison can be made. According
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to Carlyle, it can be inferred, both Islam and transcendentalism are defined by their inherent
mysticism. The element of mysticism is evident in how Carlyle discusses how both Islam and
transcendentalism see humanity as symbolic and the embodiment of divinity. Teufelsdrӧckh
reveals what he takes to be the mystical nature of humanity:
O Heaven, it is mysterious, it is awful to consider that we not only carry each a future Ghost
within him; but are, in very deed, Ghosts! These Limbs, whence had we them; this stormy
Force; this life-blood with its burning Passion? They are dust and shadow; a Shadow-system
gathered round our Me; wherein, through some moments or years, the Divine Essence is to be
revealed in the Flesh.32
Carlyle describes the teachings of Islam in a similar manner:
[God] made us at first, sustains us yet; we and all things are but the shadow of Him; a transitory
garment veiling the Eternal Splendour. “allah akbar, God is great;”—and then also “Islam,” That
we must submit to God. That our whole strength lies in resigned submission to Him,
whatsoever, He do to us. For this world, and for the other! The thing He sends to us, were it
death and worse than death, shall be good, shall be best; we resign ourselves to God.—"If this
be Islam,” says Goethe, “do we not all live in Islam?” Yes, all of us that have any moral life; we
all live so….I say, this is yet the only true morality known. A man is right and invincible, virtuous
and on the road towards sure conquest, precisely while he joins himself to the great deep Law
of the World, in spite of all superficial laws, temporary appearances, profit-and-loss
calculations; he is victorious while he cooperates with that great central Law, not victorious
otherwise:--and surely his first chance of cooperating with it, or getting into the course of it, is
to know with his whole soul that it is; that it is good, and alone good! This is the soul of Islam; it
is properly the soul of Christianity;--for Islam is definable as a confused from of Christianity; had
Christianity not been, neither had it been. Christianity also commands us, before all, to be
resigned to God….33
On this basis, the inference can be made that Carlylean transcendentalism, as a post-Christian
and post-Islamic philosophy, is nonetheless compatible with Christianity and Islam. Carlyle’s
“endorsement” of Christianity and Islam implies their preservation and embodiment in
transcendentalism. Carlyle remarks that Christianity and Islam teach “to know that we know
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nothing” in his lecture on Muhammad and, in Sartor Resartus, in the context of theorizing
transcendentalism, Carlyle remarks that “they only are wise who know that they know
nothing.”34
In his lecture on Muhammad, Carlyle remarks that “Islam means in its way Denial of Self,
Annihilation of Self [and] this is yet the highest Wisdom that Heaven has revealed to our
Earth.”35 In Sartor Resartus, Carlyle similarly comments that “Annihilation of Self [is] the first
preliminary moral Act” to attaining the Everlasting Yea, which he casts as the highest
philosophical perspective.36 Carlyle, in discussing Muhammad’s inspiration for the concept of
annihilation of self, negates the importance of Islam’s theological narrative and underscores
Islam as a contribution to philosophy: “[Muhammad] called it revelation and the angel Gabriel;-who of us yet can know what to call it? It is the ‘inspiration of the Almighty’ that giveth us
understanding. To know; to get into the truth of anything, is ever a mystic act,--of which the
best Logics can but babble on the surface.”37 Carlyle asserts that since Muhammad concluded
he attained the highest wisdom, he attributed himself being chosen to receive the revelation as
an act of god:
“Is not Belief the true god-announcing Miracle?” says Novalis.—That Mahomet’s whole soul,
set in flame with this grand Truth vouchsafed him, should feel as if it were important and the
only important thing, was very natural. That Providence had unspeakably honoured him by
revealing it, saving him from death and darkness; that he therefore was bound to make known
the same to all creatures: this is what was meant by “Mahomet is the Prophet of God;” this too
is not without its true meaning.38
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Carlyle’s discussion of the resistance Muhammad initially faced in proselytizing converts
is reminiscent of Plato’s discussion of the freed prisoner returning to the darkened cave to
convert those still in chains, while also being reminiscent of the difficulties Carlyle conceived
the philosophy of clothes would face in proselytizing converts.39 Carlyle remarks, “naturally
[Muhammad] gave offence to everybody: Who is this that pretends to be wiser than we all; that
rebukes us all, as mere fools and worshippers of wood!”40 Carlyle recounts how Muhammad
was advised against pursuing proselytism: “Could he not be silent about all that; believe it all
for himself, and not trouble others, anger the chief men, endanger himself and them all, talking
of it? Mahomet answered: If the Sun stood on his right hand and the Moon on his left, ordering
him to hold his peace, he could not obey! No: there was something in this Truth he had got
which was of Nature herself; equal in rank to Sun, or Moon, or whatsoever thing Nature had
made.”41 Such a sentiment can be analogized to Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism and
it is curious as to why Carlyle himself, or American Transcendentalist disciples such as Emerson
and Thoreau, did not make such an analogy. Muhammad is to Islam as Teufelsdrӧckh (via
Carlyle) is to transcendentalism, and just as there was something in the truth Muhammad had
got which was of Nature herself, so too can it be said of the truth Teufelsdrӧckh had got.
Carlyle himself casts Muhammad as being a new philosopher in a long line of
philosophers, a line of mysticism/romanticism on which Plato and Teufelsdrӧckh could both be
included:
To [Muhammad’s] eyes it is forever clear that this world wholly is miraculous. He sees what, as
we said once before, all great thinkers, the rude Scandinavians themselves, in one way or other,
39
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have contrived to see: That this so solid-looking material world is, at bottom, in very deed,
Nothing; is a visual and tactual Manifestation of God’s power and presence,--a shadow hungout by Him on the bosom of the void Infinite; nothing more. The mountains, he says, these
great rock-mountains, they shall dissipate themselves “like clouds;” melt into the Blue as clouds
do, and not be!...With our Sciences and Cyclopaedias, we are apt to forget the divineness, in
those laboratories of ours. We ought not to forget it! That once well forgotten, I know not what
else were worth remembering.42
The nexus between Carlyle and Islam is also informed by a liberal interpretation of Qutb
when he asserts, “the establishment of Islamic society on the foundation of a movement and its
taking the form of an evolutionary system, these twin virtues jointly contribute to render the
Islamic society unique and a peerless type by itself.”43 I will assert that Carlylean
transcendentalism informs and has relevance to Islamism in the context of Qutb’s cryptic
depiction of Islamic society as an “evolutionary system.”44 Within the context of Carlylean
transcendentalism, Qutb’s Islamism, just like every other ideology and theology, is preserved as
a function of being “retailored” into transcendentalism. This indicates how transcendentalism
can be conceived of as a type of “overlapping consensus,” to apply the Rawls term, among
disparate ideologies and theologies.45 Such a consensus can be constructed theoretically such
that it is possible for Muslims and Christians to retain their theological beliefs and identify as
Muslims and Christians while also subscribing to transcendentalism and identifying as
transcendentalists. I will suggest that it is the unyielding devotion to Islam as a singular,
particularistic, ossified, and branded theological dogmatism on the part of Islamists that
prevents the realization of what may be called “Islamic society” given that Islamists each
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adhere to their own particularistic version of Islam and themselves cannot agree with respect
to the theology of Islam.
Islamists do share a consensus in that they are devoted to Islam as an ossified theology
whose basis rests in Muhammad’s reception of god’s teachings. In other words, according to
Islamism, god has spoken the final word and all that is left to do is realize god’s revelations to
Muhammad in the seventh century in the context of constructing “Islamic society” in modern
times. Such a project is inherently problematic, if not contradictory, at least when taking Qutb’s
approach literally. This is because Qutb prescribes that Islamic society can be established via
evolution on the basis of Muhammad’s initial Islamic era which is bounded and unalterable.
Allowing for an “evolutionary system” for Islamic society to come into its full form is making an
allowance for such evolution to be inherently unbounded. There is thus a dissonance between
faith in an unalterable theology and faith in an alterable “evolutionary system” to fully realize
that theology’s teachings in the context of a society. Hypothetically, given the unbounded
nature of an “evolutionary system,” Islam may have to evolve its brand so as to realize its social
and political aims, all the while preserving its theological foundation.
I will make the radical and new claim that Carlylean transcendentalism, which can be
cast as an evolution from Islam, fulfills Qutb’s conception of Islam as an evolutionary system.46 I
recognize that the integration of Carlyle’s transcendentalism in the context of Qutb’s Islamism
is a radical and unprecedented synthesis. Based on Qutb’s stance in Milestones in which he
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casts Islam as the only option to provide a comprehensive doctrine to guide human affairs, it
could be assumed that synthesizing Islam with Carlyle’s transcendentalism would be met with
hostility and considered a heresy by Qutb and other Islamists.47 Yet such a synthesis is a
valuable construct in the academic context and could potentially be supported by those
sympathetic to the reform of Islam in the present and especially among future generations. It is
unknown whether Qutb studied Carlyle and contemplated his views toward Islam and
conception of transcendentalism. Nevertheless, it is evident that both Carlyle’s views toward
Islam and conception of transcendentalism necessarily need to be synthesized in order to be
able to cast transcendentalism as an evolution from Islam.
Transcendentalism, much like Islam, is identified as a movement that took place in
history. Qutb seeks to promote Islamism by making it known that “Islamic society does not only
denote a historical stage which could be sought in the pages of the past history but in fact it is
the demand of the modern age and an yearning for the future.”48 This is precisely the
sentiment I seek to advance with respect to transcendentalism by identifying it as the demand
of the modern age and a yearning for a post-liberal future whereby heretofore irreconcilable
and incommensurable sociopolitical conflicts (among them economic, religious, ethno-racial,
etc.) can finally be resolved. Transcendentalism identifies the rationale for the renunciation of
conflict by identifying the virtue and logic of renunciation as a value in and of itself.
Transcendentalism prioritizes renunciation and submission to a transcendent order from a
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philosophical vantage point without relying on a theological narrative susceptible to being
incommensurable with competing theological accounts.
The comparison and synthesis of Carlylean transcendentalism with Qutb’s Islamism
demonstrates both their compatibility and differences. The difficulty in integrating Carlylean
transcendentalism with Islamism lies in Carlyle’s explicit recognition of the evolution of
theologies over the course of history. In Sartor Resartus, Teufelsdrӧckh defines what he calls
“Church Clothes” as “the Forms, the Vestures, under which men have at various periods
embodied and represented for themselves the Religious Principle; that is to say, invested the
Divine Idea of the World with a sensible and practically active Body, so that it might dwell
among them as a living and life-giving WORD.”49 Qutb, on the other hand, is adamant that Islam
is the final doctrine to serve all of humanity’s needs both at the level of the individual and the
collective and is the only viable totalizing doctrine to guide humanity both in the public and
private spheres. He thus offers a basis for as to why we should reverse course from being
engulfed in jahiliyyah, a state in which God’s laws are rejected, to embrace Islam.50 Jahiliyyah is
a term taken from the Koran and is usually translated as the “age of ignorance,” in reference to
the pre-Islamic era on the Arabian peninsula.51
Carlyle invokes jahiliyyah conceptually to analogize it to the limitations of political
philosophy:
The Dryasdust Philosophisms and enlightened Scepticism of the Eighteenth Century, historical
and other, will have to survive for a while with the Physiologists, as a memorable NightmareDream. All this haggard epoch, with its ghastly Doctrines, and death’s-head Philosophies
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‘teaching by example’ or otherwise, will one day have become, what to our Moslem friends
their godless ages are, ‘the Period of Ignorance.’52
Carlyle, by invoking jahiliyyah, can be dialogued with Qutb’s political theory of Islamism.
Carlyle uses “the period of Ignorance” ostensibly to describe the totality of political
developments and political philosophy in his contemporary 1843 political civilization at the time
Past and Present is published. As a non-Islamic theorist of transcendentalism, Carlyle’s casting
of “Dryasdust Philosophism” as embodying a “period of ignorance” provides grounding to infer
that Carlylean transcendentalism can be theorized as an -ism to supersede all other previous isms. With such a lens that demonstrates the parallels between Carlyle’s transcendentalism and
Qutb’s Islamism, the differences between Bentham’s utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice
are shown to be infinitesimally small.
In a section entitled “How Islam Confronted Jahiliyyah?”, Qutb seeks to show how Islam
transcended all other religions by offering what other religions failed to offer:
Quran did not present the faith as a mere theory or theology. Nor did it adopt the style
commonly found in scholastic writings on the Unity of God characterised by pedantic
discussions. On the contrary Quran appeals to the human nature and relies for its arguments on
the signs which are found in the human soul and the surrounding environment…A particular
aspect of its revolutionary teachings was that it had practically initiated a struggle within the
society on the basis of Oneness of God and was waging a war against the Jahili concepts and
traditions under whose debris humanity lay entombed and human nature paralysed and
suspended. Hence for confronting these particular conditions it was not appropriate for Islam
to be presented in the form of theory.53
Qutb writes that Islam did not offer itself as a “theology” because it “presents a programme of
practical life and enforces the same in the world of action [and] does not remain circumscribed
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within the limited and straitened circle of life like theoretical discussions and intellectual
speculations of theology.”54
According to Qutb, Jahiliyyah in its modern incarnation “owes its existence to the putrid
element of lordship of man over man, and which separates man from the all-embracing system
of the universe.”55 Qutb writes that the extermination of Jahiliyyah has been humanity’s grand
project and that modern Jahiliyyah has been the condition of humanity’s existence since the
dawn of civilization, in both the pre-Islamic and post-Islamic eras. Elementally, Jahiliyyah has
persisted as a hegemonic social order largely unchanged throughout the entirety of human
history.
What is particularly noteworthy and striking about Qutb’s theory of Jahiliyyah is his
assertion that Jahiliyyah is a state that has been persistently antagonized by other theologies
prior to the advent of Islam and that Islam is the culminating theological doctrine to finally
terminate Jahiliyyah in its entirety. In this sense, the “Islamic message” of submission to the
one god of the universe was prophesied by all prophets prior to Muhammad and Muhammad
was the last messenger of God whose “sole purpose” was the extermination of Jahiliyyah.56
Carlyle’s transcendentalism fits within this paradigm as his political philosophy sought to
replace mutual hostility with a mutual solidarity in human society through a mutual recognition
that there exists a transcendent divine order of the universe that lies beyond the material
symbolic universe. Carlyle’s message of transcendentalism, as post-Islam, thus fits within the
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Islamic tradition as an “Islamic” message that was offered after the advent of Islam, just as
prophets prior to Muhammad offered “Islamic” messages.
Qutb theorizes on the prospects of a compromise with Jahiliyyah:
Islam does not accept any half-way compromise with Jahiliyyah. Whether it is the question of
its concepts and ideology or the laws of life based on this concept, either Islam shall exist or
Jahiliyyah. No third course is acceptable or agreeable to Islam in which Jahiliyyah and Islam
share equally. Islam’s point of view in this regard is quite clear and bright. It says that Truth is a
unit which cannot be analysed. If there will be no Truth, it shall be falsehood. Mutual
intermixing and intermingling of Truth and Falsehood and their co-existence is impossible.
Either the command of Allah will prevail or that of Jahiliyyah. Either the Divine code will operate
or the desire of self-will rule.57
This passage illustrates Qutb’s strict adherence to dogmatic Islam and suggests there is no room
for compromise or synthesis with those who may praise Islam yet not be as universally
committed to its dogma. As such, it speaks to the tension that exists between Qutb and Carlyle.
Qutb describes the dynamics of the relationship between Islam and Jahiliyyah:
There is a wide yawning valley between Islam and Jahiliyyah which cannot be bridged for the
purpose that both should be able to meet midway. If at all such a bridge could be built it could
be for the purpose that the folk of Jahiliyyah should cross over and take refuge in the lap of
Islam, whether they are the so-called Islam-professing residents of Islamic country or those
residing outside it.58
The incommensurability that exists between Islamism and Carlylean transcendentalism
should again not obscure their simultaneous compatibility in the context of Qutb’s quote.
Carlyle writes that the “Universe is but one vast Symbol of God.”59 Qutb writes that the “prime
mover [god], which is the cause of the dawning of the sun of the [Islamic] movement, does not
make the human lives the centre of its sparks, nor any nook of the material universe is the
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source of its heat and activity; rather just as we have mentioned that it descends from a source
which is beyond the earthly sphere and above the human world.”60 Carlyle and Qutb each
articulate conceptions of the divine that are essentially equal with respect to their
nebulousness and indefiniteness.
Qutb recognizes that in some respects there is a resemblance between Islam and
Jahiliyyah, but “otherwise they are like separate trees, and the roots, trunks and branches of
both are separate from each other.”61 Such a sentiment fails to acknowledge the profound
similarity of Carlylean transcendentalism and Islam and that Carlylean transcendentalism is a
steep departure from other “Jahili” ideologies and theologies, especially those that are purely
materialist such as capitalism or communism. Qutb’s omission of Carlylean transcendentalism is
even more readily apparent when he describes Islam as a tree “cultivated by the Divine wisdom
and irrigated by it” and Jahiliyyah as the “evil tree [that] has sprouted from the land of human
desires.”62 Carlylean transcendentalism is clearly a departure from such a broad definition of
Jahiliyyah as the principles it espouses—renunciation and submission to the transcendent
order—did not sprout from human desires but rather parallel Islam’s tenets in their nature.
Carlylean transcendentalism can be applied within the context of Islam to both theorize
and inform Islam because there is no basis to preclude its application. Much like liberalism is a
nebulous term that is difficult to define officially, Islam and Islamism are amorphous and
imprecise. There is no such thing as a “standard Islam” in that Islam has no institution like the
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Vatican and no authority equivalent to the Pope who is able to codify an official Islam. 63 It is not
even possible to define Islam in a way that will be acceptable to the majority of Muslims and so
Islam becomes a mental construction rather than a tangible, definable entity.64 The division of
Islam into numerous sects, rituals, and theological schools that each proclaim to represent the
“true” Islam underscores the inherent variability to Islam and how it is an umbrella that
captures such wide diversity.65 Furthermore, Islamism is not a monolithic entity and there is
mutual antagonism and hostility among Islamists who seek to institute Islam as the hegemonic
political doctrine globally.66 It is on these bases that Carlylean transcendentalism can be applied
to Islam and Islamism as “projects” that are inherently non-ossified and evolutionary.
Mozaffari brainstorms as to whether Islam is capable of adaptation in a manner
analogous to Christianity’s adaptation in the context of the Reformation. He concludes that
Islam is unique when compared to Christianity in that it is a rigid monotheistic religion that
offers no means to separate a public/secular sphere from the religious sphere. 67 Discounting
the prospects of reform through the teachings of Islamic sacred scriptures, Mozaffari ponders
as to whether a rupture exists within Muslim societies: “Is there any rupture that is calling Islam
to challenge it? By rupture, I mean a profound substantial change that regenerates a new vision
of the world, human beings, thoughts, art, nature, and so on.”68 Mozaffari’s conclusion is that,
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despite decolonization, revolutions, violence, terrorism, and war in the last decades of the
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, Islamic countries are not
facing a rupture since the hegemonic views with respect to human rights, freedom of
expression, the fate of women, art, literature, and music have gone unchanged.69 Mozaffari
then inquires as to where the rupture is to come from?70
By reflecting on how no religion can be changed, and acknowledging how the
Reformation merely changed the thinking of some Christians and not the contents of
Christianity’s sacred scriptures, Mozaffari forecasts that a rupture in the context of Islam would
have to involve a “reformation of some Muslims’ way of thinking, and not a reformation of
Islam as a religion or a revision of the verses of the Koran.”71 It is on this basis, he concludes,
that an Islamic reformation is unlikely, since Islamists are looking backward to Muhammad’s
era in Medina as the original and ideal model and golden age of Islam to construct an idealized
future.72 It is under these auspices that the consideration of Carlylean transcendentalism could
provide a means to adapt Islam since transcendentalism parallels Islam in so many ways and
was conceptualized by Carlyle, a Westerner sympathetic to Islam yet someone who
acknowledged the inadequacies of subscribing exclusively to Islam’s theology as an ossified
comprehensive doctrine.
Another difficulty in dialoging Carlylean transcendentalism with Islam is that although
an official Islam has not been ossified among Islam’s plural sects, Islam teaches that God has,
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once and for all, formulated the rules of justice.73 The dual attributes of Islamic pluralism and
yet a monolithic belief that God has established law and justice are another instance of
contradiction, or at a minimum comprise an antinomic relationship such that there is tension
between the two statements both being realized in the context of Islam. Carlyle provides a nontheological view that the laws of nature, which necessarily embody the divine and
transcendent, must be followed. Carlyle’s parameters for politics suggests that his views are in
accord with Islam, again though he is not a believer in Islamic theology: “In Parliament and out
of Parliament, and everywhere in this Universe, your one salvation is, That you can discern with
just insight , and follow with noble valour, what the law of the case before you is, what the
appointment of the Maker in regard to it has been.”74 Carlyle suggests that the laws of nature
have to be ascertained, while Islam suggests laws have been transmitted from Allah to
Muhammad and must be dutifully obeyed.
Mozaffari juxtaposes Islam’s account of justice with Rawls’s conception of justice.75 Such
a comparison is valuable in that it illustrates that those who subscribe to Islam’s theological
account of justice having been ossified through Allah’s transmission to Muhammad and found
within the teachings of the Quran will be closed to receiving other philosophical accounts of
justice. Much like MacIntyre illustrated the inherent incommensurability between Rawls and
Nozick with respect to their theories of justice, there is an incommensurability between the
Islamic and Rawlsian accounts of justice.76 This is valuable to acknowledge because it
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underscores how the purpose of juxtaposing Islam with other normative political philosophy is
not to persuade those who will resist persuasion but rather to position Islam (and Islamism) in
the larger context of philosophy. Carlylean transcendentalism can be related to Islam so as to
inform the similarities and differences, both profound and nuanced, between the two much like
how similarities and differences can be discovered between Rawls’s theory of justice and Islam
by relating the two. It is particularly useful to contrast Carlylean transcendentalism with Islam
and Rawls’s theory of justice as a means to construct transcendentalism as a coherent political
philosophy and to show that it provides an alternative account of justice.
Moreover, how Carlyle and Qutb conceptualize the rewards for subscribing to their
“theologies” can be contrasted. Carlyle casts belief in the philosophy of clothes, renunciation,
and the Everlasting Yea as intrinsically good. The Everlasting Yea, achieved as a product of
realizing the philosophy of clothes and renunciation, is a state “wherein all contradiction is
solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him.”77 Someone who has reached the
Everlasting Yea has reached the highest point of self-actualization that is achievable because he
both recognizes the entirety of the universe as divine while simultaneously makes no claims
upon the world beyond those that are materially necessary. Ostensibly, the only claims made
are those for a minimal/sufficient sustenance.
In contrast, according to Qutb, the jihadi’s struggle on behalf of god to advance Islam is
recognized by a reward in paradise.78 The reward is depicted in the Quran in quite earthly terms
such as pleasure and love.79 The reward is thus earthly and material and if the driving
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motivation behind the jihad is the promise of 72 virgins, Qutb is positioned badly for his
criticism of Western political ideologies rooted in materialism.80 Hansen and Kainz analyze the
inherent empty destination of Qutb’s Islamism:
Qutb therefore contrasts with the western materialism a concept of religion which reveals itself
to be [empty]. Reducing Islam to a struggle of believers’ self-assertion against external evil is
basically reducing the spiritual struggle of man with his faith in God (and therefore with his own
evil) to an earthly struggle between good and evil men (believers and unbelievers). The focus
on this earthly struggle implies a rejection of transcendence….Qutb falls back on the position
which he was so desperately fighting against: materialism.81
Qutb offers Islamism as a political religion, while Carlyle offers transcendentalism,
though much more implicitly, as a political religion. Carlyle’s transcendentalism is both
theorized and presented in a cryptic manner to such an extent that it has gone unrecognized as
a political religion. Carlyle, and his iconic American disciples Emerson and Thoreau, also did not
promote Carlylean transcendentalism as a comprehensive political religion to proselytize
converts. While Islamism adopted jihad as the most extreme tactic so as to lift the fog of
ignorance and proselytize new converts, as did the Quran itself, American Transcendentalism as
a movement influenced by Carlyle failed to resonate with the public outside of a small
population in New England in the nineteenth century.82 Moreover, Carlylean transcendentalism
was never refined so as to be capable of offering a coherent platform for mainstream political
discourse.
Islamic philosophy has promoted Islam as a practical political religion. Qutb promotes
Islam’s universal application and practicality when he remarks:
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We should make [people] thoroughly convinced that if they embraced Islam, their lives would
be totally changed. Their actions, characters, principles and regulations would also undergo
change and their concepts and attitude of thought would also be transformed owing to this
modification. Islam would endow them with an abundance whose expanses cannot be
conceived by human comprehension.83
Qutb emphasizes explicitly how necessary and critically important it is for Islam to be
cast as a doctrine that supersedes all others. He calls on Muslims to inculcate upon the public
that Islam is not “one of the man-made social theories and a system among self-devised
systems which are found on the face of the earth under different names and banners.” 84 Qutb
casts Islam as a “pure and uncompromising system.”85 Transcendentalism lacked a coherent
message and political program to be able to contrast itself with competing ideologies because
its cryptic account in Sartor Resartus was never refined so as to be situated in popular political
discourse. Qutb describes Islam as “characterised by an individuality of its own” and Carlylean
transcendentalism has never been branded as such.86
Qutb remarked that “the purpose for which Islam stands for Jihad is to secure the real
and complete freedom on man on this earth.”87 Qutb defines Jihad as “striving for the
establishment and supremacy of [Islam as a] Divine system.”88 Qutb defines religion as “the
system and way of life which brings under its fold the human life with all its details.” 89
Moreover, the problem religion confronts is “to banish all the fabricated gods through the
establishment of the rule of God, Most High.”90 It can be inferred that Qutb vindicates Carlyle’s
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philosophy of clothes/transcendentalism with his claim that all previous theological
conceptions of god were “fabricated” while not suggesting precisely the rationale behind why
he thinks all other gods were “fabricated” yet the Islamic god is an exception to the rule. Islam
itself is a re-fabrication and evolution from Judaism and Christianity and yet Qutb calls on all
“fabricated” gods to be banished and labels all Jewish and Christian societies as “Jahili”
societies.91 I will assert that such a contradiction can be resolved by subscribing to Carlylean
transcendentalism.
Just as Christians advance the notion that Christianity is the divine system for human
life, Qutb and Muslims advance that Islam is such a system, and the two faiths persist as being
indefinitely incommensurable and irreconcilable without drawing on Carlylean
transcendentalism to reconcile such incommensurability. I will put forward that Carlylean
transcendentalism is a system which proves capable of reconciling both while it simultaneously
reconciles all other competing ideologies and theologies as well. This is another context in
which the inference can be made that Carlylean transcendentalism makes possible the
viewpoint that all other ideologies and theologies (themselves not Carlylean transcendentalism)
embody merely an unconsciousness of Carlylean transcendentalism. Such ideologies and
theologies persist in incommensurable and irreconcilable conflicts out of not recognizing
Carlylean transcendentalism as being supra-ideology and supra-theology, which itself informs
that ideologies and theologies are “clothing” just like everything else in the universe that
symbolizes a transcendent order. Carlylean transcendentalism is thus the ideology that

91

Qutb, Milestones, 153.

165

supersedes all other ideologies and theologies by inherently showing the inadequacy of such
ideologies and theologies that are themselves not Carlylean transcendentalism.
Moreover, Carlylean transcendentalism is a political religion in that it has the capacity to
provide a system for human life. Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism leads to the inference
that Islam is an important milestone, but it is not the final milestone to ascertain a divine
system for human life. What Qutb ascribes to Islam can be ascribed to Carlylean
transcendentalism: “it is neither man-made nor a self-devised way of any human organisation
or a particular human race.”92 Carlylean transcendentalism shows itself to be what Qutb has
sought to point out about Islam, that Islam is “different in respect of its nature and reality from
all concepts which have been rampant in the world so far.”93 In re-theorizing Carlyle’s
conception of transcendentalism, I seek to amend Qutb’s claim that responsibilities and
obligations which follow from Islamism are not traceable in any other concept and way of life of
the world.94 Qutb defines the purpose of Islam in a manner that could be applicable to
Carlylean transcendentalism in that both seek to ascertain the transcendent order and create a
social existence compatible with such an order:
If Islam builds its structure in such an incomparable manner which imparts it a unique status
among human systems of history, it in fact becomes congruous with the “Central law” which
circumscribes not only the human existence but the entire universe, and whose orbit of activity
is not confined to the human system of life but embraces the whole order of existence. 95
Qutb advances the assertion that there is a unitary transcendent order to the universe,
much as Carlyle advances in Sartor Resartus. Qutb’s concluding sentence in Milestones captures
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not only his sentiments but can be applied as a synthesis of Carlyle’s own sentiments within
Sartor Resartus: “These fabricators and deceiving people are liars.”96 Essentially, Carlyle and
Qutb propose that the universe is a “mono-fabric” in that all the universe is made up of is
representative of a transcendent order. According to Qutb, “behind the curtain of this universe
an Intent is in action which resolves it; a Power which motivates it; and a Law which binds it in
order.”97
Qutb argues how the comprehensive nature of Islam can provide a lasting solution for
the predicament humanity faces. Such an account informs a prospective explanation of as to
how Carlylean transcendentalism might provide a lasting social order in its own right. According
to Qutb, humanity must achieve a perfect harmony with the nature of the universe and such a
harmony would naturally connote the “end” of human political development:
When man evolves an atmosphere of coordination and uniformity with nature, it results in the
establishment of a state of concordance between the mutual relationship of man and the
general struggle of life, for when man adopts an attitude of cooperation with nature it
consequently follows in the birth of complete agreement between human life and the universe,
and only one system prevails in the human life and the universe. Thus the collective side of
mans’ life becomes free from mutual clash and discord, and mankind is benefitted with total
goodness. Thereafter various (mysteries) of the universe do not remain secret any more. Man
becomes the knower of natures’ secrets. Hidden powers of the universe become apparent to
him, and he gets the trace of the hidden treasures in the spacious universe. He harnesses all
those powers and treasures under the direction of God’s laws for the total well-being and
prosperity of mankind, leaving no room for any clash or conflict between man and the nature.
Otherwise there is a constant struggle between them and the desires and carnal passions are
raising their head against the Divine code.98
Qutb further remarks on the corollary implications of failing to recognize and discern a
transcendent order and humanity’s place in such an order:
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Just as clash and conflict take place between man and his nature and between man and the
universe, similarly these differences growing and expanding also take the shape of mutual
discord between human beings, human groups, nations and communities and different human
races. In consequence all the potentialities, stocks and treasures of the universe instead of
being harnessed for the prosperity and advancement of mankind are converted into means of
annihilation and causes of adversity for it.99
I contend that Carlyle theorized transcendentalism, in Sartor Resartus, to be a system
which brings under its fold the entirety of human existence and calls on humanity to pursue
renunciation and submission to the transcendent order as the only and necessary means of
attaining social harmony and tranquility. Both Carlyle and Qutb theorize the renunciation of the
individual as necessary for the elevation not only of the individual but humanity as a whole.
According to both, renunciation needs to be pursued to such an extent that every individual
commits himself to ascertaining the divine order and living in accord with it. In the absence of
such renunciation and commitment, conflict among humanity in any and all forms will persist
indefinitely. Qutb remarks that the Muslims of the first generation had received perfect training
in the teachings of the Quran and thus “they had completely annihilated their individuality” and
adopted the job of propagating the message of Islam.100
Such a dialogue with Islamism shows that Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus is something of a
code that can only be decoded and applied to politics through deliberation on its political
implications in the context of other competing doctrines and “end of history” perspectives.
Carlyle does not explicitly articulate a political agenda in Sartor Resartus, nor does he articulate
the steps to be taken whereby Sartor Resartus may be applied. Rather, Carlyle merely
prophesies cryptically that the teachings in Sartor Resartus will be taken up and applied at a

99

Qutb, Milestones, 169.
See Qutb, Milestones, 270. For Carlyle’s discussion of renunciation, see Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 144-145.

100

168

later date. Ostensibly, society will be reborn when the world in all it encompasses, including
time, space, and all the ideologies and theologies previously advanced are viewed as
monochromatic clothing that masks a latent, immaterial, and transcendent order. It can be
inferred that Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism is thus totalitarian in the one sense that it
provides a comprehensive way for individuals to view their own individual lives in the context
of an all-encompassing world history whose culmination is transcendentalism itself. In the
absence of transcendentalism, one can make the inference that social and economic strife will
persist indefinitely simultaneous to the persistence of conflict among incommensurable
ideologies and theologies.
Qutb demonstrates much similarity with Carlyle in theorizing with respect to the
deficiencies of such phenomena as nationalism and economic class warfare as cures to social
ills. Qutb prescribes the ideal society as being a society not “in a condition that some are driven
by greed while others burning with envy; that all of the affairs of the society are decided by the
baton and sword, by threat, duress and violence; that the hearts of the population are desolate
and their spirits broken, as is happening under the systems which are based on the authority of
others than Allah’s.”101 For Qutb, Islamic society suppresses “all the frivolous prejudices and
weak associations of race, colour, language, country, material considerations and geographical
boundaries.”102
Carlylean transcendentalism points out the weaknesses of communism along the same
contours Qutb used in theorizing Islamism vis-à-vis communism. According to Qutb:
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[Communism] claimed to demolish all the walls which were raised by colour and race, nation
and country and geography. But the foundations of this society were also not erected on the
all-embracing base of “human friendship” rather “class conflict” was made the basis of this
society. Viewing from this angle, the communist society is another facet of the ancient Roman
society. While the Roman society conferred distinction on the “nobility” the communist society
imparts this status to the “Proletariate”, and the underlying emotion is the feeling of hatred,
malice and envy. Such a degraded and malicious society cannot bear any other fruit except
exciting the base human feelings.103
Carlyle’s transcendentalism is largely congruent with Qutb’s Islamism on these terms. Carlylean
transcendentalism promises the resolution of the deficiencies in liberalism while also removing
the basis of antagonistic class conflict (present in both capitalism and communism), ending
racism, and ending religious conflict. Carlyle’s conceptions of renunciation and social solidarity,
which he theorizes are embraced upon the acceptance of transcendentalism, illustrate the
pathway by which class conflict, racism, and religious conflict may be progressively
extinguished.104 Transcendentalism prizes and prioritizes the immaterial and spiritual as a
means to construct politically the ideal society whereas liberal democratic capitalism and
communism both prize the material and economic.
Liberal democratic capitalism and communism each fail to leverage the
immaterial/divine as a necessary construct to unite humanity and ameliorate conflict and
division in all their forms. Without drawing on a transcendent/divine construct, conflict is likely
to only persist and deepen, leading literally to the social dis-integration of individuals in the
form of bourgeoning inequality and disillusionment with materialist ideologies. Capitalism led
to economic development spanning the centuries since its advent in the nineteenth century,
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but has the potential to increasingly lead to diminishing returns in the absence of a
transcendental ethos that may be necessary to curtail inequality and achieve a type of
communitarian consensus.
What sets Carlyle’s transcendentalism and Qutb’s Islamism apart from liberal
democratic capitalism and communism is that they seek to integrate individuals into a shared
solidarity on the basis of a divine/transcendent construct, while liberal democratic capitalism
and communism are each premised on economic conflict. Transcendentalism seeks to eclipse
the material and economic so as to elevate humanity to a higher spirituality where it will attain
a higher purpose rather than perpetuate and recreate its purpose of achieving market
equilibrium through production and consumption.105
A society based on the pursuit of greater and greater consumption, whose predominant
priority is market equilibrium, is bound to be compromised in that ever-increasing consumption
alongside ceaseless technological innovation is bound to be unsustainable. Such a social order
burns itself out (either due to environmental degradation or by other means), as theorized by
Carlyle in Sartor Resartus at the advent of the industrial age and recently in the 2010s by
Milbank and Pabst in The Politics of Virtue and Deneen in Why Liberalism Failed. Even Jeff
Bezos, the consummate capitalist of the early twenty-first century, corroborates these views in
the context of advocating something as extreme as space colonization as a solution:
We humans have to go to space if we are going to continue to have a thriving civilization. We
have become big as a population, as a species, and this planet is relatively small. We see it in
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things like climate change and pollution and heavy industry. We are in the process of destroying
this planet.106
This illustrates the profound tension that lies in a realization that the drive for economic growth
as the hegemonic ethos was necessary for a time to achieve economic development, but that
pursuing renunciation—or space colonization--as an “exit ramp” rather than growth provides
an ethos to sustain and preserve such gains.
Milbank and Pabst succinctly delineate what they take to be the “metacrisis” of liberal
democracy, in which liberalism falls short of producing a stable order marked by peace and
prosperity:
Thus liberal democracy is undergoing a metacrisis (again, not a “final” crisis) whereby the
modern oscillation between the sovereign power of the state on the one hand, and the
sovereignty of self-possessed citizens on the other, removes people from their embeddedness
in families, communities, and traditions. The attempted removal of substantive loyalty
fraudulently legitimates the liberal claim that only the visible hand of government combined
with the invisible hand of the market can save society from the anarchical “state of nature,”
which liberalism really produces as its fantasised presupposition.107
Milbank and Pabst apply their political theory to international relations and conclude that “the
simultaneous interdependence of national societies and the sundering of social, cultural and
religious ties that bind together people within and across state borders suggest that liberal
hegemony faces a metacrisis.”108
Qutb has documented the resistance Islamism has met with in a manner that could
provide a window into the resistance transcendentalism would likely face if it were to be
promoted as a post-liberal political doctrine:
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Man has in every period of history in the past, in the modern times, and perhaps in future
also—tried to confront the true religion with diverse tactical feats to subdue it, because this
religion sets human beings free from the lordship of others than Allah. That is why men placed
all sorts of impediments and obstacles—political, social and economic in the way of this
religion. They resorted to racial and class shibboleths.109
Qutb reflects on the difficulty of contesting a deeply entrenched hegemony:
Dominant thoughts and concepts have their particular influences and demands. It is difficult to
get rid of them until man’s relation is established with a supreme and sublime Reality whose
protection reduces all these concepts and ideologies to triviality, making them pale into
insignificance; and until energy is realised from such source which is more superior, more
influential and more powerful than the source of those thoughts and concepts. A man who
stands counter to the general flow of the society, challenging the dominating logic of the
society, struggles against the common customs of the society, its current laws and values,
thoughts and concepts and its aberrations and misguidedness, he will not only strongly feel his
utter helplessness but also find himself alien and helpless in this fully crowded world, unless of
course he seeks the support of a Being who is stronger than man, more steadfast than
mountain and dearer than life.110
Qutb follows this passage with a conceptualization that parallels Carlyle’s conceptualization of
the “Everlasting Yea,” couched in Islamic scripture. According to Qutb, god elevates those who
accept the existence of a transcendent and divine order from the grief and anxiety of living in a
secular society. Qutb quotes a Quranic verse that essentially mirrors Carlyle’s message in his
“Everlasting Yea”: “Faint not nor grieve, for you will over come them if you are indeed
believers.”111 Qutb remarks on this in a manner that is nearly perfectly synonymous with a plot
summary of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus:
This instruction and guidance comes as a cure for both his grief and broken-heartedness. Both
these sentiments generally take hold of man under inclement conditions. But a believing man
overpowers these sentiments not merely by patience and steadfastness but by a sense of
superiority and high vision. He is niched at such a high pedestal whence the Satanic and
diabolical forces, dominant values, well-propagated thoughts and views, worldly constitutions
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and laws, deeply pervading habits and customs and the common folk gathering around
aberration appear low and degraded.
Only a believer is dominant and superior, both from the point of view of his support and
origin. To him country and state have no significance nor big personalities carry any weight.
Popular values and standards held in esteem within the country, appear inconsequential in his
eyes. Views and concepts, popular and customary among the people cannot astound him. As
such he is a supreme being. He always imbibes guidance from the eternal stream of God. He
approaches God in every matter and always pursues the path directed by Him. 112
Such passages from Qutb lay the foundation to realize that there is a mutual accord
between Islamism and transcendentalism, since transcendentalism (in the Platonic, Carlylean,
and Emersonian traditions) can be synthesized in a social and political context to merely replace
Islamic theological dogma with an unbranded divinity and offer itself as the “true religion.” It
also underscores the conclusions that Islamists should not be hostile to transcendentalism
because transcendentalism embodies Islam just like Islam itself embodies and subsumes
Christianity and Judaism. Islam was generated as a development from and resolution of the
Christian and Judaic traditions and did not arise from nothing as a wholly free-standing
independent and mutually exclusive tradition. Such is the same case for transcendentalism, as it
builds on Islam and is a means to achieve Islamist aims.
Transcendentalism is “Islamic” because it supports renunciation and submission to the
transcendent order just like Islam itself does and offers a political means of proselytization
much like Islamism. According to Qutb, “the subject of [Islam] is ‘MAN’—the whole human
species—and its sphere of activity is earth—the whole of it.”113 Such a sentiment can be applied
to transcendentalism, even though Carlyle, Emerson, Thoreau and the other American
Transcendentalists met with limited success in initially conveying it. In dialoguing
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transcendentalism with Islam, it must be noted that the transcendent order, whether theorized
through the Islamic tradition or transcendentalism, is the same order irrespective of how it is
described, theorized, or branded.
Juxtaposing Carlyle with Qutb illustrates how each was a radical who espoused a radical
philosophy as a means to fundamentally depart from and reconstitute the hegemonic political
order. Both Carlyle and Qutb were immaterialists who sought to leverage the transcendent
order as a means of yielding human solidarity and extinguishing human conflict. As James
Anthony Froude has acknowledged, if by Radicalism was meant the view that modern society
needed to be reconstituted from the root, then Carlyle was a thoroughgoing Radical.114
Transcendentalism embodies essentially what Qutb theorized that Islam embodies.
Qutb calls Islam “the last link of the lengthy chain of invitation towards Allah, initiated under
the leadership of noble messengers since the dawn of humanity.” 115 Islam is both literally and
historically not such a last link, as Carlylean transcendentalism followed it in offering an
invitation to the divine order. Islam has not offered an invitation to the divine order to a
universal audience, as it is theologically intertwined with Judaism and Christianity and thus
unable to breach the incommensurability it has with not only those two other religions but all
other religions as well. Islam is the last theological invitation to the divine order vis-à-vis the
other Abrahamic religions of Christianity and Judaism since it embodies the last distinct
theological incarnation based on the Abrahamic theological tradition, and is thus not only
closest chronologically but also philosophically to transcendentalism compared to Christianity
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and Judaism. It should be recognized that Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism as a philosophy
was born at least in part, albeit neither directly nor explicitly, as a result of Islam’s failure as a
theology to represent and yield the end of history the way it set out to do and the way Qutb
claims it is capable of doing. Essentially, if Islam represented the end of history, there would
have been neither a need nor a capacity for Carlyle to theorize transcendentalism in Sartor
Resartus, as Islam’s hegemony would have precluded the possibility.116
Transcendentalism supersedes not only Islam but all other theological traditions
because it recognizes them as arbitrary and fleeting, clothing that is worn by humanity for a
time before it arbitrarily adopts a new theology to wear as its theological clothing. It is in this
context—comparing Carlyle’s transcendentalism with Islam as the last major Abrahamic
theological incarnation--that Teufelsdrӧckh’s definition of “Church Clothes” as “the Forms, the
Vestures, under which men have at various periods embodied and represented for themselves
the Religious Principle; that is to say, invested the Divine Idea of the World with a sensible and
practically active Body, so that it might dwell among them as a living and life-giving WORD” is a
particularly useful construct.117
In this chapter, I have begun to show how Carlyle’s transcendentalism can be applied as
an alternative to Nietzsche’s nihilism, which I will build on in subsequent chapters. I have also
demonstrated how transcendentalism can be constructed as an ideology in its own right by
dialoging it with Islamism—a political ideology whose own advent was in the latter half of the
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twentieth century. In the next chapter, I will contrast Carlyle’s political philosophy with the
political philosophy of John Rawls, who is widely regarded as the most influential political
philosopher of the twentieth century. Such a contrast further enables the construction of
Carlyle’s transcendentalism as a political doctrine. Just as Carlyle’s transcendentalism is an
alternative to Qutb’s Islamism, it too is an alternative to Rawls’s analytical-constructivist
account of his liberal theory of justice.
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Chapter 4
The Antagonism of Thomas Carlyle and John Rawls

John Rawls’s twentieth-century philosophy stands in antagonism toward Thomas
Carlyle’s philosophy, albeit not explicitly. The contrast between Carlyle and Rawls in political
philosophy has large-scale implications that transcend political theory and hold relevance not
only to other subfields of political science but to large-scale conflicts in modern-day global
politics. In the history of political thought, Carlyle and Rawls, even more than Carlyle and Mill,
are polar and incommensurable. Carlyle epitomizes the intuitionist romantic and Rawls the
constructivist rationalist. Though Carlyle and Rawls are disparate philosophers, bringing the two
into dialogue is valuable because they each offered distinct insights into theorizing social
justice. That they reached diverging conclusions with respect to justice, as a function of a)
starting from different premises and b) constructing different arguments from their premises,
provides a valuable mutual test of each philosopher’s theory. In other words, the contrasting
elements, and constructivism, of Carlyle’s and Rawls’s theories can be tested against one
another. Contrasting Carlyle with Rawls also provides a lens through which to construct
Carlyle’s at times cryptic and scattered notions about justice into a coherent doctrine.
Although Rawls did not acknowledge Carlyle (or even American Transcendentalism) in
his writings as offering a conception of justice to be contended with, Rawls in many ways
emerged as a hegemonic influence on twentieth-century political philosophy from the ashes of
Carlyle’s own hegemonic influence during the nineteenth century. George Eliot described
Carlyle’s stature and prominence in the literary and academic spheres in 1855:
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There is hardly a superior or active mind of this generation that has not been modified by
Carlyle’s writing; there has hardly been an English book written in the last ten or twelve years
that would not have been different if Carlyle had not lived. The character of his influence is best
seen in the fact that many of the men who have the least agreement with his opinions are
those to whom the reading of Sartor Resartus was an epoch of their minds.1
And, in his 1965 study of Sartor Resartus, G.B. Tennyson remarked poignantly, “even today
when Carlyle enjoys far from universal acclaim, there is general agreement that Sartor Resartus
is a work of genius.”2
Sartor Resartus has been described as “deliberately unsystematic” and a “philosophy of
wonder and experience.…With its intuitive, imaginative method, it attempts at every point to
embrace a kind of totality.”3 Carlyle did not seek to construct a Kantian system.4 As literature
rather than pure (political) philosophy, Sartor Resartus epitomizes how Beenstock characterizes
the relationship between romanticism and political theory:
The relationship between political philosophy and literature does not follow the direct, practical
model of positive influence or application….It takes a complex, circuitous route that
foregrounds conflict between the two forms. Literature impacts political theory from the
bottom upwards in a relationship that cannot be conceived of as illustrative or
clarifying….Romantic writers adopted a dissident approach to political philosophy that arises
from philosophy’s dissenting approach to literature.5
Carlyle presents Teufelsdrӧckh as the main character in Sartor Resartus as an alternative to
social contract theory by way of Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophy of clothes.6 Carlyle seeks a
philosophy that brings justice to a higher level of metaphysical and spiritual abstraction than
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Rawls does.7 While Rawls theorizes justice as confined to a relationship among humans in
society, Carlyle theorizes justice as necessarily consisting of proper human relationships, but
also as conformity to the metaphysical natural laws of the universe.8
Carlyle contrasted what he called “the man of logic and the man of insight; the Reasoner
and the Discoverer, or even Knower.”9 Carlyle was a “mystic” in the sense that he believed the
deepest of all truths are known other than by reasoning.10 As a corollary, Carlyle disbelieved in
miracles, except in that deep sense in which all is miraculous, that nothing occurs as a result of
blind forces, and that behind every scientific “explanation” there remains a mystery that no
science can probe.11 To Carlyle, the reasoner and discoverer are “quite separable,--indeed, for
most part, quite separate characters.”12 Carlyle ponders, “could you ever establish a Theory of
the Universe that were entire, unimprovable, and which needed only to be got by heart; man
then were spiritually defunct, the Species we now name Man had ceased to exist.” 13 Carlyle
remarks on this paradigm, “but the gods, kinder to us than we are to ourselves, have forbidden
such suicidal acts.”14 Though Rawls’s theory of justice is by no means a “theory of the universe,”
and there is no evidence that he sought to advance a “theory of the universe,” he nonetheless
sought to advance a theory of justice that would be universal within the “universe” of justice. 15
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According to Rawls’s conception of the first feature of what he calls rational
intuitionism, the order of moral values “does not depend on, nor is it to be explained by, the
activity of any actual (human) minds, including the activity of reason.”16 Carlyle propounds the
validity of this feature of rational intuitionism:
Practically men have come to imagine that the Laws of this Universe, like the laws of
constitutional countries, are decided by voting; that it is all a study of division-lists, and for the
Universe too, depends a little on the activity of the whipper-in. It is an idle fancy. The Laws of
this Universe, of which if the Laws of England are not an exact transcript, they should
passionately study to become such, are fixed by the everlasting congruity of things, and are not
fixable or changeable by voting!17
Carlyle elaborates further:
My friend, do you think, had the united Posterity of Adam voted, and since the Creation done
nothing but vote, that three and three were seven,--would this have altered the laws of
arithmetic; or put to the blush the solitary Cocker who continued to assert privately that three
and three were six? I consider, not. And is arithmetic, think you, a thing more fixed by the
Eternal, than the laws of justice are, and what the right is of man towards man? The builder of
this world was Wisdom and Divine Foresight, not Folly and Chaotic Accident. Eternal Law is
silently present, everywhere and everywhen. By Law the Planets gyrate in their orbits;--by some
approach to Law the Street-Cabs ply in their thoroughfares. No pin’s point can you mark within
the wide circle of the All where God’s Laws are not. Unknown to you, or known (you had better
try to know them a little!)—inflexible, righteous, eternal; not to be questioned by the sons of
men.18
These passages capture how Carlyle views justice as something fixed, established, and in need
of discovery. As such, Carlyle holds that reason cannot by itself decide what justice is without
taking into account a larger (spiritual) context. Likewise, voting cannot by itself definitely
determine what justice entails.

16

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 91.
Carlyle, “Parliaments,” 282-283.
18
Carlyle, “Parliaments,” 284.
17

181

The second feature Rawls theorizes as characterizing rational intuitionism is that moral
first principles are derived “by a kind of perception and intuition, as well as organized by first
principles found acceptable on due reflection.”19 Rawls further elaborates on this feature that
intuitionists compare moral knowledge with knowledge of mathematics and that according to
intuitionism the order of moral values is said to lie in God’s reason and to direct the divine
will.20 The conclusive feature of rational intuitionism, then, is that it “conceives of truth in a
traditional way by viewing moral judgments as true when they are both about and accurate to
the independent order of moral values [and] otherwise they are false.”21
In Carlyle’s many philosophical tracts, he never entertains what Rawls theorizes as the
first feature of political constructivism, that “the principles of political justice (content) may be
represented as the outcome of a procedure of construction (structure).”22 Carlyle’s relationship
to the other features of political constructivism (as theorized by Rawls) demonstrates Carlyle’s
philosophical approach as clearly non-positivist (and non-idealist) in the context of moral,
social, and political philosophy. The second feature of political constructivism is that the
“procedure of construction is based essentially on practical reason and not on theoretical
reason, [whereby] practical reason is concerned with the production of objects according to a
conception of those objects—for example, the conception of a just constitutional regime taken
as the aim of political endeavor—while theoretical reason is concerned with the knowledge of
given objects.”23 Carlyle’s political philosophy contrasts with this second feature because
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Carlyle largely pursues social criticism and a philosophy of negation of what he takes to be the
flaws in the existent political culture and social order.
Moreover, Carlylean philosophy is inimical to the third feature of Rawls’s conception of
political constructivism, namely that it views the person as belonging to political society
understood as a fair system of social cooperation, and that persons possess the moral powers
of a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good.24 The basis upon which
Carlyle composes Latter-Day Pamphlets, for example, is that he considers the sociopolitical
environment in Victorian England to have reached such a point of injustice that it cannot persist
much longer in its current state.25 Carlyle argues that citizens lack what Rawls defines as a
“capacity for a sense of justice that enables them to understand, apply, and to act from the
reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation.”26 While Rawls
takes this as a premise, a starting-point, a given of sorts according to his ideal theory project,
Carlyle takes this to be the end of politics and political philosophy from a “non-ideal”
perspective. Thus, an inference from Carlylean philosophy could be that there would be no
need to deliberate on an ideal society if such a society was already a fair system of social
cooperation and persons possessed the moral powers of a capacity for a sense of justice and for
a conception of the good, because such a society would already be the ideal society.
In “Characteristics,” Carlyle remarks on the limits of philosophical inquiry, as such
inquiry only emerges out of a recognition that society is unhealthy.27 In a state of health,

24

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 93.
Carlyle, “The Present Time,” 3-4.
26
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 103-104.
27
Carlyle, “Characteristics,” 1-3.
25

183

inquiry does not take place as there is no need to discover the ailment and its proper remedy.
Carlyle contended that philosophy, particularly conducted as a science, could reach no positive
result.28 After reaching no positive result, philosophy’s futility would be demonstrated, and the
way would be clear for a reassertion of the healthy intuitions of humanity that had prevailed
prior to its fall from grace.29
Carlyle offers an argument that can be applied to counter the difference principle,
Rawls’s second principle of justice, and shows how the original position is a specious
construction.30 Rawls’s second principle of justice is that social and economic inequalities are
just if they are “to everyone’s advantage.”31 Carlyle makes the case that an individual whose
material existence improves may not end up being content. Carlyle argues that even with
abundance, a laborer’s discontent or real misery may be great.32 Carlyle maintains, “the
labourer’s feelings, his notion of being justly dealt with or unjustly; his wholesome composure,
frugality, prosperity in the one case, his acrid unrest, recklessness, gin-drinking, and gradual
ruin in the other,--how shall figures of arithmetic represent all this?”33 Carlyle is suggesting that
the tenor of an economic relationship, particularly that of one between employer and
employee, is of utmost importance when it comes to achieving justice. The application to
Rawls’s difference principle is that if the poor hypothetically gain financially as a function of
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growing inequality, this does not necessarily mean that the bonds of social solidarity among
rich and poor are growing stronger. The persistence of exploitation, and the poor laborer
viewing himself as being exploited, may supersede the laborer’s own financial gains as a
function of growing inequality.
Carlyle indirectly counters Bentham’s utility principle, and in a manner that can be
applied to counter Rawls’ difference principle, with the argument that happiness is inherently
insatiable.34 Though directed at utilitarianism, such an argument can be applied to Rawls in the
sense that “benefits to the least well-off” are also insatiable and that the least well-off cannot
attain spiritual satisfaction merely by being beholden to external materialism derived from
wealthier members of society. Carlyle’s views with respect to the insatiability of desires are
similar to Aristotle’s, in which on the issue of ownership of property Aristotle attests that “it is
more necessary to equalize people’s desires than their properties.”35 Aristotle defends such a
claim with the following reasoning:
The wickedness of human beings is insatiable: at first two obols were a sufficient allowance, but
now that this has become the tradition men are always wanting something more, and are never
contented until they get to infinity. It is the nature of desire to be infinite, and most people live
for the satisfaction of desire. The source from which a remedy for such evils may be expected is
not the equalization of property, but rather a method of training which ensures that the better
sort of people have no desire to make themselves richer while the poorer sort have no
opportunity to do so.36
Like Aristotle, Carlyle provides a philosophical justification for why he thinks it is optimal
to renounce and minimize desires as opposed to maximize desires in pursuit of unattainable,
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infinite, and insatiable consumption. Carlyle philosophizes with respect to human nature
through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh in a manner that is largely synonymous to what Aristotle
articulated in Politics on the insatiability of desires:
Man’s Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in
him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance
Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in joint-stock
company, to make one Shoeblack HAPPY? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two; for
the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and would require, if you consider
it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less:
God’s infinite Universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as
fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a Throat like that Ophiuchus! Speak not of them; to the
infinite Shoeblack they are as nothing. No sooner is your ocean filled, than he grumbles that it
might have been of better vintage. Try him with half of a Universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets
to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and declares himself the most maltreated of
men. –Always there is a black spot in our sunshine: it is even, as I said, the Shadow of
Ourselves.37
Carlyle follows this theory of insatiability with an application to a more realistic
condition, namely the universal recognition on the part of humanity that scarcity indeed exists
and that it is impossible for every person to consume the infinite Universe. He maintains, again
through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh:
But the whim we have of Happiness is somewhat thus. By certain valuations, and averages, of
our own striking, we come upon some sort of average terrestrial lot; this we fancy belongs to us
by nature, and of indefeasible right. It is simple payment of our wages, of our deserts; requires
neither thanks nor complaint: only such overplus as there may be do we account Happiness;
any deficit again is Misery. Now consider that we have the valuation of our own deserts
ourselves, and what a fund of Self-conceit there is in each of us,--do you wonder that the
balance should so often dip the wrong way, and many a Blockhead cry: See there, what a
payment; was ever worthy gentleman so used!—I tell thee…it all comes of thy Vanity; of what
thou fanciest those same deserts of thine to be.38
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Carlyle concludes on this basis that renunciation is a rational solution to the infinite
nature of human desires. He articulates a thesis, again through Teufelsdrӧckh, that goes
uncontemplated by both Bentham and Rawls:
So true is it, what I then said, that the Fraction of Life can be increased in value not so much by
increasing your Numerator, as by lessening your Denominator. Nay, unless my Algebra deceive
me, Unity itself divided by Zero will give Infinity. Make thy claim of wages a zero, then; thou
hast the world under thy feet. Well did the Wisest of our time write: ‘It is only with
Renunciation (Entsagen) that Life, properly speaking, can be said to begin.’39
Carlyle’s theory of consumption and renunciation thus aligns to a large extent with that
of Aristotle. Carlyle advances renunciation more strongly on the basis of the positive rewards it
makes possible, while Aristotle emphasizes the rewards that come with moderation in the
satisfaction of one’s appetites. According to Aristotle:
for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable even if it tries every source of
gratification, and the exercise of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites are strong
and violent they even expel the power of calculation. Hence they should be moderate and few,
and should in no way oppose the rational principle—and this is what we call an obedient and
chastened state—and as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the
appetitive element should live according to reason. Hence the appetitive element in a
temperate man should harmonize with reason; for the noble is the mark at which both aim, and
the temperate man craves for the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought; and this is
what reason directs.40
Aristotle articulates a conception of distributive justice that Carlyle himself affirms,
although without citing Aristotle. For Aristotle, “a just distribution is one in which there is
proportion between the things distributed and those to whom they are distributed.”41 Aristotle
maintains that those who contribute equally to the function of society should receive equal
compensation, while those who are superior or inferior should receive compensation that is
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correspondingly superior or inferior.42 From this Aristotle draws the following conclusion: “If all
are thus treated proportionately to the contribution they make, all are really receiving equal
treatment; for the proportion between contribution and reward is the same in every case. The
sort of equality which justice involves is thus proportionate equality; and this is the essence of
distributive justice.”43 Carlylean philosophy lies counter to Rawls’s difference principle with a
conception of economic justice that parallels Aristotle’s conception:
“A fair day’s-wages for a fair day’s-work:” it is as just a demand as Governed men ever made of
Governing. It is the everlasting right of man. Indisputable as Gospels, as arithmetical
multiplication-tables: it must and will have itself fulfilled;--and yet, in these time of ours, with
what enormous difficulty, next-door to impossibility! For the times are really strange; of a
complexity intricate with all the new width of the ever-widening world; times here of halffrantic velocity of impetus, there of the deadest-looking stillness and paralysis; times definable
as showing two qualities, Dilettantism and Mammonism;--most intricate obstructed times! Nay,
if there were not a Heaven’s radiance of Justice, prophetic, clearly of Heaven, discernible
behind all these confused world-wide entanglements, of Landlord interests, Manufacturing
interests, Tory-Whig interests, and who knows what other interests, expediencies, vested
interests, established possessions, inveterate Dilettantisms, Midas-eared Mammonisms,--it
would seem to everyone a flat impossibility, which all wise men might as well at once abandon.
If you do not know eternal Justice from momentary Expediency, and understand in your heart
of hearts how Justice, radiant, beneficent, as the all-victorious Light-element, is also in essence,
if need be, an all-victorious Fire-element, and melts all manner of vested interests, and the
hardest iron cannon, as if they were soft wax, and does ever in the long-run rule and reign, and
allows nothing else to rule and reign,--you also would talk of impossibility! But it is only difficult,
it is not impossible. Possible? It is, with whatever difficulty, very clearly inevitable.44
Thus, in his exposition of his account of economic justice, Carlyle seeks to demonstrate how “a
fair day’s-wages for a fair day’s-work” is “no rhetorical flourish; it is an authentic, altogether
quiet fact.”45
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Carlyle exclaims: “To reward men according to their worth: alas, the perfection of this,
we know, amounts to the millennium!”46 According to Carlyle, poverty is a deep social
malfunction and “Pauperism is the poisonous dripping from all the sins, and putrid unveracities
and godforgetting greedinesses and devil-serving cants and jesuitisms, that exist among us.”47
As Carlyle maintains:
For Pauperism, though it now absorbs its high figure of millions annually, is by no means a
question of money only, but of infinitely higher and greater than all conceivable money. If our
Chancellor of the Exchequer had a Fortunatus’ purse, and miraculous sacks of Indian meal that
would stand scooping from forever,--I say, even on these terms Pauperism could not be
endured; and it would vitally concern all British Citizens to abate Pauperism, and never rest till
they had ended it again. Pauperism is the general leakage through every joint of the ship that it
is rotten. Were all men doing their duty, or even seriously trying to do it, there would be no
Pauper. Were the pretended Captains of the world at all in the habit of commanding; were the
pretended Teachers of the world at all in the habit of teaching,--of admonishing said Captains
among others, and with sacred zeal apprising them to what place such neglect was leading,-how could Pauperism exist?48
While Rawls takes poverty and inequality more or less for granted as staples of liberal
society to be reckoned with accordingly in the original position, Carlyle contemplates a
permanent solution to poverty:
We may depend upon it, where there is a Pauper, there is a sin; to make one Pauper there go
many sins. Pauperism is our Social Sin grown manifest; developed from the state of a spiritual
ignobleness, a practical impropriety and base oblivion of duty, to an affair of the ledger…Not
one idle Sham lounging about Creation upon false pretences, upon means which he has not
earned, upon theories which he does no practice, but yields his share of Pauperism somewhere
or other.49
Carlyle communicates the high stakes that are involved with respect to the plight of the
least well-off:
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The Idle Workhouse, now about to burst of overfilling, what is it but the scandalous poison-tank
of drainage from the universal Stygian quagmire of our affairs? Workhouse Paupers; immortal
sons of Adam rotted into that scandalous condition, subter-slavish, demanding that you would
make slaves of them as an unattainable blessing! My friends, I perceive the quagmire must be
drained, or we cannot live. And farther, I perceive, this of Pauperism is the corner where we
must begin,--the levels all pointing thitherward, the possibilities lying all clearly there. On that
Problem we shall find that innumerable things, that all things whatsoever hang. By courageous
steadfast persistence in that, I can foresee Society itself regenerated. 50
Rawls and Carlyle are in agreement with respect to the need for the organization of
labor. In language that at a minimum approaches Carlyle’s, Rawls cites the organization of labor
as one of five institutions necessary to ensure the stability of society:
Society as employer of last resort through general or local government, or other social and
economic policies. Lacking a sense of long-term security and the opportunity for meaningful
work and occupation is not only destructive of citizens’ self-respect but of their sense that they
are members of society and not simply caught in it. This leads to self-hatred, bitterness, and
resentment.51
The sentiments of Carlyle and Aristotle stand in contrast to those of Karl Marx with
respect to the consideration of private property. Marx does not view renunciation as necessary
for the evolution of private property to communal ownership:
In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is completely sufficient.
It takes actual communist action to abolish actual private property. History will come to it; and
this movement, which in theory we already know to be a self-transcending movement, will
constitute in actual fact a very severe and protracted process.52
Marx’s conception of economic justice does not consider Carlyle’s emphasis on just wages and
renunciation of material appetites. Marx’s theory of economic justice in the form of
communism embodies a revolutionary transformation of norms whereby there is a radical
transition from private property to communal ownership.
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Carlyle articulates his approach to the benefit of the least well-off through a scene in
Sartor Resartus with Professor Teufelsdrӧckh:
Well do we recollect the last words he spoke in our hearing; which indeed, with the Night they
were uttered in, are to be forever remembered. Lifting his huge tumbler of Gukguk, and for a
moment lowering his tobacco-pipe, he stood up in full coffeehouse (it was Zum Grϋnen Ganse,
the largest in Weissnichtwo, where all the Virtuosity, and nearly all the Intellect, of the place
assembled of an evening); and there, with low, soul-stirring tone, and the look truly of an angel,
though whether of white or of a black one might be dubious, proposed this toast: Die Sache der
Armen in Gottes und Teufels Namen (The Cause of the Poor in Heaven’s name and -------‘s)! One
full shout, breaking the leaden silence; then a gurgle of innumerable emptying bumpers, again
followed by universal cheering, returned him loud acclaim.53
Such a passage underscores the need for a spirited empathy with the poor and has a different
tenor from Rawls’s rationalistic constructivism of the difference principle.
Moreover, Carlyle in many ways offered an “original position” that would come prior to
the original position offered by John Rawls.54 In “Characteristics,” Carlyle calls on his audience
to examine the “spirit” of society that in turn manifests itself in the material condition of
society and its members:
let us rather look within, into the Spiritual condition of Society, and see what aspects and
prospects offer themselves there. For after all, it is there properly that the secret and origin of
the whole is to be sought: the Physical derangements of Society are but the image and impress
of its Spiritual; while the heart continues sound, all other sickness is superficial, and temporary.
False Action is the fruit of false Speculation; let the spirit of Society be free and strong, that is to
say, let true Principles inspire the members of Society, then neither can disorders accumulate in
its Practice; each disorder will be promptly, faithfully inquired into, and remedied as it arises.
But alas, with us the Spiritual condition of Society is no less sickly than the Physical. Examine
man’s internal world, in any of its social relations and performances, here too all seems
diseased self-consciousness, collision and mutually-destructive struggle. Nothing acts from
within outwards in undivided healthy force; everything lies impotent, lamed, its force turned
inwards, and painfully ‘listens to itself.’55
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Carlyle was disappointed with the failure of Victorian society’s governing classes to awaken to
their duties and, in so doing, both abandon their reckless pursuit of wealth and replace the
“cash-nexus” with an ethos of social cooperation.56
That Carlyle’s moral philosophy, like Rawls’s, is presented to contest utilitarianism
should be recognized to compare their approaches. To Carlyle, justice entails striving toward
the perfectibility of all human interrelationships, both economic and non-economic. As he sees
it, “cash never yet paid one man fully his deserts to another; nor could it, nor can it, now or
henceforth to the end of the world.”57 Such a viewpoint offers a broader scope to social justice
than what is offered through Rawls’s difference principle, in that it requires more than the
difference principle as a means of attaining justice.58 Carlyle persists, “for all human things do
require to have an Ideal in them; to have some Soul in them, as we said, were it only to keep
the Body unputrefied.”59 He takes issue with how “we construct our theory of Human Duties,
not on any Greatest-Nobleness Principle, never so mistaken; no, but on a Greatest-Happiness
Principle.”60 In this way, he seeks to break from Bentham (and in a manner that can be
contrasted with Rawls) and overcome thinking of justice in utilitarian or redistributive terms.
Carlyle ponders, “Oh, if you could dethrone that Brute-god Mammon, and put a Spirit-god in his
place! One way or other, he must and will have to be dethroned.”61 He doubles down:
“Happy,” my brother? First of all, what difference is it whether thou art happy or not! Today
becomes Yesterday so fast, all Tomorrows become Yesterdays; and then there is no question
whatever of the ‘happiness,’ but quite another question. Nay, thou hast such a sacred pity left
at least for thyself, thy very pains, once gone over into Yesterday, become joys to thee. Besides,
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thou knowest not what heavenly blessedness and indispensable sanative virtue was in them;
thou shalt only know it after many days, when thou art wiser!62
Carlyle and Rawls depart from utilitarianism and go in opposite directions
philosophically. Carlyle departs toward romanticism while Rawls departs to rationalism and this
results in the incommensurability between Carlyle and Rawls. Carlyle’s philosophy is
romanticist to such an extent, I argue, that Rawls’s philosophy looks nearly synonymous to
utilitarianism if viewed through a Carlylean lens. Carlyle writes, elevating intuition over reason
and rationalism: “what a time of it had we, were all men’s life and trade still, in all parts of it, a
problem, a hypothetic seeking, to be settled by painful Logics and Baconian Inductions!”63 Both
utilitarianism and Rawls’s philosophy are each in pursuit of economic and material gains as the
basis on which each deliberates and as the primary goal that is unconsciously taken for granted,
while for Carlyle consumption is merely necessary to meet a threshold of sustenance.64 Carlyle
espouses a philosophy of renunciation as a means toward achieving wisdom and non-material
riches while Bentham and Rawls never breach the boundaries of economy into the realms of
the immaterial, ideal, Platonic, or transcendental and thus are purely materialist philosophers.
According to Rawls, critics of utilitarianism failed to “construct a workable and
systematic moral conception to oppose it. The outcome is that we often seem forced to choose
between utilitarianism and intuitionism.”65 Such a statement underscores Rawls’s lack of

62

Carlyle, Past and Present, 193-194.
Carlyle, Past and Present, 204.
64
For a discussion of Rawls’s principles of justice, see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 60. For Rawls’s discussion of
utilitarianism as the idea that “society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it,
see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 22-27.
65
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, viii.
63

193

engagement with the nature of Carlyle’s objections to utilitarianism.66 A “systematic moral
conception” is anathema to the nature of Carlyle’s critique of utilitarianism, as Carlyle has been
characterized as a philosopher who “laboriously built up a system to prove that systems are
impossible.”67
Carlyle defines “Benthamee Radicalism” as the “gospel of ‘Enlightened Selfishness,”
which begs the question as to what he would have made of Rawls’s difference principle, in
which Rawls asserts it would be agreed to by an individual in the original position because
behind a veil of ignorance an individual would want to maximize his minimum. 68 Carlyle was in
no way immune to the pursuit of material sustenance and himself enjoyed the compensation
attained via market economy, but his philosophy does not fixate on the pursuit of material
gains as being the sole or primary means to attain a philosophical ideal or enlightenment and
definitely does not cast the material as the primary end of his philosophy. This is why Rawls’s
difference principle is inimical to Carlylean philosophy.
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus offers premises and conclusions that are opposed to and thus
incommensurable with the premises and conclusions Rawls offers in A Theory of Justice. Each
text provides a constructivist approach as a means to defend a theory of social justice. Sartor
Resartus typifies and epitomizes Carlyle as someone whose “great labor was to be ascertaining
what ailed the world and then broadcasting his findings.”69 Sartor Resartus magnifies the
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adversity, tribulation, and alienation of human experience with a fictitious account of Professor
Teufelsdrӧckh’s search for social justice. A Theory of Justice offers a new theory of justice as
fairness through a constructivist approach that seeks to undermine utilitarianism by deriving
justice through a controlled social experiment, whereby individuals deliberate about justice
behind a veil of ignorance in the original position.
In many ways, Carlyle’s fictitious character Teufelsdrӧckh embodies implicitly what
Rawls explicitly sought to achieve in the original position, whereby, according to Rawls, “to see
our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is
to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of
view.”70 Teufelsdrӧckh’s search for and discovery of social justice is in fact commensurable with
justice as fairness with respect to the aim that both Carlyle and Rawls seek to achieve.
According to Rawls in his last sentences of A Theory of Justice:
The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the
point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that
rational persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, they can, whatever their
generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at
regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own
standpoint. Purity of heart, if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace
and self-command from this point of view.71
Rawls acknowledges that deriving a theory of justice requires a constructivist approach
and that “without a definite structure of this kind the question posed is indeterminate.” 72 Rawls
acknowledges this to defend himself from contract theorists who question whether a theory of
justice can be derived in the context of an original position where persons know nothing at all
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about themselves or their world.73 This is the basis for perhaps the most fundamental point of
incommensurability between Sartor Resartus and A Theory of Justice, as Carlyle casts his
protagonist as the person who knows as much as can be known about the world in that he is
able to formulate the philosophy of clothes as a function of this knowledge.74 Rawls’s
justification for his constructivist approach is thus contestable by applying Carlyle’s philosophy.
Sartor Resartus stands inimical to the following remarks Rawls makes:
From the point of view of contract theory it amounts to supposing that the persons in the
original position know nothing at all about themselves or their world. How, then, can they
possibly make a decision? A problem of choice is well defined only if the alternatives are
suitably restricted by natural laws and other constraints, and those deciding already have
certain inclinations to choose among them. Without a definite structure of this kind the
question posed is indeterminate.75
Rawls’s open restriction of Carlylean transcendentalism (as it is theorized in Sartor
Resartus) from being a plausible alternative account of social justice is particularly problematic
precisely on account of how those deciding on justice know nothing about themselves or their
world. In light of Sartor Resartus’s conclusions that are in diametric opposition to those of A
Theory of Justice, Rawls’s characterization of “natural laws and other constraints” restricting
alternatives and those in the original position having “certain inclinations” become all the more
nebulous and ill-defined.
Carlyle almost foreshadows someone like Rawls coming along in political theory’s
future. He begins his chapter entitled “Morrison Again” in Past and Present speaking of how
new Morrison’s Pills, new cure-calls, will be promoted to solve the weightiest of political
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problems, all of which are condemned to failure. Carlyle writes, “Nevertheless, O AdvancedLiberal, one cannot promise thee any ‘New Religion,’ for some time; to say truth, I do not think
we have the smallest chance of any!”76 Thus, he is using “religion” with a secular connotation,
as a secular creed whose purpose and intent would be to solve all of the social maladies and
injustices that plague the world. While not articulating definite elixirs to the problem of justice,
Carlyle offered a theory as to how all definitive prescriptions will fall short. He discounts all
cure-alls:
It seems to be taken for granted, by these interrogative philosophers, that there is some
“thing,” or handful of “things,” which could be done; some Act of Parliament, “remedial
measure” or the like, which could be passed, whereby the social malady were fairly fronted,
conquered, put an end to; so that, with your remedial measure in your pocket, you could then
go on triumphant, and be troubled no farther. “You tell us the evil,” cry such persons, as if justly
aggrieved, “and do not tell us how it is to be cured!”
How it is to be cured? Brothers, I am sorry I have got no Morrison’s Pill for curing the
maladies of Society.77
Carlyle’s humble admission that he has no exact cure-all in the form of exact principles
for the maladies of society is a foundational attribute of his as a political philosopher. In this
regard, he differs from political philosophers such as Marx and Rawls, who commit to specific
means of curing social ills, only to see their philosophies never transpire according to the ideal
they had theorized. This underscores Carlyle’s view that individuals must act as individuals to
actuate and approximate justice at the collective level, and that a top-down remedy cannot
take the place of individuals acting with the proper spirit and inspiration to improve the world
as a whole. In this way, Carlyle unveils a strategy for curing the maladies of society when he
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theorizes about the radical change that will need to be undertaken in order to resolve what
plagues modernity:
It were infinitely handier if we had a Morrison’s Pill, Act of Parliament, or remedial measure,
which men could swallow, one good time, and then go on in their old courses, cleared from all
miseries and mischiefs! Unluckily we have none such; unluckily the Heavens themselves, in
their rich pharmacopoeia, contain none such. There will no “thing” be done that will cure you.
There will a radical universal alteration of your regiment and way of life take place; there will a
most agonising divorce between you and your chimeras, luxuries and falsities, take place; a
most toilsome, all-but “impossible” return to Nature, and her veracities and her integrities, take
place: that so the inner fountains of life may again begin, like eternal Light-fountains, to
irradiate and purify your bloated, swollen, foul existence, drawing nigh, as at present, to
nameless death! Either death, or else all this will take place. Judge if, with such diagnosis, any
Morrison’s Pill is like to be discoverable!78
Carlyle expands on his conception of Morrison Pills in a way that illustrates how they are
synonymous with dogmatic theologies and ideologies that are inherently unsubstantiated and
ineffectual:
But indeed, when men and reformers ask for “a religion,” it is analogous to their asking, “What
would you have us to do?” and suchlike. They fancy that their religion too shall be a kind of
Morrison’s Pill, which they have only to swallow once, and all will be well. Resolutely once gulpdown your Religion, your Morrison’s Pill, you have it all plain sailing now: you can follow your
affairs, your no-affairs, go along money-hunting, pleasure-hunting, dilettanteing, dangling, and
miming and chattering…: your Morrison will do your business for you. Men’s notions are very
strange!—Brother, I say there is not, was not, nor will ever be, in the wide circle of Nature, any
Pill or Religion of that character. Man cannot afford thee such; for the very gods it is impossible.
I advise thee to renounce Morrison; once for all, quit hope of the Universal Pill. For body, for
soul, for individual or society, there has not any such article been made. Non extat. In Created
Nature it is not, was not, will not be. In the void imbroglios of Chaos only, and realms of
Bedlam, does some shadow of it hover, to bewilder and bemock the poor inhabitants there.79
Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, underwritten by his two principles of justice,
embodies perhaps the most compelling “remedial measure” in contemporary political
philosophy to the persistent philosophical and practical problem of injustice given the
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magnitude of its impact and influence since A Theory of Justice’s initial publication. Yet, it has
not proven itself to have conquered or cured injustice as a social malady, much less to have
been acted upon or implemented in a universal manner given the persistent problems of
economic inequality and poverty.
As such, Rawls’s theory of justice cannot escape being an ideal theory that is a
“Morrison’s Pill” when looked at through the lens of Carlylean philosophy. This is because Rawls
neglects to stipulate the necessity of improving, or making more virtuous, the human “regiment
and way of life” in any context beyond the two principles of justice.80 Rawls neglects to elevate
the virtues/values of renunciation, fraternity, and mutual solidarity in any informal or formal
sense beyond the two principles of justice. Mutual solidarity, it might be said, is intrinsic to the
difference principle (Rawls’s second principle of justice), yet the difference principle is derived
from the individual behind a veil of ignorance looking out for his/her own self-interests and
seeking to maximize his/her minimum rather than as a means to cultivate mutual solidarity and
fraternity in a genuine spirit irrespective of one’s self-interests. The two principles of justice, it
might be inferred from Carlyle, cannot undo and cure individuals living unvirtuous lifestyles,
such as engaging in exploitation or the pursuit of infinite consumption as a means to satisfy
insatiable appetites.
Carlyle, moreover, identifies the need to empower proper political leadership, and how
to go about doing so, as a problem to solve in political theory of paramount importance:
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But oppression by your Mock-Superiors well shaken off, the grand problem yet remains to
solve: That of finding government by your Real-Superiors! Alas, how shall we ever learn the
solution of that, benighted, bewildered, sniffing, sneering, godforgetting unfortunates as we
are? It is a work for centuries; to be taught us by tribulations, confusions, insurrections,
obstructions; who knows if not by conflagration and despair! It is a lesson inclusive of all other
lessons; the hardest of all lessons to learn.81
The question of political leadership is necessary to solve both in ideal and non-ideal political
theory and went largely unacknowledged by Rawls. Carlyle recognized the critical importance
of empowering the best leaders and the important (though often overlooked) distinction
between the genuinely best leaders and what he refers to as “sham” leaders.82 He identifies
this as critically important for his native England and demonstrates what the stakes are. He
maintains how “England will either learn to reverence its Heroes, and discriminate them from
its Sham-Heroes…or else England will continue to worship new and ever-new forms of
Quackhood,--and so, with what resiliences and reboundings matters little, go down to the
Father of Quacks!”83
Alasdair MacIntyre’s articulation of the incommensurability between Rawls and Robert
Nozick can be applied to theorize of the grander incommensurability and polar antagonism
between Carlyle and Rawls.84 Incommensurability manifests when philosophers share no
consensus with respect to not only the conclusions they reach but the assumptions, starting
points, and methods they employ to arrive at such conclusions.85 MacIntyre conceives of
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incommensurability as taking place when divergent arguments with respect to a political,
philosophical, and/or moral problem are logically valid, the conclusions follow from the
premises, yet “the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the
claims of one as against another.”86 According to MacIntyre, “there seems to be no rational way
of securing moral agreement in our culture.”87 The contrast between Rawls and Nozick
exemplifies this in that Nozick frames his conception of justice in an account of acquisition and
entitlement while Rawls frames his conception of justice in an account of the equality of
persons in their claims to basic needs.88 After comparing the two, MacIntyre arrives at a
conclusion:
But our pluralist culture possesses no method of weighing, no rational criterion for deciding
between claims based on legitimate entitlement against claims based on need. Thus these two
types of claim are indeed, as I suggested, incommensurable, and the metaphor of “weighing”
moral claims is not just inappropriate but misleading.89
MacIntyre points out that Rawls and Nozick each neglect to “make any reference to
desert in their account of justice, nor could they consistently do so.”90 For example, in Nozick’s
account, acquisition could be either just or unjust, based on desert or not. Rawls’s difference
principle is wholly exclusive from desert in that desert is in no way a necessary justification for
the distribution of resources from the wealthy to the least well off. Rawls invokes Mill to
invalidate the legitimacy of any call for a proper compensation for one’s work as necessary for
the attainment of economic justice. Rawls concludes, reiterating Mill:
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In the case of wages, the precepts to each according to his effort and to each according to his
contribution are contrary injunctions taken by themselves. Moreover, if we wish to assign them
certain weights, they provide no way to determine how their relative merits are to be
ascertained. Thus common sense precepts do not express a determinate theory of just or fair
wages.91
Carlyle can be contrasted to Rawls when Rawls remarks that a “higher principle” such as the
two principles of justice as fairness are necessary in order to derive a determinate theory of just
wages.92 By omitting a higher principle, Carlyle charges intuition with the task of deriving just
wages as compensation for work, as there is no scientific means of deriving just wages that
does not call on intuition. As it is impossible to scientifically apportion just wages, Carlyle calls
for the pursuit of achieving an approximation such that the approximation will grow more and
more just over time rather than less and less just.93 By moving in the direction of justice,
solutions to the problems of exploitation, inequality, and poverty will be more and more within
reach and consciously enacted. This illustrates, just as MacIntyre does with Rawls and Nozick,
that Rawls and Carlyle are incommensurable.
Rawls bases his theory of justice on the assumption that alienation and exploitation will
persist in perpetuity and that they cannot be solved under free market conditions. This
embodies a tense dissonance in that Rawls presents his ideal theory of justice by upholding
implicitly, or at least assuming, that alienation, exploitation, and poverty are non-ideal
attributes/products of the free market that cannot be solved by individuals at the level of
individual action. If individuals are incapable of altering their economic behaviors of production
and consumption (and the compensation of labor that corresponds accordingly) at the
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individual level as a means to attain economic justice, why should it be assumed that they
would assent to the difference principle as a means to attain economic justice? Rawls reflects
that “competition is at best imperfect and persons receive less than the value of their
contribution, and in this sense they are exploited.”94 Yet, such exploitation arises only in an
economy in which individuals behave unjustly at an individual level in apportioning
compensation based on the value of labor. Rawls’s solution to exploitation is a “competitive
economy with the appropriate background institutions [as] an ideal scheme which shows how
the two principles of justice might be realized.”95 However, this means of attaining justice
requires intuition and is indeterminable as a function of embodying a retroactive correction of
market forces.
Like Carlyle in a different application, Rawls uses the term “approximate” to describe
the extent to which justice is attained, or can be attained, using his two principles of justice. 96
Rawls maintains that, calling on the two principles of justice, “we are in a better position to
assess how serious the existing imperfections are and to decide upon the best way to
approximate the ideal.”97 Rawls does not elaborate on the specifics of how to go about
assessing existing imperfections or even how to properly recognize imperfections. He also
neglects any discussion of what is necessary “to decide upon the best way to approximate the
ideal,” as this phrase offers no systematic means of either approximating the ideal or
ascertaining the conditions to attain the ideal.
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Rawls maintains that distributive justice in the form of “fair day’s wages for fair day’s
work” would not be chosen as a principle of justice in the original position. Rawls writes:
There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things
in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according
to virtue. While it is recognized that this ideal can never be fully carried out, it is the
appropriate conception of distributive justice, at least as a prime facie principle, and society
should try to realize it as circumstances permit. Now justice as fairness rejects this conception.
Such a principle would not be chosen in the original position. There seems to be no way of
defining the requisite criterion in that situation. Moreover, the notion of distribution according
to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations….A just scheme,
then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded
upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent
upon their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify
the duties and obligations of individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency
for distributive shares to correspond to it.98
Rawls discounts heavily the fact that economic relations are the relations of individuals who
make choices in the free market and that individuals determine supply and demand and
production and consumption when he seeks an argument for why the difference principle is
more just than merely the conscious pursuit of ameliorating exploitation within the free
market. Carlylean philosophy calls on individuals to act justly so that justice can be achieved
collectively (or at least more increasingly approximated), whereas Rawls relies on the difference
principle to correct the collective market injustice ex post facto that results from the injustice of
the collection of individual economic actors who operate at the individual level.99
Rawls maintains, “surely a person’s moral worth does not vary according to how many
offer similar skills, or happen to want what he can produce.”100 The difference between Carlyle
and Rawls is that Carlyle thinks economic justice can be achieved within the economy by
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economic actors only when they consciously choose to transcend the laws of the marketplace
and recalibrate wages so they increasingly approximate a just distribution of wages for work.101
Such a view demonstrates that Rawls’s difference principle is an admission that the market is
unjust and can only be made just beyond the scope of the market itself. Rawls does not offer a
discussion of why we should not seek to achieve a greater approximation of desert on the basis
of worth in the marketplace as a primary means of pursuing justice. Rawls’s view that a
person’s worth does not depend on how many people happen to want what he can produce is
effectively a wholesale negation of the free market, since this is the only means a market allows
for the compensation of labor. If individuals should be held to no liability to satisfy the demands
of the marketplace, the marketplace is cast as being not viable and its legitimacy as an
economic system is voided universally.
Carlyle’s theory of economic justice is discounted only, or at least primarily, for its
perceived lack of attainability.102 However, through a conscious commitment on the part of
individual economic actors, Carlyle’s vision of economic justice could be attained. Just
compensation for goods, services, and labor’s value can likely be more consciously
approximated via consumption behavior rather than retroactively as a means to increasingly
approximate economic justice. In other words, consumers can be proactive in furthering the
cause of economic justice by patronizing firms that have a record of compensating their
employees in a just manner. Carlyle derided capitalism in the nineteenth century as being the
culprit for economic injustice, remarking how “the world, with its Wealth of Nations, Supply-
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and-demand and suchlike, has of late days been terribly inattentive to that question of work
and wages.”103 The proper apportionment of wages to work so that they are in parity is
antithetical to capitalism, since capitalists seek primarily, if not only, to accumulate capital and
maximize profits via exploitation of workers. Carlyle provides a compelling illustration of the
atomization, depersonalization, and alienation that capitalism produces:
We will not say, the poor world has retrograded even here: we will say rather, the world has
been rushing on with such fiery animation to get work and ever more work done, it has had no
time to think of dividing the wages; and has merely left them to be scrambled for by the Law of
the Stronger, law of Supply-and-demand, law of Laissez-faire, and other idle Laws and Un-laws,-saying, in its dire haste to get the work done, That is well enough!
And now the world will have to pause a little, and take up that other side of the
problem, and in right earnest strive for some solution of that.104
He recognizes how his conception of economic justice is cast aside with mockery
because it is easy and convenient to simply cast it aside as being nothing more than a rhetorical
flourish. Carlyle acknowledges how cheap criticism would likely unfold: “Fair day’s-wages for
fair day’s-work! Exclaims a sarcastic man: Alas, in what corner of this Planet, since Adam first
awoke on it, was that ever realised?”105 He maintains that the just apportionment of wages to
work affirms justice to such an extent that he remarks:
Give me this, you have given me all. Pay to every man accurately what he has worked for, what
he has earned and done and deserved…what more have I to ask?....This is the radiance of
celestial Justice….A thing ever struggling forward; irrepressible, advancing inevitable; perfecting
itself, all days, more and more,--never to be perfect till that general Doomsday, the ultimate
Consummation, and Last of earthly Days.106
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Carlyle thus acknowledges that the achievement of a perfectly just society is impossible, but yet
provides a means to pursue justice so that it is increasingly approximated and achieved.
Carlyle also makes known the contrast between the pursuit of justice and the
consequences of injustice. He observes, “imperfect Human Society holds itself together, and
finds place under the Sun, in virtue simply of some approximation to perfection being actually
made and put in practice.”107 He underscores his concept of “approximation” as regards the
attainment of “truth” in another passage:
As Phlogiston is displaced by Oxygen, and the Epicycles of Ptolemy by the Ellipses of Kepler; so
does Paganism give place to Catholicism, Tyranny to Monarchy, and Feudalism to
Representative Government,--where also the process does not stop. Perfection of Practice, like
completeness of Opinion, is always approaching, never arrived; Truth, in the words of Schiller,
immer wird, nie ist; never is, always is a-being.108
Carlyle strikes what might be characterized as a proto-Marxist chord when he
ultimately concludes:
This is the supportable approximation [workers] would rest patient with, That by their work
they might be kept alive to work more!—This once grown unattainable, I think your
approximation may consider itself to have reached the insupportable stage; and may prepare,
with whatever difficulty, reluctance and astonishment, for one of two things, for changing or
perishing! With the millions no longer able to live, how can the units keep living? It is too clear
the Nation itself is on the way to suicidal death.109
Such an account illustrates the broad spectrum of justice/injustice that wages naturally fall on.
Workers can either be exploited to the point at which they literally can no longer achieve
subsistence with the wages they are allotted, or exploitation can be entirely voided if all
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individual economic actors demand the riddance of exploitation and the just compensation of
wages for work.
Rawls overlooks economic consumption as a variable to come to terms with in his
difference principle. He does so by neglecting a discussion of how those who are impoverished
came to be impoverished and whether among the destitute some might have more defensible
justifications for their situation than others. Whether one spent a trust fund they inherited and
thus are poor, or whether one was a family-less, disabled orphan who faced extreme resistance
and thus is poor, is not deliberated upon. As MacIntyre analyzes, “for Rawls how those who are
now in grave need come to be in grave need is irrelevant; justice is made into a matter of
present patterns of distribution to which the past is irrelevant.”110 The least well-off could
perpetually remain the least well-off as a function of their economic consumption which would
perpetuate inequality. Rawls does not provide parameters for what could be defined as morally
defensible consumption and, thus, he neglects acknowledging what runaway consumption
could entail.
Consumption is a plausible topic to emerge in the original position, particularly in the
context of the difference principle. If the least well-off benefit equally from the wealthy it will
be the case that the least well-off will commit their resources in different ways. Hypothetically,
some would spend and others would save. Would the difference principle be philosophically
defensible if it did not stipulate savings and renunciation from consumption? After all, if it did
not stipulate that, it would in fact be incentivizing consumption and a perpetuation of poverty.
Ralph Waldo Emerson provides an account of why consumption is not only a legitimate but
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necessary subject to entertain in the context of discussions of economic justice and economic
inequality:
For the whole value of the dime is in knowing what to do with it. One man buys with it a landtitle of an Indian, and makes his posterity princes; or buys corn enough to feed the world; or
pen, ink, and paper, or a painter’s brush, by which he can communicate himself to the human
race as if he were fire; and the other buys barley candy. Money is of no value; it cannot spend
itself. All depends on the skill of the spender.111
John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, in their criticism of liberalism and deliberations upon
post-liberalism in 2016, echo Carlyle on the need to attain just wages as a necessity to the
attainment of a just society. They emphasize the need to transcend the law of supply and
demand by proposing a collectively imagined shared scale of priority in what is economically
desired.112 Consumption and production could be stabilized as a type of “third way” that
departs from both a market and command economy.113 Milbank and Pabst thus propose a
means to overcome “the divorce of the meaning of material market ‘growth’ from its root
meanings of organic, moral and spiritual growth.”114 A shared scale of desires at the level of the
collective “would tend to infuse into transactions—prices, wages, shares—a greater sense of its
natural justice, over and above prevailing market conditions.”115 In this way, Milbank and Pabst
normatively argue on behalf of a market that embodies social justice in its functioning. An
economy that itself is representative of social justice stands counter to Rawlsian justice
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achieved ex post-facto via the difference principle. Milbank and Pabst’s conception of social
justice would take place such that:
We could then have some sense of a “proper” price paid for a thing of such and such moral as
well as economic value; of a “proper” wage or salary paid for such and such a social task
involving different degrees of talent, labour, scope, risk and need for a strenuous exercise of
virtue; of “proper” shares in a firm as between the appropriately weighed contributions of
owners, managers and workers.
All these things need first and foremost to become habitual through the growth of a
new ethos.116
Moreover, Milbank and Pabst explicitly cite Carlyle’s clarion call in Past and Present on
economic elites to subordinate their ownership and direction of resources to the needs of
workers so as to recreate feudal solidarity in the context of a free-market political economy.117
They theorize that such a mutualistic solidarity would take place in a post-liberal political
economy wherein wages, prices, and profits among owners, workers, shareholders and
consumers are negotiated ethically in addition to economically.118
Milbank and Pabst articulate policy solutions so as to foster a mutual solidarity in the
context of the economy they view as increasingly deteriorating as a result of growing asset and
income inequality, and the de-professionalisation and the proletarianisation of the
workforce.119 In this context, they argue on behalf of the wider distribution of the ownership of
capital through employee-ownership and stake-holding whether of property and plant capacity
or of financial investment in one’s own or other firms.120 A genuine “living wage,” they argue, is
perhaps the most essential and intuitive economic policy prescription so as to foster a
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mutualistic economy.121 Milbank and Pabst also call for an index between wages and
productivity growth so that prosperity may be shared and not accumulate only among a few
owners or executives.122
Brad S. Gregory, a critic of liberalism due to its manifestation of hyper-pluralism,
captures the essence of incommensurability when he writes that “given the manifest
vulnerability of their respective assumptions and starting points, the preferences of
[philosophers] are ultimately and literally arbitrary—that is, a function of the will.”123
Emotivism, the doctrine that all judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, attitude,
or feeling, is pervasive.124 MacIntyre asserts that the only means to achieve moral agreement is
by “producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree
with one.”125
I will make the claim that, as the “highest achievement of the Romantic movement in
Europe,” Sartor Resartus produces, or at least Carlyle seeks to produce, non-rational effects on
emotions and attitudes so as to proselytize his audience to transcendentalism from the
philosophical vantage point they had prior to reading it.126 What is more, Sartor Resartus
provides a means to articulate transcendentalism in a “rational” manner in the sense that its
conclusions are logically derived from premises that are themselves logically constructed with
strict attention to detail.

121

Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 160.
Milbank and Pabst, The Politics of Virtue, 161.
123
Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 125.
124
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 11.
125
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 12.
126
Lea calls Sartor Resartus the “highest achievement of the Romantic movement in Europe.” I build on this view
to conclude that Sartor Resartus constructs transcendentalism as a philosophy that can be applied in the contexts
of politics and religion. See Lea, Carlyle: Prophet of To-day, 30.
122

211

As I have shown, Carlyle’s transcendentalism simultaneously typifies “non-rationalism”
from the perspective of Enlightenment materialist discourse in that it is Platonic, asserting that
there is a divine and transcendent order that can be neither ascertained through theological
nor empirically scientific means.127 The “philosophy of clothes” is the basis from which Carlyle’s
philosophical solutions are derived. Carlyle’s transcendentalism supersedes incommensurable
ideologies and theologies and by doing such supersedes incommensurability conceptually in the
manner that MacIntyre had said universally defined moral, political, and philosophical
discourse. I draw this conclusion because inherent to transcendentalism is the view that all
other ideologies not transcendentalism are “clothing” and ideologues devoted to such
ideologies are not cognizant of the “philosophy of clothes,” which rests on a different plane.
Both Carlyle and Rawls seek to appeal to independent impersonal criteria. Carlyle
premises his conclusions from the vantage point of the most alienated human perspective,
while Rawls premises his conclusions from the vantage point of an original position behind a
veil of ignorance. Carlyle’s premise derives the “philosophy of clothing” while Rawls’s premise
yields the two principles of justice. The views Carlyle seeks to impart to his audience are both
expressions of personal preference and evaluative expressions whereby Carlyle proposes
conclusions that any and all can, might, and should assent to, based on the constructivist basis
on which such conclusions rest. In the contrast between Carlyle and Rawls, each seeks to win
support for his philosophical conclusions based on the premises he constructs and from which
his conclusions are derived. The question becomes, in order to generate non-rational effects:
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whose premises are more compelling and provide a more compelling conclusion? This, I
contend, is the chief question to be asked in juxtaposing Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus with Rawls’s A
Theory of Justice. That this question cannot be answered purely objectively does not undermine
the capacity of Carlyle’s philosophy to challenge the supposed objectivity of the original
position/veil of ignorance on which Rawls’s two principles of justice are constructed from.
Carlyle’s transcendentalism, in light of MacIntyre’s conceptualization of
incommensurability and emotivism, suggests that those who do not agree with both its
premises and conclusions are not only unwilling to accept transcendentalism as a philosophy
that supersedes and literally transcends their own philosophical, ideological, and/or theological
perspectives, but are also unwilling to accept it as a philosophy that supersedes and transcends
all other philosophical, ideological, and theological perspectives. Those who are willing to
entertain the merits of transcendentalism yet are unwilling to part from their own ideologies
and theologies are left with the task of demonstrating why their views should not be
characterized as emotivist, or based on arbitrary subjectivity and emotion. As such, refusal of
Carlylean transcendentalism, in the context of incommensurability and emotivism, is again a
type of modern confirmation of Plato’s allegory of the cave, as narrated in The Republic.128
Those who are imprisoned in the cave are those who see ideologies and theologies (that are
not transcendentalism) and the incommensurable and interminable disagreement they
precipitate as something other than “clothing.”
It can be inferred from Sartor Resartus that Teufelsdrӧckh seeks to tell the world that all
ideologies and theologies are mere clothing and that the realization of such a view would be

128

Plato, The Republic of Plato, 231.

213

the equivalent of gaining enlightenment as to how the world truly is. Subscribers to the
diversity of ideological and theological persuasions would realize that their upholding of a
particular ideology, at the personal level, was for the purpose of humanity as a collective to
eventually discover transcendentalism as the means to resolve incommensurable ideologies
and the interminable conflict that would persist in a scenario in which transcendentalism is
perpetually absent.
It is in the diversity of ideologies and theologies that provides fodder for the recognition
that they are mutually incommensurable and the antagonism between them is interminable.
Thus the diversity of ideologies and theologies was a necessary historical construct,
hypothetically, to the eventual construction and attainment of transcendentalism as a
theoretical next stage of development. Sartor Resartus, in this way, leads to the inference and
conclusion that all ideologies and theologies are themselves streams, each following the path of
least resistance to the same confluence, which is transcendentalism. Such is the confluence that
informs that transcendentalism is naturally positioned as the philosophy that terminates
heretofore incommensurable and interminable antagonism among all other ideologies and
theologies. However, in the context of emotivism and incommensurability, transcendentalism
will by default be seen as merely one more arbitrary viewpoint among many. Such an account
parallels MacIntyre’s own account that his advocacy of Aristotelianism as a salve to the problem
of the incapacity of attaining moral consensus will be found hollow:
It is important to note that I am not claiming that Aristotelian moral theory is able to exhibit its
rational superiority in terms that would be acceptable to the protagonists of the dominant
post-Enlightenment moral philosophies, so that in theoretical contests in the arenas of
modernity, Aristotelians might be able to defeat Kantians, utilitarians, and contractarians. Not
only is this evidently not so, but in those same arenas Aristotelianism is bound to appear and
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does appear as just one more type of moral theory, one whose protagonists have as much and
as little hope of defeating their rivals as do utilitarians, Kantians, contractarians.129
MacIntyre’s discussion of the nature of philosophical disagreement illustrates that such
disagreement can be overcome through the adoption of transcendentalism:
But if those who claim to be able to formulate principles on which rational moral agents ought
to agree cannot secure agreement on the formulation of those principles from their colleagues
who share their basic philosophical purpose and method, there is once again prima facie
evidence that their project has failed, even before we have examined their particular
contentions and conclusions. Each of them in his criticism offers testimony to the failure of his
colleagues’ constructions.130
I will assert again, in the shadow of MacIntyre’s claim, that Carlyle’s transcendentalism
is a construction that is universal in that it subsumes all other philosophies within it and while
doing so discounts all of them as being incapable of being themselves universal comprehensive
philosophical doctrines. In this way, Carlyle’s transcendentalism again proves itself to be a
means to overcome the otherwise interminable conflict between incommensurable and
irreconcilable ideologies and theologies. Subscribers to the diversity of ideologies and
theologies would theoretically be capable of uniting in their adoption of transcendentalism as a
type of consensus to resolve such conflict.
Carlyle’s “philosophy of clothes” is a constructivist philosophy that provides readers of
Sartor Resartus a means to themselves view the world from Teufelsdrӧckh’s vantage point.
Both Carlyle and Rawls each seek to premise their philosophical conclusions on impersonal
constructs as a means to legitimate the conclusions they draw. Carlyle’s philosophy is
constructed from an impersonal viewpoint of what he seeks to characterize as that of
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alienation, while Rawls’s philosophy is constructed from an impersonal original position behind
a veil of ignorance (not knowing how we would be constituted or if we would or would not be
alienated). Such a stark contrast and incommensurability in the impersonal premises Carlyle
and Rawls each devise may indicate that there is no single impersonal premise that can be
genuinely appealed to as the valid impersonal premise. The question might then become:
between Carlyle and Rawls, whose constructivist philosophy is the more, or most, compelling
and whose impersonal premise is the most compelling?
Teufelsdrӧckh offers his “philosophy of clothes” as a finality for philosophy in the sense
that the learning that comprises the basis for his philosophy symbolizes the intellectual
condition humanity finds itself in as of the nineteenth century.131 Thus, while embodying a
maximum level of alienation, Teufelsdrӧckh also embodies a maximum of knowledge and
wisdom because he is able to view the world from an unbiased standpoint as a function of his
alienation. Such knowledge of the world is also derivative of Teufelsdrӧckh’s travels and the
experiences that derive from wandering the world in pursuit of philosophy. Teufelsdrӧckh’s
level of learning and insight symbolizes “the condition of European man after centuries of
learning, wars, art, and religion.”132 As such, Carlyle has invested Teufelsdrӧckh with a
“representative quality designed to render his lesson applicable to a large number of men.”133
For Carlyle, Sartor Resartus is “an attempt to bring the innumerable facets of modern life
together in a meaningful order, an attempt that had engaged Carlyle’s energies from the time
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he turned from religion to science.”134 Rawls similarly sought in A Theory of Justice to answer
the question of what a human political community in all its innumerable facets of ethnic, racial,
religious, and socioeconomic diversity, to name but a few markers of diversity, would ascertain
and assent to as the embodiment of “justice.”
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus leads one to inquire along the same lines as MacIntyre in After
Virtue: “What then would the social world look like, if seen with emotivist eyes?”135
Teufelsdrӧckh views the world with emotivist eyes by making the determination that the
universe is entirely clothing. By viewing the world as entirely clothing, all other ideologies and
theologies, each of which asserts itself as the one true account compared to all other inferior
accounts, are just confirmation that all ideologies and theologies that are not
transcendentalism are arbitrary and based on attitude, preference, and feeling. MacIntyre
further inquires, “And what would the social world be like, if the truth of emotivism came to be
widely presupposed?”136 The result would plausibly be the adoption of a philosophy very similar
to Carlyle’s “philosophy of clothes.”
If everyone were to consciously acknowledge emotivism, then such a premise could
naturally lead to the choice to adopt either Nietzsche’s nihilism or Carlyle’s transcendentalism.
Carlyle serves as an antagonist to Nietzsche and is an antagonist who is mutually exclusive from
Aristotle’s antagonism. MacIntyre proposes that humanity must face a choice between
Nietzsche or Aristotle, as Nietzsche more than any other represents the failure of the
Enlightenment to provide a definable and rationally defensible means to resolving any political
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question for collective political society.137 MacIntyre poses the choice between Aristotle and
Nietzsche along the following terms:
What then the conjunction of philosophical and historical argument reveals is that either one
must follow through the aspirations and the collapse of the different versions of the
Enlightenment project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the Nietzschean
problematic or one must hold that the Enlightenment project was not only mistaken, but
should never have been commenced in the first place. There is no third alternative and more
particularly there is no alternative provided by those thinkers at the heart of the contemporary
conventional curriculum in moral philosophy, Hume, Kant and Mill. It is no wonder that the
teaching of ethics is so often destructive and sceptical in its effects upon the minds of those
taught.138
As MacIntyre has made known, “Nietzsche succeeds if all those whom he takes on as
antagonists fail. Others may have to succeed by virtue of the rational power of their positive
arguments; but if Nietzsche wins, he wins by default.”139 MacIntyre asserts that Nietzsche does
not win on the basis that the Aristotelian tradition succeeds by virtue of the rational power of
its positive arguments.140 In so claiming, MacIntyre ignores Carlyle as not only an antagonist to
Nietzsche but also as an antagonist to Aristotle. That Nietzsche fails does not automatically
mean that Aristotle succeeds. MacIntyre’s binary choice between Nietzsche or Aristotle shuts
out Carlyle in much the same fashion that Rawls does in ignoring Carlyle in the original position.
In both cases, Carlyle is not considered, ostensibly because his political philosophy was neither
refined nor promoted and his profile as a political philosopher was likewise not developed in
the manner Nietzsche’s and Aristotle’s were.
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MacIntyre outlines a valuable context whereby Carlyle’s transcendentalism could be
inserted and entertained as a viable alternative to both Aristotle and Nietzsche:
Hence the defensibility of the Nietzschean position turns in the end on the answer to the
question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle? For if Aristotle’s position in ethics and
politics—or something very like it—could be sustained, the whole Nietzschean enterprise
would be pointless. This is because the power of Nietzsche’s position depends upon the truth of
one central thesis: that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail and that therefore
belief in the tenets of morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of rationalisations which
conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will. My own argument obliges me
to agree with Nietzsche that the philosophers of the Enlightenment never succeeded in
providing grounds for doubting his central thesis; his epigrams are even deadlier than his
extended arguments. But, if my earlier argument is correct, that failure itself was nothing other
than an historical sequel to the rejection of the Aristotelian tradition. And thus the key question
does indeed become: can Aristotle’s ethics, or something very like it, after all be vindicated?
It is an understatement to call this a large and complex question.141
MacIntyre acknowledges critics of his who would agree with his assessment of liberal
individualism but who would deny not only that the Aristotelian tradition is a viable alternative,
but deny as well that it is in terms of an opposition between liberal individualism and
Aristotelianism that the problems of modernity ought to be approached.142 While such a brand
of criticism rests on the view that the key intellectual debate in modernity is between liberal
individualism and some version of Marxism, this brand of criticism leaves room for Carlylean
philosophy, as Carlylean philosophy falls into the broad category of protoMarxist/communitarian criticism. MacIntyre discounts Marxism on the basis that a Marxist who
took Trotsky’s last writings seriously “would now see no tolerable alternative set of political and
economic structures which could be brought into place to replace the structures of advanced
capitalism.”143 Such a Marxist, enlightened to Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism, might
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plausibly conclude that though the structures of advanced capitalism may not be replaced, the
values that define economic and political behavior in advanced capitalism would have to evolve
so that renunciation and mutual solidarity (as Carlylean values) at a minimum would need to
modify the hegemonic values of consumption and mutual competition in order for advanced
capitalism to be sustainable.
MacIntyre is adamant that Marxism “is exhausted as a political tradition…[and] this
exhaustion is shared by every other political tradition within our culture.”144 Carlyle’s
transcendentalism is not exhausted in this fashion because, although it had the capacity to
develop as a coherent political tradition and gain wide currency in the popular political culture,
it has gone unrefined and unrecognized in this regard. As such, transcendentalism has not been
exhausted; rather, it has not been formulated and proposed as a legitimate doctrine beyond
Carlyle’s satirical conception of it, much less attempted. Carlyle has gone unappreciated as a
political philosopher who offered a practical philosophy—not only by Rawls and MacIntyre in
the twentieth century, but by Carlyle’s own disciples in the nineteenth century. Carlyle himself
did not actively promote his political philosophy as a practical comprehensive doctrine to the
resolution of political conflict, because to do so would have required him to provide a
nonfiction account of how transcendentalism supersedes other competitor ideologies and
theologies.
After neutralizing Nietzsche, MacIntyre resolves that “it is therefore after all the case
that the crucial moral opposition is between liberal individualism in some version or other and
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the Aristotelian tradition in some version or other.”145 Carlyle’s philosophy of
transcendentalism may typify “some version or other” of both a reconciliation and resolution of
the antagonism between liberal individualism and the Aristotelian tradition. In constructing his
theory of transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus, Carlyle constructs an ideal and explicitly
remarks that he is seeking to proselytize. Carlylean transcendentalism can be cast as a type of
Aristotelian telos for humanity to strive to achieve both at the level of collective society and the
level of the individual.
The contrast between Aristotle and Carlyle is incommensurable and irresolvable in much
the same way MacIntyre poses that the opposing views of Rawls and Nozick are
incommensurable and irresolvable. As MacIntyre contends, for Nietzsche or the Nietzscheans
to succeed, the case for Aristotelianism would have to be rebutted.146 This is also the standard
for Carlyle in that for Nietzsche or the Nietzscheans to succeed, Carlylean philosophy would
have to be rebutted. This would precipitate a clash between Carlylean and Aristotelian
philosophy whereby who would prevail has heretofore been a topic untouched by political
philosophy.
Passages from Aristotle indicate how his philosophy clashes with Carlylean
transcendentalism by setting anti-Platonic parameters that exclude transcendentalism from
being a subject to deliberate upon. Teufelsdrӧckh typifies the “fool” or “madman” Aristotle
speaks of perhaps in an archetypal fashion:
Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a possible subject of deliberation, or is
deliberation impossible about some things? We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a
madman would deliberate about, but what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of
145
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deliberation. Now about eternal things no one deliberates, e.g. about the material universe or
the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square…but the things that are
brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way, are the things about which
we deliberate, e.g. questions of medical treatment or of money-making.147
In another passage discussing what is worthy of deliberation, Aristotle offers an account in
contrast to that offered by Teufelsdrӧckh, who is Professor of “Things-in-General”:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he
shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, nor a statesman whether he shall produce
law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they
consider how and by what means it is to be attained….148
In such a context Teufelsdrӧckh—his unique biography and radical philosophy—has no place.
Alienated from the specialization that defines the division of labor into doctors, orators,
statesmen, etc., Teufelsdrӧckh became a Professor of Things in General naturally as a matter of
course (and not as a matter of choice after having set his end) and ostensibly sought to impart
his “philosophy of clothes” to the doctors, orators, and statesmen uninformed of the
philosophy’s tenets as a function of their incapacity to attain it on their own.
Aristotle leaves out the important consideration of how a doctor becomes a doctor or a
statesman a statesman, and a study of Teufelsdrӧckh informs us that they do so as a function of
not becoming a philosopher of clothes (aka not being alienated). If each had become a
philosopher of clothes, each would plausibly still recognize the inherent necessity of medicine
in the same way they would without having been informed of the philosophy of clothes, but
oratory and statesmanship would be seen in an entirely different light as a function of looking
at such pursuits through the lens of the “philosophy of clothes.” Oratory and statesmanship
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would plausibly be viewed as petty and as activities undertaken prior to and bereft of the
ascertainment of “the philosophy of clothes” and its implications. This means that the orator
uninformed of the philosophy of clothes would stand in stark contrast to the orator who came
to terms with the philosophy of clothes--and likewise for the statesman. The statesman and
orator who are simultaneously philosophers of clothes, it can be inferred, would view
statesmen and orators unfamiliar with the philosophy of clothes as petty, paltry, and limited in
the scope of their viewpoints.
Teufelsdrӧckh’s biographical background that allows for him to ascertain “the
philosophy of clothes” is compatible with Aristotle’s ruminations on “intuitive reason” as the
basis for acquiring the “first principles” from which “scientific knowledge” may be derived.
Carlyle unpacks Teufelsdrӧckh’s account of his first principles at the beginning of Sartor
Resartus, which correlate with Aristotle’s philosophy of science. In proposing the “philosophy of
clothes,” Carlyle seeks to radically alter our perspective of science by providing the “philosophy
of clothes” as a new lens to examine it with. The conclusions drawn in Sartor Resartus and the
method from which they are drawn are compatible with Aristotle’s philosophy of science, in
which Aristotle ruminates:
Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and necessary; and the
conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for
scientific knowledge involves demonstration). This being so, the first principle from which what
is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, or of practical
wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be demonstrated, and art and practical
wisdom deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of
philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some
things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things
invariable or even variable are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and
intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical wisdom, scientific knowledge,
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or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the
first principles.149
Aristotle’s view that no one deliberates upon his end is particularly incongruent to his
definition of wisdom, whereby he defines wisdom as either excellence in one’s art such as
sculpting or the state of being wise in general.150 With respect to the latter definition, Aristotle
reflects such that:
we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or in any other
limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,
Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman
Nor wise in anything else.
Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that
the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess
truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with
scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were
its proper completion.151
Such parameters beg the natural question: how, in the context of incommensurable and
irresolvable moral and political debates, can one resolve the philosophical conflict between
Carlyle and Nietzsche? Both Carlyle and Nietzsche start from the same implicit initial principles
and premises that they do not explicitly state, namely that neither Aristotle nor Christianity nor
the Enlightenment has been successful in providing a comprehensive doctrine to resolve moral
and political conflict. They nonetheless derive disparate conclusions. This is precisely why
Carlyle should be examined as a viable alternative to Nietzsche that is separate from Aristotle
because the claim can be made that it is the lack of recognition accorded to Carlyle that has at
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least partially enabled Nietzsche’s “success” as a negator of Aristotle, Christianity, and the
Enlightenment. Such a choice would be between siding with Nietzsche and his view that the
world is devoid of meaning and any transcendent divinity or Carlyle and his view that the world
is a material construct that symbolizes a transcendent and divine order. Since it requires just as
much faith to be a nihilist as it does to be a transcendentalist, Carlyle offers an alternative to
Aristotle, Christianity, and the Enlightenment “equal” to the one that Nietzsche does.
Theoretically, the nihilist position may be attractive only as a function of the current
disenchanted state of modernity such that nihilism negates the prospects of another divine idea
of the world to be discovered embedded within the divine idea of the world, which is itself the
“philosophy of clothes.”
In the next chapter, I will further engage Carlyle and Rawls with respect to their
disparate philosophical constructions of justice, one of if not the most important, contestable,
and controversial subjects in the context of political philosophy. I will also seek to illustrate the
bold contrasts between Carlyle and other political philosophers such as Nietzsche and
MacIntyre, contrasts that I have heretofore addressed but did not fully flesh out. This will be
done so as to cast transcendentalism as a coherent prospective ideological construct in the
context of both the history of political thought and contemporary political philosophy.
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Chapter 5
Carlyle’s Construction of Justice and Contemporary Political Philosophy

Carlyle offers unique insights into theorizing the nebulous and intangible concept of
justice within the context of political philosophy. Carlyle’s conception of justice acknowledges
that his transcendentalism is a philosophical opposite to Nietzsche’s nihilism. In this chapter, I
seek to present evidence whereby Carlyle’s transcendentalism can be defended in light of what
I contend are the shortcomings of ideologies in competition with transcendentalism. In this
way, I begin to lay the groundwork to cast Carlyle’s transcendentalism as a prospective “postliberal” doctrine. Transcendentalism can be integrated and synthesized with liberalism so that
liberalism evolves into what may be described as “post-liberalism.”
The contrast between Carlyle and Nietzsche is between the two “characters” Carlyle and
Nietzsche construct—Teufelsdrӧckh and the Übermensch, respectively. The Übermensch
epitomizes the nihilist, while Teufelsdrӧckh epitomizes the transcendentalist. For Alasdair
MacIntyre, the Übermensch “represents individualism’s final attempt to escape from its own
consequences. And the Nietzschean stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an
alternative to the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more
representative moment in its internal unfolding.”1
If the truth of emotivism came to be widely presupposed in the context of political
philosophy, such truth might be the basis of the final division in philosophy whereby some
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might adhere to nihilism and others to transcendentalism.2 The social world would then be a
dichotomy between Nietzschean Übermenschen and Carlylean Teufelsdrӧckhs, and there
would be no other choice than the two. Übermensch would live by values that each individual
sets for himself, which could only mean the perpetuation of hyperpluralist judgments based on
feeling, attitude, and a concomitant will to power. MacIntyre debunks the plausibility of the
Übermensch, writing that it belongs “in the pages of a philosophical bestiary rather than in
serious discussion” and concludes that Nietzsche is most powerful in the negative aspect of his
philosophy.3 The Teufelsdrӧckhs, or transcendentalists, would each accept the “philosophy of
clothes” and consciously seek to perceive and interpret the clothing that is the universe in
pursuit of attaining spiritual development and a meaningful existence. The transcendentalists
would do this alongside applying the principles of the “philosophy of clothes,” such as
renunciation and the Everlasting Yea, toward the larger spiritual rebirth of society at a collective
level, as Carlyle does himself in the concluding chapters of Sartor Resartus.
By acknowledging Nietzsche and MacIntyre’s treatment of Nietzsche as a liberal
individualist, I will seek to make the claim that liberalism (as the enabler and stage for plural
ideologies and theologies) represents a stage in political development before an evolution
toward transcendentalism. I do so because the constructivism and synthesis of MacIntyre and
Nietzsche allow for transcendentalism to be established as a political ideology in its own right.
This is the case because transcendentalism recognizes such pluralism of non-transcendental
ideologies and theologies (in the context of liberalism) as comprising a type of mono-fabric.
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Conscious recognition of such would, or at least could, transition a pluralist environment into
the singular and universal acceptance of transcendentalism.
I argue that liberalism and Islamism, as opposing ideologies with respect to their
allowance for pluralism, each come to a confluence in transcendentalism because
transcendentalism proves itself as the only doctrine that resolves their otherwise irreconcilable
and interminable conflict. This is because a liberal and an Islamist can each be cast as a liberal
individualist Übermensch pitted against one another in irreconcilable incommensurability. In
this context, transcendentalism, not nihilism or liberalism or Christianity, can offer a means to
resolve such conflict. It is in this light that the polarized ideological tension between the liberal
United States and Islamist Iran, for example, may have a chance of being resolved by their
reaching an ideological consensus that supersedes both liberalism and Islamism. In this way,
such a consensus would not take the form of a modus vivendi but rather the form of what may
be referred to as a “supra-consensus,” as I have just laid out. Such a discussion of
transcendentalism’s prospects in the context of international relations underscores its
prospects for achieving consensus within the context of a single nation-state as an embodiment
of social justice and means to resolve otherwise incommensurable and interminable moral and
political debates.
Essentially, as MacIntyre argues and Gregory rearticulates, reason has been unable to
effectively provide an answer to life questions over the last four centuries and in contemporary
philosophy: “What should I live for, and why?” “What should I believe, and why should I believe
it?” “What is morality, and where does it come from?” “What kind of person should I be?”

228

“What is meaningful in life, and what should I do in order to lead a fulfilling life?”4 Gregory
concludes that reason alone is unlikely to answer the life questions.5 As Gregory eloquently
concludes, “those who reject MacIntyre’s analysis of irreconcilable moral disagreements must
explain why sophisticated moral philosophers today continue to argue in trajectories that are
now more than two centuries old without approaching any nearer to a resolution of their
disagreements, and how anyone could possibly devise a rational, consensual means to resolve
their differences.”6 A discussion of the incommensurability of Carlyle and Rawls suggests that
reason alone is unlikely to be able to define justice. Carlyle’s romanticism is nearly a pure
converse to Rawls’s rationalism and such antagonistic incommensurability leads to skepticism
that either reason or intuition can alone provide an answer to the question of justice.
The Rawlsian original position does not account for the evolution and evanescence of
liberal society. The original position is static and calls for static principles of justice, while liberal
society and economy is continually experiencing an autonomous alteration of the means of
production. Rawls also does not account for criticisms of the scientifically unverifiable faith in
unending progress. As Christopher Lasch notes in The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its
Critics, the founders of modern liberalism in the eighteenth century were the first to argue that
“human wants, being insatiable, required an indefinite expansion of the productive forces
necessary to satisfy them.”7 Zygmunt Bauman rearticulates this sentiment in Does Ethics Have a
Chance in a World of Consumers?: “While consumer society rests its case on the promise to
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gratify human desires like no other society in the past could do or dream of doing, the promise
of satisfaction remains seductive only so long as the desire stays ungratified.”8 Bauman
remarks, “for the consumerist economy, the first and now abandoned focus of consumption
(appeal to the needs) portends ill: the suspension of shopping. The second (appeal to foreverelusive happiness) bodes well: it augurs another round of shopping.”9 Gregory synthesizes the
antagonism that exists between constructing ethics and the culture of consumerism in that
“consumerist ideology succeeds through the inculcation of a manipulative, contradictory
message: endless acquisition is the highway to human happiness, and one should be unhappy
with whatever one has just been persuaded to purchase, no matter what it is.”10
Carlyle’s philosophy, particularly as espoused in Sartor Resartus, would not endorse the
view that inequality is justified so long as it benefits the least well off because at a certain point,
at which absolute poverty has been eliminated and relative poverty might persist, Carlyle would
advocate renunciation of any further material enrichment, in contrast to the utilitarian
economic creed of (enslavement to) pursuing the satisfaction of infinite and insatiable
appetites for material wealth.11 Rawls neglects to stipulate how the difference principle might
be practiced differently when every member of the political community attains a satisfactory
amount of minimum goods yet still some remain in a state of relative poverty.
Bauman and Gregory have introduced, albeit without citation, Carlyle’s call for
renunciation of material consumption to be heard by a twenty-first century audience in the
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context of the twenty-first century. They are, essentially, purely Carlylean sentiments in that
they are representative of Carlyle’s inaugural social criticism. Bauman reiterates as his thesis in
2008 what Carlyle already sought to teach in his 1833 publication of Sartor Resartus, namely
that infinite consumption is not the road to infinite happiness.12 According to Bauman’s thesis,
succinctly phrased:
The case for rising consumption, in its plea to be recognized as the royal road to the greatest
happiness of the greatest numbers, has not been proved, let alone closed: it stays wide open.
Indeed, as deliberations of the facts of the matter proceed, the evidence in favor of the plaintiff
grows thinner and more dubious. In the course of the trial, more serious doubts have been
raised: is it not, rather, the case that, in opposition to the plaintiff’s argument, a consumptionoriented economy actively promotes disaffection, saps confidence, and deepens the sentiment
of insecurity….13
Bauman argues that consumerism as an ideology has been unsuccessful in yielding happiness
because 1) it is up to only a certain threshold (that coincides with providing for essential needs)
that the sentiment of being happy grows with increasing the increments of income, and 2)
“there is no evidence whatsoever that with the overall growth of the volume of consumption,
the number of people reporting that they ‘feel happy’ grows.”14 Bauman’s conclusions are able
to serve as the foundation for a grander conclusion: that a society that does not embrace
renunciation effectively embraces consumerism, and consumerism that pursues insatiable
consumption is seeking what is not only unattainable but unsustainable.
A point of consensus between Carlyle and Rawls is in their skepticism about majority
rule alone being able to achieve justice. Rawls re-affirms Carlyle (and Plato) when he states that
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“there is nothing to the view, then, that what the majority wills is right.”15 Rawls breaks from
Carlyle and Plato when he affirms that the justification for majority rule rests on the two
principles of justice.16 Rawls himself acknowledges that the theory of justice has its limitations
and “many aspects of morality [are] left aside.”17 Carlyle can be applied to shed light on Rawls’s
own acknowledgement of justice as fairness’s limitations when Rawls remarks that “any list of
conceptions of justice, or consensus about what counts as reasonable conditions on principles,
is surely more or less arbitrary. The case presented for justice as fairness, so the contention
runs, does not escape these limitations.”18 In this sense, Carlyle and Rawls clash when Rawls
maintains, in contradiction to his acknowledgement of his theory’s arbitrariness and limitations,
that “being designed to reconcile by reason, justification [for justice as fairness] proceeds from
what all parties to the discussion hold in common.”19 Carlyle and Rawls are again
incommensurable on the basis of Rawls’s conception of justification: “proofs become
justification once the starting points are mutually recognized, or the conclusions so
comprehensive and compelling as to persuade us of the soundness of the conception expressed
by their premises.”20 On these terms, Carlyle and Rawls exhibit an incommensurability with
respect not only to their starting points but also to the conclusions that are derived from their
premises.
Rawls’s disregard of and incommensurability with romanticism is most evident in his
acknowledgement of the possible limitations of his theory of justice:
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Certainly the argument for the principles of justice would be strengthened by showing that they
are still the best choice from a more comprehensive list more systematically evaluated. I do not
know how far this can be done. I doubt, however, that the principles of justice (as I have
defined them) will be the preferred conception on anything resembling a complete list. (Here I
assume that, given an upper bound on complexity and other constraints, the class of
reasonable and practicable alternatives is effectively finite.) Even if the argument I have offered
is sound, it only shows that a finally adequate theory (if such exists) will look more like the
contract view than any of the other doctrines we discussed. And even this conclusion is not
proved in any strict sense.21
Rawls leaves open the possibility that justice as fairness would not be chosen in the
original position and is open to competing accounts of justice to be aired:
Ideally of course one would like to say that [those in the original position] are to choose among
all possible conceptions of justice. One obvious difficulty is how these conceptions are to be
characterized so that those in the original position can be presented with them. Yet granting
that these conceptions could be defined, there is no assurance that the parties could make out
the best option; the principles that would be most preferred might be overlooked. Indeed,
there may exist no best alternative: conceivably for each conception of justice there is another
that is better. Even if there is a best alternative, it seems difficult to describe the parties’
intellectual powers so that this optimum, or even the more plausible conceptions, are sure to
occur to them…Thus although the two principles of justice may be superior to those
conceptions known to us, perhaps some hitherto unformulated set of principles is still better.22
While Rawls demonstrates his openness to alternative conceptions of justice in the
context of the original position, he subsequently narrows down the list of possible alternatives
whereby a Carlylean conception of justice goes unrecognized. He entertains what he calls “a
short list of traditional conceptions of justice” alongside “a few other possibilities suggested by
the two principles of justice.”23 The possible conceptions of justice that would be entertained
by the parties in the original position are limited because Rawls firmly establishes that there are
only a certain defined number of possibilities that would be contemplated. Rawls limits the
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scope of the original position by merely defining a scope: “I then assume that the parties are
presented with this list [of alternative conceptions of justice] and required to agree
unanimously that one conception is the best among those enumerated.”24 Rawls reflects in a
manner that lacks specificity when he concludes: “Thus justice as fairness moves us closer to
the philosophical ideal; it does not, of course, achieve it.”25
Rawls defines rationality as each individual “tr[ying] as best he can to advance his
interests.”26 Carlyle and Rawls are incommensurable at this juncture because Rawls’s
stipulation neglects contemplation of Teufelsdrӧckh’s biography and Carlyle’s theory of
transcendentalism. Teufelsdrӧckh illustrates the newfound values one derives in the face of
adversity in the advancement of one’s interests. Such values speak to the pettiness of being
beholden to seeking merely to advance one’s own interests. Carlyle’s construction of
Teufelsdrӧckh’s biography implicitly leads to the conclusion that renunciation, mutual
solidarity, and generosity should be prioritized and should replace self-interestedness and that
it is in fact rational to do so.27 When considering Carlyle’s opposing view, Rawls’s definition of
rationality is also a conception of the good. As a conception of the good, this definition of
rationality contradicts Rawls’s framing of the veil of ignorance, in which he states that no one
“know[s] his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or
pessimism.”28
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Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus is in essence a fictitious biographical profile of an individual
who lives behind his own veil of ignorance. It is defined by Teufelsdröckh’s search for a
conception of the good, as well as his search for the particulars of his rational plan of life.
Teufelsdrӧckh’s biographical construction embodies a compelling counterargument to Rawls,
since Rawls states that “we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of
one person selected at random [and] if anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of
justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached.”29
Teufelsdrӧckh also undermines Rawls’s claim that all those behind a veil of ignorance in the
original position “know that they have some rational plan of life.”30 Teufelsdrӧckh’s life
experiences lead him to principles fundamentally inimical to the two principles of justice Rawls
asserts anyone would arrive at in the context of the original position behind a veil of
ignorance.31 Rawls is ostensibly unfamiliar with Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophical conclusions and
unfamiliar with Sartor Resartus’s foundational influence on Emerson, and American
Transcendentalism more generally.
Rawls acknowledges and concedes that once the veil of ignorance is removed, some
may not want more primary social goods either for religious or other reasons.32 However, this
does not invalidate the other dimensions associated with Teufelsdrӧckh’s persona, namely the
resistance he faces in discovering a conception of the good and rational plan of life. His lack of a
conception of the good and lack of a rational plan of life are intertwined with and necessary
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prerequisites to his determination that renunciation is superior to alternatives such as the
difference principle in what should define moral and political philosophy.
While Rawls laid out the parameters of the original position and sought to derive a
superior conception of justice by comparing a set number of alternatives against one another,
he nevertheless admits that following such a procedure is less than ideal. Rawls reflects that
“admittedly this is an unsatisfactory way to proceed.”33 Rawls remarks that it would be better
to “define necessary and sufficient conditions for a uniquely best conception of justice and then
exhibit a conception that fulfilled these conditions.”34 Carlyle did this, in Sartor Resartus,
though in neither an explicit nor a systematic way. This in many ways is the point at which
Carlyle and Rawls diverge most markedly, whereby Carlyle illustrates justice in a manner
shrouded by romanticism that is inherently incommensurable with Rawls’s approach that
embodies systematic rationalism.
There are multiple instances in which statements Rawls makes in A Theory of Justice are
explicitly opposite to and incommensurable with those offered by Carlyle in Sartor Resartus. For
example, Rawls makes the simple and highly intuitive claim that conflict arises in society
because each member prefers a larger to a smaller share of the benefits made possible by
collaboration.35 Though reasonable, such an account is nonetheless contestable, given Carlyle’s
alternative normative account, which provides a rationale whereby the renunciation of
attaining larger and larger shares of benefits would become obvious.36 Carlyle’s philosophy in
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Sartor Resartus shows that it is simply not the case that each prefers a larger to a smaller share
without qualification. In so doing, Carlyle demonstrates that he is attempting to solve the
problem that is the basis for conflict as a means to resolve conflict. A philosophical construction
that illustrates why individuals should pursue renunciation of consumption as their default
yields mutual solidarity as a replacement for conflict. In this context, it is valuable to
acknowledge the philosophical construction by which Carlyle is able to conclude that it is
actually irrational to prefer a larger to a smaller share without qualification:
Man’s Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in
him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite. Will the whole Finance
Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake, in joint-stock
company, to make one Shoeblack HAPPY? They cannot accomplish it, above an hour or two; for
the Shoeblack also has a Soul quite other than his Stomach; and would require, if you consider
it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less:
God’s infinite Universe altogether to himself, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as
fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a Throat like that Ophiuchus! Speak not of them; to the
infinite Shoeblack they are as nothing. No sooner is your ocean filled, than he grumbles that it
might have been of better vintage. Try him with half of a Universe, of an Omnipotence, he sets
to quarrelling with the proprietor of the other half, and declares himself the most maltreated of
men. –Always there is a black spot in our sunshine: it is even, as I said, the Shadow of
Ourselves…So true is it, what I then said, that the Fraction of Life can be increased in value not
so much by increasing your Numerator, as by lessening your Denominator. Nay, unless my
Algebra deceive me, Unity itself divided by Zero will give Infinity. Make thy claim of wages a
zero, then; thou hast the world under thy feet. Well did the Wisest of our time write: ‘It is only
with Renunciation (Entsagen) that Life, properly speaking, can be said to begin.’37
Rawls skips the crucial and necessary step of providing a normative defense or justification for
why each member of a society should or should not prefer a larger to a smaller share. He takes
this for granted, because it is so hegemonically engrained in the context of modern liberal and
individualized capitalism that there is a blindness to any other alternative. Taking for granted a
preference for a greater to a lesser share by not contesting it merely reinforces the problem of
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inequality that Rawls directs the difference principle to resolve. It should be noted that the
application of the difference principle in the resolution of the problem of inequality is done
retroactively in the sense that the difference principle corrects for inequality after the free
market’s initial distribution of resources.
The fact that Carlyle provides a normative theory for renunciation can be applied to
negate the need for a veil of ignorance in the original position. Renunciation is inherently at
odds with the basis upon which Rawls maintains that a veil of ignorance is necessary, namely to
insure that those deliberating on principles of justice do not exploit their circumstances to
construct principles of justice that are to their own advantage. A normative theory of
renunciation breaks down the veil of ignorance in that everyone can adopt it while knowing
one’s place in society as a result of the philosophical arguments made on behalf of its adoption.
This means that whether or not someone adopts renunciation is not dependent on whether
one is wealthy or poor but simply on whether one can be convinced that renunciation is
optimal and actually beneficial. Just as an individual can adopt renunciation, as Teufelsdrӧckh
did, so too can every individual and thus the hegemonic mindset of a population of any size can
also be altered toward such a direction.
Rawls establishes the scope of his project for formulating a theory of justice by setting
boundaries whereby Carlyle’s approach to discovering justice lies outside its scope. Rawls has
such confidence in the two principles of justice he formulates that “the acceptance of the two
principles constitutes an understanding to discard as irrelevant as a matter of social justice
much of the information and many of the complications of everyday life.”38 On the contrary,
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Sartor Resartus provides an account of the complications of everyday life and how they are the
context for discovering a philosophy of social justice.
Would Teufelsdrӧckh be able to alter the decision-making in the original position if,
hypothetically, he were the only person enabled to present an argument before the decider
behind the veil of ignorance? Such a thought experiment underscores the incommensurability
inherent between A Theory of Justice and Sartor Resartus. If, hypothetically, Teufelsdrӧckh
were to be able to present his case either (a) during the deliberations taking place in the
original position to derive principles of justice or (b) as a response (or rebuttal) to the parties
after they agreed on the two principles of justice, it is possible, if not highly probable, that the
parties would be unable to agree on principles of justice. The incorporation of romanticism into
the context of the original position is amenable to Rawls’s commitment to constructivism. Such
an amendment to the original position would in no way invalidate the neutrality of the original
position and veil of ignorance. It would merely be a test of the veil of ignorance and original
position as philosophical constructs whereby Carlyle’s conception of justice could interface and
thus either synthesize with and confirm Rawls’s theory of justice or yield deadlock as a result of
their incommensurability.
The charge may be levelled, in amending the original position to pose Carlyle’s
philosophy as an alternative, that doing so would taint the original position—that it would then
become impure and invalidated based on the intentions Rawls had in mind. A charge may be
levelled (and it may already have been) that, in order to attain the principles of justice, one
must assemble the wisest philosophers, rather than those who know nothing about themselves
and their conceptions of the good, in order to do so. Also, it may be charged, why should any
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one philosopher get to enjoy the privilege of making a case to the jury, so to speak? If one
person (i.e. Teufelsdrӧckh) should be given such a privilege in such an arbitrary fashion, why
shouldn’t others? Such a question underscores the potential vulnerability of Rawls’s theory of
justice if there are potentially multiple philosophies on the topic of justice that stand in
contradistinction to Rawls’s philosophical account. And if others are allowed to compete to
persuade the “jury” to adopt certain principles of justice, then does this not nullify the spirit of
the original position as being the sole basis for a social contract theory?
Carlyle deliberates on and defines justice using a variety of criteria worthy of attention.
For example, he maintains that “it is not what a man outwardly has or wants that constitutes
the happiness or misery of him… [but] it is the feeling of injustice that is insupportable to all
men.”39 Carlyle defines injustice as “another name for disorder, for unveracity, unreality; a
thing which veracious created Nature, even because it is not Chaos and a waste-whirling
baseless Phantasm, rejects and disowns.”40 Moreover, Carlyle has faith in the realization of
justice. He theorizes of such a realization:
An ideal of right does dwell in all men, in all arrangements, actions and procedures of men: it is
to this ideal of right, more and more developing itself as it is more and more approximated to,
that human Society forever tends and struggles. We say also that any given thing either is
unjust or else just; however obscure the arguings and strugglings on it be, the thing in itself
there as it lies, infallibly enough, is the one or the other. To which let us add only this, the first,
last article of faith, the alpha and omega of all faith among men, That nothing which is unjust
can hope to continue in this world.41
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In this context, Carlyle offers the view that the pursuit of justice is evolutionary,
whereby injustice is progressively negated. For him, justice can be distinguished from injustice
through intuition and feeling. In another passage, he theorizes justice this way:
No man at bottom means injustice; it is always for some obscure distorted image of a right that
he contends: an obscure image diffracted, exaggerated, in the wonderfulest way, by natural
dimness and selfishness; getting tenfold more diffracted by exasperation of contest, till at
length it become all but irrecognisable; yet still the image of a right. Could a man own to
himself that the thing he fought for was wrong, contrary to fairness and the law of reason, he
would own also that it thereby stood condemned and hopeless; he could fight for it no longer.42
In this way, Carlyle contends that the pursuit of justice is a universal pursuit that is applicable to
all. Individuals may have different perceptions of what justice entails, but each nonetheless
strives toward achieving justice.
Martin Luther King, Jr. communicated Carlyle’s commitment to an eventual
achievement of a just society through evolution and a process of elimination of attributes
impeding realization of such a society. “I am convinced we shall overcome,” said King, “because
the arc of a moral universe is long but it bends toward justice. We shall overcome because
Carlyle is right—no lie can live forever.”43 King’s citation of Carlyle indicates their agreement
that the pursuit of justice is a project that is progressive and cumulative over an extended
period of time. Rawls’s conception of justice, by contrast, is derived in the context of ideal
theory in that it is the “first virtue of social institutions.”44 At least in the context of politics,
Rawls constricts justice to be tested in laws and institutions, but shows common ground with
Carlyle in that he views justice as “uncompromising” as a first virtue of human activities.45
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James Anthony Froude summarizes Carlyle’s conception of justice at the meta-level:
God’s law was everywhere: man’s welfare depended on the faithful reading of it. Society was
but a higher organism, no accidental agreement of individual persons or families to live
together on conditions which they could arrange for themselves, but a natural growth, the
conditions of which were already inflexibly laid down. Human life was like a garden, ‘to which
the will was gardener,’ and the moral fruits and flowers, or the immoral poisonous weeds, grew
inevitably according as the rules already appointed were discovered and obeyed, or slighted,
overlooked, or defied. Nothing was indifferent. Every step which a man could take was in the
right direction or the wrong. If in the right, the result was as it should be; if in the wrong, the
excuse of ignorance would not avail to prevent the inevitable consequence.46
Froude expounds on Carlyle’s position by describing how Carlyle felt modern political thought
and modern humanity believes in things such as expediency, the rights of “man,” and
government by majorities, all rudiments that reflect as if humanity could make laws for itself. 47
Froude further clarifies Carlyle’s position, which was that “the law, did they but know it, was
already made; and their wisdom, if they wished to prosper, was not look for what was
convenient to themselves, but for what had been decided already in Nature’s chancery.”48
Carlyle theorizes of the exponential growth of injustice that results from not discerning
and practicing justice at the individual and collective levels:
Justice, Justice: woe betides us everywhere when, for this reason or for that, we fail to do
justice! No beneficence, benevolence, or other virtuous contribution will make good the want.
And in what a rate of terrible geometrical progression, far beyond our poor computation, any
act of Injustice once done by us grows; rooting itself ever anew, spreading ever anew, like a
banyan-tree,--blasting all life under it, for it is a poison-tree! There is but one thing needed for
the world; but that one is indispensable. Justice, Justice, in the name of Heaven; give us Justice,
and we live; give us only counterfeits of it, or succedanea for it, and we die! 49
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Posing a fictional conversation between two persons on the topic of justice, Carlyle quoted one
as admitting the difficulty of adhering to what nature prescribes as just:
“Well, I have no pocket-definition of Justice,” said he, “to give your Lordship. It has not quite
been my trade to look for such a definition; I could rather fancy it had been your Lordship’s
trade, sitting on your high place this long while. But one thing I can tell you: Justice always is,
whether we define it or not. Everything done, suffered or proposed, in Parliament or out of it, is
either just or else unjust; either is accepted by the gods and eternal facts, or is rejected by
them.”50
Froude condenses and rephrases Carlyle’s view: “In politics as in all else, Carlyle insisted
always that there was a right way of doing things and a wrong way; that by following the right
way alone could any good end be arrived at.”51 According to Carlyle, it was imperative to find
the right way of managing the affairs of a nation, just as it was imperative to find the right way
when it comes to such things as cultivating the soil, healing diseases, or of exercising any one of
the million functions on which society depends.52
An apt analogy to describe the philosophical contrast between Carlyle and Rawls (and
their divergent critiques of Bentham’s utilitarianism) could be the notion of two people
travelling from the equator in search of a more temperate climate. Carlyle travels north (in the
direction of transcendentalism/romanticism), while Rawls travels south (in the direction of
liberalism/rationalism), both doing so as a matter of course dependent on factors out of their
control that socialized them into such divergent philosophical paths. Carlyle and Rawls were
socially constituted differently in that they lived not only in different eras and different places,
but had different personal backgrounds that informed their normative political philosophies. As
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with any comparison between two philosophers, the fact that they were not the same and did
not embody the same philosophy must be a question of social constitution in which all
philosophers are socially constituted or predisposed to espouse a unique philosophy in contrast
with all existent philosophy. Upon arriving at his own philosophical destination, each has no
real consciousness of what lies in the philosophical domain each did not travel to, in
contradistinction to his own. Each does not even know that the other side exists.
To return to the analogy, one conceivably might discover a dense jungle while the other
a vast open desert. The dichotomy in flora and fauna between a jungle and desert is the
equivalent of the analogy between Carlyle and Rawls as philosophers. Each cannot speak on the
other’s terms because they have no means of doing so, let alone the talent to be able to do so.
In political and moral philosophy, the contrast between Carlyle and Rawls informs us that a
romantic cannot be a rationalist and a rationalist cannot be a romantic. They each see the
world through a different lens and their philosophies embody ideals and worldviews that share
little if anything in common.
Rawls defines his ideal theory of justice as fairness as being “realistically utopian” in that
“it probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world (given its laws
and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate political
values—democratic perfection, if you like.”53 Carlyle’s non-ideal theory, espoused in Sartor
Resartus, in many respects was a pursuit of an ideal in a similar fashion to Rawls such that
transcendentalism could be cast as a realistically utopian doctrine that all might hypothetically
subscribe to and adopt. According to Rawls, ideal theory deals with the paradigm of a society in

53

John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 13.

244

which everyone “is presumed to act justly,” whereas Carlyle, it can be inferred, would take
everyone acting justly as the end, rather than the premise, of any valid political theory.54
According to Carlyle, politics would end when everyone acts justly, as there would be
nothing more to achieve or prove. As Lea characterizes him, “[Carlyle] cannot conceive of a
society united in loyalty and sincerity, even for a moment: for these are the chief conditions of
a just choice in policies and men.”55 Yet, Lea follows this statement with an inquiry that
foreshadows Rawls. Lea asks, if it is impossible to conceive of or realize such a society united in
acting justly, “in what way are we to imagine a society coming to consciousness of itself, or
transcending its own atomism and individualism?”56 Carlyle’s non-ideal theory is thus in pursuit
of what Rawlsian ideal theory presumes, as Rawls defines non-ideal theory as dealing in
“principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice…the pressing, urgent matters…in
everyday life.”57 While Rawls takes up justice as what he considers to be the pre-eminent
question that faces political theory, Carlyle “does not deny the existence of any transcendent
criterion of justice…but he quite refuses to discuss a question that has no bearing on the
immediate problems of life.”58
As Carlyle maintains, “innumerable ‘Philosophies of Man,’ contending in boundless
hubbub, must annihilate each other, before an inspired Poesy and Faith for Man can fashion
itself together.”59 In a statement that almost explicitly foreshadows MacIntyre, Carlyle remarks
“that ages of Heroism are not ages of Moral Philosophy; Virtue, when it can be philosophised
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of, has become aware of itself, is sickly and beginning to decline.”60 Moreover, “to the popular
judgment, he who talks much about Virtue in the abstract, begins to be suspect.”61 Carlyle
captures MacIntyre’s sentiments in a passage that reads nearly as a condensed plot summary of
MacIntyre’s After Virtue:
Goodness, which was a rule to itself, must now appeal to Precept, and seek strength from
Sanctions; the Freewill no longer reigns unquestioned and by divine right, but like a mere
earthly sovereign, by expediency, by Rewards and Punishments: or rather, let us say, the
Freewill, so far as may be, has abdicated and withdrawn into the dark, and special nightmare of
a Necessity usurps its throne; for now that mysterious Self-impulse of the whole man, heaveninspired, and in all senses partaking of the Infinite, being captiously questioned in a finite
dialect, and answering, as it needs must, by silence,--is conceived as non-extant, and only the
outward Mechanism of it remains acknowledged: of Volition, except as the synonym of Desire,
we hear nothing; of ‘Motives,’ without any Mover, more than enough.62
Carlyle himself discusses what will take place “after virtue.” He remarks on how virtue
and moral philosophy are inimical to one another in that virtue is unconscious while moral
philosophy is merely an “account” of the death of virtue. He writes: “as the last stage of all,
when Virtue, properly so called, has ceased to be practiced, and become extinct, and a mere
remembrance, we have the era of Sophists, descanting of its existence, proving it, denying it,
mechanically ‘accounting’ for it;--as dissectors and demonstrators cannot operate till once the
body be dead.”63 Since the unconsciousness of virtue cannot be reclaimed once virtue has
become extinct, we are left in a state in which moral (and political) philosophy is unable to
make claims based on any grounds other than those that are subjective. According to Carlyle,
moral and intellectual genius are “‘ever a secret to itself’” and “in the Body Politic, as in the
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animal body, the sign of right performance is Unconsciousness.”64 Emery Neff describes
Carlyle’s views in what can be taken as a type of MacIntyrean terms:
Each man was sent by his Creator into the world with a special duty to perform. In the
performance of this duty all claims for happiness should be renounced. Virtue was its own
reward, and should be practiced unhesitatingly, in obedience to the voice of God.65
Rawls articulates the problem of political liberalism: “How is it possible that there may
exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”66 Rawls’s
conception of a stable society, it can be argued, is largely synonymous with a static society and
a society in which an individual is merely an instrument who fits within the scope of a
comprehensive doctrine alongside other individuals who facilitate the eternal existence of
other comprehensive doctrines. While Rawls contends that the requirement that all citizens
affirm the same comprehensive doctrine is “unrealistic” and “utopian,” he does so in the belief
that a society divided by a multiplicity of doctrines is effectively the greatest normative ideal
and comprises a political utopia most worthy of eternal preservation.67
Rawls’s philosophy presents his version of liberal society as being an approximation to a
utopia, and an inference that can be made from Carlylean philosophy is that such an outlook
epitomizes not only a stagnant and stationary society, but one entirely bereft of Carlylean
transcendentalism. Though it can be presumed that the level of support for individual
comprehensive doctrines within a population waxes and wanes over time and that the
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doctrines to choose from on the “menu” also evolve, such a process merely reinforces the
argument that a liberal society is utopic only if it is characterized by this eternal pluralism with
never any emergent resolution/consensus among incompatible religious, philosophical, and
moral comprehensive doctrines. Hypothetically, should an emergent comprehensive doctrine
gain an overwhelming majority of popular support so that citizens seek to supersede political
liberalism by replacing it with this comprehensive doctrine, Rawls’s conception of political
liberalism would not allow for it to take place because it would not allow itself to be
superseded. This illustrates how political liberalism itself is a comprehensive doctrine. Despite
such promotion of what would amount to be merely an ossified or static society characterized
by a perpetual division on the basis of religion, philosophy, and morality, Rawls persists that his
“political liberalism is not comprehensive liberalism.”68
Rawls is adamant with respect to two features of liberal society: 1) the diversity of
reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern
democratic societies is not merely a historical condition but rather a permanent feature of the
culture of democracy and 2) a political society as a community united in affirming one and the
same comprehensive doctrine requires the oppressive use of state power for the maintenance
of political community.69 A consideration of Carlyle informs us that both claims, though evident
in the present, are highly speculative in the long term, since they fail to account for the
possibilities of evolution taking place within the context of liberal democratic society. In this
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light, Rawls has little basis on which to deliberate on the permanency of the features of
democratic society.
The pluralism of moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines can be winnowed down
and consolidated without an explicit abolition of liberalism being the ultimate political mission.
A winnowing can take place through natural evolution, whereby certain doctrines become
negated over time even to the point where, hypothetically, Rawls’s conception of justice could
eventually become a comprehensive doctrine accepted by all. It need not follow that such a
unity behind a single comprehensive doctrine necessarily should require the oppressive use of
force by a state. A grassroots social movement in support of a comprehensive doctrine could, at
least theoretically, grow to the point of having support universally so as to be called a universal
consensus rather than an overlapping consensus, if it is compelling enough to be able to attain
such a status. That comprehensive doctrines which displaced liberalism in the past, such as
fascism and communism, assumed authority against the spirit of liberalism in largely top-down
fashion (with limited social/political movements) by usurping power through political channels
does not preclude the possibility of a universal consensus emerging “organically” within the
context of liberalism’s natural evolution. Such a consensus need not be illiberal nor
undemocratic merely by disallowing adherence to other opposing comprehensive doctrines.
Rawls demonstrates his antagonism toward the Hegelian project of synthesizing a
universal doctrine dialectically. He uses the example of society in the Middle Ages as one that
was united in Catholicism.70 Rawls maintains that the Inquisition’s suppression of heresy was
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needed to preserve that shared religious belief.71 Such an example is historical and does not
account for the potential of a new comprehensive doctrine to arise as a product of the negation
of past doctrines, with such past doctrines having become defunct via evolution.
In this light, liberal society could be theorized as a means to the end of discovering the
comprehensive doctrine to succeed it. Liberal society can be cast as a laboratory in which
experiments are attempted to discover the comprehensive doctrine to satisfy the next stage of
political development and possibly inaugurate the “end of history.” Carlyle exemplifies the
process whereby political theory has the potential to negate virtually all existing religious,
moral, and philosophical doctrines and, in so doing, synthesize a new doctrine as a type of
dialectical product.
While Rawls’s “intention is not to replace” comprehensive doctrines, Carlyle instead
seeks to discredit and negate the capacity of any and all existing comprehensive doctrines from
providing hegemonic political governance on normative grounds.72 Rawls promotes a doctrine
of political liberalism rooted in the two principles of justice achieving an overlapping consensus
among adherents of incompatible comprehensive doctrines as legitimate and philosophically
defensible. According to Rawls, such an overlapping consensus supersedes all other past,
present (and possibly future?) comprehensive doctrines because no past, present, or future
comprehensive doctrines would ever be able to supersede it as embodying the fullest
conception and definition of political justice.
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Carlylean philosophy, as can be inferred from Carlyle’s conceptualization of
transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus, allows for disagreement with Rawls’s account of
pluralism as being “the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free
institutions.”73 Carlyle’s transcendentalism, as I have theorized, supersedes the
incommensurability and incompatibility inherent in the pluralism of moral, religious, and
philosophical doctrines. In this way, a pluralism of incompatible comprehensive doctrines that
maintain themselves indefinitely would only connote a lack of progress toward the attainment
and validation of the one true comprehensive doctrine. Rawls’s conception of political
liberalism illustrates a society that would merely be “treading water” in a status quo and
embodies an ideal that does not account for the realities of liberal society in which
comprehensive doctrines are constantly either gaining adherents or losing them in the
competitive marketplace of ideas.
Rawls’ assessment of democratic society is myopic because, while the democratic
society of the twentieth century was characterized by a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines,
democratic society in no way disallows the evolution to a state of affairs in which democratic
citizens rally around fewer and fewer comprehensive doctrines. Such evolution potentially
could occur within the context of democracy until just one comprehensive doctrine remained
viable and emerged as a type of universal consensus rather than overlapping consensus. As
Carlyle has illustrated, there is no such thing as a stable society, as societies are in constant
evolution/devolution toward or against justice based on the actions of individuals who
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comprise the collective political community.74 Stability may be inherently the most inimical
attribute that could be assigned to liberal society, as everything in liberal society is in constant
flux, including levels of mutual racial, economic, religious, and ideological antagonism.
By reverting to political liberalism from comprehensive liberalism, not only does Rawls
move away from Carlyle, he also moves away from the larger tradition of philosophy (i.e. Hegel
and Marx) that avidly pursued the discovery of a singular comprehensive doctrine.75 In “Signs of
the Times,” Carlyle wrote disparagingly of philosophers held in high esteem: “Our favourite
Philosophers have no love and no hatred; they stand among us not to do, nor to create
anything, but as a sort of Logic-mills to grind out the true causes and effects of all that is done
and created.”76 Moreover, “an intellectual dapperling of these times boasts chiefly of his
irresistible perspicacity, his ‘dwelling in the daylight of truth,’ and so forth; which, on
examination, turns out to be a dwelling in the rush-light of ‘closet-logic,’ and a deep
unconsciousness that there is any other light to dwell in or any other objects to survey with
it.”77
David Alec Wilson, a Carlyle biographer, asserted as to how “Carlyle was too great a man
to be a system-manufacturer or creed-cobbler”:
The necessary imperfections of knowledge render a complete scientific account of human life
for ever impossible. We never can know men as well as a botanist, e.g., can know flowers. Our
manufacturers of philosophical systems—to say nothing of theologians—and our omniscient
pseudo-scientific historians are about as wise as those old sages who devoted their lives to the
search for the “philosopher’s stone,” or cracked their heads against the hard problem of
perpetual motion.78
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In their conceptualization of post-liberalism, Milbank and Pabst pose a question that
Carlyle’s philosophy can be applied to answer. Such a question underscores the difficulty of
moving from a critique of liberalism to the attainment of a post-liberal society. Milbank and
Pabst ask:
But how can people be educated into virtue? We have already seen that modern liberal
assumptions render this impossible. On the one hand, enlightened utilitarianism reduces
everything to egotistic pleasure, machinic or informational efficiency and the strength of the
market-state. On the other hand, individualist romanticism reduces all to willful self-seeking
and, again, the strength of the state and market combined.79
They acknowledge the limitations of utilitarianism and individualist romanticism, and by so
doing come to entertain the possibility that education into virtue requires assent to something
like belief in the Platonic forms.80 They remark, “one can therefore conclude that our natural
desire to know the transcendent Good ensures that we can in some degree realise it, while
guarding against any totalitarian notion that we have the precise formula for its
implementation.”81 This sentiment can be applied to Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, as Carlyle seeks
to construct a means to attain the transcendent Good in the context of its plot, but concedes
explicitly that there is no precise formula for its implementation. The conclusion can be drawn
that the good life is in being a transcendentalist, which is largely synonymous with being a
Platonist. In this context, being a transcendentalist is not instrumental towards achieving a
higher utilitarian or material substantive end, but can be conceived of as an end in and of itself
and as being intrinsically good.
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Alex Bavister-Gould points out the contradiction in MacIntyre’s philosophy by
juxtaposing MacIntyre’s commitments in After Virtue with those he proposes subsequently in
his support of Thomism as a viable political tradition to support as a means of curing the ills of
modernity:
From the standpoint of the author of After Virtue, the adoption of Thomism is as much an
absurd impossibility as a return to Barthist Protestant faith or communist party membership.
This, I think, makes the argument of After Virtue of continuing and independent interest. It is
more and other than a ‘dry-run’ for Whose Justice? and its sequels, and it opens possibilities
that others, if not MacIntyre himself, might yet and fruitfully explore.82
In adopting Thomism as a viable philosophical tradition to respond to the crisis of
liberalism (and the concurrent state of modernity as an era no longer guided by virtue),
MacIntyre contradicts a core thesis offered in After Virtue: namely, that there is no means to
reconcile the inherent incommensurability that exists among the universe of disparate
ideologies and theologies that compete against one another, each of which has some adherents
in the pluralist condition of liberalism.
Carlylean transcendentalism contains a means to solve the problem of
incommensurability that MacIntyre has pointed out as unresolved and largely unresolvable.
Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism thus compromises MacIntyre’s central and sweeping
thesis in After Virtue: “the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic
theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any
notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his-telos.”83 The inference, applying Carlylean
transcendentalism, is that one could reject Christianity and Aristotelianism and yet still realize
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his telos through being a transcendentalist, and thus seek to account for the true nature of
reality and the universe. Carlyle’s inherent yet implicit pronouncement of the failure of the
Enlightenment project in Sartor Resartus prefigured MacIntyre’s proclamation of the same in
After Virtue.84 I argue that Carlyle sought to resolve the failures of the Enlightenment by
proposing a philosophical account in Sartor Resartus whose conclusions provided a telos and, if
universally adopted, would connote entering a new stage in political development toward the
“end of history.” It can be inferred that it is the case that the Enlightenment has failed and
Carlyle’s transcendentalism has not been adopted that incommensurable and interminable
debates persist in the contexts of moral and political philosophy.
Carlyle’s philosophy has much in common with the subsequent philosophy MacIntyre
offers, as both were harsh critics of the modern sociopolitical order while being unable to offer
alternatives popularly adopted. Each theorized an alternative but provided no practical step-bystep guidebook as how to take a metaphorical exit ramp off the highway of modern liberal
democratic capitalism and drive in an entirely different direction. This is a fundamental way in
which Carlyle and MacIntyre, as a post-Marxist, departed from Marx’s own criticism of
liberalism, in that Marx offers a detailed account of the things that must be done in order to
achieve communism as a new political order.85
Carlyle must be further contrasted with Nietzsche, Aristotle, Christianity, and the
Enlightenment so as to elaborate on how transcendentalism can be constructed as a unique
and independent ideology. Carlyle’s transcendentalism is elaborate and provides a resolution in
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the adoption of the philosophy of clothes and the adoption of the Everlasting Yea. In contrast,
Aristotle’s conception of eudemonia and Nietzsche’s conception of the ϋbermensch are
nebulous and indefinable. Carlyle’s transcendentalism leads to the conclusion that Aristotelian
happiness and the Nietzschean ϋbermensch are essentially equal because they are equally
nebulous. Teufelsdrӧckh provides a blueprint in the sense that readers of Sartor Resartus can
adopt his philosophy and adopt his vantage point after being persuaded of its merits through
the duration of the book. Aristotle maintains that happiness can be defined with more clarity “if
we could first ascertain the function of man.”86 Aristotle remarks that the flute-player, sculptor,
and any artist has a function, and Carlyle seeks to make known that Teufelsdrӧckh, as
“Professor of Things in General,” has a unique function in accounting for the entirety of the
universe as being clothing that symbolizes a divine, transcendent, and immaterial order.
Ostensibly, if the flute-player, sculptor, and any artist or member of any occupation
were to adopt Teufelsdrӧckh’s philosophy, the “philosophy of clothes,” they would promote
themselves onto a higher plane in the sense that they would evolve from carrying out a
function by nature specialized and limited in scope to carrying out a function universal in
scope—accounting for the transcendental nature of the entirety of the universe. Specialized
laborers who had gone about their functions unacquainted with and unfamiliar with Carlyle’s
philosophy of clothes could then share in a solidarity by universally becoming Teufelsdrӧckhs,
or transcendentalists. The “function of man,” it can be concluded from inference from Sartor
Resartus, is to gain consciousness of the transcendentalist philosophy. Such a function has not
been taken up since collective humanity heretofore has not recognized Carlylean
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transcendentalism as the basis for pursuing that function. In other words, specialized
occupations can be taken up while being united in pursuing transcendentalism as the universal
function of humanity.
In comparison to Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism, I argue that all other ideologies
and theologies are incommensurable and arbitrary. Carlylean transcendentalism supersedes
them. This is the logic behind how transcendentalism provides humanity a unique account of
what the human function is. Aristotle asks, “Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain
functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function?”87 In seeking to
discover humanity’s unique function, Aristotle considers how “life seems to belong even to
plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man.”88 Aristotle concludes that humanity’s
function is “a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle.”89 Humanity’s peculiarity rests in its peculiar capacity to gain consciousness
of Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism and consciously (and universally) recognize it as
the apex of philosophy. The synthesis of Aristotle and Carlyle becomes that the “function of a
good man [is] to be the good and noble performance of”90 being a transcendentalist.
Throughout The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides commentary with respect to
describing virtuous human life that is readily applicable to Carlyle’s account of Teufelsdrӧckh’s
biography in Sartor Resartus. When it comes to the human experience of bad fortune through
experiencing a multitude of bad events, Aristotle maintains that “even in these [bad events]
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nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not
through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.”91 Such an account
provides a synopsis of Teufelsdrockh’s personal philosophical journey from Everlasting No to
the Centre of Indifference to the Everlasting Yea. Teufelsdröckh’s alienation and rejection led
him initially to adopt nihilism in the Everlasting No, and then he transitioned to the Everlasting
Yea through his adoption of transcendentalism, made possible by his “greatness of soul.”92
Carlyle’s transcendentalism has been overlooked as a viable goal for humanity, but
Nietzsche, and particularly Aristotle, have been examined in the literature and have provided
solutions that have not been popularly adopted.93 For example, no one is living in “Aristotelian”
or “Nietzschean” political societies but, I argue, it is possible to construct a Carlylean
transcendentalist society by applying Sartor Resartus to politics. Teufelsdrӧckh is an elaborate
literary construction with which it is possible for readers to identify if they choose to read
Sartor Resartus and then themselves embody Teufelsdrӧckh’s vantage point not only in their
political lives but in the full scope of their lives. Teufelsdrӧckh is thus a blueprint that readers
can replicate for themselves. Teufelsdrӧckh also serves as a type of dialectical synthesis of
Aristotelian eudemonia and the Nietzschean ϋbermensch in that Teufelsdrӧckh achieves
fulfillment by living by a radical philosophy that he sets for himself but yet seeks to impart to
others to resolve society’s problems. It can be inferred from Carlyle’s construction of Sartor
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Resartus that Teufelsdrӧckh achieves fulfillment as a resolution to a narrative plot from which,
and only from which, his self-realization is enabled.
Aristotle frames the final end for humanity in the following terms:
Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes,
and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends;
but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will
be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we
are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake
of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the
sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always
desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.94
While Aristotle determines that happiness is the “final end,” the Everlasting Yea and the
philosophy of clothes become the “final ends” realized by Teufelsdrӧckh’s unique biography,
which enabled their discernment. I will argue that the Everlasting Yea and transcendentalism
are conceptions of the good for humanity. The Aristotelian virtues, though conceptions of the
good in themselves, can be informed by the addition of the Everlasting Yea and
transcendentalism. Virtues practiced for the sake of happiness underscore the vagueness of
happiness, particularly when considering the Everlasting Yea and transcendentalism as offering
specific destinations for humanity to arrive at.
Teufelsdrӧckh compels us to think that one cannot be truly happy until one has
discerned the highest philosophical truths (the Everlasting Yea and the philosophy of clothes)
and that happiness as Aristotle frames it will be as empty as that of being a satisfied pig, as Mill
characterizes the adherence to Bentham’s philosophy of utilitarianism. Aristotle defines
happiness as the final end because it is what “we choose always for itself and never for the sake
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of something else.”95 The synthesis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics with Carlyle’s Sartor
Resartus leads to the inference that not only is Aristotelian happiness compatible with Carlyle’s
concept of the Everlasting Yea, but happiness is most attainable if one’s philosophy is the
Everlasting Yea and the philosophy of clothes.
Carlylean philosophy can be applied to ask of MacIntyre, with a non-Nietzschean and
non-liberal lens, why should we assume Aristotle reached the apex of moral, ethical, and
political philosophy and that moral philosophy has subsequently declined in the period
subsequent to Aristotle? MacIntyre contends that it is a fact that “Aristotelianism is
philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought.”96 This dissertation
seeks to advance the normative argument that Carlylean philosophy, specifically his theory of
transcendentalism and its political implications as presented in Sartor Resartus, is
philosophically a compelling modern political and moral philosophy. Carlyle thus demotes both
Aristotle and Nietzsche through his promotion of transcendentalism, as transcendentalism
transcends not only every –ism but Aristotelian teleology and Nietzschean nihilism.
MacIntyre does not justify why he thinks Aristotle provides the grandest formulation of
moral and political philosophy, other than that he was among the first philosophers of such,
and theorized the concept of “teleology,” and that subsequently there has been a departure
from Aristotelian teleology in favor of emotivism and pluralism. If moral and political
philosophy had inaugurated themselves in the context of a state of pluralism and emotivism,
and yielded a world in which Aristotle formulated his virtue ethics as a monolithic philosophy to
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sew the world together, it is possible MacIntyre would similarly object to such a state of
philosophy as rejecting the validity of ancient pluralism and liberalism the way liberals critique
his own fidelity to Aristotle.
MacIntyre asserts in After Virtue that moral philosophy has suffered the effects of a
catastrophe comparable to an imaginable world in which the natural sciences suffer the effects
of a catastrophe.97 Such a world would be one in which, were analytical philosophy to flourish,
such philosophy would never reveal the fact of the disordered state of the world.98 MacIntyre
writes, “what we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.”99 MacIntyre states his
hypothesis by asserting “that we are in a condition which almost nobody recognises and which
perhaps nobody at all can recognise fully.”100 Carlyle’s transcendentalism, theorized in Sartor
Resartus, is compatible with and informs MacIntyre’s account of the state of philosophical
discourse with respect to not only moral philosophy but political philosophy as well. As
MacIntyre writes:
And at least if even to entertain this hypothesis puts me into an antagonistic stance, it is a very
different antagonistic stance from that of, for example, modern radicalism. For the modern
radical is as confident in the moral expression of his stances and consequently in the assertive
uses of the rhetoric of morality as any conservative has ever been. Whatever else he denounces
in our culture he is certain that it still possesses the moral resources which he requires in order
to denounce it. Everything else may be, in his eyes, in disorder; but the language of morality is
in order, just as it is. That he too may be being betrayed by the very language he uses is not a
thought available to him. It is the aim of this book to make that thought available to radicals,
liberals and conservatives alike. I cannot however expect to make it palatable; for if it is true,
we are all already in a state so disastrous that there are no large remedies for it.101
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I contend that both Carlyle and MacIntyre seek to transcend, and thus resolve, the crisis
of hyperpluralism. For MacIntyre, it can be inferred from After Virtue that hyperpluralism can
be defined as the interminable nature of the competition among moral and political
philosophies. Drawing an inference from Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, hyperpluralism can be
characterized as the notion that all competing ideologies are not only merely “clothing” worn
by humanity prior to its consciousness of transcendentalism but also, as such, historical
constructs that are necessary in order to eventually derive the realization of transcendentalism.
In this way, Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism informs MacIntyre’s account that there is a
singular conceptual scheme that has been shattered, resulting in interminable debates with
respect to competing emotivist moral and political philosophies.
MacIntyre recounts the “catastrophe” that befell philosophy as a historical construct:
Suppose it were the case that the catastrophe of which my hypothesis speaks had occurred
before, or largely before, the founding of academic history, so that the moral and other
evaluative presuppositions of academic history derived from the forms of the disorder which it
brought about. […] For the forms of the academic curriculum would turn out to be among the
symptoms of the disaster whose occurrence the curriculum does not acknowledge.102
As Christopher Stephen Lutz synthesizes from such a thought experiment, “in other words,
modern history does not record the catastrophe because the catastrophe is invisible to it,
because modern history is itself one of the fruits of the catastrophe.”103
The rationale for transcendentalism’s conversion to a practical movement is that it
provides a means of resolving otherwise interminable moral, political, and social conflicts that
not only persist but are exacerbated in the context of modern liberal democratic capitalism.
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Transcendentalism provides a philosophical narrative whereby liberalism can transition to postliberalism in a manner that preserves the gains made possible by the liberal capitalist social
order. In this way, Carlylean transcendentalism should be considered as an alternative
resolution to the “riddle of history” in contradistinction to Marx’s presentation of communism
as the solution to what Marx calls the “riddle of history”:
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement,
and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism
therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being—a return
become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This
communism, as fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed
humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and
nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and
essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity,
between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it
knows itself to be this solution.104
Carlylean transcendentalism resolves, or at least ameliorates, economic conflict by
providing a philosophical account of how exploitation and thus the mutual hostility within
humanity can be terminated. Transcendentalism naturally can be cast into the role of postcapitalism, since it preserves the gains made by capitalism that date from the inauguration of
the industrial age. Transcendentalism does this by recognizing the need for renunciation of the
pursuit of insatiable consumption as a means of conserving scarce resources and preserving the
free marketplace in the context of the long-term. In the absence of renunciation, capitalism
would only continue to embody the pursuit of insatiable consumption as a means for the
continuous generation of profits, which would lead to unending expansions in consumer and
national debt (as in the case of the US in particular) in addition to unsustainable consumption of
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finite resources. In the long term, capitalism leads to environmental degradation and consumer
dissatisfaction and disillusionment, and thus a taste for the spiritual, rather than satisfaction
with merely being a consumer in the economic sphere.
Transcendentalism promises humanism and social solidarity to replace burgeoning
competition, division, polarization, hyperpluralism, economic inequality, and identity politics.
Renunciation, much as it resolves the problem of exploitation, resolves the problems of
inequality, identity politics, ethnocentrism, and racism. Communism and Islamism have both
promised an end to identity politics by universalizing their respective “creeds,” so that
members of all nations, races, and ethnicities can join in solidarity in their affirmation of
communism or Islam.105 Communism and Islamism were unsuccessful in this regard because
they each were particularistic ideologies incommensurable with not only one another but with
all other ideologies.
Transcendentalism’s supersession of communism and Islamism, by resolving their
incommensurability as a function of casting them and all other non-transcendentalism
ideologies as “clothing,” is the means by which transcendentalism itself can be universalized
across all nations, races, and ethnicities. Racism, ethnocentrism, and identity politics can be
ameliorated and extinguished when all see themselves in universal accord, affirming
transcendentalism. Transcendentalism yields racial solidarity as a means of replacing racism.
Communism and Islamism each sought to proselytize converts and realize their aims explicitly
calling for revolution in which violence would be a significant if not primary component. The
notion that communism or Islamism can attain universal affirmation has proven specious and

105

See Qutb, Milestones, 116; Hansen and Kainz, “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology.”

264

shows how transcendentalism’s commitment to renunciation rather than revolution offers a
plausible means of attaining universal solidarity. I argue that it is through Carlyle’s
transcendentalism, rather than Marx’s communism, that exploitation is put an end to in the
manner Marx said it would: “In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is
put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In
proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one
nation to another will come to an end.”106
Transcendentalism curtails exploitation, inequality, and racism, among other social
problems, only to the extent of the proportion of a populace affirming and adhering to
transcendentalism and its call for renunciation. Until transcendentalism is affirmed universally
and globally, it will compete against antagonistic ideologies that would be universally hostile
towards it, much as Islamism has experienced. In effect, Carlylean transcendentalism would be
just one more ideology among others such as liberal democratic capitalism, communism,
fascism, and Islamism competing for adherents until it is recognized as superseding its
competitors. Not only would this be the case, but transcendentalism would be seen as just one
more ideology allowed within the context of pluralistic liberalism. The extent to which
transcendentalism embodies merely one more ideology subsumed within the context of
liberalism, or rather embodies an overlapping consensus in the context of liberalism, or serves
as post-liberalism (a successor to liberalism) is difficult to forecast. This is because ascertaining
transcendentalism’s practical application is to a large extent a next stage after constructing
transcendentalism as a coherent political doctrine. Transcendentalism’s practical adoption and
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application would be dependent on political and economic climates, and transcendentalism can
be applied to local, national, and international political contexts.
Marx’s description of sociological trends that would facilitate communism in the
nineteenth century are potentially applicable to the facilitation of the adoption of Carlylean
transcendentalism in the twenty-first century. According to Marx, “national differences and
antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development
of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of
production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.”107 The hypothetical rejection of
Carlylean transcendentalism portends the acceptance of the perpetuation of incommensurable
ideologies and the accompanying interminable economic and political conflict that results from
such rejection. Intractable and bourgeoning economic and political conflict promises eventually
to lead to the disintegration and dissolution of liberal democratic capitalism as the hegemonic
social order, or at a minimum to a dramatic degeneration of the liberal social order. This
context leads to one of the biggest questions facing liberalism: to what extent can liberal
political institutions contain increasing levels of contentious politics?
Scholarship in the 2010s has rearticulated MacIntyre’s claims in works such as Brad S.
Gregory’s The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society and
Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed. These books document the hazardous trajectory of
liberalism as a function of growing social disintegration and open the possibility for discourse
on post-liberalism. In The Unintended Reformation, Gregory documents the continuous
fracturing and proliferation of ideologies over the past five hundred years that precipitated with
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medieval Christianity’s incapacity of remaining the hegemonic and singular sociopolitical
ideology. As the hegemonic philosophical and political philosophical tradition during the
medieval era, Christianity proved unsuccessful as a sustainable universal ideology when
Christianity fractured during the Reformation into Catholicism and Protestantism. The
Reformation was unsuccessful in that Protestantism fractured into a plurality of various sects,
which then gave rise to the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, much like Protestantism, has
been unable to provide a universally consensual ideology and too has yielded a hyperpluralism
of divergent and competing ideologies. From the medieval era, there has only been one
consistent trendline: the systematic and exponential growth in the pluralism of both religious
and secular ideologies with the corresponding less and less agreement on shared values that
should be lived by. As Gregory puts it, “modern philosophers replicated in a rationalist key the
unintended, open-ended, apparently irresolvable pluralism of Protestantism.”108 Gregory
continues:
There is nothing remotely resembling agreement or convergence among contemporary
philosophers about what is true, what reason prescribes, what their discipline’s starting point
or assumptions ought to be, what philosophy’s most important problems are and priorities
should be, or by what methods philosophers should or could try to resolve their
disagreements…[Modern philosophy] sought universal, rationally demonstrable truth, but has
produced instead an open-ended welter of preferential, ultimately arbitrary truth claims.109
After reading and appreciating Carlyle, John Stuart Mill published a review urging a
competent author to undertake writing a Treatise on the Ambiguities of the Moral Sciences
which “would enable all kinds of thinkers, who now are daggers drawn, because they are
speaking different dialects and know it not, to understand one another, and to perceive that,
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with the proper explanations, their doctrines are reconcilable.”110 Such a treatise, according to
Mill, would “contribute a large part to what is probably destined to be the great philosophical
achievement of the era, of which many signs already announce the commencement, viz., to
unite all half truths, which have been fighting against one another since the creation, and blend
them in one harmonious whole.”111 I argue that Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus has the capacity to do
this if not only the intellectual community but also the public at-large gains consciousness of
the principles and conclusions that it espouses.
The trajectory of MacIntyre’s philosophical quest, particularly in After Virtue, casts
doubt on the potential of there being any revival of the Aristotelianism and teleology that
MacIntyre advocates.112 Horton and Mendus characterize MacIntyre’s references to “the
construction of local forms of community” and the need “for another—doubtless very
different—St Benedict” as seeming to be “little more than whistling in the dark to keep the
spirits up when set against his coruscating critique of modernity.”113
MacIntyre’s expressed purpose of Against the Self-Images of the Age could be applied to
Carlyle as the definitive account of Carlyle’s philosophical career: “the aspiration to link
philosophical criticism and ideological commitment.”114 MacIntyre introduces Against the SelfImages of the Age with a passage that may be applied to consideration of Carlyle’s career and
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his inability to articulate artfully an ideology (that would gain widespread popular support) to
invalidate the numerous ideologies and doctrines in his own era. MacIntyre theorizes:
Against those who believe that some particular ideology is still able to provide the light that our
individual and social lives need, I shall assert that—in the case of psychoanalysis, of Christianity,
and above all of Marxism—either intellectual failure, or failure to express the forms of thought
and action which constitute our contemporary social life, or both, have led to their necessary
and in the long run not to be regretted decay. Against those who believe that in our type of
society ideology as such can no longer find living roots or expression, I shall assert that it is the
specific traits of these particular ideologies that we have inherited which make them no longer
viable, and not any characteristics of ideology as such; and moreover that the belief in the end
of ideology itself masks an ideology which is no less an ideology for being so often
unacknowledged and which is perhaps less reputable than it might be insofar as it goes
unrecognized.115
Such a passage provides a valuable backdrop to acknowledge the unending possibility of the
emergence of a new ideology, or ideologies, to resolve the failings of ideologies attempted in
the past. I have sought to illustrate how Carlyle’s transcendentalism might be acknowledged
and cast as a viable ideology to displace competitor ideologies and constructs in the context of
political philosophy.
In the next chapter, I compare Carlyle’s critique of modernity in the context of the
nineteenth century with Jacques Ellul’s critique in the context of the twentieth century. Just as
there are parallels between Carlyle and Qutb with respect to developing a “transcendental”
philosophy, parallels exist between Carlyle and Ellul with respect to their bleak attitude toward
what they take to be the hegemonic role technology plays in defining modernity. I unpack
Carlyle’s cryptic theory of the “phoenix” of modernity, in which he contends infinite
mechanization and construction of the materialist economy alongside the not-mutually-
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exclusive decay of the role of spirituality in human affairs portends the unsustainability of both
trends to the point of cataclysm.
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Chapter 6
Carlyle, Ellul, and Their Critiques of Modernity

Thomas Carlyle and Jacques Ellul levelled large-scale critiques of modernity in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. While others criticized specific forms of
government, specific political economies (such as capitalism or communism), or political
developments within specific countries, Carlyle and Ellul stand out for the all-encompassing
nature of their critiques of the hegemony of the industrial technological materialism that has
defined modernity writ large. According to them, this hegemony has spilled across countries
and political economies such that every country, whether capitalist or communist, has had its
politics defined by the dominant and unquestioned pursuit of infinite industrial and
technological development so as to promote materialist consumption while demoting
immaterialist spirituality. Carlyle and Ellul run parallel to one another in that each sought to
argue that humanity does not guide modern industrial/technological development but, rather,
humanity is dominated by the autonomous and infinite nature of industrial/technological
development. It is not that they are against modern technological improvement as a means to
an end, but they are against technology/industry as ends in and of themselves that block out
the possibility of individuals attaining any other status than that of a producer and consumer in
subservient service to the autonomous evolution of the economy at large.
Carlyle theorized about the critically important ramifications of the mechanization of
society and humanity:
Thus does the Genius of Mechanism stand by to help us in all difficulties and emergencies, and
with his iron back bears all our burdens.
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These things, which we state lightly enough here, are yet of deep import, and indicate a
mighty change in our whole manner of existence. For the same habit regulates not our modes
of action alone, but our modes of thought and feeling. Men are grown mechanical in head and
in heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith in individual endeavor, and in natural force, of
any kind. Not for internal perfection, but for external combinations and arrangements, for
institutions, constitutions,--for Mechanism of one sort or other, do they hope and struggle.
Their whole efforts, attachments, opinions, turn on mechanism, and are of a mechanical
character.
We may trace this tendency in all the great manifestations of our time; in its intellectual
aspect, the studies it most favours and its manner of conducting them; in its practical aspects,
its politics, arts, religion, morals; in the whole sources, and throughout the whole currents of its
spiritual, no less than its material activity.1
This embodies Carlyle’s romanticist critique of modern liberal democratic capitalism
stimulated by the advent of industrialism. Carlyle sought to defend his thesis that, in modernity,
means have replaced ends and means are now the ends in every respect ranging from the arts
and religion to politics. Metaphysics, the Philosophy of the Mind, and Moral Sciences have
been superseded and replaced by the science of the age, which is “physical, chemical,
physiological; in all shapes mechanical.”2
Carlyle singles out politics in particular when he says that nowhere is the “deep, almost
exclusive faith we have in Mechanism more visible than in the Politics of this time.”3 It is in this
context that Carlyle presents an iron cage thesis whose language sounds similar to that used by
Weber years later.4 Carlyle maintains:
Civil government does by its nature include much that is mechanical, and must be treated
accordingly. We term it indeed, in ordinary language, the Machine of Society, and talk of it as
the grand working wheel from which all private machines must derive, or to which they must
adapt, their movements. Considered solely as a metaphor, all this is well enough; but here, as in
so many other cases, the foam hardens itself into a shell,’ and the shadow we have wantonly
evoked stands terrible before us and will not depart at our bidding. Government includes much
1
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also that is not mechanical, and cannot be treated mechanically; of which latter truth, as
appears to us, the political speculations and exertions of our time are taking less and less
cognisance.
Nay, in the very outset, we might note the mighty interest taken in mere political
arrangements, as itself the sign of a mechanical age.5
In forming his critique of the mechanism of the age, Carlyle neither ignores nor
dismisses the positive results of industrialism. With respect to industrialism’s devotion to
“honest triumphs in engineering and machinery” and the making of “honest contrivance, and
accumulation of capital by it,” Carlyle does not remain unconvinced but authoritatively
acknowledges that “truly, good consequences follow out of it: who can be blind to them?”6 His
next assertion, adding qualification to his endorsement of industrialism, is that industrialism
yields at most “half of a most excellent and opulent result” and is “baleful only when it sets-up
(as too often now) for being the whole result. A half-result which will be blessed and heavenly
so soon as the other half is had,--namely wisdom to guide the first half.”7
Carlyle’s “Signs of the Times” is an important text that inaugurates modern social
criticism in many ways, and its themes and theses are re-articulated by prominent social
scientists and philosophers such as Max Weber and Jacques Ellul. As Ellul will do in the
twentieth century, Carlyle warns that industrialism has the potential to be all-consuming,
whereby humans increasingly become beholden to serving technology and not the other way
around. He emphasizes how wisdom needs to guide the development of industrialism, and
interchanges the word “beaverism” with “industrialism” as a way to suggest that human
wisdom is not always the basis of human industrial output:
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If a man can keep his intellect silent, and make it even into honest beaverism, several very
manful moralities, in danger of wreck on other courses, may comport well with that, and give it
a genuine and partly human character; and I will tell him, in these days he may do far worse
with himself and his intellect than change it into beaverism, and make honest money with it. If
indeed he could become a heroic industrial, and have a life ‘eminently human’! But that is not
easy at present. Probably some ninety-nine out of every hundred of our gifted souls, who have
to seek a career for themselves, go this beaver road. Whereby the first half-result, national
wealth namely, is plentifully realised; and only the second half, or wisdom to guide it, is
dreadfully behindhand.8
Carlyle’s criticism of technology in many ways represents the advent of the critique of
technology because it coincided with the start of the industrial age. The critique Carlyle offered
in 1829 in “Signs of the Times” is echoed and amplified, though without credit to him, by
Jacques Ellul in his landmark twentieth-century text, The Technological Society. Carlyle
challenges his readers to “observe how the mechanical genius of our time has diffused itself
into quite other provinces. Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery,
but the internal and spiritual also.”9 Moreover, he offers a statement that essentially defines
Ellul’s thesis in The Technological Society:
To us who live in the midst of all this, and see continually the faith, hope and practice of every
one founded on Mechanism of one kind or other, it is apt to seem quite natural, and as if it
could never have been otherwise. Nevertheless, if we recollect or reflect a little, we shall find
both that it has been, and might again be otherwise. The domain of Mechanism,--meaning
thereby political, ecclesiastical or other outward establishments,--was once considered as
embracing, and we are persuaded can at any time embrace, but a limited portion of man’s
interests, and by no means the highest portion.10
Carlyle introduces the dichotomy between “Dynamics” and “Mechanics,” in that the
science of Dynamics “treats of, and practically addresses, the primary, unmodified forces and
energies of man, the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Enthusiasm, Poetry,
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Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character.”11 The science of Mechanics, on the
other hand, addresses the finite, practical and external world.12 He provides a critique of what
he takes to be the direction political philosophy is taking by drawing on the contrast between
Dynamics and Mechanics:
Now it is certain, that in former times the wise men, the enlightened lovers of their kind, who
appeared generally as Moralists, Poets, or Priests, did, without neglecting the Mechanical
province, deal chiefly with the Dynamical; applying themselves chiefly to regulate, increase and
purify the inward primary powers of man; and fancying that herein lay the main difficulty, and
the best service they could undertake. But a wide difference is manifest in our age. For the wise
men, who now appear as Political Philosophers, deal exclusively with the Mechanical province;
and occupying themselves in counting-up and estimating men’s motives, strive by curious
checking and balancing, and other adjustments of Profit and Loss, to guide them to their true
advantage: while, unfortunately, those same ‘motives’ are so innumerable, and so variable in
every individual, that no really useful conclusion can ever be drawn from their enumeration.
But though Mechanism, wisely contrived, has done much for man in a social and moral point of
view, we cannot be persuaded that it has ever been the chief source of his worth or
happiness.13
To substantiate his view that Mechanism has become dominant over Dynamism, Carlyle
cites as evidence that there are machines for education in the form of a “secure, universal,
straightforward business, to be conducted in the gross, by proper mechanism” and machines
for religion in that the Bible-Society professes itself to be a high and heavenly institution but is
found on reflection to be nothing more than an “earthly contrivance [that is] supported by
collection of moneys, by fomenting of vanities, by puffing, intrigue and chicane” and is a
“machine for converting the Heathen.”14 G.B. Tennyson summarizes Carlyle’s position toward

11

Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 327.
Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 327.
13
Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 327-328.
14
Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” 318.
12

275

technology: “the machine becomes to him the great enemy, because it dehumanizes; it severs
the organic relation of man to nature and God.”15
Carlyle was not opposed to technology itself but rather to its role in “mechanizing”
humanity and the concurrent ill effects that came along with doing so. For example, he
acknowledged how technology made it possible for humanity to be “much better fed, clothed,
lodged and, in all outward respects, accommodated.”16 Nonetheless, Carlyle also recognized
“how wealth has more and more increased, and at the same time gathered itself more and
more into masses, strangely altering the old relations, and increasing the distance between the
rich and the poor.”17
Leo Marx frames a question for Carlyle about his animus toward technology: “If he
accepts the value of machine technology, if he believes that there is no turning back, why does
he have this animus?”18 Carlyle’s antagonism toward industrial society must be distinguished
from the romantic’s nostalgic and reactionary rejection of industrialism in calling for a return to
an earlier, simpler society.19 Carlyle’s philosophy is a basis upon which Henry David Thoreau
theorizes the “quiet desperation” of his native Concord’s local economy—a system in which his
fellow villagers work endlessly, not to reach a goal of their choice but to serve the demands of
the market mechanism.20 Like Carlyle, Thoreau uses technological imagery to represent how
industrialization is not only an economic phenomenon but has engulfed the human psyche and
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all of society.21 Thoreau’s indictment of Concord’s economy might have been written to confirm
Carlyle’s dark view of industrialism and Thoreau puts himself in Carlyle’s company by attacking
the popular illusion that improving the means of production is enough, that if the machinery of
society is in good order all would be well and the rest would care for itself.22
In the midst of World War II, Erich Kahler boldly proclaimed that “the rule over men by
things and machines, man’s adaptation to the machine, has come to its climax.” 23 Though he
was shortsighted in this analysis, in that technology’s scope has only expanded since World War
II, his view is nonetheless in accord with Carlyle’s initial diagnosis of industrialism. Kahler
presents a profound perspective in 1943 that must be reckoned with in the twenty-first
century:
As the beginning of the great industrial development, there was still talk of human welfare. The
rationalistic optimists expected that the new inventions, and those still to come, would enrich
and develop man’s nature. Machines would relieve him of toil for the bare necessities of
existence, they would make human labor more and more superfluous and thus leave him time
and strength to live his own life, to live for higher knowledge and happiness. But just the
opposite of these fair dreams came true. The aids to existence became ends in themselves, and
man lives almost exclusively for the increase and the cult of these aids. He is working himself to
death to produce the appurtenances of life.
The optimists of today still endow all-powerful production with the mission of blessing
an increasing number of people with a higher standard of living. But what does a higher
standard of living mean today? Does it still mean a higher standard of life, more leisure for
pleasure through deeper understanding? No, it means more air-conditioning, more washing
machines, refrigerators and safety razors, automobiles and airplanes. Of course, modern living
conditions mean more and more widespread cleanliness, hygiene, security of daily life. But the
comforts of cleanliness of the body are outweighed by the growing barbarism of inner life, and
the comforts of hygiene and security in the details of life are largely upset by the terrible
insecurity of life as a whole.24
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Kahler’s juxtaposition of the costs and benefits of industrialism acts to underscore the
argument that there are not only benefits of industrialism, which he sees as the hegemonic
viewpoint. He emphasizes that the external and material benefits of industrialism are
neutralized or even “outweighed by the growing barbarism of inner life,” whereby “inner life”
would entail what is mental, spiritual, and emotional.
Lewis Mumford, a twentieth-century critic of technology, painted a dramatic picture of
what is at stake with the prospect of continuous automation of society by means of technology:
“As for the eventual assemblage of a completely automated world society, only innocents could
contemplate such a goal as the highest possible culmination of human evolution. It would be a
final solution to the problems of mankind, only in the sense that Hitler’s extermination program
was a final solution for the ‘Jewish problem.’”25 Mumford concludes that “the exponents of
progress were too committed to their doctrine to anticipate that the authoritarian institutions
they sought to destroy forever might come back more oppressively than ever, fortified through
the very science and technics that they valued as a means of emancipation from the past.” 26
Consequently, “though even now few people seem to suspect the ideal form and the ultimate
destination of the industrial organization that has been taking shape in our own time, it is in
fact heading toward a static finality, in which change of the system itself will be so
impermissible that it will take place only through total disintegration and destruction.”27
Mumford’s emphases on the path-dependent trajectory of technical civilization and the
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problem of its sustainability when it is fully assembled underscore how he was a prominent
critic of technology and an antagonist to the hegemonic support of technology’s advance.
Jacques Ellul defined rationalism as a phenomenon whose “aim was to construct a
perfectly coordinated machine, single, hierarchized, and cohesive, in which the human element
would be reduced to a minimum; to establish a mechanical administration that was anonymous
and would eliminate every element of chance afforded by ideas, passions, sentiments, or
personal interests.”28 Ellul seeks to illustrate how politics has been engulfed by and, as a
consequence, superseded by technology. He wants to show that there is no longer room for
genuine political and ideological debate because modern technological society naturally yields
an “adherence to the ongoing socio-economic development generated by technological
motives enforced by technological means, moving in the direction of a technological
continuity.”29 This is a profound critique of both technology and politics, and seeks to show that
humanity is not awake to the dominance of technology, which Ellul views as an autonomous
driver of politics.
For Carlyle, modernity will reach a climax as a “phoenix,” in that the sociopolitical and
economic world order inaugurated by the industrial revolution will come to fruition and then
decay and evolve to a new world order as a function of being unsustainable. Carlyle conceives
of modernity in this fashion through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh:
Thus, if Professor Teufelsdrӧckh can be relied on, we are at this hour in a most critical
condition; beleaguered by that boundless “Armament of Mechanisers” and Unbelievers,
threatening to strip us bare! “The World,” says he, “as it needs must, is under a process of
devastation and waste, which, whether by silent assiduous corrosion, or open quicker
combustion, as the case chances, will effectually enough annihilate the past Forms of Society;
28
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replace them with what it may. For the present, it is contemplated that when man’s whole
Spiritual Interests are once divested, these innumerable stript-off Garments shall mostly be
burnt; but the sounder Rags among them be quilted together into one huge Irish watch-coat for
the defence of the Body only!”30
Such a passage, though cryptic, offers a theory as to how Carlylean transcendentalism might
assume a hegemonic standing not only in politics and society, but in the human consciousness
and psyche. In his account of modernization, Carlyle presages what would become Weber’s
future account in theorizing that modernization is defined by mechanized rationalization and
refinement alongside disenchantment. The “Armament of Mechanisers” is “boundless” in that
the pursuit of greater mechanization takes place infinitely and unyieldingly as a function of the
inauguration of the industrial age. The “Armament of Mechanisers” works alongside the
“Unbelievers” in divesting the world of its spirit, whereby modern humanity loses
consciousness that there is any such thing as transcendent “spirit” within the material world. As
a result, the world and its material resources are being consumed until such a process burns
itself out as a function of no longer being materially sustainable.
The “phoenix” takes place, according to Carlyle’s theory, when “man’s whole Spiritual
Interests are once divested,” or when, again presaging Weber, humanity’s iron cage of
modernity (marked by disenchantment) comes to its fullest fruition. Weber famously theorized
the iron cage of modernity in the conclusion to The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of
Capitalism:
In Baxter’s view, concern for outward possessions should sit lightly on the shoulders of his
saints “like a thin cloak which can be thrown off at any time.” But fate decreed that the cloak
should become a shell as hard as steel [stahlhartes Gehӓuse]. As ascetism began to change the
world and endeavored to exercise its influence over it, the outward goods of this world gained
increasing and finally inescapable power over men, as never before in history. Today its spirit
30
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has fled from this shell—whether for all time, who knows?...No one yet knows who will live in
that shell in the future. Perhaps new prophets will emerge, or powerful old ideas and ideals will
be reborn at the end of this monstrous development. Or perhaps—if neither of these occurs—
“Chinese” ossification, dressed up with a kind of desperate self-importance, will set in. Then,
however, it might truly be said of the “last men” in this cultural development: “specialists
without spirit, hedonists without a heart, these nonentities imagine they have attained a stage
of humankind [Menschentum] never before reached.”31
According to Carlyle, when the world is rationalized and disenchanted at its climactic
point, “innumerable stript-off Garments shall mostly be burnt.” Such burning of “garments,” it
can be inferred, connotes that all previous ideologies and theologies will be burnt, since it is
when humanity is divested entirely of its spiritual interests and engulfed entirely in mechanism
and unbelief. Such a world is all-consuming and burns itself out as a “phoenix” because
mechanization and unbelief each come into their full being, like the mythical bird, before
returning to ash. It will be at this point that Carlylean transcendentalism, hypothetically, could
emerge as a potential hegemonic ideology that supersedes all previous ideologies and
theologies while also displacing liberal democratic capitalism’s hegemony. Such an occurrence
would connote the “phoenix” being reborn.
Transcendentalism emerges when “the sounder Rags,” in other words, those not burnt,
will be “quilted together into one huge Irish watch-coat for the defence of the Body only!” This
is potentially when humanity will regain consciousness of the world as clothing, as symbolic of a
transcendent order. The leftovers, products of the previous age of ignorance, will be retailored
to fit the needs of a new transcendentalist world. Everyone will be conscious of the philosophy
of clothes and recognize that the previous era was an era wholly unconscious of that
philosophy. With all ideologies and theologies burnt out, and seeing through the illusion of how
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clothing defined society in the previous era, clothing will be used “for the defence of the Body
only” in the newly emergent transcendentalist era. In summary, by inference from Carlyle’s
theory, everyone would be a transcendentalist and have consciousness of the philosophy of
clothes to the same extent Teufelsdrӧckh has consciousness of the philosophy of clothes.
Carlyle suggests that there is no means available of determining precisely when the
“phoenix” will be triggered, as he theorizes that “what time the Phoenix Death-Birth itself will
require depends on unseen contingencies.”32 Carlyle writes on the nature of the “phoenix”:
For us, who happen to live while the World-Phoenix is burning herself, and burning so slowly
that, as Teufelsdrӧckh calculates, it were a handsome bargain would she engage to have done
‘within two centuries,’ there seems to lie but an ashy prospect. Not altogether so, however,
does the Professor figure it. “In the living subject,” says he, “change is wont to be gradual: thus,
while the serpent sheds its old skin, the new is already formed beneath. Little knowest thou of
the burning of a World-Phoenix, who fanciest that she must first burn out, and lie as a dead
cinereous heap; and therefrom the young one start up by miracle, and fly heavenward. Far
otherwise! In that Fire-whirlwind, Creation and Destruction proceed together; ever as the ashes
of the Old are blown about, do organic filaments of the New mysteriously spin themselves; and
amid the rushing and the waving of the Whirlwind-Element, come tones of a melodious
Deathsong, which end not but in tones of a more melodious Birthsong.33
Carlyle underscores the magnitude of politics and the political realm through his
portrayal of how Teufelsdrӧckh conceives of it: “among all the wondrous provinces of
Teufelsdrӧckh’s spiritual world, there is none he walks in with such astonishment, hesitation,
and even pain, as in the Political.”34 Carlyle acknowledges, through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh’s
English editor, the tension that lies in the dual realization that a) political conflict is a necessary
prerequisite to the maintenance of the English political order and is the means by which “our
invaluable Constitution kept warm and alive” and b) politics is always conducted in the space of
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the present, “where the Present seems little other than an inconsiderable Film dividing the Past
and the Future.”35 The conclusion that can be drawn from these two characteristics that define
politics is that politics is based on political conflict continuously taking place in the “perpetual”
present with no resolution being attainable, and no attention paid to the immensity that
defines the future in contrast to the “inconsiderable Film” of the present.
Moreover, it can be inferred that Carlyle believes the political influence of any one
individual, given the weight of these two characteristics that define politics, is bound to be
inconsequential. The individual who has consciousness of politics as defined by these two
characteristics will, furthermore, view it differently than those who are unconscious of such
characteristics. Consciousness of such characteristics might ostensibly lead to the resolution of
political conflict via an acknowledgement of the pettiness and artificiality of political conflict
and how the future is a much more pertinent subject for politics than the ephemeral present.
Nonetheless, those who participate in politics as political actors go about behaving
politically in ways unconscious of the two characteristics Carlyle theorizes as defining politics.
Such political actors elevate the present to the point of putting it on a pedestal, whereas the
past and future and the exponentially greater magnitude they have weighed against “the film”
of the ephemeral present goes largely unrecognized. Politics revolves around the pettiness and
infinitesimal scope of the present and not around the vastness of the past and future.
For the individual political actor conscious and accepting of Carlyle’s characterization of
politics, the question then becomes: “how shall we domesticate ourselves in this spectral
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Necropolis, or rather City both of the Dead and of the Unborn?”36 Presumably, political actors
and political action would be altered if everyone internalized such a question in coming to
terms with Carlyle’s definition of politics. Political actors would be able to conceive of politics
from the radical perspective that it is conceived of in Sartor Resartus. If perpetual political
conflict is in fact a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of the political order, political
conflict that is perpetually without resolution is irrational to engage in, since it is merely
political participation that antagonizes and neutralizes the opposition.
According to Carlyle, the weight of the future is so immense and heavy in comparison to
the film of the ephemeral present, and is defined by the inevitability of history’s trajectory (i.e.
the phoenix), that “in those dim longdrawn expanses [of the future], all is so immeasurable;
much so disastrous, ghastly….”37 It is on this basis of Carlyle’s elemental construction of a
definition of politics that he divulges the extent and scope of the radical position Teuelsdrӧckh
occupies in regard to politics, a radicalism arguably far grander than what is commonly defined
as “radical” within mainstream political discourse:
And then with such an Indifference, such a prophetic peacefulness (accounting the inevitablycoming as already here, to him all one whether it be distant by centuries or only by days), does
he sit;--and live, you would say, rather in any other age than in his own! It is our painful duty to
announce, or repeat, that, looking into this man, we discern a deep, silent, slow-burning,
inextinguishable Radicalism, such as fills us with shuddering admiration.38
Thus, Carlyle offers an implicit normative theory of political non-participation. In such a
context, Carlyle provides a critique of voting and elections in which he conceives of them as
inadequate to attain an ideal political existence:
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[Teufelsdrӧckh] appears to make little even of the Elective Franchise; at least so we interpret
the following: “Satisfy yourselves,” he says, “by universal, indubitable experiment, even as ye
are now doing or will do, whether FREEDOM heavenborn and leading heavenward, and so
vitally essential for us all, cannot peradventure be mechanically hatched and brought to light in
that same Ballot-Box of yours; or at worst, in some other discoverable or devisable Box, Edifice,
or Steam-mechanism. It were a mighty convenience; and beyond all feats of manufacture
witnessed hitherto.”39
Thus, humanity’s ideal political existence cannot be attained merely by putting it up to a vote
but must be acquired through the discernment and intuition that are necessary for the
unequivocal determination and realization of the ideal. Teufelsdrӧckh asks a question
fundamental to the history of political thought: “ ‘But after all, were the problem, as indeed it
now everywhere is, To rebuild your old House from the top downwards (since you must live in
it the while), what better, what other, than the Representative Machine will serve your
turn?’”40
Zygmunt Bauman theorizes on the failure of the Enlightenment to have had an influence
to lead history to move in a rational direction:
One can only say that for the past two or three centuries since that great leap to human
autonomy and self-management variously called “Enlightenment” or “the advent of the
modern era,” history has run in a direction no one planned, no one anticipated, and no one
wished it to take. What makes this course so astonishing and such a challenge to our
understanding is that these two to three centuries started with the human resolve to take
history under human administration and control—deploying for that purpose reason, believed
to be the most powerful among human weapons (indeed, a flawless human facility to know, to
predict, to calculate, and so to raise the “is” to the level of the “ought”)—and were filled
throughout with zealous and ingenious human effort to act on that resolve. 41
Bauman’s all-encompassing critique of the Enlightenment is intended to illustrate that the
Enlightenment has not facilitated unidirectional progress to a destination that embodies

39

Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 189.
Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 189.
41
Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?, 110-111.
40

285

rationality. Such a retrospective indictment of the Enlightenment provides a basis to contend
with Carlyle’s transcendentalism and the prospects of its practical application.
In The Technological Society, Ellul echoes what Carlyle wrote in the nineteenth century
in the context of the twentieth century:
Technical civilization means that our civilization is constructed by technique (makes a part of
civilization only what belongs to technique), for technique (in that everything in this civilization
must serve a technical end), and is exclusively technique (in that it excludes whatever is not
technique or reduces it to technical form).42
As a corollary, Ellul also concludes that “the enormous effort required to put this technical
civilization into motion supposes that all individual effort is directed toward this goal alone and
that all social forces are mobilized to attain the mathematically perfect structure of the
edifice.”43 Put another way, “technique encompasses the totality of present-day society. Man is
caught like a fly in a bottle. His attempts at culture, freedom, and creative endeavor have
become mere entries in technique’s filing cabinet.”44 Carlyle wrote the equivalent of Ellul’s
theory when he commented on the human experience in the modern age through the voice of
Teufelsdrӧckh:
And now the Genius of Mechanism smothers him worse than any Nightmare did; till the Soul is
nigh choked out of him, and only a kind of Digestive, Mechanic life remains. In Earth and in
Heaven he can see nothing but Mechanism; has fear for nothing else, hope in nothing else: the
world would indeed grind him to pieces; but cannot he fathom the Doctrine of Motives, and
cunningly compute them to grind the other way?45
Carlyle theorizes how humanity is thus governed by, consumed by, and beholden to
mechanism to the extent that humanity would unconsciously let mechanism “grind itself to
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pieces.” Technology grinds humanity to pieces because humanity lacks the spiritual fortitude to
choose what is spiritual over mechanism, a choice that would grind mechanism to pieces.
Humanity is so enchanted by mechanism that it cannot recognize mechanism as grinding
humanity to pieces, leaving humanity without soul or spirit. Carlyle laments, “‘Were he not, as
has been said, purblinded by enchantment, you had but to bid him open his eyes and look” to
discover the state of actual disenchantment that a world governed by mechanism and
calculation manifests.46 Christopher Lasch provides a synthesis of Carlyle’s romantic critique of
technology when he says Carlyle believed that “technology sheltered mankind from the forces
of nature, as clothes protected the body against the cold, but interposed a barrier behind which
the inner meaning of the natural world was lost to sight.”47
Ellul proposes an allegory about the resistance a revolutionary book faces in being
published, which in many ways is applicable to Thomas Carlyle’s own experience finding a
publisher for Sartor Resartus:
Suppose one were to write a revolutionary book. If it is to be published, it must enter into the
framework of the technical organization of book publishing. In a predominantly capitalistic
technical culture, the book can be published only if it can return a profit. Thus, it must appeal to
some public and hence must refrain from attacking the real taboos of the public for which it is
destined. The bourgeois publishing house will not publish Lenin; the “revolutionary” publishing
house will not publish Paul Bourget; and no one will publish a book attacking the real religion of
our times, by which I mean the dominant social forces of the technological society. Any author
who seeks to have his manuscript published must make it conform to certain lines laid down by
the potential publishers. A manuscript which in subject matter and format does not conform
has no chance….All this amounts to saying that technical forces, which were put into operation
ostensibly for the diffusion of thought, lead in practice to its emasculation. 48
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From this, Ellul concludes that inflammatory revolutionary manifestos and new economic and
political doctrines can be written, “but as soon as any of these appear to have any real effect in
subverting the universal social order, they are forthwith excluded from the technical channels
of communication.”49
Ellul theorizes that technical civilization sprang forth from the favorable climate it had
under liberalism, but that the domination of technical civilization ultimately spells the negation
of liberalism. He thus refutes critics who maintain that technical civilization is compatible with
liberalism:
It will doubtless be pointed out, by way of refutation, that production techniques were
developed during the ascendancy of liberalism, which furnished a favorable climate for their
development and understood perfectly how to use them. But this is no counterargument. The
simple fact is that liberalism permitted the development of its executioner, exactly as in a
healthy tissue a constituent cell may proliferate and give rise to a fatal cancer. The healthy body
represented the necessary condition for the cancer. But there was no contradiction between
the two. The same relation holds between technique and economic liberalism. 50
Ellul illustrates how new technical developments are never “demanded” by an individual
(or even the collective population) in liberal society but, rather, are “imposed” on the individual
as a result of the autonomous historical development of technical civilization. According to Ellul,
“technical development follows its own proper laws, not the tastes of the public. It was not the
public which demanded air travel and television. Technical progress created these things, and
they were technically diffused and imposed on the public.”51 Ellul juxtaposes capitalism and
communism as both being political economies in which the individual is enslaved to mass
society: “for the proletariat, as for the bourgeoisie, man is only a machine for production and
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consumption. He is under obligation to produce. He is under the same obligation to consume.
He must absorb what the economy offers him.”52 In so doing, Ellul nullifies and invalidates the
notion that politics plays a primary role in guiding human societies in the modern technological
era with a synthesis of the many dimensions of his social theory:
The counterpart of the necessary reduction of human life to working is its reduction to gorging.
If man does not already have certain needs, they must be created. The important concern is not
the psychic and mental structure of the human being but the uninterrupted flow of any and all
goods which invention allows the economy to produce. Whence the measureless trituration of
the human soul, the true issue of which is propaganda. And propaganda, reduced to
advertising, relates happiness and a meaningful life to consumption. He who has money is the
slave of the money he has. He who has it not is the slave of a mad desire to get it. The first and
great law is consumption. Nothing but this imperative has any value in such a life.
This summary description enables us to grasp quickly the subjective and incoherent way
in which the human being tends to permit himself to be reduced to the two closely related
variables of the economic man. All other dimensions are excluded in this idealized concept.
Money is the principal thing; culture, art, spirit, morality are jokes and are not to be taken
seriously. On this point, there is once again full agreement between the bourgeoisie and the
Communists.53
Here, Ellul can be applied to consider MacIntyre’s concern with the necessity of
pursuing a conception of the good. Ellul notes that it is commonly supposed “that technique
evolves with some end in view, and that this end is human good”:
Technique, as I believe I have shown, is totally irrelevant to this notion and pursues no end,
professed or unprofessed. It evolves in a purely causal way: the combination of preceding
elements furnishes the new technical elements. There is no purpose or plan that is being
progressively realized. There is not even a tendency toward human ends. We are dealing with a
phenomenon blind to the future, in a domain of integral causality. Hence, to pose arbitrarily
some goal or other, to propose a direction for technique, is to deny technique and divest it of
its character and its strength.54
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MacIntyre similarly seeks to portray the illusion of liberalism’s perfectionist aspirations, an
illusion that professedly offers a social order in which individuals exercise their autonomy in
choosing between alternative conceptions of a good life. According to MacIntyre, present-day
market economies only offer such choice to a minority who hold a privileged position, whereas
the majority are locked out from such possibilities.55
Ellul’s views in The Technological Society are espoused in similar ways by other
twentieth-century academics who take up the study of what is termed “technics.” A selection
from Oswald Spengler reads as if it is lifted directly from Ellul:
It is not true that human technics saves labour. For it is an essential characteristic of the
personal and modifiable technics of man, in contrast to genus-technics, that every discovery
contains the possibility and necessity of new discoveries, every fulfilled wish awakens a
thousand more, every triumph over Nature incites to yet others. The soul of this beast of prey is
ever hungry, his will never satisfied—that is the curse that lies upon this kind of life, but also
the grandeur inherent in its destiny. It is precisely its best specimens that know least of quiet,
happiness, or enjoyment. And no discoverer has ever accurately foreseen the practical effect of
his act.56
Moreover, Bauman provides a conclusion in 2008 that is compatible with the
conclusions Ellul draws in The Technological Society:
Just as the easily satisfied “traditional worker” (a worker who wished to work no more than
absolutely necessary to allow his habitual way of life to continue) was the nightmare of the
budding society of producers, so the traditional consumer, guided by yesterday’s familiar needs
and immune to seduction, would (were she or he allowed to survive) sound the death knell of a
mature society of consumers, consumer industry, and consumer markets.57
Such conclusions by Spengler and Bauman corroborate Ellul’s thesis, namely that the
technological/economic system is autonomous and dominant, rather than the individuals who
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facilitate the system. Individuals, and their insatiable appetites for innovation and consumption,
are merely cogs that provide the fuel for the system’s incessant expansion toward a destination
that is unplanned for and unknown.
In The Political Illusion, Ellul seeks to show how “faith in attainable ends, in the
improvement of the social order, in the establishment of a just and peaceful system—by
political means—is a most profound, and undoubtedly new, characteristic in our society.” 58 He
also expounds on how he thinks political affairs are constrained and nearly artificial since they
are subject to what is A) necessary and to what is B) ephemeral.59 Ellul goes so far as to say that
“homo politicus” is by his nature “homo religious” to show the level of faith contemporary
humanity has in politics being the cure-all for all problems.60 He presents the common twodimensional definition of “politization” that he takes to be partially true but yet still lacking:
“the importance and growing frequency of ideological debates; and [politization] is manifested
by the tendency to treat all social problems in the world according to patterns and procedures
found in the political world.”61 In this way, Ellul consolidates his own definition of politization to
be the phenomenon whereby “all problems have, in our time, become political”:
To think of everything as political, to conceal everything by using this word (with intellectuals
taking the cue from Plato and several others), to place everything in the hands of the state, to
appeal to the state in all circumstances, to subordinate the problems of the individual to those
of the group, to believe that political affairs are on everybody’s level and that everybody is
qualified to deal with them—these factors characterize the politization of modern man and, as
such, comprise a myth. The myth then reveals itself in beliefs and, as a result, easily elicits
almost religious fervor.62
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Ellul’s thesis and language in many ways mirrors that of Carlyle’s original critique of
modernity in “Signs of the Times.” For example, Ellul reflects as to how “we consider it obvious
that everything must be unreservedly subjected to the power of the state; it would seem
extraordinary to us if any activity should escape it.”63 In “Signs of the Times,” Carlyle notes that
“no individual now hopes to accomplish the poorest enterprise single-handed and without
mechanical aids; he must make interest with some existing corporation, and till his field with
their oxen.”64 Carlyle applies this to the mechanism of politics:
Nowhere, for example, is the deep, almost exclusive faith we have in Mechanism more visible
than in the Politics of this time. Civil government does by its nature include much that is
mechanical, and must be treated accordingly. We term it indeed, in ordinary language, the
Machine of Society, and talk of it as the grand working wheel from which all private machines
must derive, or to which they must adapt, their movements. Considered merely as a metaphor,
all this is well enough; but here, as in so many other cases, the foam hardens itself into a shell,
and the shadow we have wantonly evoked stands terrible before us and will not depart at our
bidding.65
Ellul thus echoes Carlyle when he says that “any attempt on the part of any enterprise,
university, or charitable enterprise to remain independent of the state seems anachronistic to
us.”66
Carlyle’s description of the politization he sees going on in the 1820s is similar to Ellul’s
description in the 1960s. Sarcastically, Carlyle mocks the predominant view:
Were the laws, the government, in good order, all were well with us; the rest would care for
itself! Dissentients from this opinion, expressed or implied, are now rarely to be met with;
widely and angrily as men differ in its application, the principle is admitted by all.67
Ellul characterizes politization in a similar manner:
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it is not just the fact of the state being at the center of our lives that is crucial, but our
spontaneous and personal acceptance of it as such. We believe that for the world to be in good
order, the state must have all the powers.68
Ellul maintains that the causes or catalysts of politization are the expanding scope of the
state and the growth of the individual’s participation in political life.69 According to Ellul, the
individual’s participation in political life is growing as a result of speedier communications,
population growth, greater access to education, the trend whereby the state’s actions
increasingly concern everybody, and that the state needs assurance of its legitimacy by the
expressed support of the people.70
An inference can be made from Ellul, namely that politization proves what may seem
counterintuitive: politics and political theory are ineffectual if politization increases and are
effectual if politization decreases. The ever-growing trend to politicize social problems
demonstrates both the limits of politics in being able to solve social problems and the limits of
political theory to devise political or institutional cures for them. It is only the trend of a
decreasing rate of politization that would show politics and/or political theory to be effective.
This is because when less is politicized, it corresponds as a function to there being less need for
politicization, because a political program has resolved the need for every problem to be
addressed by political means. Such a program might simply result in recognizing and exposing
the fallacy of thinking every problem has a political solution, rather than a solution that must
take place at the individual level so that it can be resolved from the bottom up at the collective
level. Rather than seeking a political solution as a default means to solve problems, Carlyle’s
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alternative prescription may be heeded by all individuals at the level of the individual: “To
reform a world, to reform a nation, no wise man will undertake; and all but foolish men know,
that the only solid, though a far slower reformation, is what each begins and perfects on
himself.”71 Ostensibly, the reformation of individuals via the individual perfecting reform on
himself or herself can yield genuine reform at the collective level in a manner that a political
solution cannot.
Ellul conceives of the ballot box with a fierce Carlylean skepticism. He mocks the
predominant view of the political world: “To progress is to receive this power [to place a paper
ballot in a box], this mythical share in a theoretical sovereignty that consists in surrendering
one’s decisions for the benefit of someone else who will make them in one’s place.”72 Ellul is
adamant in his view that the modern state grants powers to the individual that are never
anything but “innocuous concessions,” powers to endorse what is good for the state.73 He
synthesizes these ideas to conclude that “the masses actually do not participate in political
affairs, but yet firmly believe that they do; and, in addition, make their illusory participation
their principal criterion of dignity, personality, liberty.”74
Moreover, Ellul claims that modern society condemns “apolitical people,” which is the
label applied by society to persons who behave in a manner that suggests they do not think
politics comprises the panacea of any or all social problems:
In our society anyone who keeps himself in reserve, fails to participate in elections, regards
political debates and constitutional changes as superficial and without real impact on the true
problems of man…will be judged very severely by everybody. He is a true heretic of our day.
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And society excommunicates him as the medieval church excommunicated the sorcerer. He is
regarded as a pessimist, a stupid fellow (for he fails to see the very deep and secret more in the
political game), a defeatist who bows his head to fate, a bad citizen: surely, if things go badly, it
is his fault, for if he were more civic minded, the vote would turn out differently (it is not
enough to have 80 per cent of the voters cast their vote; no, we need 100 per cent!), and
democracy would be more effective. Negative judgments rain down on him; his effectiveness
and his morality are judged; even his psychic health is questioned (the unpolitical man is
obviously a little paranoid or schizophrenic!). Finally the ultimate condemnation of our day and
age is hurled at him: he must be a reactionary.75
Such a characterization applies to Carlyle’s political profile and sheds light on how Carlyle’s lack
of faith in political solutions to every problem might have contributed to his being discredited
or disregarded as a political philosopher.
Ellul maintains that there is a stark difference between real and illusory political action.
According to Ellul, true political decisions must never obey necessity, which means political
action cannot be limited to that of a machine simply supporting inexorable events.76 Ellul
specifies that real political decisions can be made only by those who are not compelled by an
uncompromising cause to behave reflexively in only one possible way. As such, “real political
decisions can be made only by men who are not too much tied down by their constituents, or
by legal texts, or too conditioned by a monolithic civilization, or ruled by circumstances.”77
Ellul emphasizes how mechanism and the technical development of society have largely
curtailed true political decision making. Ellul insists that “the true choice today with regard to
political problems depends on the technicians who have prepared a solution and technicians
charged with implementing the decisions.”78 Thus, political decisions are no longer taken on the
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basis of a philosophic principle, a doctrine, or an ideology, but on the basis of reports handed
down by technicians and experts outlining what is useful, possible, and efficient.79
What is more, Ellul describes politics as “ephemeral” and taking place in the transitory
realm that is modernity at-large.80 Ellul informs us that politics is as unlasting as a television
news broadcast or a newspaper and that current events themselves are the most important
elements that make contemporary politics ephemeral.81 Just as how “we bring all our care, all
our intelligence to bear on the production of a TV broadcast that will last only twenty minutes
and survive only in the spectator’s fleeting memory,” so the innumerable decisions, votes,
decrees, elections, plans, and fruits of all the political activities are just as ephemeral.82 From
this analysis, Ellul concludes that “this is one of the most distressing aspects of contemporary
man.”83
Ellul theorizes that a synergistic relationship between technology and mass media
cripples politics and keeps politics from achieving anything beyond a mere response to current
events. According to Ellul, the citizen “only knows what happened yesterday, excites himself
only over the latest events, and demands that the politician should take a position on it [while]
all the rest matters little to him.”84 Thus, the politician is in a place to have to respond and thus
be beholden to the incessant, albeit ephemeral, current events.85 The development of the
technological infrastructure of the mass media precipitates an environment in which incessant
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and ephemeral news becomes irresistible. In a statement that may be more an apt
characterization of the media climate in the 2010s than it was in 1967 when it was published,
Ellul maintains that from the moment mass media machinery was created, the need for
information “spread like lightning, like an avalanche, and not only ever more information but
also ever more recent information was needed.”86 This yields an environment in which people
will be more interested the more the information is superficial, unimportant, and befitting that
of a spectacle:
If everybody is in agreement that nowadays the exercise of authority is solely based on public
opinion; if the ruling powers draw their splendid existence from public opinion; if, on the other
hand, it is true that opinion must come from the outside, never being self-generated; if, finally,
this opinion never exists except in connection with a news event—then we will understand
both the influence of the news phenomenon and the ephemeral character that it necessarily
imposes on political affairs.
I will posit it as a sort of principle that the predominance of news produces a
fundamental political incapacity in the individual, be he a leader or just a citizen. 87
Moreover, Ellul provides a corollary conclusion that is particularly apt for a discussion of
Carlyle in the context of contemporary politics and political philosophy:
If a man speaks at such a moment of a deeper level, he appears out of tune with his time,
uncommitted; although only by digging more deeply can political thought be formed and the
present be eventually explained. But who is looking for an explanation? Because he is riveted to
the news, the citizens rejects the truly fundamental problems, remaining attached exclusively
to perfectly outmoded and useless terms and images such as “Right and Left,” “capitalism and
communism,” and really believes that the fundamental political problems are located.88
He maintains that the nineteenth-century brand of political theory that advocated the
realization of a particular ideology, whether it be socialism, liberal humanism, etc., has
devolved so that “for our time (and for the foreseeable future) we have developed a
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mechanism whereby politics operates independently of any such values.”89 Carlyle’s social
criticism and conception of transcendentalism illustrate that he sought to go beyond superficial
politics to reach a deeper level of inquiry and analysis.
Ellul seeks to show how the modern state has become a vast body that possesses a
multitude of centers, bureaus, services, and establishments, and wants to expose the concept
of the state primarily consisting of the presidential regime, parliament, and elections as simply
antiquated.90 He does not hold back and communicates his dismay by acknowledging how
political scientists know about the complexity and depth of the modern state yet “surprisingly,
we then find them once again discussing the presidential regime or electoral procedures as
though the political future were dependent on these illusory forms.”91 Essentially, a
contradiction is manifest between knowledge of what the modern state is and the constant
affirmation that the citizen can control the state.92 Ellul concludes that efficiency is the primary
and hegemonic political value in a manner deeply reminiscent of Carlyle’s own conclusion in
“Signs of the Times”:
Efficiency is, after all, the [bureaucratic] machine’s fundamental law. This imperative really
aligns the machine with the technological world and ideology. The bureaucracy has nothing
whatever to do with values. It does not know social justice or political liberty. It is there to
function, to make a political-economic-social body function, to make it advance as a whole. It
does not seek to promote verities. It cannot consider individuals. It obeys the sole rule of
efficiency. Yes, it will be said, this machinery operates in order to attain an aim set by politics,
and that aim incorporates value! Not at all. If a political aim is set, it becomes diluted in the
machine and soon has no more content. The administration no more obeys central leadership
than it knows values. Everybody is merely concerned that his political-economic-social sector
should function well, without crisis or stoppage; everyone has his sector and fails to know the
whole.93
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In this chapter, I have sought to present the compatibility between Carlyle’s nineteenthcentury criticism toward modernity and Ellul’s twentieth-century criticism. Such critiques are
sociological and seek to demonstrate that the hegemonic spirit of mechanization is suprapolitical and dominates politics. In many ways, the dialogue of Carlyle with Ellul allows for the
conclusion that politics is a mirage, or an “illusion,” as Ellul characterized it. The hegemonic
values of materialism, growth, and technological expansion are dominant and taken for granted
to such an extent that political actions that seek to depart from them would be received as
heretical and sacrilegious. What is more, Carlyle and Ellul illuminate a reality in which modern
development is autonomous and incapable of significant reform. They seek to show how there
is a lack of resources to be able to appreciably reign in and alter the destiny of modern
development. As such, modernity is largely on auto-pilot due to the ossified hegemony of the
continuous pursuit of greater consumption coupled with the continuous expansion of
technology. In the next chapter, I will discuss Carlyle’s theory of the “phoenix” in the context of
Ellul to ascertain the prospects of Carlyle’s application to philosophical deliberations on postliberalism, which have only emerged to any significant extent in the 2010s.
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Chapter 7
Carlyle’s Theory of the Phoenix and the Dissolution of Liberalism?

Carlyle’s ideas can be applied to the work of twenty-first-century political philosophers
who grapple with the weaknesses inherent to liberalism that could potentially lead to its
collapse as the hegemonic political and economic ideology on the global stage. Literature that
theorizes about the prospects of the advent of “post-liberalism” does so on the basis, either
implicitly or explicitly, that a return to the “transcendental” in some form will be necessary to
cure liberalism’s malignancies. Carlyle’s theories of transcendentalism and the dissolution of
liberalism can be applied to post-liberal literature such as Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism
Failed and John Milbank and Adrian Pabst’s The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the
Human Future because such post-liberal philosophers demonstrate compatibility with Carlyle’s
political thought and lay a foundation for a re-assessment of Carlyle’s ideas.
Carlyle cryptically presents a theory of the “phoenix” in Sartor Resartus in a chapter of
that name. I contend that such a theory is valuable to engage because it embodies an “end of
history” narrative that is a departure from the more dominant narratives offered by Karl Marx
and Francis Fukuyama. Marx concluded that there is a scientific basis for the manifestation of
communism as the successor to what he took to be capitalism’s eventual and inherent
unsustainability.1 On the other hand, Fukuyama, as an eyewitness to the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the conclusion of the Cold War, declared that liberal democratic capitalism
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constituted the last stage of human political development.2 Carlyle’s theory of the “phoenix” is
a “third way” to these two accounts that inherently glorify communism or capitalism. Carlyle’s
thesis is that liberal democratic capitalism will come into its full form (i. e. reach the highest
level of economic development) before becoming unsustainable, causing it to naturally decay,
and then evolve, to a new state that cannot be forecasted with any kind of precision.
There is certainly room for debate as to whether and to what extent Carlyle’s theory of
the “phoenix,” espoused only explicitly and cryptically in a brief chapter in a work of fiction,
should be taken seriously as offering what may be called an “end of history” narrative.3
Carlyle’s theory is not offered in as serious and detailed a fashion as Marx’s and Fukuyama’s.
Nonetheless, I hold that Carlyle’s theory should be considered, particularly in light of the
emergence of philosophical deliberations on ascertaining the prospects of “post-liberalism” to
resolve the irregularities liberalism is theorized to be itself incapable of resolving.
Carlyle begins his theory of the “phoenix” with Teufelsdrӧckh’s conclusion that “Society,
properly so called, [is] as good as extinct; and that only the Gregarious feelings, and old
inherited habitudes, at this juncture, hold us from Dispersion, and universal national, civil,
domestic and personal war!”4 The basis for this conclusion parallels the assessment that
MacIntyre famously articulated in After Virtue: namely, that there is no longer a doctrine that is
universally shared and accepted, one that allows for humanity to be bound together in a state
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of social solidarity in pursuit of a telos.5 Carlyle’s Teufelsdrӧckh prefigures what would later
become MacIntyre’s core thesis in After Virtue:
“For the last three centuries, above all, for the last three quarters of a century, that
same Pericardial Nervous Tissue (as we named it) of Religion, where lies the Life-essence of
Society, has been smote at and perforated, needfully and needlessly; till now it is quite rent
into shreds; and Society, long pining, diabetic, consumptive, can be regarded as defunct; for
those spasmodic, galvanic sprawlings are not life, neither indeed will they endure, galvanise as
you may, beyond two days.”
“Call ye that a Society,” cries [Teufelsdrӧckh] again, “where there is no longer any Social
Idea extant; not so much as the Idea of a common Home, but only of a common, over-crowded
Lodging-house? Where each, isolated, regardless of his neighbor, turned against his neighbor,
clutches what he can get, and cries ‘Mine!’ and calls it Peace, because, in the cut-purse and cutthroat Scramble, no steel knives, but only a far cunninger sort, can be employed? Where
Friendship, Communion, has become an incredible tradition; and your holiest Sacramental
Supper is a smoking Tavern Dinner, with Cook for Evangelist? Where your Priest has no tongue
but for plate-licking: and your high Guides and Governors cannot guide; but on all hands hear it
passionately proclaimed: Laissez faire: Leave us alone of your guidance, such light is darker than
darkness; eat your wages, and sleep!...a World becoming dismantled….”
We might ask, are there many “observant eyes,” belonging to Practical men, in England
or elsewhere, which have descried these phenomena; or is it only from the mystic elevation of
a German Wahngasse that such wonders are visible? Teufelsdrӧckh contends that the aspect of
a “deceased or expiring Society” fronts us everywhere…“What, for example,” says he, “is the
universally-arrogated Virtue, almost the sole remaining Catholic Virtue, of these days? For some
half-century, it has been the thing you name ‘Independence.’’’6
On this basis Carlyle entertains and theorizes, albeit cryptically, what will emerge
literally as post-liberalism:
Are we returning, as Rousseau prayed, to the state of Nature? “The Soul Politic having
departed,” says Teufelsdrӧckh, “what can follow but that the Body Politic be decently interred,
to avoid putrescence? Liberals, Economists, Utilitarians enough I see marching with its bier, and
chaunting loud paeans, towards the funeral-pile, where, amid wailings from some, and
saturnalian revelries from the most, the venerable Corpse is to be burnt. Or, in plain words, that
these men, Liberals, Utilitarians, or whatsoever they are called, will ultimately carry their point,
and dissever and destroy most existing Institutions of Society, seems a thing which has some
time ago ceased to be doubtful.”7
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In this context, Carlyle suggests that liberalism will be all-consuming and give way to another
ideology to take its place as the hegemonic ideology. The newly emerging ideology cannot be
forecasted with precision, as it is not possible to foresee exactly how liberalism will evolve and
decay. Nonetheless, the crux of Carlyle’s theory of liberalism is that it will be unsustainable.
Another passage from Carlyle reads as if it were a synopsis of Ellul’s The Technological
Society, given the level of criticism Carlyle hurls at the budding industrial and technical
civilization, which he forecasts will come into full being before returning to ash:
“Our European Mechanisers are a Sect of boundless diffusions, activity, and co-operative spirit:
has not Utilitarianism flourished in high places of Thought, here among ourselves, and in every
European country, at some time or other, within the last fifty years? If now in all countries,
except perhaps England, it has ceased to flourish, or indeed to exist, among Thinkers, and sunk
to Journalists and the popular mass,--who sees not that, as hereby it no longer preaches, so the
reason is, it now needs no Preaching, but is in full universal Action, the doctrine every where
known and enthusiastically laid to heart? The fit pabulum, in these times, for a certain rugged
workshop-intellect and heart, nowise without their corresponding workshop-strength and
ferocity, it requires but to be stated in such scenes to make proselytes enough.—Admirably
calculated for destroying, only not for rebuilding! It spreads like a sort of Dog-madness; till the
whole World-kennel will be rabid: then woe to the Huntsmen, with or without their whips!
They should have given the quadrupeds water,” adds [Teufelsdrӧckh], “the water, namely, of
Knowledge and of Life, while it was yet time.”8
Teufelsdrӧckh concludes in a fashion similar to Ellul more than a century later: “with a tragic
solemnity, that the monster UTILITARIA, held back, indeed, and moderated by nose-rings,
halters, foot-shackles, and every conceivable modification of rope, should go forth to do her
work;--to tread down old ruinous Palaces and Temples, with her broad hoof, till the whole were
trodden down, that new and better might be built!”9
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It is on the basis of these several passages from Sartor Resartus that Carlyle forecasts
how “the phoenix” will ultimately take shape and precipitate a new era, analogous in many
ways to how a product is yielded from adding elements together in a chemical formula:
Thus, if Professor Teufelsdrӧckh can be relied on, we are at this hour in a most critical
condition; beleaguered by that boundless “Armament of Mechanisers” and Unbelievers,
threatening to strip us bare! “The World,” says he, “as it needs must, is under a process of
devastation and waste, which, whether by silent assiduous corrosion, or open quicker
combustion, as the case chances, will effectually enough annihilate the past Forms of Society;
replace them with what it may.”10
Carlyle then writes an extraordinarily cryptic sentence, through the voice of
Teufelsdrӧckh, that could arguably be his core thesis, while simultaneously being the climactic
legacy of Sartor Resartus: “‘For the present, it is contemplated that when man’s whole Spiritual
Interests are once divested, these innumerable stript-off Garments shall mostly be burnt; but
the sounder Rags among them be quilted together into one huge Irish watch-coat for the
defence of the Body only!’”11 Here, Carlyle suggests that when the world becomes
disenchanted and de-spiritualized, and humanity becomes essentially nothing more than
automated producers and consumers serving the needs of the industrial civilization, the
multiplicity of theologies and ideologies that have “clothed” humanity until then will be
garments that will be stripped off and extinguished. Ideologies and theologies will be
eliminated naturally, since they were merely what humanity wore until the point of
disenchantment was reached, as a function of reaching the apex of an industrial economy.
Moreover, in such a context, the theologies and ideologies humanity swore by for
centuries will be stripped off naturally as a function of their carrying no weight and serving no
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purpose in a disenchanted world in which “man’s whole Spiritual Interests are once divested.”
The conclusion that “the sounder Rags among them [will] be quilted together into one huge
Irish watch-coat for the defence of the Body only!” reads almost as a pure enigma. It suggests
that at the time of “the phoenix,” when all previous theologies and ideologies are found out
and recognized as clothing merely worn by humanity along its extended journey from the
“cradle of civilization” to an industrial civilization that has reached its highest capacity, only
certain elements from them will be “retailored” into transcendentalism as the final ideology. In
this regard, Teufelsdrӧckh speaks of “Religion, in unnoticed nooks, weaving for herself new
Vestures” and it is on this basis that the narrator in Sartor Resartus asks: “Teufelsdrӧckh himself
being one of the loom-treaddles?”12 Carlyle follows this up immediately: “Elsewhere
[Teufelsdrӧckh] quotes without censure that strange aphorism of Saint-Simon’s, concerning
which and whom so much were to be said: L’age d’or qu’une aveugle tradition a placé jusqu’ici
dans le passé est devant nous; The golden age which a blind tradition has hitherto placed in the
Past is Before us.”13 It is at this particular place in Sartor Resartus where the inference can be
made that Carlyle prophesies that transcendentalism will become a viable ideology in the
future because transcendentalism is precisely the “new Vesture” that Teufelsdrӧckh “loomtreaddles” and such a vesture would inaugurate the new “golden age.”
At this juncture, the “philosophy of clothes,” or transcendentalism, will be widely known
and perceived in a universal fashion through which humanity will universally recognize all
theologies and ideologies as merely “clothing” that have been worn on its long historical path
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to a fully disenchanted and fully-developed industrial economy. Humanity will have
consciousness of the “philosophy of clothes” so as to distinguish between theologies and
ideologies as one type of “clothing” and clothing (to be physically worn by humanity) as another
and exclusive type of “clothing.” Henceforth, humanity will adopt clothing that will be “for the
defence of the Body only” and will never again wear the theologies and ideologies on its
persons from which it has divested itself.
Carlyle takes the position that the adoption of transcendentalism is the ultimate
destination for human history and humanity has path dependency to eventually reach this
destiny, such that it cannot be altered:
“Nevertheless,” cries Teufelsdrӧckh, “who can hinder [the phoenix]; who is there that
can clutch into the wheel-spokes of Destiny, and say to the Spirit of the Time: Turn back, I
command thee?—Wiser were it that we yielded to the Inevitable and Inexorable, and
accounted even this the best.”14
Thus, Carlyle offers a philosophy that maintains that history is purely evolutionary and
path dependent.15 He asserts, through the voice of Teufelsdrӧckh:
“Society,” says [Teufelsdrӧckh], “is not dead: that Carcass, which you call dead Society,
is but her mortal coil which she has shuffled off, to assume a nobler; she herself, through
perpetual metamorphoses, in fairer and fairer development, has to live till Time also merge in
Eternity. Wheresoever two or three Living Men are gathered together, there is Society; or there
it will be, with its cunning mechanisms and stupendous structures, overspreading this little
Globe….”16
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So, when will “the Phoenix” take place and produce transcendentalism as the basis for a
future “golden age?” Carlyle seeks to answer this specific question through Teufelsdrӧckh’s
commentary:
“in what year of grace such Phoenix-cremation will be completed, you need not ask. The law of
Perseverance is among the deepest in man: by nature he hates change; seldom will he quit his
old house till it has actually fallen about his ears. Thus have I seen Solemnities linger as
Ceremonies, sacred Symbols as idle Pageants, to the extent of three hundred years and more
after all life and sacredness had evaporated out of them. And then, finally, what time the
Phoenix Death-Birth itself will require depends on unseen contingencies.—Meanwhile, would
Destiny offer Mankind that after, say two centuries of convulsion and conflagration, more or
less vivid, the fire-creation should be accomplished, and we find ourselves again in a Living
Society, and no longer fighting but working,--were it not perhaps prudent in Mankind to strike
the bargain?”
Thus is Teufelsdrӧckh content that old sick Society should be deliberately burnt (alas!
with quite other fuel than spicewood); in the faith that she is a Phoenix; and that a new
heavenborn young one will rise out of her ashes!...will not the judicious reader shake his head,
and reproachfully, yet more in sorrow than in anger, say or think: From a Doctor Utriusque Juris,
titular Professor in a University, and man to whom hitherto, for his services, Society, bad as she
is, has given not only food and raiment (of a kind), but books, tobacco and gukguk, we expected
more gratitude to his benefactress; and less of a blind Trust in the future, which resembles that
rather of a philosophical Fatalist and Enthusiast, than of a solid householder paying scot and lot
in a Christian country.17
A literal reading of this passage would mean that “the Phoenix” would be due to usher in a new
age by 2033, if Sartor Resartus’s 1833 publication date is the date from which two centuries
should be calculated. In considering transcendentalism as a prospective post-liberal political
ideology, this dissertation seeks to theorize as to how liberalism could more efficiently and
effectively transition to transcendentalism without paying the potential costs of a “phoenix.” A
recognition of Carlylean transcendentalism as a potential post-liberalism means that
transcendentalism can be planned and promoted rather than understood as merely an
unforeseen natural evolution from liberalism. As such, this dissertation seeks to begin to refine
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Carlylean transcendentalism from its crude state and provide a normative argument for its
adoption as a means of intentionally transitioning from liberalism to transcendentalism.
Such normative promotion of transcendentalism conjures a discussion of
transcendentalism’s potential parallels to communism as a post-liberal ideology in its own right.
Just as Marx offered communism scientifically with confidence that it is inevitable and will be
the next ideology to follow the hegemony of liberal democratic capitalism, Carlyle, through
Teufelsdrӧckh’s voice, concludes that transcendentalism will follow liberal democratic
capitalism.18 Unlike Carlylean transcendentalism, Marx’s communism, beyond being merely a
scientific theory, was studied, theorized, and promoted by communists in the political spheres
of nation-states and at the global level. This dissertation in many ways marks the first attempt
to provide a normative promotion of transcendentalism as a political ideology, because Carlyle,
Emerson and Thoreau, as the most iconic transcendentalists, never promoted it as a practical
political ideology to be adopted in the same fashion communists promoted communism’s
universal adoption.
Carlyle theorizes that industrial society will come to fruition in the context of political
and economic liberalism but that it will be impossible to sustain indefinitely. Carlyle also
maintains that it is illusory to think that political action can redirect or alter the path that
history will ultimately take. As an inaugural social criticism of the modern industrial era, Sartor
Resartus provides a cryptic prophecy that all attempts at radical alterations of the hegemonic
liberal world order will be thwarted and are destined to fail.19 Essentially, the hegemonic liberal
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world order is destined to come into full being before it naturally and organically dissolves,
giving way to a new social order. Carlyle’s meta-narrative of modern political history stands in
contrast to Fukuyama’s narrative of the progression of history in addition to the
Hegelian/Marxist narrative, whereby Fukuyama argued that liberalism itself connotes the last
stage of human political development.20 Through Sartor Resartus, Carlyle rejects both the
narration of unending progress and the dialectical pattern of history and poses the phoenix
narrative as an alternative account.
Ellul and MacIntyre each present a meta-narrative of the “phoenix” without explicitly
naming it as such, as Carlyle does. The narratives of Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre are largely
compatible with one another in that each concludes that decline will be an inevitable product
of modernization and the economic expansion that takes place in the context of liberal
democratic capitalism’s hegemony. According to Ellul, a “monolithic technical world” is taking
shape and coming into full form, and it is “vanity to pretend it can be checked or guided.”21
Ellul, sounding much like MacIntyre, prioritizes the need to discover a new end, or telos, for
human society in the midst of the technical age to replace the society that unconsciously
pursues a monolithic technical construction as its only telos.22 Ellul comments on technology’s
all-encompassing, yet hidden and deceitful, grasp on humanity:
The aims of technology, which were clear enough a century and a half ago, have gradually
disappeared from view. Humanity seems to have forgotten the wherefore of all its travail, as
though its goals had been translated into an abstraction or had become implicit; or as though
its ends rested in an unforeseeable future of undetermined date, as in the case of Communist
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society. Everything today seems to happen as though ends disappear, as a result of the
magnitude of the very means at our disposal.23
MacIntyre reflects in a similar fashion: “what matters at this stage is the construction of local
forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained
through the new dark ages which are already upon us.”24
Ellul concludes The Technological Society with reflections reminiscent of those made by
Carlyle through Teufelsdrӧckh in Sartor Resartus. Ellul reflects on the trend of ever-increasing
specialization in specialized academic disciplines in the context of higher education, remarking
that “it seems as though the specialized application of all one’s faculties in a particular area
inhibits the consideration of things in general.”25 What is more, “none of our wise men ever
pose the question of the end of all their marvels [and] the ‘wherefore’ is resolutely passed
by.”26 While Carlyle attempts to illustrate philosophically how the entire universe is monolithic
in that all that makes up the universe (including time and space themselves) are mere clothing
symbolizing and embodying the divine idea of the world, Ellul seeks to show how technical
civilization is monolithic and how every human activity (economic, political, social, cultural, etc.)
is monolithic in that it is required to conform to the autonomous nature of technical
civilization.27
In a profound statement that can be applied to synthesize his work with the work of
Carlyle, MacIntyre, and even Marx, Ellul reflects that it is “apparently our fate to be facing a
‘golden age’ in the power of sorcerers who are totally blind to the meaning of the human
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adventure.”28 This statement is nearly a perfect repetition of Carlyle’s own in Sartor Resartus in
which he remarks that the phoenix will come about by those who are completely unconscious
that they have conjured a phoenix rather than a golden age of liberalism/utilitarianism. It is
valuable to return to Carlyle’s conception of the phoenix in the context of Ellul’s own
conception:
Are we returning, as Rousseau prayed, to the state of Nature? “The Soul Politic having
departed,” says Teufelsdrӧckh, “what can follow but that the Body Politic be decently interred,
to avoid putrescence? Liberals, Economists, Utilitarians enough I see marching with its bier, and
chaunting loud paeans, towards the funeral-pile, where, amid wailings from some, and
saturnalian revelries from the most, the venerable Corpse is to be burnt. Or, in plain words, that
these men, Liberals, Utilitarians, or whatsoever they are called, will ultimately carry their point,
and dissever and destroy most existing Institutions of Society, seems a thing which has some
time ago ceased to be doubtful.”29
Carlyle, MacIntyre, and Ellul each distinctly illuminate the meaning of the “human
adventure” and do so while sharing Karl Marx as their point of nexus. Carlyle, as one of Marx’s
philosophical influences, narrates the “human adventure” through Sartor Resartus, and
MacIntyre and Ellul, as post-Marxists, inform as to how Marx erred in his theory of the “human
adventure.” The sorcerers of whom Ellul speaks, who he claims are totally blind to the meaning
of the human adventure, are those who have ostensibly either no familiarity with the types of
criticism of modernity levelled by critics (for example, Carlyle, Marx, MacIntyre, and Ellul
himself) or have dismissed their criticisms outright. Such sorcerers have no consciousness that
they are conjuring a “phoenix” that will turn to ash, or at a minimum devolve, rather than
persist as a golden age of infinite economic growth as a function of infinite consumerism.
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The “sorcerers” of whom Ellul speaks are largely synonymous with the “Liberals,
Economists, Utilitarians” Carlyle speaks of, namely those who mistakenly see the incarnation of
liberal political economy in its full fruition as a “golden age.”30 For Ellul, such a technological
society coming into its full being is no golden age. For Carlyle, the “Liberals, Economists,
Utilitarians” are blind to the notion that liberal political economy reaching its apex yields not a
golden age but rather the disintegration of society because when the atomization of utilitymaximizing individuals reaches its full form the other institutions and previous nexuses (other
than cash-payment) that bonded members of society together will be destroyed. Such talk of
“sorcerers” is also reminiscent of Marx’s passage on “sorcerers” in the “Communist Manifesto”:
“Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a
society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the
sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called
up by his spells.”31
The history of political thought offers many instances of philosophers attempting to
foresee the dissolution of types of political regimes. Such thought is evident spanning from
ancient political philosophy through to the twenty-first century. Plato and Aristotle theorized of
the devolution of regime types in The Republic and Politics, respectively. The early twenty-first
century has witnessed discussion of what post-liberalism might entail with such controversial
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texts as Why Liberalism Failed by Patrick Deneen and The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and
the Human Future by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst. These two texts represent merely the
genesis of deliberations in political theory as to what might be the next stage of human political
development that follows liberalism. Deneen and Milbank and Pabst point out the
achievements of liberalism, all the while making known that liberalism is not without pitfalls
that would be hazardous to either ignore or overlook.
Deneen goes so far as to say that liberalism has failed because it succeeded.32 Such an
argument correlates with Carlyle’s theory of a phoenix, since it embodies the view that
liberalism has reached its full fruition and as a function of doing so has sprung internal tensions
that will preclude the sustainability of liberal democratic capitalism as a social order. As
Milbank and Pabst theorize, with respect to liberalism:
its self-swallowing is no partial crisis, susceptible to a new adjustment, but is rather a
metacrisis, which cannot be transcended, whether for good or ill, in a purely liberal way.
This holds true despite the many historical wars over truth as to claims to territory or
creed: for were they not more noble than liberal wars over money, and less terrible than the
wars that have been instigated by nihilists who have taken the liberal logic to its limits? At least,
the past wars over jurisdiction and belief assumed a reachable horizon of consensus in eternally
guaranteed moral reality: the pax romana or the pax christiana. But it is this horizon that
liberalism no longer envisages. Initially it wagers that a more modest, horizon-less cynicism will
produce a more stable political pacification. But in the long run, this very cynicism has proved
to be naïve delusion: a horizon, after all, of assumed ontological violence that eventually proves
a terrible prophecy of the nihilist consequences of such an assumption, without by one jot
confirming it.33
Almost two centuries after Carlyle first identified it, Milbank and Pabst echo Carlyle’s
concern that “cash payment” is the sole nexus that binds humanity, both economically and
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politically.34 Their conclusion is nearly a complete reincarnation of the core of Carlyle’s
philosophy: “at the heart of liberal self-undoing lies the primacy of the economic and the
political over the social and thus the subordination of both social bonds and civic ties to the
abstract standards of law and contract.”35
The fusion and synthesis of the critiques of modern liberal democratic capitalism
provided by Carlyle (as a pre-Marxist), Ellul (as a post-Marxist), and MacIntyre (as a postMarxist) shows that growth in alienation, inequality, exploitation, hyperpluralism, polarization,
hyperconsumerism, atomization, automatization, and Weberian rationalization are taking
place. What is more, such a synthesis demonstrates that modern liberal democratic capitalism
shows no signs of being able at any point to facilitate what is needed—the arrest and reversal
of all such growth--to ensure its own stability, legitimacy, and even survival. As such, postliberalism, in some form, is upon us. Milbank and Pabst conceive of post-liberalism as the
“primacy of common good.”36
Brad S. Gregory describes the modern sociopolitical environment in a manner that can
be appropriated to synthesize the philosophies of Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre, since they each
identified the limitations and vulnerabilities of Enlightenment rationalism:
Modern reason in its two most influential expressions is therefore a schizophrenically mixed
bag: philosophy has dramatically failed, but science has spectacularly succeeded. One
consequence is that the ever-expanding technological capacities afforded by scientific advances
are set within an increasingly rancorous culture of moral disagreement and political
contestation. If not necessarily a failure of modernity per se, this fact certainly contributes to its
volatility and potential for man-made catastrophes on scales inconceivable in the preindustrial
world.37
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Gregory’s nuanced assessment of the Enlightenment’s results serves as a dual critique of the
Enlightenment’s philosophical failings and its technological advances. In the absence of any
philosophical consensus generated by the Enlightenment, technology exacerbates political and
philosophical conflicts and has the potential to yield unprecedented catastrophes. Such an
assertion parallels and synthesizes the arguments of Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre.
In The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future, Milbank and Pabst
themselves explicitly appropriate Carlyle as a foundation for their argument that “the notion of
a collective neutrality as to some sort of fundamental existential choice is as much a myth as it
would be in the case of an individual [such that] for in either case, not to choose is, after all, to
choose only arbitrary choosing, supplemented by a qualifying, yet confirming, utilitarian notion
of the objective and effective as the only thing that can ever be chosen in all its modes.”38 They
make this claim by arguing that Locke’s advocacy of toleration “was in reality an advocacy of
civic indifference,” because Locke was hostile to the notion of Christianity supplying a viable
comprehensive doctrine for political society.39
Milbank and Pabst conceive of post-liberalism not as anti-liberalism, in the sense that
they acknowledge that liberalism has precipitated valuable effects in the form of individual
freedom, respect for the individual, and diversity of preferences up to a point.40 As Milbank and
Pabst define post-liberalism, they assert it “implies not that liberalism is all bad, but that it has
inherent problems and deficiencies.”41 Milbank and Pabst recognize liberalism’s value and its
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contributions, but also argue that “evermore individual rights and untrammelled economic
contract alone cannot provide security, prosperity and human flourishing for the many.” 42
Milbank and Pabst second Carlyle’s critique that eventually the hegemonic social order defined
as liberal democracy will erode to a “sum of zero”:
At first, as we have already noted, the exultation of negative freedom of choice swept away
many rigid restrictions and autocracies that have eventually seemed without justification even
for their (often religious) instigators. However, in the long run, liberalism seems to undo itself
and to reveal that, as a mode of sophistry, it erodes the very political field that it claims to save.
This self-undoing turns out to mean that eventually liberalism is exposed as a tautology and as
only applying to abstract individuals and the monolithic collectivity, thereby revealing nothing
of the deeper truths about human association.43
A synthesis of the philosophies of Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre provides a context for
coming to terms with both the contributions and limitations of liberalism. Such a synthesis also
leads one to conclude that post-liberalism (or, at minimum, a stark evolution of liberalism) is
inevitable and that conclusion can be reached by bringing Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre in
dialogue with one another. Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre are philosophically compatible and
complementary toward one another to such an extent that the deficiencies of liberalism
become readily apparent. It could be said that Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre collectively reach a
“limit of political theory” in that they identify the deficiencies and contradictions of liberal
democratic capitalism, but each fails to offer a viable doctrine to cure the ills. This dissertation
has sought to refute that claim with respect to Carlyle by arguing that he has offered a
prospective, albeit cryptic, solution in the form of transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus.
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In a robust thesis that implicitly synthesizes Carlyle, Ellul, and MacIntyre, Milbank and
Pabst conclude succinctly that “the triumph of liberalism today more and more brings about
the ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes) and the idea of man as self-owning animal (Locke) that were
its presuppositions.”44 They resolve that liberalism’s facilitation of the war of all against all
“developed illusory proof in the shape of practical violence of its negative assumptions [and
this] also undermines its claims to offer the salve to this reality.”45 Liberalism, having assumed
in theory the “war of all against all” and “man” as a self-owning animal, has yielded in practice
such theoretical assumptions.46 Milbank and Pabst succinctly articulate their critique of
liberalism:
In this manner, liberalism marks the unnecessary victory of vice over virtue—of
selfishness, greed, suspicion and coercion over common benefit, generosity, a measure of trust
and persuasive power. Just as liberal thought has redefined human nature as fundamentally
individual existence abstracted from social embeddedness, so too liberal practice has replaced
the quest for reciprocal recognition and mutual flourishing with the pursuit of wealth, power
and pleasure—leading to economic instability, social disorder and ecological devastation.47
As an alternative to liberalism, Milbank and Pabst offer what is purely a Carlylean
solution in that it echoes in 2016 what Carlyle first articulated in the nineteenth century.
Milbank and Pabst maintain that “the only genuine alternative is a post-liberal politics of virtue
that seeks to fuse greater economic justice with social reciprocity.”48 The phrase “greater
economic justice with social reciprocity” alone could be used to define a theme that Carlyle
pursued in his prolific writing. Such a phrase is also indicative of what transcendentalism might
potentially yield if it is recognized, refined, and embraced as a political ideology to adopt as a
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means of resolving the limitations found in liberalism. Transcendentalism represents a
prospective resolution to the consideration that “callous cash-payment” is the sole nexus that
binds humanity together.
As Gregory concludes in The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution
Secularized Society, “judged on their own terms and with respect to the objectives of their own
leading protagonists, medieval Christendom failed, the Reformation failed, confessionalized
Europe failed, and Western modernity is failing, but each in different ways and with different
consequences, and each in ways that continue to remain important in the present.”49 Gregory
defines modernity:
What remains in the absence of shared answers to the Life Questions is a hyperpluralism of
divergent secular and religious truth claims in contemporary Western states, and of individuals
pursuing their desires whatever they happen to be. The world in which all Europeans and North
Americans are living today is a combination of hegemonic and hyperpluralistic realities, the
former safeguarding and permitting the latter. Highly bureaucratized sovereign states wield a
monopoly of public power in enforcing laws. The hegemonic cultural glue comes especially
from all-pervasive capitalism and consumerism: scientific findings are applied in manufacturing
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technologies to make the stuff consumers want, whatever they want, heirs to the early modern
Christians who made the industrious revolution that preceded and prepared the way for the
Industrial Revolution. There is no shared, substantive common good, nor are there any realistic
prospects for devising one (at least in the immediately foreseeable future). Nor does secular
discourse offer any realistic prospects for rationally resolving any of the many contested moral
or political issues that emerge from the increasingly wide range of ways in which individuals
self-determine the good for themselves within liberalism’s politically protected formal ethics of
rights. Appeals to a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” are akin to reminders of the fact that
antagonistic Christians nevertheless continued to share many beliefs in common in the
sixteenth century. Indeed they did. But it hardly conduced to their moral agreement or political
cooperation.
As a result, public life today, perhaps especially in the United States, is increasingly riven
by angry, uncivil rivals with incompatible views about what is good, true, and
right…Nevertheless, these same liberal states continue to depend on the widely embraced
pursuit of consumerist acquisitiveness to hold together the ideological hyperpluralism within
their polities.50
Gregory’s portrayal of the interminable political conflicts that define liberalism illustrates that
liberalism itself may not be sustainable indefinitely. Liberalism’s vulnerability could manifest in
its incapacity of generating a shared consensus, namely the kind of consensus Rawls sought to
theorize in order to sustain liberalism.
Deneen’s 2018 book Why Liberalism Failed reads in large measure as a re-articulation of
Thomas Carlyle’s political philosophy, retrospectively looking back on the past two centuries
while Carlyle forecasted two centuries forward from the middle of the nineteenth century.
Though Deneen does not explicitly reference Carlyle, multiple passages in Deneen’s text mirror
closely Carlyle’s sentiments. While Deneen’s lack of credit given to Carlyle suggests he derived
his conclusions independently of him, an engagement with Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed
provides a valuable means to legitimize Carlyle’s philosophy from the perspective of hindsight.
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For example, Deneen’s discussion of the ideology of progress is nearly synonymous with
Carlyle’s composed in 1840. According to Deneen:
The development of progressivism within liberalism is only a further iteration of this pervasive
presentism, a kind of weaponized timelessness. Like classical liberalism, progressivism is
grounded in a deep hostility toward the past, particularly tradition and custom. While widely
understood to be future-oriented, it in fact rests on simultaneous assumptions that
contemporary solutions must be liberated from past answers but that the future will have as
much regard for our present as we have for the past. The future is an unknown country, and
those who live in a present arrayed in hostility to the past must acquire indifference toward,
and a simple faith in, a better if unknowable future. Those whose view of time is guided by such
belief implicitly understand that their “achievements” are destined for the dustbin of history,
given that the future will regard us as backward and necessarily superseded. Every generation
must live for itself. Liberalism makes humanity into mayflies, and unsurprisingly, its culmination
has led each generation to accumulate scandalous levels of debt to be left for its children, while
rapacious exploitation of resources continues in the progressive belief that future generations
will devise a way to deal with the depletions.51
Such a view is nearly synonymous with Carlyle’s viewpoint:
…what a melancholy notion is that, which has to represent all men, in all countries and times
except our own, as having spent their life in blind condemnable error, mere lost Pagans,
Scandinavians, Mahometans, only that we might have the true ultimate knowledge! All
generations of men were lost and wrong, only that this present little section of a generations
might be saved and right. They all marched forward there, all generations since the beginning
of the world, like the Russian soldiers into the ditch of Schweidnitz Fort, only to fill-up the ditch
with their dead bodies, that we might march-over and take the place! It is an incredible
hypothesis.
Such incredible hypothesis we have seen maintained with fierce emphasis; and this or
the other poor individual man, with his sect of individual men, marching as over the dead
bodies of all men, towards sure victory: but when he too, with his hypothesis and ultimate
infallible credo, sank into the ditch, and became a dead body, what was to be said?—Withal, it
is an important fact in the nature of man, that he tends to reckon his own insight as final, and
goes upon it as such.52
As Deneen argues, “by now we should entertain the possibility that liberalism continues
to expand its global dominion by deepening inequality and constraining liberty in the name of
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securing their opposite.”53 Derivative from such a view is his assertion that “we effectively
possess little self-government, either as citizens over our leaders or as individuals over our
appetites.”54 Deneen further reflects on liberal democratic capitalism in a manner deeply
reminiscent of Carlyle’s forecast for liberal democratic capitalism in the nineteenth century as
eyewitness to the advent of the modern industrial age:
Liberalism has failed—not because it fell short, but because it was true to itself. It has failed
because it has succeeded. As liberalism has “become more fully itself,” as its inner logic has
become more evident and its self-contradictions manifest, it has generated pathologies that are
at once deformations of its claims yet realizations of liberal ideology. A political philosophy that
was launched to foster greater equity, defend a pluralist tapestry of different cultures and
beliefs, protect human dignity, and, of course, expand liberty, in practice generates titanic
inequality, enforces uniformity and homogeneity, fosters material and spiritual degradation,
and undermines freedom. Its success can be measured by its achievement of the opposite of
what we have believed it would achieve. Rather than seeing the accumulating catastrophe as
evidence of our failure to live up to liberalism’s ideals, we need rather to see clearly that the
ruins it has produced are the signs of its very success. To call for the cures of liberalism’s ills by
applying more liberal measures is tantamount to throwing gas on a raging fire. It will only
deepen our political, social, economic, and moral crisis.55
Carlyle’s views in 1840 demonstrate almost a perfect compatibility and parallel to those
of Deneen:
All this of Liberty and Equality, Electoral suffrages, Independence and so forth, we will take,
therefore, to be a temporary phenomenon, by no means a final one. Though likely to last a long
time, with sad enough embroilments for us all, we must welcome it, as the penalty of sins that
are past, the pledge of inestimable benefits that are coming. In all ways, it behoved men to quit
simulacra and return to fact; cost what it might, that did behove to be done. With spurious
Popes, and Believers having no private judgment,--quacks pretending to command over dupes,-what can you do? Misery and mischief only. You cannot make an association out of insincere
men; you cannot build an edifice except by plummet and level,--at right-angles to one another!
In all this wild revolutionary work, from Protestantism downwards, I see the blessedest result
preparing itself: not abolition of Hero-worship, but rather what I would call a whole World of
Heroes. If Hero mean sincere man, why may not every one of us be a Hero? A world all sincere,
a believing world: the like has been; the like will again be,--cannot help being. That were the
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right sort of Worshippers for Heroes: never could the truly Better be so reverenced as where all
were True and Good!56
Carlyle and Deneen share the view that liberalism is a stage in sociopolitical evolution that
cannot be sustained as the final stage of such evolution. Deneen articulates what Carlyle
forecasted to be the “sad enough embroilments for us all” stemming from liberalism, such as
inequality and material and spiritual degradation.
Deneen discusses at length the decline of the humanities in universities as a result of
them being deemed not useful or irrelevant to the modern economy. According to Deneen, the
humanities will persist in some form as a “‘boutique’ showcase,” but the humanities are
nonetheless on a downward trajectory, having an ever smaller role in the modern university.57
The decline of Carlyle scholarship exemplifies this decline of the humanities. Sartor Resartus,
Carlyle’s magnum opus, once resonated both in university and public intellectual circles as a
foundational text in the humanities, but has become largely forgotten and unheard of in the
twenty-first century.58 The notion that politics, political science, and political theory could be
guided by principles derived from Sartor Resartus as a nineteenth-century work of fiction is
difficult to imagine in the early twenty-first century. Yet, with refinement and application, the
precepts Carlyle espouses in Sartor Resartus can prove valuable as a foundation to inaugurate
Carlylean transcendentalism as post-liberalism.
Deneen defends the humanities by arguing that they provide a valuable lesson that is
going unlearned in the climate of the early twenty-first century:
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Its warning would be simple, recalling its oldest lessons: at the end of the path of liberation lies
enslavement. Such liberation from all obstacles is finally illusory, for two simple reasons: human
appetite is insatiable and the world is limited. For both of these reasons, we cannot be truly
free in the modern sense. We can never attain satiation, and will be eternally driven by our
desires rather than satisfied by their attainment. And in our pursuit of the satisfaction of our
limitless desires, we will very quickly exhaust the planet. Our destiny, should we enter fully
down this path toward our complete liberation, is one in which we will be more governed by
necessity than ever before. We will be governed not by our own capacity for self-rule but rather
by circumstance, particularly the circumstances resulting from scarcity, devastation, and
chaos.59
Compatible with the philosophical thesis of Sartor Resartus, this passage implores readers to
entertain renunciation as the means (and only means) to attain the highest form of genuine
liberty, self-governance, and self-command for individuals. Renunciation is perhaps the chief
lesson Carlyle sought to impart in Sartor Resartus and it can be applied in contexts beyond
consumerism such as ethnocentrism.
The concept that liberalism has failed because it has succeeded correlates to Carlyle’s
theory of the phoenix, whereby the modern world order would come to its fullest incarnation
before being unable to sustain itself. Deneen sounds like Carlyle theorizing about the phoenix in
Sartor Resartus:
The “Noble Lie” of liberalism is shattering because it continues to be believed and defended by
those who benefit from it, while it is increasingly seen as a lie, and not an especially noble one,
by the new servant class that liberalism has produced. Discontent is growing among those who
are told by their leaders that their policies will benefit them, even as liberalism remains an
article of ardent faith among those who ought to be best positioned to comprehend its true
nature. But liberalism’s apologists regard pervasive discontent, political dysfunction, economic
inequality, civic disconnection, and populist rejection as accidental problems disconnected from
systemic causes, because their self-deception is generated by enormous reservoirs of selfinterest in the maintenance of the present system. This divide will only widen, the crises will
become more pronounced, the political duct tape and economic spray will increasingly fail to
keep the house standing. The end of liberalism is in sight.60
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Deneen suggests that political development is likely to follow one of two paths. He
theorizes that “liberalism” as a political system might persist but only operate in forms contrary
to its purported claims about liberty, equality, justice, and opportunity. According to Deneen,
this will entail the continual growth of the administrative state and the imposition of liberalism
through surveillance, legal mandate, police power, and administrative control by administrative
bureaucrats who disdain the populist course democracy has taken. Such a conclusion is
comparable to Tocqueville’s in Democracy in America, where Tocqueville prophesies democracy
culminating in despotism.61 The alternative Deneen offers is liberalism giving way to a new
regime type altogether, much like what happened in the twentieth century when Germany
evolved politically from liberalism to fascism and Russia flirted with liberalism before imposing
communism: “while these brutal and failed examples suggest that such possibilities are unlikely
to generate widespread enthusiasm even in a postliberal age, some form of populist nationalist
authoritarianism or military autocracy seems altogether plausible as an answer to the anger
and fear of a postliberal citizenry.”62 Deneen concludes:
While growing discontent in Western liberal democracies suggests that either outcome is a
realistic possibility, neither is to be wished for in the form it is likely to take. Yet the failure of
liberalism itself invites this outcome, even as the unwillingness of liberalism’s defenders to
perceive their own complicity in fostering widespread discontent among their fellow citizens
only makes such a lamentable outcome more likely. Liberalism’s defenders today regard their
discontented countrymen as backward and recidivist, often attributing to them the most
vicious motivations: racism, narrow sectarianism, or bigotry, depending upon the issue at hand.
To the extent that liberalism regards itself as a self-healing, perpetual political machine, it
remains almost unthinkable for its apologists to grasp that its failure may lead to its
replacement by a cruel and vicious successor. No serious effort to conceive a humane
postliberal alternative is likely to emerge from the rear-guard defenders of a declining regime.63
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Invoking Plato, he maintains that political evolution from the status quo to a new
political order is the only thing that is guaranteed:
Imagining a humane alternative to either liberalocratic despotism or the rigid and potentially
cruel authoritarian regime that may replace it seems at best a parlor game, at worst a fool’s
errand. Yet engaging in the activity once central to political philosophy—the negotiation
between the utopian and realistic, begun by Plato in the Republic—remains essential if the
grimmer scenarios of a life after liberalism are to be avoided, and something potentially better
brought into being. If today only the barest outlines may be discerned amid a landscape so
completely shaped by our liberal age, tentative first steps are required. The destination is
unknown and unforeseeable, and the journey will probably require generations to complete. 64
Deneen suggests that, in conceiving of what a post-liberal political order may look like,
we must outgrow the age of ideology: “Of the three great modern ideologies [liberalism,
communism, and fascism], only the oldest and most resilient remains, but liberals mistook the
fall of its competitors for the end of history rather than the pyrrhic victory it really was.”65
Additionally, he asserts that “there is evidence of growing hunger for an organic alternative to
the cold, bureaucratic, and mechanized world liberalism offers.”66 Yet this alternative would in
no way take the form of an ideology to replace liberalism, as “the impulse to devise a new and
better political theory in the wake of liberalism’s simultaneous triumph and demise is a
temptation that must be resisted. The search for a comprehensive theory is what gave rise to
liberalism and successor ideologies in the first place.”67 The recognition of Carlylean
transcendentalism, as theorized in Sartor Resartus, as a legitimate prospective political theory
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to succeed liberalism stands as a counterargument to Deneen’s claim that a comprehensive
theory should not be searched for.
Milbank and Pabst explicitly leverage Carlyle’s philosophy in their argument that market
equilibrium is the primary, if not only, conception of the good that is strived for in the context
of modern liberal democratic capitalism.68 In this way, they capture Carlyle’s desire to see
humanity transcend servitude to the market as subservient, individualistic, and atomized
producers and consumers and create a communitarian society based on mutual economic and
social solidarity.69 Milbank and Pabst appropriate Carlyle explicitly:
Thus both the invisible hand of “providence” and the visible hand of the state are deemed to be
seeking the same goal of perfect rational equilibrium that coordinates egoistic wishes, without
any mutual agreement as to the common good. In the case of both left and right, the reality of
the aspiring and discerning soul has been tacitly abandoned in favour of the willful and powerseeking manipulation of animal appetites—as Thomas Carlyle argued in his presentation in Past
and Present of the first effectively “post-secular” analysis of modernity.70
Milbank and Pabst ask: “Can a new emphasis on the common good and the promotion
of human flourishing be truly relevant to hard economic questions?” 71 They answer in the
affirmative, maintaining their view on the basis that liberalism takes the form of a phoenix, just
as Carlyle did previously in Sartor Resartus and Patrick Deneen does later in Why Liberalism
Failed. Milbank and Pabst conclude much as did Deneen that liberalism is destined to fail
because of its success, particularly in the realm of liberal market capitalism. They argue that a
new emphasis on the shared conception of the common good will take form from the ashes of
liberal market capitalism “because liberalism also, as an indication of its fatal theoretical
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tautology, is subject to that very law of diminishing returns which it has itself articulated.”72
Milbank and Pabst defend this by claiming that at first liberalization of financial markets leads
to growth but in the long run too much financial liberty leads to market anarchy and state
coercion.73 They cite “over-abstraction from the real economy; the creation of credit and debt
that dissolves property and other assets into purely nominal value; self-interest that can be
aligned to market failure rather than market success; the non-constraint of capital by labour;
and a multitude of transactions that are only about shifting around the existing monetary
symbols of wealth, not about creating new wealth, even in abstract terms.” 74
Milbank and Pabst restate in 2016 what Carlyle originally said in his inaugural criticism
of liberal modernity in Sartor Resartus: “the quest for maximal utility is subject to the law of
diminishing returns.”75 Essentially, market forces are the only means to adjudicate and derive
to some extent a mutual agreement as to the common good. Liberal economics fails to
acknowledge qualitatively beyond the scope of supply and demand “a range of goods that vary
in qualitative intensity and satisfy our souls just because they fulfil our creative talents and
natural desire for beauty.”76 Milbank and Pabst draw on Carlyle to elaborate on such a
viewpoint in a manner that underscores his significance as not only a social theorist applicable
to his own contemporary world of Victorian England but also his perhaps greater application to
comprehending the globalized world of the early twenty-first century:
Liberalism, by contrast [to a qualitative and aesthetic distinction among goods], treats all goods
as if they could really be subject to a flattening quantitative calculus, because they are seen as
mere measurable stimuli for a soulless organism. Far from such an outlook representing the
72
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most basic, governing realities, it rather substitutes what Carlyle called a “succedaneum” for
concrete and variegated interpersonal existence…As Carlyle declared, “It is your souls that lie
dead […] and are not souls at all, but mere succedanea for salt to keep your bodies and their
appetites from putrefying”. Instead of vivid reality, liberal economists posit a grey simulacrum.
Yet, thanks to mass manipulation, it becomes increasingly the case that the colours of quality
get washed out of the lives of all but a few, who can afford to paint their private lives in more
interesting shades.77
Then, in an all-encompassing appropriation of Carlyle’s philosophy to define the zeitgeist of
modern sociopolitical and economic society, they resolve that:
liberal capitalism tends to turn people into automatons devoid of character and creativity,
ushering in first the Mechanical and now the Digital Age in which [according to Carlyle]
“nothing is now done directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated contrivance”. In this
manner, the oligarchy seduces the masses to consume more and more shoddy goods whose
appeal will, indeed, soon pale – causing them to seek to earn more in order to be able to buy a
new variant or new seductive novelty.78
Ellul had previously provided an analysis that is nearly synonymous with such
sentiments:
The technical society must perfect the “man-machine” complex or risk total collapse. Is there
any other way out? I am convinced that there is. Unfortunately, I am also compelled to note
that neither the scientists nor the technicians want any part of any other solution. And since I
work with realities and not abstractions, I recognize the inevitability of the fact that technical
difficulties demand technical solutions. All the troubles provoked by the encounter between
man and technique are of a technical order, and therefore no one dreams of applying
nontechnical remedies. Men distrust them.79
He concludes, referring to technical civilization as “Behemoth,” a mono-civilization, that
“Behemoth can rest easy; neither Henry Miller’s eroticism nor Andre Breton’s surrealism will
prevent him from consuming mankind.”80
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Milbank and Pabst characterize the state of the world in the early twenty-first century
as “the ‘disenchanted immanence’ of an eventually secularised liberalism that has now
captured our culture.”81 They provide a succinct synopsis of the human political, social, and
economic condition in 2016 that is comparable to Carlyle’s philosophy:
In consequence [of the “disenchanted immanence” of secularised liberalism], sheerly
impersonal and devitalized social forces have started to undermine the interpersonal
relationships and mutual flourishing on which vibrant cultures depend. Behind the functionalist
formation that serves utilitarian purposes of utility maximisation lurks a nihilism that believes in
nothing except the power of an impersonal natural flux that somehow (it is never really
explained) combines randomness with efficient mechanism. We, accordingly, require a new and
dynamic re-induction into virtue in order to save humanity from the post-humanist nightmare
of bio-robotic rule and help to restore the cultural primacy of the living, yet always technically
supplemented and, thereby, rational human person.82
Milbank and Pabst call for a revival of Platonism/Christianity in a new form to serve as a
comprehensive doctrine for society to live by as a type of post-liberal ideology and this provides
a compelling context to consider how a revival of Carlylean transcendentalism could serve as a
prospective solution:
Today, what the West’s politics and education need in cultural terms is a revival of the
archaically Western vision in a new form. As T.S. Eliot wrote in Little Gidding (1942), “It is not to
ring the bell backward. Nor is it an incantation. To summon the spectre of a Rose. We cannot
revive old policies. Or follow an antique drum”. So to call for a revival does not mean restoring
unjustifiable hierarchies and inequalities that the Enlightenment and liberalism rightly swept
away. After all, Christianity had already democratized Platonism with its God who reached
down to be born in a manger and its more open yet more extreme, ever-to-be repeated
mysteries of water, bread and wine as the now more accessible and yet more necessary modes
of triggering recollection of the eternally good.83
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They theorize how a revival is “required to uphold the absolutely incomparable value of both
the person and of relational reciprocity in free association.”84 They do not define such a revival
as explicitly Christian, but themselves articulate the necessity of a type of “transcendentalist”
approach:
It is hard to see how we can sustain the genuine Western legacy unless we revive, more
democratically, its archaic idiom. This is required to uphold the absolutely incomparable value
of both the person and of relational reciprocity in free association. We need both the mysticism
of the individual soul and the spiritual and liturgical community of souls, in whatever sense. For
our true human equality resides in the upper register of the shared psychic and not in the lower
register of matter, which is the realm only of the unconscious and occultly striving or desiring,
and so not of the communal. Whenever equality has tried to speak in the name of our lowest
shared attribute, a fantasised and grim purpose has been ideologically attributed to the
innocent simplicity of matter—whether of racial preference, class preference or economic
growth for the sake of it. The option of “disenchanted immanence” has failed us dismally.
Instead, a more democratized version of “enchanted transcendence” sees all worldly
realities, including cultural ones, as symbolizing something higher and hidden.85
For Milbank and Pabst, “enchanted transcendence” is preferable to Enlightenment
notions of “man as the measure of all things and of human beings encouraged (like their
omnipotent maker) to dominate nature, even though they cannot be trusted to relate to each
other but must, rather, submit to a mechanised version of divine providence (whose workings
reflect Newtonian physics, like Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand’).”86 They conclude that “such
‘disenchanted transcendence’ is to be rejected.”87 This conceptualization of “enchanted
transcendence” shows parallels to Carlyle’s conceptualization of transcendentalism in Sartor
Resartus. In the context of Milbank and Pabst’s construction, I contend that a revival of
transcendentalism promises to be more effective in facilitating relational reciprocity in free
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association because it promises to resolve incommensurable, antagonistic, and seemingly
irresolvable ideological and theological conflicts. I also contend that a revival of Christianity
would not resolve the incommensurable “polychromatic” nature that is the multiplicity of
theologies in the way a revival of transcendentalism promises to. Carlylean transcendentalism
fashioned and promoted as a popular political ideology fulfills the definition of what Milbank
and Pabst strive to achieve in that itself would embody a Platonic and democratized version of
“enchanted transcendence” in which all worldly realities are seen as symbols of what is higher
and hidden. Milbank and Pabst thus strive for what amounts to be the popular acceptance of
Carlyle’s transcendentalism.
In this chapter, I have sought to apply Carlyle to emerging debates in political
philosophy that concern the sustainability of liberalism and, concurrently, the prospects of
post-liberalism. Such a deliberation will require much more refinement and attention beyond
the scope of this dissertation so as to effectively describe and promote an evolution toward the
“transcendental” in the context of popular politics. Beginning the conversation is a crucial step
so as to apply Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism in the context of the twenty-first century
and beyond. In the next and final chapter, I will synthesize what I have presented heretofore so
as to attain a coherent conclusion.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion: Carlyle’s Transcendentalism and a New Stage of Political Development?

In a statement applicable to this dissertation, David Sorensen commented: “If Carlyle is
to be redeemed for the twenty-first century, then his salvation lies not in his prophecies, but in
his histories, in which he dramatized the vicious reality of political religions.” 1 Such a comment
underscores how Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism should not be applied as rigid
dogma but rather should be synthesized with the present hegemony of liberalism so as to
facilitate post-liberalism. I argue that liberalism itself can be cast as a political religion that has
been sworn by largely because of the failures of communism and fascism as alternative political
religions. But liberalism and all of the multiple ideologies subsumed within and allowed by it
have yielded increasing polarization, inequality, and identity politics, particularly in the United
States.2
I have sought to situate Thomas Carlyle’s philosophy, in particular his theory of
transcendentalism, in the larger context of the history of philosophy. By relating Carlylean
transcendentalism to politics and to competing political and philosophical doctrines,
transcendentalism’s application to both the theoretical and the practical can be better
understood. The intention was to expose transcendentalism as a political philosophy in disguise
and, as such, something heretofore not applied as an ideology in the context of politics to
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resolve political problems. Carlyle’s account of transcendentalism has relevance and application
to the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle, to Carlyle’s contemporary philosophers John
Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche, and to twentieth-century philosophers such as Jacques Ellul,
Sayyid Qutb, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. On these bases, I also have sought to provide
a normative argument as to why Carlylean transcendentalism should be considered as a
prospective and valid post-liberal ideology in the context of post-liberal philosophers who have
themselves drawn on Carlyle for inspiration in some instances in the twenty-first century.
Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism, as articulated in Sartor Resartus, offers a means
by which political, economic, and religious conflict could be resolved (or at least heavily
mitigated) through the adoption of the philosophy of clothes and the principle of renunciation
derived from such a philosophy. Carlylean transcendentalism mitigates political conflict by
conceiving of non-transcendentalist political ideologies as incommensurable and thus incapable
of achieving consensus because they are inherently fodder for interminable conflict. Such
ideologies are incapable of genuinely embodying comprehensive doctrines, in Rawls’s
conception of them, as a function of manifesting unconsciousness of the philosophy of clothes,
which itself is an ideology that supersedes competitor ideologies because it is Platonic and
views non-transcendentalist and incommensurable ideologies as essentially shadows on the
wall of the Platonic cave.3 Though Carlyle did not explicitly invoke and promote
transcendentalism as an exceptional philosophy in comparison to the limitations inherent in
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other political philosophical accounts, such a promotion of transcendentalism can be made in
the context of Carlyle’s conclusion:
The Dryasdust Philosophisms and enlightened Scepticism of the Eighteenth Century, historical
and other, will have to survive for a while with the Physiologists, as a memorable NightmareDream. All this haggard epoch, with its ghastly Doctrines, and death’s-head Philosophies
“teaching by example” or otherwise, will one day have become, what to our Moslem friends
their godless ages are, “the Period of Ignorance.”4
Carlyle is suggesting--especially in light of and applying his conception of
transcendentalism--that the Enlightenment settled for ascertaining what is merely material and
perceptible by the senses and through science, by resisting and being blind to all that is
mystical, romantic, and transcendental. Carlyle is also suggesting that the Enlightenment is a
passing phase. In such an evolution, the future elevation of enchantment to displace the
disenchantment which the Enlightenment instigated will show the disenchanted age to be a
period of ignorance. It was short-sighted and a period of ignorance because it had no intention
of ascertaining a higher meaning through the symbolism of all that is material and perceptible.
This is an exposition of the philosophical pathway and line of reasoning Carlyle takes to
conclude that what is romantic, mystical, and transcendental automatically occupies a higher
plane than what proverbially are the shadows on the Platonic cave (i.e., all that is merely
material and perceptible).
An inference that may be drawn from Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism is that
political questions that have been ripe for bitter debates between incommensurable sides can
be resolved through ascertaining and adhering to the natural order (a.k.a. reading the
“clothing” of the universe). By doing so, transcendentalism favors minimalism over
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consumerism, nature over mechanism, and spirituality rather than disenchantment. As such, it
should be recognized as a philosophy in opposition to that of Nietzsche’s nihilism. An inference
from this is that the political and ideological clash at the highest level could potentially be
conceived as a choice between Carlyle and Nietzsche rather than, as MacIntyre theorized,
between Aristotle and Nietzsche.5
Carlylean transcendentalism also offers the means by which religious conflict can be
resolved, as incommensurable theologies can be superseded by Carlylean transcendentalism or
provide a common consensus among theological accounts. Escaping the Platonic cave connotes
the adoption of Carlyle’s transcendentalism and becoming a transcendentalist in a manner
compatible with Teufelsdrӧckh in Sartor Resartus. The adoption of transcendentalism portends
the mitigation of economic conflict, as renunciation on the part of all (ie. both wealthy and
poor) is a means to attain a more equitable distribution of resources at the point when
capitalism has developed itself into full capacity (rather than by means of a proletarian
revolution). This illustrates again how Carlylean transcendentalism fulfills a post-liberal solution
the way Marx’s communism promised to, yet failed. Carlylean transcendentalism is shown,
therefore, to be most valuable when it is adopted precisely when liberal democracy and
capitalism have each flourished to their fullest capacities and whose achievements need to be
preserved and sustained by transitioning to post-liberalism. The time at which liberal
democracy and capitalism should transition to post-liberalism is when diminishing returns are
evident in the form of increasing economic inequality and increasing political contention on
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economic, identity-based, and ideological grounds, attributes of the growing instability and
unsustainability of liberalism.
Carlyle recognized that change can take place through people reforming themselves
individually rather than through revolution, so as to yield reform at the collective level. His
political philosophy can be boiled down to this: “To reform a world, to reform a nation, no wise
man will undertake; and all but foolish men know, that the only solid, though a far slower
reformation, is what each begins and perfects on himself.”6 Such a claim can be synthesized
with how Carlyle defines justice as “a thing ever struggling forward; irrepressible, advancing
inevitable; perfecting itself, all days, more and more,--never to be perfect till that general
Doomsday, the ultimate Consummation, and Last of earthly Days.”7 Transcendentalism can
serve as a prospective means by which individuals can reform their lives and strive toward
justice with the knowledge that justice is something that can only be increasingly approximated
but never fully attained.
The post-Cold War era has precipitated the revival of ideological forces of ethnonationalism, far-right and far-left populism, and the resurgence of Islamist jihad, which could
ultimately prove to be as threatening to liberal hegemony as fascism and communism once
were.8 On top of this, the West today looks bereft of ideas and deeply divided, particularly
compared with previous eras such as the era since the discovery of the New World or the Cold
War era.9 Additionally, part of the appeal of liberalism was the promise of progress, but it can
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be asserted that liberalism unleashed the forces of science and technology while divorcing
modernization from the pursuit of substantive shared ends.10 It can be concluded that
liberalism’s weakness lies in its tendency to release human energy and foster individual
freedoms while at the same time failing to guide the forces it unleashes on an international as
well as national scale.11
In beginning the process of articulating the form and shape that post-liberalism would
and should take, Milbank and Pabst are adamant that “above all, there remains a clear need for
a broad popular movement in shaping a politics of the common good—a movement that can
overcome the binaries that divide Western countries and, increasingly, the whole world: young
versus old, owners versus workers, natives versus immigrants, city versus countryside, faithful
versus secular.”12 In the concluding paragraph of The Politics of Virtue, they assert that the
emergence of a religious and metaphysically inspired post-liberal movement may seem
unlikely, but it nevertheless is far less unlikely than any other scenario of non-fascistic
resistance to liberalism.13 In their concluding sentence, Milbank and Pabst invoke Carlyle: “After
all, ‘man’ is, as Thomas Carlyle put it, ‘the missionary of Order.’”14 Such conclusion to a political
philosophy text that is representative of the genesis of a political theory of post-liberalism
provides a launching point to examine Carlyle’s transcendentalism as a candidate to be a
religious and metaphysically inspired post-liberal movement. Carlylean transcendentalism, too,
may be far less unlikely than any other scenario of non-fascistic resistance to liberalism.
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Carlyle’s theory of transcendentalism has the means to offer a revival of the Western
heritage in a new form. Transcendentalism literally and intrinsically retailors incommensurable
and antagonistic “polychromatic” ideologies into a new “monochromatic” and universal
doctrine. Transcendentalism, as such, is post-ideological and embodies post-liberalism.
Liberalism had been assumed to be non-ideological but has proven to be an ideology that has
upheld neutrality as its ideological foundation. Liberalism’s commitment to neutrality has
fostered greater antagonism among conflicting ideologies and theologies with no means of
resolution to the escalation of such conflicts. Moreover, liberalism has set the stage for the
insatiability of consumption and identity politics to flourish in the economic and political
spheres, respectively. I argue that such phenomena are not sustainable and provide further
evidence that liberalism as the enabler is not sustainable. Transcendentalism offers a viable
means of resolving the incommensurable and antagonistic ideologies present in liberal society
while simultaneously preserving the gains that liberal democratic capitalism has precipitated
since the advent of the industrial age. As such, transcendentalism is a prospective “exit ramp”
from liberalism toward a new sociopolitical and economic future.
Michael Touloumtzis provides a compelling account of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus and
Thoreau’s Walden when he remarks that “both of these books are attacks on the status quo,
and they are calls to action as well as calls to understanding.”15 Touloumtzis recognizes the
inherent radicalism of the transcendentalism that Carlyle and Thoreau propose. He concludes
that “both Thoreau and Carlyle face this difficulty in putting forth their arguments: that their
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pronouncements are so far beyond the norms of common thought and expressions that they
are very apt to be misunderstood.”16 Such an insight might explain, at least partially, why
transcendentalism has never penetrated the popular political imagination as a viable and
practical political ideology.
Specifically, Carlyle’s exposition of transcendentalism in Sartor Resartus offers a means
to conceive of it as a sociopolitical ideology that can be compared to the existent and
competitor ideologies of liberalism, Islamism, fascism, and communism. While liberalism
vanquished communism and fascism in the late twentieth century, Carlylean transcendentalism
has attributes that suggest it is a plausible candidate to take up the mantle of hegemony as
post-liberalism. Carlylean transcendentalism can be characterized as post-Islamism in addition
to being post-liberal and can be characterized as a “fifth-way” in reference to liberalism,
Islamism, fascism, and communism. Carlylean transcendentalism can be conceived as a
prospective “end of history” ideology the way liberalism, Islamism, fascism, and communism
have proven themselves incapable of embodying the last stage of political development. As
such, I would argue that transcendentalism has the potential to recast domestic politics in
nation-states globally, as well as the potential to recalibrate international relations.
Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus is political philosophy in disguise. Carlyle unveiled the cryptic
and highly-romanticized claim that a golden age lies beyond the age of liberal democratic
capitalism with the publication of Sartor Resartus in 1833, when modern democracy and
capitalism were only nascent and emerging phenomena. There is evidence to suggest that
Carlyle’s theory has been vindicated: that liberal democratic capitalism would evolve, phoenix-
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like, to give way to a new hegemonic social order over the span of two centuries. As a text that
epitomizes romanticism, Sartor Resartus teaches us that a golden age needs to be conceived of,
theorized, and articulated so that it may then gain popular support and be realized. The idea of
a golden age can serve as a type of Aristotelian telos for a polity to strive to achieve. Such a
golden age need not be rooted in uncompromising dogma but rather application of principles
such as renunciation and mutual solidarity.
Carlyle theorizes that renunciation and mutual solidarity are foundational virtues that
transcendentalism embodies inherently. Mutual solidarity crystallizes as a product of Carlyle’s
romanticist plot construction in Sartor Resartus through the mutually reinforcing premises of 1)
renunciation in the form of annihilation of self and 2) recognition of the universe as clothing
symbolic of a transcendent/divine order. In other words, in the context of Carlyle’s
romanticism, making the most minimal personal claims upon the world and viewing the
universe as universally divine become the most rational positions to take. Renunciation is
rational because the only alternative is to be a slave to one’s otherwise insatiable desires.
Transcendentalism is rational because the alternatives are: 1) to view the universe as
disenchanted and be a nihilist rather than a transcendentalist; 2) to be neither a nihilist nor a
transcendentalist and resort to being a utilitarian, which ostensibly leads one to seek to satisfy
insatiable desires; or 3) to subscribe to an ideology that is not transcendentalism which is
antagonistic and incommensurable to competing ideologies. Teufelsdrӧckh’s views lead to a
grand conclusion that embodies and supports mutual solidarity, a conclusion that theoretically
can be adopted and applied at a personal level, universally, and in the context of politics as an
ideological viewpoint:
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With other eyes too could I now look upon my fellow man; with an infinite Love, an infinite Pity.
Poor, wandering, wayward man! Art thou not tried, and beaten with stripes, even as I am? Ever,
whether thou bear the Royal mantle or the Beggar’s gabardine, art thou not so weary, so
heavy-laden; and thy Bed of Rest is but a Grave. O my Brother, my Brother! why cannot I
shelter thee in my bosom, and wipe away all tears from thy eyes.17
If everyone were to make the most minimal claims on the world and view the world as
universally the embodiment of divinity, each would ostensibly conceive of this vantage point
and adopt this position.
The conscious recognition that Carlylean transcendentalism embodies the identity of
being post-liberal offers a basis for the conscious evolution of liberalism to post-liberalism.
Without such conscious recognition, liberalism would evolve without any formal guidance to a
new and unknown state, likely one defined increasingly by authoritarianism and populism. 18
Transcendentalism offers the means to consciously and formally redirect and evolve liberalism
to a new state so that the hard-fought gains of liberalism may be preserved from
authoritarianism and populism. The rise of populism, authoritarianism, and nationalism globally
should be taken as indicators that the nexus of cash payment is not enough to maintain and
preserve the hegemony of globalized capitalism on either local, national, or global scales.
In the context of the United States, transcendentalism embodies a prospective “thirdway” between increasingly divided and polarized ideologies and political parties and a political
climate guided increasingly by identity politics, racial division, and the economic and urban-vsrural divides. Liberal democratic capitalism has yielded increasing antagonism rather than its
mitigation in the United States in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Since
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disparate and incommensurable ideologies have not been reconciled and there is no evidence
to suggest they can be reconciled, in the absence of reconciliation the only alternative has
shown itself to be a deepening polarization clash until such tension can no longer hold the
political fabric together.
Transcendentalism calls on us to devise a new means to resolve the seemingly
incommensurable and intractable divisions that grip American politics by seeking to reconceive
American politics from its vantage point. For example, which demographic groups in the United
States would be most open to adopting transcendentalism rather than the mutually-polarizing
and antagonistic binary of liberalism and conservatism? Moderates and those not wedded to an
ideology or a political party could potentially be open to the adoption of transcendentalism.
Moreover, youth and “new minorities,” such as Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and
multiracial Americans, could potentially find transcendentalism attractive so as to inaugurate it
as a viable third-way in the context of American politics. This is because these demographic
groups have been shown to demonstrate the least identification with the Democratic and
Republican Parties.19 Such a prospect would reconfigure the demographics of American politics.
A youth movement could potentially support transcendentalism as a third-way to vanquish the
ideological and partisan polarization that has increasingly gripped American politics since the
1960s, polarization that has only precipitated continuously escalating contention that will likely
not be sustainable if civil unrest is viewed as something to be avoided.20
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By drawing on renunciation and mutual solidarity as foundational principles,
transcendentalism’s platform can be devised and proposed so as to inaugurate a new stage in
political development. For example, transcendentalism views mutual solidarity as a necessity to
be eventually adopted within the context of liberal democratic capitalism since the sole nexus
of cash payment is not sustainable in preserving human society and community at either the
local, national, or global levels. The nexus of cash payment as the primary (if not only) universal
nexus of humanity from the advent of the industrial age in the nineteenth century to the
twenty-first century has only grown more frayed as capitalism has increasingly evolved to a
fuller incarnation in the contexts of increasing economic inequality both at national and global
scales.
Liberal democratic capitalism’s hegemony has precipitated consumerism and hyperpluralism in the context of maintaining cash payment as the primary nexus that holds society
together. The insatiability inherent in consumerism as the hegemonic ethos that pervades
economic behavior in the free market illustrates that consumerism is not sustainable. The
growth in the pluralism of incommensurable and irreconcilable ideologies inherently embodies
social dis-integration and the economic nexus can only take the place of shared ideological
solidarity to an extent and only for so long until the economic nexus based on continuously
increasing inequality too disintegrates. The economic nexus cannot hold the social fabric
together in the context of continuously increasing economic inequality and increasing
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ideological pluralism with nothing on the horizon that suggests that such trends will be
reversed.21
Socialism has not proven itself to offer viable solutions to the problems of humanity
being predominantly organized by the nexus of cash payment in the free market and increasing
inequality. This is because socialism fosters class warfare, resentment, and the pursuit of
insatiable material consumption largely in the same fashion capitalism does. Neither capitalism
nor socialism endorse renunciation as an economic virtue that needs to be incorporated at least
to some extent in the context of economic production and consumption. Emerson’s framing,
albeit crude, of how socialists and capitalists are synonymous is applicable in this context.22
Emerson identifies the inherent tension, if not cognitive dissonance, that socialists
embody by being purely non-transcendental materialists much like capitalists embody nontranscendental materialism: “they attack the great capitalist, but with the aim to make a
capitalist of the poor man.”23 An inference from this is that the overcoming of exploitation with
a spirit of renunciation is of an entirely different character from the overcoming of exploitation
with a spirit of greed, which is synonymous to the spirit a capitalist would have. At the time
when capitalism has developed to its fullest post-industrial form, renunciation of the pursuit of
insatiable material consumption at the individual and collective levels and prioritizing the
pursuit of equitable compensation for labor should be prized as valuable economic means of
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preserving the gains made by capitalism since the nineteenth century. In the American
example, the only alternatives to doing such would be continuations of the growth in consumer
and national debts, growth in inequality, and the furtherance of environmental degradation.
Such trends illustrate why renunciation and mutual solidarity could be such valuable and
necessary concepts to apply to free market capitalism as their preservatives.
Renunciation embodies a duality: moderation of consumption and an amelioration of
inequality. It recognizes that infinite economic growth, infinite profit generation, and the
maintenance of exploitation in the context of the maintenance of capitalism as the economic
status quo is not sustainable and ultimately will lead to diminishing returns, runaway inequality,
and environmental degradation. An economy based on the infinite pursuit of economic growth
and consumption is unsustainable. I argue that there needs to be a focus on renunciation,
moderation, and preservation, but this stands wholly contra to capitalism, which only prizes the
infinite advance of consumerism and profits. Renunciation acts as a preservative to sustain the
gains capitalism has generated by “plateauing” the economy at an ideal level so that it does not
eventually become all-consuming and burn itself out through the destructive tendency of
promoting infinite consumption and continuous profit generation for a continuously growing
global population.
Without the adoption of renunciation, mutual solidarity, and equitable compensation
for labor, capitalism is liable to evolve only randomly and naturally in the context of there being
no conscious alteration of values on the part of consumers and producers. Liberal democratic
capitalism is bound to yield diminishing returns precisely because renunciation plays no
economic role in the context of the pursuit of insatiable economic consumption and no political
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role in the context of 1) increasing commitments to incommensurable ideologies on the part of
devoted ideologues with the concomitant unwillingness to comprise, and 2) increasingly
racialized factions premised on racial division and mutually antagonistic ethnocentrisms. These
economic and political constructs, which increasingly form the bedrock of liberal democratic
capitalism, indicate that liberal democratic capitalism has not mitigated but rather precipitated
a “war of all against all.”
In the context of the United States, for example, I will assert that an increasing
population coupled with increasing inequality, alongside the maintenance of cash payment as
the primary nexus that holds the social fabric together, is not sustainable. Renunciation and
mutual solidarity can be consciously adopted as a basis for a new nexus of social relations to
preserve the free market economic system so that it does not eventually burn out and lead to
negative outcomes and externalities such as increasing class warfare (by means of populism
and potentially other means), increasing homelessness, environmental degradation, and
resource depletion. The adoption of renunciation and mutual solidarity preserves the free
market in a manner distinct from socialism, in that it does not support the government as a
third-party engaging in formal wealth redistribution. The challenge lies in the necessity of
maintaining and balancing free market competition while at the same time adding renunciation
so as to attain and ossify an ideal economy. This requires economic actors to balance their need
to be consumers and producers in pursuit of necessary profits with the recognition that
renunciation is necessary to curb exploitation, runaway inequality, and a single-minded pursuit
of consumption. Economic actors who juggle these contradictory demands effectively will
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precipitate a collective economy that approximates one characterized by equity and economic
and social justice.
Renunciation has not played a role in capitalism since it inherently embodies what is
contrary to capitalism’s heretofore blind devotion to continuous and infinite economic
expansion and continuous and infinite profit-making. Neither continuous economic expansion
nor continuous profit-making are sustainable in the context of finite resources and population
growth. This shows how transcendentalism naturally fits as a post-liberal and post-capitalist
ideology and how capitalism’s status-quo is not sustainable. Capitalism was necessary to yield
economic expansion and increase the quality of living on a global scale, but an exit ramp needs
to be taken to maintain and preserve the economy that capitalism has generated since the
nineteenth century. The mitigation of inequality, consumer and national debt, environmental
degradation, and resource depletion inherently can be conceived of as attributes of a golden
age that lies post-capitalism.
The difficulty in conceiving of and realizing post-liberalism is that those who personally
profit the most from liberalism are unwilling to recognize its deficiencies. They are unwilling to
recognize the diminishing returns of a liberal economy and a liberal political system because, in
addition to their personal profits, liberalism is seen as the only alternative to previously failed
illiberal regimes. As Deneen has articulated:
To the extent that liberalism regards itself as a self-healing, perpetual political machine, it
remains almost unthinkable for its apologists to grasp that its failure may lead to its
replacement by a cruel and vicious successor. No serious effort to conceive a humane
postliberal alternative is likely to emerge from the rear-guard defenders of a declining regime.24

24

Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed, 181-182.

347

A consensus with respect to the adoption of Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism
can be valuable and might eventually be necessary so as to assert political will in opposition to
such rear-guard defenders of a declining regime who are essentially analogous to Carlyle’s
conception of “Boa Constrictors.” As Carlyle has said, “but what, except perhaps some such
Universal Association, can protect us against whole meat-devouring and man-devouring hosts
of Boa Constrictors?”25 Carlyle’s conception of transcendentalism provides a means by which
such an association could prospectively form as an alternative to Marx’s conception of a
political revolution. The beginnings of such a “Universal Association” might possibly be
ascertained in the growth of populism globally in the context of the 2010s and illustrate that
transcendentalism has gone unheeded and unrecognized as an alternative approach to
nationalist or Marxist revolutionary populism.
Yet, perhaps the largest question asked in the context of Carlyle’s cryptic political
philosophy in Sartor Resartus remains to be answered: is the “phoenix” real, or when liberal
democratic capitalism has reached full capacity, can it somehow sustain itself and not naturally
evolve to a new stage in human political development? While preparing a final draft of this
thesis, the coronavirus pandemic engulfed the globe. The ramifications of the pandemic on the
stability of the world order, which had increasingly been defined by globalization, free market
capitalism, and technology, are yet undetermined. It cannot be disputed that globalization
enabled and facilitated the coronavirus pandemic, as coronavirus was only able to spread as a
function of the global transportation infrastructure and high level of global travel made possible
by the modern capitalist economy only increasingly coming into its full form. The pandemic is
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causing unprecedented economic decay on the global level and illustrates that the global
economy is not invulnerable to irregularities whose negative impact may be exacerbated with
the vast scope of the global economy. Such a catastrophe, the scale of which has not been
witnessed since World War II, could potentially yield a transcendentalist awakening and a
concomitant diminution of the hegemony of non-transcendentalist materialism. An elevation of
nature, spirituality, and renunciation could potentially be within reach as a function of the
pandemic instigating a phoenix of the global order. But that, of course, is yet to be determined.
The coronavirus pandemic may signify only a minor tremor that allows for the maintenance of
globalized capitalism for a longer period.
The natural evolution of political economy can perhaps be said to fit under the same
purview as Carlyle’s theory of justice:
An ideal of right does dwell in all men, in all arrangements, actions and procedures of men: it is
to this ideal of right, more and more developing itself as it is more and more approximated to,
that human Society forever tends and struggles. We say also that any given thing either is
unjust or else just; however obscure the arguings and strugglings on it be, the thing in itself
there as it lies, infallibly enough, is the one or the other. To which let us add only this, the first,
last article of faith, the alpha and omega of all faith among men, That nothing which is unjust
can hope to continue in this world.26
It has been my intention to consider and construct Carlyle’s philosophy with a normative aim of
realizing justice more fully. At a minimum, Carlyle’s conception of social justice, as an
evolutionary project continuously unfolding, may be the ideal reassurance.
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